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ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to examine the claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' 
within the context of international society with specific reference to Singapore, Malaysia 
and Indonesia during the last twenty years. Prominent leaders of these three countries 
have claimed that they have distinctive values and cultures such as Confucian values, 
`Asian values' and Pancasila values which support their own brand of democracy, the 
so- called `Asian democracy', Pancasila democracy or a soft -authoritarian system. It has 
been argued by some Western critics, media and policy makers that such claims have 
been used by these authoritarian leaders mainly to justify and legitimise their harsh 
policies towards opposition groups, the media and academics. This justification, it is 
argued, has strengthened the existing authoritarian regimes and instigated the emergence 
of such regimes in Southeast Asia. 
This thesis, however, shows that the intentions behind the claims of 'Asian 
values' and `Asian democracy' are more complicated than these critics have presumed. 
Apart from the fact that the claim of cultures and values can become a place where the 
leaders of the three governments can reject emerging pressures and demands for 
democratisation, the claim of `Asian values' has also been used to transform traditional 
cultures and values to the needs of a capitalist economy and the management of modern 
government. In the three countries studied, leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir 
Mohamad argue that people have to change some of their traditional cultures and 
customs that are incompatible, and to maintain those which are suitable, with the 
demands for progress and competitiveness within the global economy and modern state. 
The assertion about the distinctiveness and superiority of `Asian values' and 
`Asian democracy' over `Western values' and liberal democracy has also sometimes 
emerged. For critics of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy', this assertion has been 
seen as an attack on Western political institutions and thus drawing a strict line between 
an `Asian political system' and `Western liberal systems'. This thesis, however, shows 
that this assertion is basically product of domestic politics, and follows an objective 
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which is particularly aimed at building a national identity and a sense of pride in their 
own values and cultural systems and for their nation in general. In this sense, the claims 
of `Asian democracy' reflect a certain confidence within the elites in the countries 
studied about the durability and legitimacy of their political and economic system in 
facing challenges from within and without their societies. This leads to a demand for a 
recognition as actors equal with Western states, and for a right to set their own political 
and economic agendas to solve challenges and problems faced by their society in a 
better way than that which has been managed within Western liberal democratic and 
capitalist economic system. 
The claims of `Asian values' which supports specific forms of 'Asian 
democracy', however, neither offer an alternative to Western liberal democracy nor 
challenge the existing norms and values in international society. In terms of the 
philosophical content of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy', the leaders claiming 
`Asian values' suggest a need for adaptation, selection and adjustment of Western 
values before they are applied in their social and political context. They emphasise the 
importance of prioritising one value over another, and attempt to eradicate the excesses 
of `too much' individual freedom and liberal ideas such as is happening, in their view, 
in Western countries. In its development, the claims of `Asian values' and `Asian 
democracy' promulgated particularly by some prominent figures such as Lee Kuan 
Yew, Mahathir Mohamad and Soeharto, are prevented from becoming a hegemonic 
discourse, because they have been contested within certain elite circles and by 
significant numbers of opposition groups as well as influential groups of university 
academics and students. 
Together with the belief that liberal notions of democracy need to be adapted 
and adjusted, there have been common agreements both within the government and 
society that government power should be checked and limited, while on the other hand 
they also believe that the government should be able to maintain political stability and 
apply the principles of `good government'. The government and many groups in 
society, however, differ on how such a good and strong government could be achieved. 
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There have been growing demands within society that such a good government has to 
rely on stronger control of the government from within society by giving people more 
space for political dialogues and by giving them more say within parliament. On the 
other hand, there is still a belief on behalf of these governments that the opening up of 
the political system may be detrimental to the stability and economic achievements 
gained so far. This tension has become a pattern dominating the debate around demands 
for democracy within these countries. The solution to this problem will determine the 
forms of political systems in those countries in the future. 
Given this complex feature behind the claims of `Asian values' and `Asian 
democracy', in the discussion of democracy in international relations, this thesis 
suggests that it is necessary to consider a broader perspective in promoting democracy 
and democratisation than that which mainly focuses on the expansion of a liberal 
democracy model. Given the fact that order in the international society depends on how 
norms and values are shared and adapted by its members, efforts to inculcate norms of 
emerging universal values such as democracy and human rights need to pay attention to 
the phenomenon and conditions surrounding the emergence of the claims of 'Asian 
values' and 'Asian democracy'. Western liberal states as core members of international 
society need to pay attention to cultures and values living and circulating within non - 
liberal countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia before promoting a model 
of democracy as a standard model or a standard of civilisation in international society. 
The claims should be considered as part of a dialogue process designed to achieve new 
shared values and norms in international society. They should not necessarily be seen as 
challenging the effort to find the norms and values, since they neither offer a substantial 
challenge nor reflect a permanent phenomenon. These countries are still struggling to 
locate the best form of a democratic system which can appropriately represent the 
interests of the whole nation just as the leaders of their independent movements had 
also struggled to establish a legitimate rational political and cultural basis in the early 
years of the independence of these countries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For a short period following the end of the Cold War and the triumph of liberal 
democracy over communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, a new optimism 
about the diffusion of democracy in Third World countries dominated the thinking of 
both Western intellectuals and policy makers. Some intellectuals in the West renewed 
their interest in looking at the conditions supporting transitions to democracy in the 
Third World.t As well, Western policy makers showed particular interest in linking their 
official state policies, such as aid and economic cooperation, to progress towards 
democracy in the Third World.2 Growing demands for democratic government, 
followed by pressures from some international organisations such as the United Nations, 
and regional organisations such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) in South 
America, have emerged widely in the post Cold War era.3 
However, many Third World leaders remain uncomfortable with these renewed 
interests. As in the past, being faced by various criticisms and demands from Western 
governments and international aid organisations, many leaders, for example, some from 
ASEAN countries as well as China, stand firm in their rejection of the Western model of 
democracy. Their main stated objection to Western policies is the belief that each 
country has its own unique set of problems.4 Furthermore, these leaders have generally 
argued that each country must develop its own characteristics of democracy in 
accordance with its own social and cultural values and economic needs. They have also 
asserted the right of independent sovereign nations to determine their own style of 
See, among others, Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave, Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
Adrian Leftwich, `Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World', Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1993, pp. 605 -606; About the development of US policy on democracy 
and human rights, see, for example, Harry Harding, `Promoting Human Rights in Asia: American 
and Australian Approaches', in Roger Bell, Tim McDonald and Alan Tidwell (eds.), Negotiating 
the Pacific Century, The "new Asia ", the United Stated and Australia (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 
1996), pp. 268 -294. 
s See, for an example, Thomas M. Franck, `The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance', 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 86, No. 1, January 1992, pp. 46 -91. 
° Amyn B. Sajoo, Pluralism in `Old Societies and New States', Emerging ASEAN Contexts 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Occasional Paper No. 90, 1994), pp. 70 -77. 
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democracy in accordance with the above factors. Socio- cultural conditions in the Third 
World, as well as the sovereign state system that allows `self -determination', therefore, 
seem to have acted as a barrier to Western pressures. 
In three countries of Southeast Asia; Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia (during 
Soeharto's government), the criticism has even given rise to a reaction which seeks to 
strengthen their `Asian democracy'.5 Leaders of these countries have put forward their 
own particular models of democracy, which lean more towards the authoritarian model 
that has been employed at certain times in some Newly Industrialised Countries 
(Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea). They have generally embraced a strong state and 
government role in managing economic growth, rather than leaning towards the Western 
liberal- democracy model.6 
So the optimism described at the beginning of this introduction confronts a 
different reality when faced with the enunciation of certain particular styles of 
democracy. So far the debate concerning `Asian values', `Asian democracy', `Western 
values' and `liberal democracy' has been informed by the debates between relativism 
and universalism in international society. The universalist argument is that `Asian 
democracy' is only a justification used by Southeast Asian authoritarian regimes to 
avoid the demand for democratisation, defined generally as liberal democracy. The 
claims are seen as a justification by some leaders to counter a growing demand for 
democratisation within their countries. In contrast, the relativist argument is in line with 
the proponents of `Asian democracy' who argue that `Asian democracy' has a 
significant cultural foundation in Southeast Asian countries making it a natural 
phenomenon for these countries. It argues that Asian cultural characteristics are of 
`Asian Democracy', here, refers to forms of democracy claimed by leaders of Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Singapore as being different from those in the Western liberal democracy standards. Indeed, 
there are no clear -cut concepts of `Asian democracy', hut as will be discussed later, there are some 
parallel measures taken by those leaders to justify and make their forms of democracy acceptable. 
James Walsh, `Asia's Different Drum', Time, June 14, 1993, pp. 28 -34; see also, The Economist, 
December 9th, 1995, pp. II -12; Aryeh Neier, `Asia's Unacceptable Standard', Foreign Policy, 
Vol. 92, Fall 1993. 
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paramount significance in explaining the persistence of the authoritarian style of 
government in some Southeast Asian countries. 
This thesis does not attempt to resolve the debate; nor does it support one of the 
above positions. Rather it is an attempt to go beyond the debate by trying to examine 
why and how the claims of 'Asían democracy' have become manifest in three Southeast 
Asian countries: Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Such scrutiny could help to 
determine how far the claims of a distinctive model of democracy --what we might label 
`Asian democracy' - can be justified. Hence a fruitful approach to issues concerning 
democracy and democratisation in these countries and its implications for international 
society can be examined. 
In contrast to the above debates focusing on relativism versus universalism, I 
argue that the claims of `Asian democracy' have to do with identity politics. They 
reflect a long effort by the countries studied to adapt ideas of democracy and the modern 
state from the West to their local and cultural contexts. The leaders of these countries 
attempted to ensure that whatever model of democracy they adopt, they should be part 
of the political life of their own society. This kind of political enterprise to invent a 
suitable form of democracy is an unfinished process since it has been contested within 
the societies themselves and, therefore, it cannot be seen as detrimental to the evolving 
norms of democracy and human rights in international society. It should be mentioned, 
however, that the above claims derive from the need of these countries for recognition 
as actors equal with other Western states in international society. 
Before elaborating upon the `Asian democracy' debate, some conceptual 
definitions need to be made. Firstly, I attempt to clarify certain conceptual problems 
regarding democracy, democratisation, `Asian democracy' and international society. I 
also explain in this part the scope of this study and the reasons for choosing the three 
Southeast Asian countries as case studies. Secondly, I outline the subsequent chapters of 
the study. 
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A. SOME CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS 
Democracy has often been described as `an essentially contested concept'. Both 
in Western societies where the concept originated and in Asian societies where the 
concept gained ground at the beginning of the 20th century, there are no fixed 
definitions and models of democracy. However, it seems that there are some basic ideas 
and principles of democracy that tend to be accepted in many parts of the world. As will 
be discussed, these basic ideas and principles will be used as a starting point to 
understand the interpretation of democracy that has emerged in claims of `Asian 
democracy'. As the ideas are contested, the study examines also the counter claims from 
oppositional groups within the countries under discussion. I will also develop briefly a 
concept of international society to explain the international context for the claims of 
`Asian democracy'. 
1. Defining Democracy and Democratization 
Liberal democracy is one aspect of modernity that national Ieaders of the 
countries under discussion have had to deal with since their struggle for independence. 
The ideas of liberalism, which frame the liberal democracy model, inspired the 
nationalist liberation movements struggling for independence. This is evident in their 
efforts to build their nations to meet international standards as independent nations 
under the principle of sovereignty in an international society. Ideas of liberalism emerge 
clearly in the form of the freedom of Third World nations in international society.$ 
As will be discussed, some common ideas of liberal democracy have influenced 
the visions of democracy in the countries studied. The liberal democratic ideas and 
Stephanie Lawson, `Cultural Relativism and Democracy: Political Myths about "Asia' and the 
"West ", in Richard Robison (ed.), Pathways to Asia : the Politics of Engagement (St Leonards, 
N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 1996). 
Christopher Hughes, `China and Liberalism Globalised', Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1995, pp. 428. 
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norms which have been universalised particularly after the collapse of Communist 
systems in Eastern Europe have provided and brought `a political lexicon's such as 
freedom, good government and openness commonly demanded within Southeast Asian 
countries. In this thesis, I hope to be able to trace how far these ideas have influenced, 
adjusted and been used both by the governments and their opponents in their ideological 
discourses. It remains to be seen to what extent the discourses surrounding these ideas 
have, in turn, influenced the form of democracy in the case study countries. 
Since the birth of the countries studied, it is worthwhile noting that the ideas of 
freedom and human rights originating from Western colonial countries influenced the 
independence movements and the fledgling post -independence governments. These 
leaders believed that independence presented them with the opportunity to realise 
human dignity as free people. In terms of its moral ends, this belief is congruent with 
concepts of democracy.10 For leaders of some Third World countries, concepts of 
democracy have similar moral ends. As C. B. Macpherson argues, the ultimate goals in 
Third World concepts of democracy are 
to provide the conditions for the full and free development of the essential human 
capacities of all the members of the society. They (concepts of democracy) differ 
in their views as to what conditions are needed, and as to how they must move to 
achieve those conditions'." 
In light of Macpherson's argument, it is, therefore, in terms of process to realise 
moral ends of democracy that many countries have different approaches. In Western 
liberal democratic experiences, to realise the moral ends of democracy was to liberalise 
the state. A liberal democratic system was essential to meet the demands from a society 
Takashi Inoguchi and Edward Newman, Introduction: `Asian Values' and Democracy in Asia, 
Proceeding of a Conference held on 28 March 1997 at Hamamatsu, Shizuoka, Japan, organised by 
the Shizuoka Prefectural Government and the Organizing Committee of the Asia- Pacific Forum; 
see < http:// www. unu. edu/ hq /unupress /asian- values.html >. 
0 C. B. Macpherson argues that there are three concepts of democracy. The first one is the liberal 
democracy model applied in the West, the second one incorporates modern communist concepts 
and the final one is neither liberal nor communist but represented by `newly independent 
underdeveloped countries', see C. B. Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy, the Massey 
Lectures (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 36; Thanks to Khoo Bo Teik, a political scientist 
from the Malaysia University of Science, who draws my attention to this Macpherson's book. 
Ibid., p. 37. 
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which had liberalised many aspects of its cultural, social, and economic Iife, within a 
liberal -capitalist economic system.'2 
David Held argues that the concept of democracy has been privileged in Western 
political life because `it offers - in theory at least - a form of politics and life in which 
there are fair and just ways of negotiating values and value disputes'.13 Such a form 
offers ways to resolve and relate different values through a political dialogue.14 hi this 
sense, it is preferable as a form of government because of its `intrinsic fairness' and its 
`overall good consequences' for a society.'5 Democracy, according to Held, is a key 
word that can 'Iegitimately frame and delimit' the competing ideologies and interests in 
a state. 16 
In the Western liberal countries, the spirit of the above ideas generally 
necessitates the presence of two main criteria.'? The first criterion is equality. It is 
important in a democratic country that citizens have an equal opportunity to participate 
in the appointment of public officials, principally via general elections. The second 
criterion is that `ultimate political power is vested with the people of a state'. It is the 
right of citizens to choose a government which can administer the country and pursue 
their interest. The legitimation of government, in this case, depends on citizen 
agreement.'s 
To effect the materialisation of this spirit of democracy, the state has 
traditionally advocated providing a number of 'para- political institutions', practices and 
structures which can guarantee and preserve individual rights and equality. There has 
12 (bid., pp. 5 -11. 
13 David Held, `Liberalism, Marxism, and Democracy', in Stuart Hall, David Held and Tony 
McGrew (eds.), Modernity and Its Futures (Cambridge: The Open University Press, 1994), p. 41. 
° Ibid. 
s David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer, `Introduction', in David Copp, Jean Hampton, 
and John E. Roemer (eds.), The Idea of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), p. 4. 
16 Held, op. cit., pp. 41 -42. 
17 N. Ganesan, Pluralisme Culturel et Potentiel Unificateur de La Democratic en Asie du Sud -est' 
(Cultural Pluralism and the Unifying Potential of Democracy in Southeast Asia, translated by N. 
Ganesan), Revue Internationale de Politique Comparee, Vol. 2, No. 2, September 1995, pp. 301- 
317. 
18 Ibid. pp. 301 -303. 
7 
been a conventional assumption that the roles of the `para- political institutions' have to 
cover what is defined as a minimalist definition of democracy. Based on the standards in 
the liberal democracy model, such institutions should provide and guarantee 
competition, political participation, respect for human rights - particularly civil and 
political liberties,19 and civilian control over the military (which is especially relevant in 
the Indonesian case),20 as basic conditions for a democratic system. To elaborate briefly, 
competition in this perspective should be meaningful in so far as individuals and 
organised groups can compete freely with each other for political office. Political 
participation in the selection of leaders and policies should include all adults. Basic civil 
and political liberties must include freedom of expression, freedom to form and join 
organisations, and freedom of the press. Finally, civilian control over the military, in 
this perspective should, at least, be able to restrict military intervention in politics.21 
In terms of the above definition, democratisation, defined as process, means: 
`the extension of competition, participation and human rights to an increasing 
number of institutions, issues and people that were not previously governed by 
these democratic principles as well as the process whereby civilians take control 
over the military or at least restrict the military's willingness and capacity to 
intervene in politics.'22 
The elements of democracy outlined above, particularly competition, 
participation, protection of human rights, and civilian control over the military, which 
can engender political dialogue, can be found in many ideologies and values. These 
ideologies and values may contribute their forms of democracy. 
In the West, as Giovanni Sartori has highlighted, the above ideas and standards 
of democracy are formulated in liberal democratic constitutions. The standards are 
y Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Upset (eds.), Democracy in Developing 
Countries, Vol. 2, Africa (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1988), p. xvi; Georg Sorensen, Democracy and 
Democratization (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 13; Lawson, op. cit.; and Anders Uhlin, `The 
Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia: An Actor -Structure Approach', Scandinavian Political 
Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1995, p. 134. 
20 T..L. Karl, `Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America', Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, 1990, 
p. 2; and Uhlin, op. cit., p. 134. 
21 Uhlin, ibid., pp. 134 -136. 
22 Ibid., p. 135. 
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important because they protect people from the abuse of power by a government.23 The 
desirability of democracy lies in its rule of law, or in Sartori's words, in its `harm - 
avoidance rule', which can protect people from being imprisoned, tortured and killed 
because their values are different from those of their government.24 
In many Third World countries, the standards have been sometimes written in 
constitution but its applications and interpretations depend on the will of the 
government which often use cultures as justification. Attention only to the forms, 
principles and procedures of democratic government is, therefore, not enough. The 
standards may be clearly stated in constitutions, but their applications can be different 
from the written articles on the constitutions. In many cases, they have been interpreted 
to fit different regimes' designs of democracy and legitimacy. It is often that, in the 
designs enunciated by regimes, the standards have been translated and given new 
meanings,Z5 particularly by relating them to ideas which have had their roots in the 
countries under discussion, and some have been formulated in formal ideologies such as 
Pancasila, Rukunegara and Confucianism 26 The regimes under discussion, 
furthermore, have claimed that their designs of democracy are suitable versions of 
democracy considering their complex political, economic and social problems, and so 
23 Giovanni Sartori, `How Far Can Free Government Travel ?', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, No. 3, 
pp. 102 -103. 
24 Ibid., p. 103. 
25 For a brief discussion of the adaptation and evolution of democracy in Asia, see, Chan Heng Chee, 
`Democracy: Evolution and Implementation, An Asian Perspective', in Robert Bartley (et. al), 
Democracy and Capitalism, Asian and American Perspectives (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies - ISEAS, 1993), pp. 1 -25. 
26 The standards in the liberal democracy model are used as a point of departure because these 
standards have become the elements with which national leaders of the countries under discussion 
have had to deal since their struggle for independence. Even the ideas of liberalism, which frame 
the liberal democracy model, have inspired the national liberation movements to gain 
independence. This has materialized in their efforts to build their nations to meet international 
standards as independent nations under the principle of sovereignty in international society. Ideas 
of liberalism, as Christopher Hughes argues, emerge clearly in the form of the freedom of a nation 
in international society. See, Hughes, `China and Liberalism Globalised', Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1995, pp. 425 -445. The liberal democracy model as a 
mechanism of government, however, has evolved in different ways. As Chan Heng Chee has 
explained, it has to be adapted and modified to the local context `to suit the contours of the host 
setting' and so cannot be transplanted directly. See, Chan, op. cit., p. 7. 
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have discredited other attempts within their societies to interpret and define democracy 
in ways that threaten their hegemonic position. 
The emergence of the Iocal frameworks and designs of democracy set up by the 
governments shows that the above forms and common standards of democracy based on 
liberal democracy cannot be easily transplanted to non -liberal societies in Third World 
countries.27 In some Southeast Asian countries, the ideas of democracy have been given 
different interpretations when they intersected with local conditions. Democracy might 
mean a strong commitment to people power such as `people's democracy' or Demokrasi 
Rakyat interpreted by Mohammad Hatta and it could be a `guided democracy' as 
enunciated by Soekarno in Indonesia.28 It can also be translated as `tutelary democracy' 
where government leaders are trusted by people to guide society such as in the cases of 
Malaysia and Singapore.29 
In these newly independent countries, the ideas of democracy had another 
function. It `came as a revolution against the liberal capitalist society and state'.30 
Leaders who organised popular independent movements in those countries claimed that 
they represented the interests of common and oppressed people. Many of these leaders 
received popular support and some of their pre- independence ideas were democratic in 
nature.31 They claimed that their leadership transcended class, and the government 
formed after gaining the independence was `rule in the interests of the whole people'.32 
In this context, those leaders seemed to interpret democracy in a manner similar 
with its original meaning in the West, as `rule by common people, the plebeians' and 
`the lowest and largest class'.33 Their traditional values and cultures have sometimes 
n Even among Western countries, as Tocqueville argues, American democracy cannot be 
transplanted to France because of the differences in social, geographical, and historical 
circumstances between the two countries. See, Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
(New York: Mentor Books, 1961), particularly chapter on Author's Introduction, pp. 26 -37. 
28 Anthony Milner (ed.), Comparing Culture (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 153. 
29 Ibid., p. 150; see also Bilahari Kausikan, `Governance That Work', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, 
No. 2, 1997. 
30 Macpherson, op. cit., p. 5. 
31 Ibid., p. 23. 
32 Ibid., p. 5. 
33 According to Macpherson, the notion of democracy in pre -industrial Western society was 
democracy `as rule by and for the oppressed people', see Macpherson, ibid., p. 24. 
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been mobilised to reject many features of liberal democracy and to support the claim of 
the government as the vanguard of common people and general will. In this situation, a 
development of one single dominant party which could represent the whole elements 
and interests within society was often adopted, whereas opposition parties were 
generally regarded as threatening the interest of the whole society and even as close to 
treason.34 There has also been an emphasis on the importance of a strong leadership and 
strong government that can manage the economy and uphold the unity of the nation. 
The situation where there was one dominant party which had a hegemonic 
power, however, changes. In their development, government parties in Third World 
countries cannot as easily claim to represent general will of people as they might be able 
to do so during the early days of independence. Opposition groups emerge and contest 
any hegemonic attempt to maintain such an idea. The idea that there is a general will 
within society which can be represented only by a single party or a government party, 
cannot be accepted any more. Cultures such as hierarchy and harmony which aIIow such 
a view to circulate for so long have gradually faded. Views such as individual freedom, 
the liberal state, and political competition, all of which seem to be unnatural within 
these countries in the early independent years are incrementally adapted to demands for 
more freedom and democracy, particularly after the emergence of a certain level of 
middle class within such societies. 
In this light, there has always been a continuous transformation of democratic 
ideas. Viewed as a process, democracy, as Robert Rothstein argues, means, 
... more than a set of procedures to elect accountable leader; it is also a set of 
values and beliefs -a culture- that gives real meaning to these procedures. Without 
an underlying culture of democracy, the procedures can be misused to disguise the 
continuation of authoritarian rule' .35 
Elements of both `old' and `new' elements of democracy are evident in 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Some undemocratic values such as feudalism 
sa Ibid., p. 26. 
35 Robert L. Rothstein, On the Meaning of Democracy in the Third World', in Kanti P. Bajpai and 
Harish C. Shukul (eds.), Interpreting World Politics: Essays for A. P. Rana (New Delhi: Thousand 
Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1995), p. 293. 
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common in their traditional cultures have an impact on the way the leaders are treated 
and thus the way they manage their countries. For example, one aspect feudalism which 
respects leaders unconditionally, leads to authoritarian attitudes of the governments in 
the countries. On the contrary, many principles of modern democracy which were 
unknown in a traditional culture such as the concept of the modem state have changed 
traditional views on people, authority and power.36 
In the current forms of democracy in some Asian countries, one notable form 
looks like a hybrid political system. It is a hybrid political system composed of Western 
democratic and authoritarian styles of government. In the words of Robert Rothstein, the 
hybrid system of government is a `government of and for the people but not by the 
people, a restricted form of limited democracy that might be acceptable to some leaders 
who are genuinely committed to political and economic development'.37 Such a hybrid 
system which combines an authoritarian and democratic style of politics can even be 
identified in the political system in Taiwan which has been widely acknowledged as 
having transformed itself from an authoritarian government to a liberal democratic 
system such as in the West.38 
It is based on the above transformations of ideas of democracy that this thesis 
will discuss the claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy'. The above 
formulations and developments of ideas of democracy illustrate a number of valuable 
aspects necessary to the consideration of democracy in the three case studies. 
Independence movements and the governments formed after that, were inspired by the 
36 In Javanese cultures, for example, there is no democracy in the Western sense. People are the 
object of the King or Sultan. They depend on the King's order to take actions. Power is gained not 
mainly through a general election but by gaining a metaphysical power both from descent and from 
performing certain rituals. Interview with Isbodroini Suyanto MA, a lecturer of the University of 
Indonesia, November 1996; In the view of Giovanni. Sartori, the transformation process of 
democracy can also be seen as a part of tensions between the value and fact of democracy. Sartori 
identifies that there is always tensions between democracy as an ideal or what it ought to be and as 
a reality in every day life. Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited (New Jersey: 
Chatham House Publishers, 1987), pp. 7 -8. 
37 Robert L. Rothstein, On the Meaning of Democracy in the Third World', in Kanti P. Bajpai and 
Harish C. Shukul (eds.), Interpreting World Politics: Essays for A. P. Rana (New Delhi: Thousand 
Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1995), p. 297. 
R L.H.M Ling and Chih -yu Shih, `Confucianism with a Liberal Face: The Meaning of Democratic 
Politics in Postcolonial Taiwan', The Review of Politics, Vol. 60, No. 1, Winter 1998. 
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idea of freedom as in liberal democracy. At that time, there had been claims circulating 
among national leaders of the countries that they represented the people and the general 
will. In the experiences of these countries, however, the ideas of democracy have been 
translated into many forms, some forms have even moved away from the forms of 
democracy in liberal Western countries. The current forms of democracy have been 
justified by the governments of the three countries by pointing to culture and historical 
conditions. These justifications, however, have been contested by other interpretations 
of democracy, especially from opposition groups. 
In addition to this, it is important to highlight problems with democratisation 
within these countries. In this thesis the problem of democratisation, is seen not only in 
terms of the extension of competition, participation and civil rights in institutions, but 
also regarding the actual realisation of minimal rights, the commitment of leaders to 
empower citizens and the appropriateness of political parties and other political 
institutions to bridge the gap between state and society. In other words, there should be 
efforts to bridge the gap between the value and the fact of democracy in real political 
life. In the words of Held, this is conceived as a `double -sided phenomenon' including 
the reformation of the state and the restructuring of civil society. Both state and society 
need to be inter- dependently transformed in the democratisation process.39 
2. `Asian Democracy' and `Asian Values' 
Since the independence of Southeast Asian countries, `Asian democracy' has 
arisen as a phenomenon meshing modern ideas of democracy with the local context. It 
was not long after its independence that Indonesia chose a multi -party system. After 
gaining their independence, Malaysia and Singapore inherited a British model of liberal 
democracy. However, in both countries security and sedition laws were introduced by 
the respective governments which differentiated their political system from the British 
system. In addition, Malaysia instituted an American -style system of judicial review. 
39 Held, op. cit., pp. 43 -44. 
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These countries have for a long time been searching for the best political system with 
which to support the dynamics of their societies. However, I will focus on the 
emergence of `Asian democracy' in the last ten to twenty years, during which time it has 
impacted significantly on the discussion of democracy in the post -Cold War setting. 
The terms `Asian style democracy' or `Asian democracy' will be used 
interchangeably in this study. The term `Asian democracy' was originally enunciated by 
some Western academics to refer to a style of democracy operating in some Asian 
countries -a style that possessed notable and significant differences from liberal 
democracy in the West.40 `Asian democracy' is based on an assumption that certain 
cultural values which might be labelled as `Asian values' have supported the 
development of a distinctive Asían style of democracy.41 The claims of 'Asian values', 
therefore, mean that `Asians' have specific values which support the claims of `Asian 
democracy'. The values commonly claimed involve among others, hard work, respect 
for authority, harmony, placing the community before society and social discipline. 
Some critics have claimed that the terms `Asian democracy' and `Asian values' 
are cultural constructs used by authoritarian Asian governments to justify their 
authoritarian styles. In this context, they are understood as political and ideological 
discourses promoted by the state. What I refer to as `Asian democracy' in this study, 
however, is broader than the above common assumption suggest. It includes significant 
discourses of democracy not limited to the claims promoted by government, particularly 
those which may impact on the debate of the claims of `Asian democracy'. Still, to a 
4° See for example, Clark D. Neher, `Asian Style Democracy', Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 11, 1994; 
Steven J. Hood, `The Myth of Asian -Style Democracy', Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 9, September 
1998; L.H.M Ling and Chih -yu Shih, op. cit. Other academics do not use the term `Asian 
democracy' directly but refer to the same style of democracy. They use, for example, terms such as 
`soft authoritarian'. See, among others, Francis Fukuyama, `Asia's Soft- Authoritarian Alternative', 
New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2, Spring 1992 and `The Illusion of Exceptionalism', 
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 3, July 1997; Denny Roy, `Singapore, China and "Soft 
Authoritarian" Challenge', Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 1, November 1994; and Meredith Woo - 
Cumings, `The "New Authoritarianism" in East Asia', Current History, Vol. 93, No. 587, 
December, 1994. 
41 According to Richard Robison, Asian leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew, Mahathir Mohamad and 
Soeharto claims that "`Asian' models of political and social organisation embody the principles of 
harmony, hierarchy and consensus ". See, Richard Robison (ed.), Pathways to Asia : the politics of 
engagement (St. Leonards, N.S.W. : Allen & Unwin, 1996). 
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large degree `Asian democracy' has become a state -created political game using cultural 
and ideological symbols to sustain power, which can then be directed against an 
opposition inspired by, according to the state elites, `Western liberal democracy' and 
other opposition movements within their countries. These opposition discourses should 
be included among the contending discourses of democracy starting from the 
independence of the countries studied. 
State -constructed democracy will be used as a starting point. The thesis will 
evaluate how this has been constructed, what kind of discourses are used to promote its 
necessity, why liberal democracy is chosen as one target in identity building and how far 
this discourse has gained hegemony. Having considered these issues I will examine the 
further question of what alternative discourses exist, how they have developed, and how 
they are discredited by the dominant government discourse of democracy. 
3. International Society 
Given the complex processes behind the adaptations and challenges to ideas of 
liberal democracy within the countries studied, it is necessary to examine how far the 
ideas of liberal democracy as a part of a broader expansion of other Western values, 
norms and cultures have spread over non -Western countries. Apart from helping to 
understand how far the ideas of Iiberal democracy have been adapted and challenged, 
the focus on the spread of liberal democratic ideas may also help to explain to what 
extent local frameworks of democracy enunciated by some leaders of the countries 
studied have impacted on the search for `shared values' and norms of democracy in 
international relations. 
To explain the above adaptations and challenges to liberal democracy and its 
implications to international relations, I will use the concept of international society. 
Compared to other concepts of order in International Relations, this concept offers a 
more sophisticated explanation of the claims of `Asian democracy' because it discusses 
values, norms and cultures in international relations. According to Andrew Linklater, 
international society is a progressive concept because it incorporates elements of diverse 
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cultures and norms into international relations.42 Political communities with different 
cultures and values attempt to find practices of international order which can provide a 
framework for their mutual co- existence.43 According to Ole Waever, international 
society also has an interesting place in international relations since it differs from 
realism and liberalism. This difference is evident in that international society uses 
historical aspects as a part of its analysis.44 An international society is not simply 
assumed to be based on common interest and hierarchy of power as in the international 
system. It recognises the importance of shared cultures as one of its core principles. 
The claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' can be understood as a 
response from non -Western countries to the expansion of the original international 
society from the West. One response to the expansion took place in the form of a 
challenge to Western norms, cultures and values. Such a challenge has taken place since 
the original Western concept of international society expanded to non -Western 
countries, particularly after the World War II 45 The inclusion of Third World countries 
in this concept, for example, has resulted in what Hedley Bull called `the revolt against 
the West' 46 
Currently, one such challenge may be seen from the emergence of the claims of 
`Asian values' and 'Asian democracy'. Of particular importance is the claims of three 
Southeast Asian countries: Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia which through their 
leaders, assert that they have a distinctive historical and cultural background to support 
their existing political system. These claims have invited many international responses, 
particularly from Western governments, theorists and commentators. 
42 Andrew Linklater, `Rationalism', in S. Bruchill (ed.), Theories of International Relations (London: 
Macmillan, 1996). 
as Nicholas J. Wheeler, `Guardian Angle or Global Gangster: a Review of the Ethical Claims of 
International Society', Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. I, March 1996, pp. 125 -126. 
44 Barry Buzan, ` >From International Structural Realism and Regime Theory meet the English 
School, International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 3, Summer 1993, p. 328. 
45 Hedley Bull, `The Emergence of A Universal International Society,' in Hedley Bull and Adam 
Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). 
46 Hedley Bull, `The Revolt Against the West', in Bull and Watson (eds.), ibid., pp. 217 -228. 
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4. The Case Studies 
The main reason to choose Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia (until the fall of 
Soeharto on May 1998) is because of the outspokenness of their Ieaders in promoting 
`Asian democracy' over `liberal democracy'. Apart from this, two other considerations 
lead one to choose these countries as case studies. Firstly, these are countries where 
contesting civilisational ideologies, values and cultures, such as those of Hinduism, 
Confucianism, the West and Islam, have shaped political conflicts and bargaining 
throughout their history. 
Secondly, the role of the state in promoting discourses and ideologies to support 
their own style of democracy varies. This is a unique phenomenon since state 
interventions in formatting political platforms for contesting ideologies range from 
those that engage in complete intervention, to doubtful, inconsistent intervention and 
reluctant intervention. As will be shown later, Singapore is a state controlling the design 
and format of political ideologies and values for its community. Indonesia under the 
Soeharto government represented a case where the state had the ambition to control the 
whole range of discourses about democracy by adopting a formal ideology, but failed to 
do so because of the extent of cultural and ideological pluralism in Indonesian society. 
In Malaysia, although political and ideological dialogues and debates among different 
political entities have taken place, the state seems to be reluctant to get involved fully in 
these processes, except where intervention is needed to ensure the survival of the state 
itself. 
B. OUTLINE OF THIS STUDY 
The first chapter of this study critically examines current debates on `Asian 
democracy'. It argues that it is important to go beyond the common debate between 
universalism and relativism if the claims of `Asian democracy' are to be understood 
clearly. The debates promoted by the proponents and critics of `Asian democracy' have 
produced a dichotomy between the `East' and the `West'. In this study, particular 
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attention is given to the way in which some cultural arguments have been used both by 
the proponents and critics of `Asian democracy' to explain the persistence and 
weaknesses of 'Asían democracy'. The cultural argument used by some academics has 
obscured the constructed aspect of culture managed for their political purposes by 
various elites within the three regimes. I then construct a theoretical framework through 
which I elaborate the claims of `Asian democracy'. It argues that the claims and 
promotions of `Asian democracy' constitute an effort by the elites studied to fix a 
certain meaning of democracy for their domestic and international audiences. My points 
of departure to understand this are international society theory, which explains the 
spread of ideas of democracy from the West, and Gramsci's theory of hegemony, which 
shows how power in its disguised forms is applied in societies. 
The second chapter looks at the Singaporean case. There have been attacks on 
the `Western model of democracy' in Singapore. The Singapore government under 
Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong assert that `Asian 
democracy' is defined by specific Asian values and cultures. Initially formulated as 
Confucian values, these are described as superior to Western values and have been 
promoted vigorously among Singaporeans. In contrast to the two other countries studied 
here, the government version of democracy in Singapore is better planned and more 
systematically applied to its people. Its tiny size and small population make it possible 
for the government to control different views and to apply severe sanctions with respect 
to opposition parties and their activities. 
The third chapter discusses the application of `Asian democracy' in Malaysia. In 
contrast to the Indonesian case which is mainly domestic -oriented, the Malaysian 
government under Mahathir Mohamad has promoted an `Asian democracy' by creating 
an outside `Other', that is the Western democratic polity. Mahathir argues that the 
Western style of democracy as inappropriate for Malaysian society because it leads to 
criminality and immorality in people. In Malaysia, however, the government version of 
'Asian democracy' has been contested by other meanings of democracy. Alternatives to 
18 
Mahathir's vision of democracy have emerged among various groups in society 
including opposition parties and other factions within Malay society. 
The fourth chapter looks at Indonesia. `Asian democracy' or what is commonly 
called Pancasila democracy, was set up by the Indonesian New Order regime at its 
inception in 1966. I show how that particular meaning of `Asian democracy' has been 
promoted and naturalised by the New Order government for Indonesians. The 
government achieves this by using historical, ideological and cultural justifications and 
by discrediting other interpretations of democracy as something harmful for 
development and for political stabilisation. In a massive campaign to create a structure 
of appropriate political behaviour for the nation which is untainted by past ideological 
battles, the New Order regime to a certain degree dismissed, or at least narrowed 
significantly, the possibility of dialogue and debate about democracy. Nevertheless, 
alternative perceptions of democracy have challenged the government's position and, to 
a certain degree, triggered the fall of Soeharto in May 1998. 
The fifth chapter attempts to bring together points of similarity and difference in 
establishing `Asian democracy' within these three countries. What conclusions can be 
drawn, how the claims of `Asian democracy' have been justified, why there is a need to 
do so, what consequences have emerged because of the efforts to normalise a particular 
version of democracy within those societies, and how far the society and non- 
governmental powers have been given space to contest the government views, are some 
questions to be answered. All these questions are very important in establishing a 
possible approach by international relations to democracy and democratization. 
Chapter V also includes a section on the implication of `Asian democracy' in 
international society. It critically examines existing approaches to universalizing 
democracy in international relations. To a certain degree, the dominant approach to 
democracy in international relations has been to universalize only a specific 
interpretation of democracy. This approach has been promoted by some Western leaders 
as a contest between democracy and authoritarian models of government. It has been 
argued that such promotion has targeted some Asian leaders. `Asian democracy', as 
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promoted by some leaders in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, is one form of reaction 
toward such an approach, which itself follows the same logic of promoting a particular 
meaning of democracy. This study suggests that an appropriate approach to democracy 
is to move away from such acrimonious debates and work with various democratic 
elements in the societies discussed. 
Chapter I 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO `ASIAN VALUES' 
The aim of this theoretical chapter is to locate a framework which can explain why and 
how the claims of `Asian values' and 'Asian democracy' emerged in Singapore, 
Malaysia and Indonesia. This chapter also attempts to set up a framework to explain 
how far such claims have impacted on the discussion of democracy in international 
relations. 
For the above purposes, this chapter utilises the concepts of hegemony and 
international society. In the concept of hegemony, I focus on a Gramscian approach, 
which helps explain how the governments in the three countries have created and 
socialised their models of democracy as the only platform for political life. To explain 
the impact of the above claims on international relations, T use an international society 
concept, The claims will be located within the debate about norms, values and cultures 
in the school of international society or the English School, which currently gained its 
new significance after the end of the Cold War.' 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Firstly, it discusses some problems 
with current approaches to the claims of 'Asían values' and `Asian democracy'. 
Secondly, it outlines my alternative approach to these claims, with specific reference to 
An international society approach is commonly labeled the English School of International Society 
because it was initially promoted by English -based scholars such as C.A.W. Manning, Martin 
Wight, Hedley Bull, John Vincent and Adam Watson. It offers an alternative to the dominant realist 
(Hobbesian realism) and idealist (Kantian idealism) approach in international relations. The 
pioneer works in this area can be seen in C.A.W. Manning, The Nature of International Society 
(London: University of London, 1962); Martin Wight, Systems of States (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1977); Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, A Study of Order in World Politics, 
(London: Macmillan, 1977); Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International 
Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Bull's Anarchical Society is the most comprehensive 
book and a representative work on International society. The current upsurge of this approach can 
be seen in Richard Shapcott, `Conversation and Coexistence- Gadamer and the Interpretation of 
International Society', Millennium, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1994; Barry Buzan, `From International System 
to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory meet the English School, 
International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 3, Summer 1993; Nicholas J. Rengger, `Culture, Society, 
and Order in World Politics', in John Baylis and N.J. Rengger (eds.), Dilemmas of World Politics, 
International Issues in a Changing world (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), Nicholas J. Wheeler, 
'Guardian Angle or Global Gangster: a Review of the Ethical Claims of International. Society', 
Political Studies, Vol_ 44, No. 1, March 1996. 
21 
Gramsci' s concept of hegemony and a concept of the expansion of international society. 
Thirdly. it outlines the uses of the alternative theoretical approach to the case studies. 
A. PROBLEMS IN THE EXISTING APPROACHES 
Before locating the claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' within the 
context of international society, discussion should focus on some problems with current 
approaches to the claims. 
The understanding of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy', to a certain degree, 
is informed by three common assumptions. The first assumption takes as its starting 
point the so- called `the end of history' thesis.2 This thesis promotes the victory of liberal 
democratic institutions over other forms of political institutions and structures. The 
second assumption endorses the `clash of civilisation' thesis; where the claims are seen 
as a reaction of non -Western cultures to the West. The third assumption attempts to take 
the middle- ground by differentiating between historical cultures which inform the 
existing political systems in Asia and manipulated cultures used by elites to justify their 
power. 
This chapter argues that neither of the first two approaches has adequately 
explained the claims of `Asian values'. They merely explain either internal or external 
factors behind the claims. While I agree with certain points of the third approach, as will 
be shown later, it also needs qualifying since it does not sufficiently consider 
international aspects of the spread of Western ideas. What is needed is an integrated 
approach which can understand both the external and national contexts of the claims for 
the states studied here. 
`The end of history' thesis gains its significance from the collapse of the 
communist systems in Eastern Europe. With the end of these systems, it proposes that 
Western liberal democracy does not have any serious contender.4 This thesis has 
s Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York : Free Press, 1992). 
s Samuel P. Huntington, `The Clash of Civilisations', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993. 
4 Fukuyama, op. cit. 
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informed analyses about the likelihood of such a triumph spreading to authoritarian 
systems in Third World countries.5 Analysis has focused on the changing political and 
economic structures in those countries which has resulted in growing numbers of middle 
class actors demanding democratisation. The failure of democratic ideas to materialize 
in a particular country is, therefore, seen as largely due to the lack of certain necessary 
socio- economic conditions under which these ideas may develop. Lack of a middle class 
is regarded as one important reason for this failure.6 
Furthermore, this approach assumes that the globalization of Western values, 
beliefs and cultures has informed much of the economic success and political changes in 
Asia. Such an assumption has resulted in a `new orientalism' approach to examine the 
importance of Western cultures and values.' New orientalists argue that the reason for 
the East Asian success is Western modernization. According to this view, East Asian 
countries owe the West for their success. The countries have been able to adopt 
elements of the European culture of modernization, such as the Protestant work ethic, in 
their economic activities.8 The success, according to this approach, is part of Western 
civilising forces continuing their anti- Communist modernising mission in the Cold War 
s Lucian Pye, for example, argues that legitimacy of authoritarian systems is in crisis because it is not 
compatible with the modernization process. He believes that authoritarian systems all over the 
world will collapse and 'a variety of part free, part authoritarian systems' will emerge. See Lucian 
W. Pye, `Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism', American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 84, No. 1, 1990, p. 3. 
c On the debate of the role of middle ,class on democratization, see, Richard Tanter and Kenneth 
Young (eds.), The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 19, 
(Clayton: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990); For a critical argument on 
middle class in Asia, see David Martin Jones and David Brown, `Singapore and the Myth of the 
Liberalizing Middle Class', The Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1994, pp. 79 -87; and David Martin 
Jones, `Democratization, Civil society, and Illiberal Middle Class Culture in Pacific Asia', 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, January 1998, pp. 147 -169. 
7 The term `new orientalism' is used by Mark Berger to label the approach that elaborates the 
superiority of Western cultures and values behind the economic success of East Asian countries. 
See, Mark T. Berger, `Yellow Mythologies: The East Asian Miracle and Post -Cold War 
Capitalism', Positions, Vol. 4, No. 1, 199pp. 93 -100. The adoption of these Western values is seen 
as part of the success of a Western civilizing mission in the world, see ibid., p. 93. 
Ibid., pp. 93 -100; For another critique to the approach which suggest that Asians should adopt 
Western values in modernising their countries, see L.H.M Ling and Chih -yu Shih, `Confucianism 
with a Liberal Face: The Meaning of Democratic Politics in Postcolonial Taiwan', The Review of 
Politics, Vol. 60, No. 1, 1998, pp. 58 -61. 
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era. As Chris Patten argues, it is the values of economic liberty, free trade, and a 
commitment to prosperity, as applied in the West, that have brought success.9 
The universalisation of Western culture and its political institutions establishes, 
in this framework, the basis for norms in international society. The expansion of 
international society beyond its European limits means the spread of basic Western 
norms, values and institutions such as sciences, intellectual traditions, concepts of 
sovereign state and codes of conduct in international society. 1° In contemporary world 
politics, as Aryeh Neier points out, political freedom becomes a global intrinsic value 
and one of the accepted standards for governments in many countries. 
hi recent writings, the `democratic peace thesis' has emerged as another example 
of this universalisation showing as it does a confidence that liberal democratic 
institutions prevent war among nations. It argues that liberal democratic countries rarely 
fight each other because they have mechanisms checking the decision to wage war. 12 
Stephanie Lawson and Miyume Tanji, however, argue that in contrast to this 
universalisation of democracy, there has emerged a particularisation of democracy.t3 
They argue that the `democratic peace thesis' is a kind of universalisation of a specific 
model of democracy, which is Western liberal democracy applied to the world. It is in a 
reaction to this project that some countries in Southeast Asia, for example, have 
particularised their own understanding of democracy, in the forms of `Asian 
democracy' .14 
I argue that `the end of history' thesis and the approach embodying the 
universalisation of Western ideas of liberal democracy, fail to understand not only such 
a particularization, but also why democratization has not taken place and why some 
9 Chris Patten, `Asian Values and Asian Success, a Speech by the Governor of Hong Kong', 
Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 8 -10. 
Adda Bozeman, `The International Order in a Multicultural World', in Bull and Watson (eds.), op. 
cit., pp. 387 -406. 
Aryeh Neier, `Asia's Unacceptable Standard', Foreign Policy, No. 92, Fall 1993, pp. 43 -44. 
12 Bruce Russet, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 
24 -25. 
Miyume Tanji and Stephanie Lawson, -Democratic Peace" and "Asian Democracy ": A 
Universalist- Particularist Tension', Alternatives, No. 22, 1997, pp. 146 -150. 
4 Ibid. 
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authoritarian regimes, which were supposed to fall, are still in power. In cases such as 
the Southeast Asian countries, as Donald Emmerson suggests, there have been different 
processes of political change from those commonly discussed in democratisation 
theories. He argues that, in comparison to other regions, Southeast Asia always 
challenges the expectations and explanations of democratization, since it is difficult to 
isolate the preconditions in politics, culture and economy that are likely to produce 
Iiberal democracy.15 In particular, contrary to the conventional argument that economic 
prosperity leads to democratization, cases such as Malaysia and Singapore, where the 
economy has been developed significantly, demonstrate that improved economic 
conditions do not necessarily lead to a development of liberal democracy.16 
Because it emphasises the homogenizing impact of democracy, as a product of 
Western modernity, on other parts of the world, the central problem with this approach 
is that it does not elaborate on various cultural responses to liberal ideas of democracy 
within non -Western countries. It assumes that development and changes within Western 
values and cultures can spread and replace other cultural values in non - Western 
countries. 
However such an assumption, indicative of this approach, does not pay enough 
attention to the possibility of resistance to Western values within the infiltrated 
countries. The reaction to the spread of Western values in non -Western countries is 
viewed, by Western countries generally, as an effort to reject modernising forces or 
historical progress. The claims of `Asian democracy', for example, are understood as a 
political and ideological instrument of authoritarian leaders to justify their current 
systems against demands for democratization." Implied in such a conclusion is the 
5 Donald K. Emerson, `Region and Recalcitrance: Rethinking Democracy through Southeast Asia', 
The Pacific Review. Vol. 8, No. 2, 1995, pp. 225, 238. 
a David Martin Jones, `Democratization, Civil Society,...', op. cit., 147 -169; James Chin, `Anti - Y' P pp. 
Chinese Chauvinists and HDB Upgrades: the 1997 Singapore General Election', South 
East Asía Research, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1997, pp. 217 -241. 
7 See, for examples, Steven J. Hood, `The Myth of Asian -Style Democracy', Asian Survey, Vol. 38, 
No. 9, September 1998; Kenneth Christie, `Regime Security and Human Rights in Southeast Asia', 
Political Studies, Vol. 43, Special Issue Politics and Human Rights, 1995; Joakim Ojendal and 
Hans Antlov, `Asian Values and its Political Consequences: Is Cambodia the First Domino', The 
Pacific Review, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1998; Alan Dupont, `Is There An "Asian Way "?', Survival, Vol.38, 
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belief that cultures and values in Third World countries are subordinate cultures and that 
those countries are passive actors in this contest. 
The second approach is underpinned by the `clash of civilisation' thesis. The 
claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' are seen as a reaction by the countries 
studied to the globalization of Western cultures, resulting in the idea of `Asian style 
democracy'. It argues that particular approaches to democracy, based on local cultures 
different from those in the West, have emerged in some parts of Asia. This approach 
perceives that `Asia' tends to develop as a single identity, which strengthens `the clash 
of civilisations', Some Asian leaders subscribe to this idea by assuming that there has 
been a Western ideological hegemony which needs to be countered. 
At the heart of the tendency to accept local reactions emerging as distinctive 
concepts, such as `Asian values' and cultures in the post Cold War era, lies Samuel 
Huntington's thesis of the `clash of civilisations'. For Huntington, major civilisations in 
the world, China and the West among others, will clash, as has been happening 
throughout the history of both civilisations, because of differences in their cultural 
values.18 In Huntington's analysis, the universalisation of Western cultures and values 
has stimulated criticisms and counter reactions in Asia, because both Asia and the West 
as cultural entities have their own unique historical development.19 
Before Huntington, Adda Bozeman, departing from an international society 
perspective, commented on the reactions to the `Westernization' of the world. 
According to her, it was only in its initial wave that the universalisation of Western 
principles and norms, such as the sovereign state system and non -intervention, took 
No. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 21 -23; Neier, op. cit., pp. 42-47; Chen Maiping, `What are Asian 
Values', NIAS, Nordic Newsletter of Asian Studies, No. 2, June 1997; Stein Tonnesson, `Do 
Human Rights and Asian Values Go Together', NIAS, Nordic Newsletter of Asian Studies, No. 4, 
December 1996. 
is Samuel P. Huntington, `The Clash of Civilisations', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, pp. 24- 
29; see also Samuel Huntington, `Many World Orders', interview of David Gergen, editor at large 
of US News and World Report with Samuel Huntington, 9 January 1997, see 
< http: // wwwl. pbs. org :80 /newshour /gergen/january97 /order 1- 10.html> 
19 Samuel P Huntington, `The West Unique, Not Universal', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6, 
Nov/Dec. 1996, pp. 35 -37. 
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place peacefully.20 After this initial wave, which, according to Adam Watson included 
the expansion of Western concepts of the state to `ancient civilisations of Asia' and 
`pre -literate societies in Africa',21 has passed, the expansion of international society wiII 
have a reverse impact. Some parts of the world, notably Islamic countries, have 
strengthened their claims to a special identity and morality. There has also been an 
emerging diversity of political systems based on specific cultural concepts in non - 
Western countries.22 The expansion has brought about 'a plurality of frames of 
references', resulting in a more diverse and multicultural world.23 
One of the frames of reference in this multicultural world, according to this 
approach, may lie in the claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy'. These claims 
acknowledge the importance of `Asian values' while illustrating the inappropriateness 
and the decline of 'Western values'. The most common justification for supporting 
'Asian values' comes from the success of economic development in East Asian 
countries. Proponents of `Asian values' attempt to demonstrate that the successful 
economic development of these `Newly Industrializing Countries' (NICs) is due 
particularly to their traditional value system such as Confucianìsm.24 The success has 
proved, for these NICs, that their values are `at least as good a foundation for modernity 
as those derived from the West'.25 Similarly, in terms of democracy, they also attempt to 
convince Western audiences that their style of democracy is as good as that which has 
developed in the West. This is commonly followed by the assertion that Western values 
are in decline or are decadent. With respect to economic development, some proponents 
20 Bozeman, 'The International Order...', in Bull and Watson (eds.), op. cit., p. 404. 
zi Adam Watson, New States in the Americas', in Bull and Watson (eds.), op. cit., p. 140. 
22 Bozeman, `The International Order...,' in Bull and Watson (eds.), op. cit., p. 404; see also, C. B. 
Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy, the Massey Lectures (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1966), p. 2. Macpherson argues that revolutions have been made against Western liberal 
democracy, in the forms of 'proletarian democracy, of `people democracy' and of several varieties 
of African and Asian democracy'. 
23 Bozeman, op. cit., p. 391. 
24 A comprehensive views on how fixed culture /race have influence the economic success and 
modernity in East Asia can be seen in Mark T. Berger, 'Yellow Mythologies...', op. cit., pp. 91- 
126. 
zs Peter R. Moody, Jr., `Asian Values', Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1, Summer 
1996, p. 169. 
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of `Asian values' have even suggested the West should learn from the success story of 
the East about how to maintain high productivity. 
Informed by the above arguments, the political rhetoric of Southeast Asian 
leaders, loaded with themes designed to show the superiority and victory of their 
culture, has strengthened the division between the West and the East. Some leaders and 
academics, in Southeast Asia in particular, have taken part in discourses of `Asian 
democracy' and `Asian values' to counter what they perceive as Western domination. 
For example, this can be seen in. Kishore Mahbubani's comment: 
`It is difficult for a European or a North American to understand the 
momentousness of the psychological revolution in East Asía because they cannot 
step into East Asian minds. Their minds have never been wrapped in colonialism... 
The growing realization of East Asians that they can do anything as well as, if not 
better than, other cultures has led to an explosion of confidence.'26 
What can be concluded from such arguments is that a reaction to Westernization 
has emerged, leading to the emergence of a fixed conceptualisation of culture /race. 
Huntington's article on the `clash of civilisations', as Wright -Neville argues, represents 
a crude culturalist argument which have informed some approaches to culture in 
International Relations and some Asian studies.27 In Asia, this is often said to occur in 
the claims that `Asian values and cultures' uphold `Asian democracy'. 
Such approaches are often used to explain the continuity of authoritarian 
political systems in Asia.28 Values such as patron -client communitarianism, 
personalism, patronage, the family system, consensus, deference to authority, dominant 
political parties, and strong interventionist states or organic states are treated as very 
25 Kishore Mahbubani, `The Pacific Way', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1, 1995, p. 103. 
27 David Wright-Neville, `The Politics of Pan Asianism: Culture, Capitalism and Diplomacy in East 
Asia,' Pacifica Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, May /June, 1995, p. 4; The examples of writings which 
emphasizes the importance of cultures in explaining a political system, among others are, CIark D. 
Neher, `Asian Style Democracy', Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 11, 1994; Lucian W. Pye with Mary 
W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics, the Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985); Benedict Anderson, Language and power : 
exploring political cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); David 
Reeve, Gollear of Indonesia: an Alternative to the Party System (Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, 1985); Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Political Change in Southeast Asia: Trimming the Banyan 
Tree (London: Routledge, 1996). 
zs Neher, `Asian style.... op. cit.; Lucian W. Pye with Mary W. Pye, op. cit.; Anderson, op. cit., 
Reeve, op. cit., Vatikiotis, op. cit. 
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significant in `Asian democracy'. Such conceptions of culture have become important in 
explaining the existence of a political system. In the words of Clark Neher, these values 
are central in maintaining the essence of Southeast Asian political systems, which lie 
somewhere between `concepts of semi- democracy and semi -authoritarianism'. 29 
The same problem in the first approach applies to this second approach. It 
explains only partial aspects of the globalisation of Western values and ideas. However, 
in contrast to the first approach, which emphasises the homogenising impact of Western 
values, the second approach mainly focuses on the resistance of `Asian cultures' to the 
`Western cultures', leading to a claim of culture specific concepts. It argues that Asians 
possess their own culture, and the West has imposed its cultures on other countries. As a 
consequence, resistance has emerged leading to a clash of civilisations. As in the first 
approach, this view sees culture as more or less static. It changes and adapts slowly to 
new ideas. 
The third approach has gone farther than the above two approaches, since it 
tends to reconcile the above conflicting views by recognizing that there are two aspects 
of culture and argues that the role of political actors is important in revitalising culture 
for their society. The first aspect of culture, according to the proponents of this approach 
consists of underlying values and cultures which support the claims of some leaders 
about the working mechanism of their existing style of democracy. The second aspect of 
culture consists of manipulated cultures to justify the interests of regimes in power. 
Given this situation, the approach maintains that the task of a research agenda is to 
identify the underlying and the manipulated cultures. It inquires as to whether cultures 
are engineered to serve the political platform of a certain regime. In the words of 
Annette Marfording, the question is whether `people have determined their cultural 
values for themselves or whether a cultural ideology has been imposed upon them from 
above.' 3° 
29 Neher, op. cit., p. 949. 
30 Annette Marfording, `Cultural Relativism and the Construction of Culture: An Examination of 
Japan', Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1997, p. 433. 
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In the process of making sense of culture, according to this third approach, the 
role of political leaders is important. The notion of culture as a shared symbols is seen 
by the proponents of this approach as a political resource that can be exploited by 
political leaders for their political purposes. In some societies, government officials, 
bureaucrats and intellectuals have attempted to define their country's history in terms of 
the culture of the present and a vision for the future. As will be shown, Antonio 
Gramsci, also demonstrates that the role of culture is important in the sense that it is 
used to support a hegemonic project. The concept of 'Asían democracy' being promoted 
by some Asian leaders needs, then, to be critically reviewed -to ascertain its origins and 
the identity of those for whom its promotion is important. It is often, as Adamantia 
Pollis argues, that elites in modern states exploit the language of cultural diversity to 
justify and rationalise their arbitrary use of power, rather than to adhere to a more widely 
accepted meaning of the values existing in society.31 
An approach focusing on the search for genuine cultures, on the way cultures 
have been manipulated and transformed, and on the actors manipulating cultural for 
their political purposes, will be also used in this thesis. However, most analysis which 
use this approach, have largely focused on the role of political actors in manipulating 
cultures to justify their power. There has been a lack of attention on how culture has also 
been invented by political elites in order to cope with the modern demands of economic 
progress and contain the problems inherent in liberal democracy models. 
This kind of lacuna, can be seen in the following examination of `Asian values'. 
The claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' promoted by the three countries in 
Southeast Asia have been denounced as hardly offering a new or unique Asian way. It 
actually mimics the ways orientalists have pictured the East.32 The claims, as Brian 
Turner argues, take for granted a similar logic of dichotomy inherited from orientalists: 
the West is defined as rational and progressive whereas the East is religious, despotic, 
31 Adamantia Pollis, `Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism', Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1996. 
32 William A Callahan, `Rescripting East/West Relations, Rethinking Asian Democracy', Pacifica 
Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1996. 
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patrimonial and backward.33 It has been argued today that the reverse has taken place: 
the West is described as facing many social problems while the East is in harmony. As 
the concepts of `the West' and `the East' have developed,34 the concepts of `Asian 
democracy' versus `Western democracy', and `Asian values' versus `Western values', 
have also emerged from Western and Eastern leaders who use cultural justifications to 
represent political difference. When criticising Mahathir Mohamad and Shintaro 
Ishihara's book The Voice of Asia, Allan Patience, for an example, expressed the above 
tendency as follows, 
`The "Asian values" they evangelise are echoes of imperial manners, making 
Mahathir and Ishihara pathetic comprador of a passe neo- colonialism... Their idea 
of the "West" is tendentious, a reversal of Said's Orientalism... Maybe we need a 
book on Occidentalism -which would demonstrate how some "Asian" leaders are 
trying to construct an idealist account of the "West" to parody it for political 
purposes' .35 
The significance of the debate, then, in this perspective, is not so much the 
content as the consequences of the debate. In terms of content, `Asian values' and 
'Asian democracy' concepts are easy to criticize because of their vague characteristics 
and unclear formulations. The essence of the debate lies in how one proponent has been 
able to show superiority over an opponent, and use that position to discredit and 
marginalize the opponent's views. In the words of Richard Robison, `Asian values 
should be seen, therefore, not so much in terms of its value as an explanation but as an 
ideology integral to particular political and economic models' .36 
This seems to be the case for countries developing their own models of 
democracy and development in Southeast Asia. The way these countries' leaders have 
defined and represented `the Other' has resulted in the claims of `Asian democracy', 
which deny the applicability of other models of democracy in their own countries. The 
33 Richard Robison, `Introduction' to Special issue on Politics and economics in the twenty -first 
century: is there an Asian model ?', Pacific Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1996, p. 309. 
w Stuart Hall, `The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power', in S. Hall and B. Gieben (eds.), 
Formations of Modernity (London: Open University Press, 1992), pp. 276 -280. 
35 Campus Review, 28 March - 3 April 1996, quoted in Nicholas Tarling , Nations and States in 
Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 127. 
36 Robison, `Introduction' ..., op. cit., p. 307. 
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debate about content, proposed by some academics, in this context is only part of the 
aim to show the superiority and legitimacy of official `Asian democracy' discourses 
over other discourses of democracy. 
While T agree with the focus on the elites and their hegemonic strategy as the 
center of analysis in the above example, particularly in relation to how the construction 
of culture has been pursued by leaders, the uses of the approach in the above example, 
however, have three deficiencies. Firstly, it pays attention mainly to one aspect of the 
way culture has been manipulated; that is the use of culture to serve the political needs 
of elites to justify their political power. It does not examine the way culture has been 
reinvented by the elites to support modern political and economic demands. This later 
effort has sometimes attracted genuine support from society and strengthened the sense 
of national unity in the countries studied. This interpretation of culture may serve 
conservative leaders, but can also be oriented to support the logic of modernism and 
capitalism as promoted by the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad, and 
Singapore former PM, Lee Kuan Yew 37 An alternative approach should be broad 
enough to cover all possible consequences of cultural interpretation. 
Secondly, the above example has not solved the problem of the link between the 
actors and genuine and `constructed' cultures. It is rather difficult to distinguish 
`genuine' culture from `constructed' culture. It is possible, by looking at the underlying 
cultures and attempting to differentiate them from the manipulated cultures, that 
proponents of the third approach may be able to expose elites who manipulate culture 
for their own political and ideological projects. However, this still leaves unanswered 
the question of the relationship between the actors, namely leaders, their supporters, 
their cultural system and international environments within which they operate. It is 
important to note that, to strengthen the validity of their claims elites have used existing 
37 Wright -Neville, op. cit., pp. 21 -25; see also Mafoot Simon, `Dr. Mahathir revises Dilemma' The 
Straits Times, June 29, 1997, about how Mahathir has revised his former assumption of Malay 
backwardness in his book `Malay Dilemma' in order to fit a new demand of modernisation. 
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cultures, revitalising and updating them for new purposes.38 The support given to such 
claims from societal forces needs to be identified in order to know how deeply the 
claims are rooted in society. In some cases, the claims about `Asian values' and `Asian 
democracy' may not be merely about manipulation. In particular the appeal to reinvent 
and readjust cultures to the demand for a modern democratic and economic system by 
the elites have a degree of genuine support from within society. To assume such claims 
are merely a product of manipulation may be to ignore certain meanings, aspirations and 
the various purposes of the claims. 
Thirdly, the above example disregards the importance of international factors in 
informing an actor's understanding of culture in a changing international environment. 
The claims can be seen as a kind of rejection of pressure from Western liberal 
democracies to their models of democracy. Leaders of these countries such as Mahathir, 
Lee Kuan Yew and Soeharto claims to have already set up a system which is durable 
enough to represent the interests of the whole citizenry. For these leaders, other systems, 
particularly Western liberal democracy, may neither be conducive nor supportive to their 
countries economic and social objectives. 
The sweeping changes in the international system due to the triumph of liberal 
democracy over communism has worried the Ieaders of the so- called soft -authoritarian 
systems in Southeast Asia. That is why together with their efforts to strengthen 
legitimacy within domestic society, the leaders of these Southeast Asian countries also 
attempt to convince the international audiences of the legitimacy of their application of 
democracy. The countries have for a long time dealt with and attempted to embrace 
various `universal' aspects of democracy. By using the claims of `Asian democracy', 
elites in the governments of these countries attempt to show that they have already set 
up a framework to understand democracy based on their own abilities within their own 
national boundaries. For leaders of these countries, their fràmeworks of democracy are 
seen as an expression of their national identity. The process of this identity formation is 
35 Geir Helgesen and TA Xing, `Democracy or Minzhu: the Challenge of Western versus East Asian 
Notions of Good Government', Asian Perspective, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1996, p. 99. 
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motivated by a desire to construct effective problem solving techniques without Western 
intervention. In the view of these leaders any challenge to their framework of democracy 
must be analysed and dealt with nationally. 
B. TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
To locate an alternative approach, it is necessary to overcome the above three 
problems in the current analysis of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy'. The problems 
with cultures and political actors need to be overcome by proposing a framework which 
is not only able to explain the manipulation of cultures by political elites but also able to 
analyse various intentions of actors in redefining and interpreting cultures. The problem 
with the significance of international aspects behind the claims of `Asian democracy' 
can be overcome by developing an international society concept. In the first part of this 
section, I show how political actors react and define their state identity by using cultures 
both to emulate some parts and to reject other parts of Western values, including ideas 
about democracy. In the second part, I elaborate the significance of the claims within the 
context of an international society. 
1. Political Actors and Cultures 
The problem with the current approach to `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' 
leads us to focus on how cultures and values have become central for various political 
actors in the region under study. While it is important to recognise external factors, they 
have a meaning only within the framework set up by these political actors, particularly 
political elites within government circles. The external factor is an important structural 
factor for the elites in pursuing their state identity. The elites consider to renew their 
state identity based on the changing structure and norms of international society, and on 
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an assumption that the redefinition can also ensure the confidence of people in domestic 
politics on their state identity. 
One response provided by these elites with regard to the above `state identity' 
question is the dual claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy'. For the leaders of 
the countries studied, these claims offer a distinct conception of values and democracy 
which are different from those of the West. The claims are designed to fulfill a double 
purpose. The first purpose is to ensure support for a government- sponsored framework 
of national and political identity which can also strengthen the domestic political 
legitimacy of current regimes. The second purpose is to counter Western pressures on 
democracy and human rights. The leaders of these countries have attempted to show that 
their countries are equal actors alongside other states in international society. 
Furthermore, by using the claims of `Asian values' the actors attempt to assert the 
particular roles and contributions of their states as envisaged within the changing norms 
of international society. 
However, it is important to note that although the leaders claims that their 
countries have specific values and therefore specific models of democracy, it does not 
necessarily mean that the claims is fixed and final. Nor does it mean that they offer 
thematically different or more substantive interpretations of democracy from those in 
the West. The notion of `politics of identity' here means an effort to make a boundary39 
between `us' and `them' by formally and generally using language such as `our way' and 
`their way', while the contents, details and sources of the `way' or `style' themselves are 
of secondary importance. A definition of identity includes the cultural and moral 
attributes possessed by a political group or community, as well as its objectives40 and 
desires 4t 
39 
40 
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Jonathan Friedman, 'The Politics of De- Authentification: Escaping from Identity, A Response to 
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To discuss further the politics of identity, we must account firstly for actors 
claiming `Asian values' as part of the national identity, and examine how they 
conceptualise the claims of Asian values'. Secondly, I elaborate the cultural and values 
based method used by actors to maintain a state's hegemony. Functions of the state are 
frequently not justified in terms of its rational functions but in terms of its cultural or 
emotional attachment with its citizens. 
(a) The Actors 
Because it is impossible to conceive of cultures and values as independent 
aspects devoid of any intervention from political actors, it is important to depart from 
the interpretations of culture from the political elites (surrounding the government 
circle) who claim and promote `Asian values' and `Asian democracy'. These elites 
claim to represent the state and to speak with the state's voice. Certainly, there have 
been other alternative voices contributing to `Asian values'. This will be considered in 
conjunction with the claims of `Asian values' by those leaders. 
Why are elites in the government circle? They have the authority to interpret 
culture to serve the needs of the country, particularly the need for development and 
political stability. They can also promote a certain identity for the nation, and define 
what political structure the nation should adopt. Their position, their control of media 
and their ability to use the knowledge and connections they have, make them a powerful 
element in keeping culture up to date with current problems in the society. As Hans 
Antlov argues, `Some people -the ruling class- have better access to the knowledge and 
resources necessary to force or inspire a particular interpretation of power and 
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domination'.42 They have communication skills, charisma, and social and professional 
networks43 which give them the `power to know and act upon an object'.44 
History, ideology and culture, when in the hands of these actors, often become 
the source of a master narrative, a `controlling political idea' to manage disintegrative 
elements, hierarchy45 and economic gaps within a society. The actors also can be seen as 
state apparatuses to establish a certain meaning of order, and to keep an alternative 
possibility of an ideal order alive, at least in people's imagination.46 The ideas of 
national salvation, for example, have become a master narrative on which national 
building programs are based. 
The above process suggests that those who are in a position to influence the 
conceptualization, production and circulation of a dominant discourse will have power 
and influence within society.47 Because of its central role, elites in the government 
always have the power and influence to occupy this position. Government elites play a 
dominant role, for example, in a process of establishing a particular meaning of 
democracy as the only appropriate form, thus denying other meanings. Through what is 
commonly called cultural politics, elites can determine and produce meanings, identities 
and subjectivity in the interests of their particular group.48 
(b) A Hegemonic Strategy within Domestic Politics 
A complicated process of adaptation and rejection of Western ideas of the state 
has taken place within these countries. This is followed by a process characterised by 
42 Hans Antlov, 'Enchanted Power and Crude Rule: Legitimization and Domination in Rural Java', in 
011e Tornquìst and Karl Reinhold Hallquist (eds.), Asian Societies in Comparative Perspective 
(Copenhagen, NIAS/NASEAS, 1991), p. 415. 
as Michael Woods, `Discourses of Power and Rurality, Local Politics in Somerset in the 20th 
Century,' Political Geography, Vol. 16, No, 6, 1997, pp. 456 -457. 
44 Aysegul C. Baykan, `Islam as an Identity Discourse', ARENA journal, No. 1, 1993, p. 45. 
45 Joel S. Migdal, Why Do So Many States Stay Intact ?, paper presented at the Australian National 
University Workshop on Weak and Strong States in Southeast Asia and Melanesia, August 12 -14, 
1997, p. 33. 
46 Tania Murray Lì, `Images of Community: Discourse and Strategy in Property Relations,' 
Development and Change, Vol. 27, 1996, p. 503. 
47 Woods, op. cit., p. 457. 
48 Glenn Jordan and Chris Weedon, Cultural Politics (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 
543 -545. 
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Antonio Gramsci49 as a hegemonic strategy adopted by a group of elites to legitimize its 
power and existence before its members. With this hegemonic strategy, a group or a 
regime is able to counter both external and internal pressures to its existence. Such a 
strategy has been used to counter the growing demands for democratic government 
reflected, among other things, in the emergence of opposition movements in domestic 
politics and in Western pressures on democracy and good government within 
international society. By implementing this strategy, elites want to make sure that they 
get sufficient support from the masses to sustain both their political institutions and their 
policies. 
Gramsci's hegemony concept may, indeed, facilitate an understanding of why 
new norms of democracy in international society have been interpreted differently. It 
helps in understanding the strategies adopted by government elites and in explaining 
why social forces, inspired by democratic movements and informed by liberal 
democratic ideas and growing as counter -hegemony movements to the regimes in 
power, have not arisen in a form capable of seriously challenging to authoritarian ideas 
of government or the ruling regime. 
It is noteworthy to outline the process of gaining hegemony as described by 
Antonio Gramsci. He states that every potential hegemon, including a ruling class or 
regime, attempts `to legitimise its social power, wealth and prestige to the masses it 
[seeks] to dominate ideologically.'S0 The regime or a ruling class as social power, as 
Clifford Geertz adds, gets involved in ideological wars, insisting that their moral, 
religious, practical, and aesthetic ideas can be accepted and institutionalised so that they 
have a powerful social effect within a society.51 Gramsci believes that a regime, in 
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attempting to establish hegemony, will try to present `the conditions of its existence... as 
a universal principle, as a world -view, as religion....' 52 
The superiority of one hegemonic principle over another, according to Gramsci, 
is not determined by `the virtue of its intrinsic logical character but rather when it 
manages to become a `popular religion'.53 By `popular religion', Gramsci refers to the 
capability of a regime to `nationalise itself'54 or in the international context analogously 
to `universalise itself'. The particular form of `popular religion' can include many 
concepts that have universal appeal such as nationalism, state sovereignty, capitalism, 
democracy, socialism and Islamic solidarity. But the success of the hegemonic project 
itself depends on how the `popular religions' can influence and ensure unity and 
harmony between the leaders and the led.55 
By following this approach, we can see that concepts in domestic politics such as 
patriotism and nationalism can operate as `popular religions' which serve to link leaders 
and the led. They have been transformed into `a collective national- popular will' in 
which the interests of all groups can be represented appropriately.56 In short, it is 
important for any regime or state to be capable of representing and articulating the 
whole of the `national -popular ideological elements' so that it `appears as the 
representative of the general interest'.S7 
To define their interests, potential hegemons express their leadership by 
reference to general rather than specific interests,58 where there is little doubt about their 
importance and where there must be support from other groups for the interests. The 
52 Antonio Gramsci, cited in Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, America's Quest for Supremacy and 
the Third World: A Grarnscian Analysis (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988), p. 120. In the 
Indonesian revolution, concepts such as `Mertju Suar', the Great Revolution of Mankind are 
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ss Chantal Mouffe, `Hegemony and ideology in Gramsci', in Chantal Mouffe (ed.), Gramsci and 
Marxist Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 194. 
sa Ibid., p. 194. 
ss Ibid., p. 194. 
56 Ibid., p. 194. 
57 Ibid. pp. 194-195. 
58 Ibid., p. 97. 
39 
concepts of national unity, national development, survivalism, and national self - 
determination, are among the most common concepts used as hegemonic strategies. 
A moment of hegemony, according to Gramsci, occurs when the subordinate 
groups uncritically and passively internalise the values, beliefs and ideas or world view 
of the dominant group. In other words, when the hegemony seems to be accepted as a 
natural process and becomes a psychological condition among the people, then a 
consensual hegemony condition has been ensured.59 Allan Bullock's (et al.) definition of 
hegemony captures this very well. 
`The feature which this usage (the predominance of one social class over others) 
stresses is not only the political and economic control exercised by a dominant 
class but its success in projecting its own particular way of seeing the world, 
human and social relationships, so that this is accepted as `common sense' and part 
of the natural order by those who are in fact subordinated to it' 60 
Following this perspective, it can be stated that a hegemon, which could be one 
fundamental group with other groups allied to it, holds a hegemonic position when the 
leadership represents the `complete fusion of economic, political, intellectual and moral 
objectives'.61 The leaders achieve such a hegemonic position through `the intermediary 
of ideology when an ideology manages to spread throughout the whole of society 
determining not only united economic and political objectives but also intellectual and 
moral unity'.62 Together with this effort, the group creates `organically, one or more 
strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own functions 
not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields. The capitalist 
entrepreneur creates alongside himself the industrial technician, the specialist in 
political economy, the organisers of a new culture, of a new legal system, etc.'63 
However, every attempt to create a hegemony invites an opposition and a 
counter -hegemony from political and social powers in a society. Foucault, for example, 
59 Hooey, op. cit., pp. 32 -33. 
60 Allan Bullock (et. all.), The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought (London: Fontana Press, 
1988), p. 379. 
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discusses the refusal of economic and ideological state violence, the opposition toward 
privileges of knowledge and the `opposition against secrecy, deformation, and 
mystifying representation imposed on people' .64 The Gramscian concept of hegemony, 
notes the varying responses to efforts to create a hegemony in a society, ranging from 
passive revolutions, wars of positions, and counter -hegemony movements. 
The main problem with the contest of power and war of words, therefore, is how 
far a society is given a chance to become involved in such contests and struggles. This 
question is important, because the power to define and fix a meaning, following Hans 
Antlov, `is not for everybody's exercise'. Hegemony implies that dominant classes 
define the meaning of key terms in their own interests.65 They have communication 
skills, charisma, and social and professional networks66 which gives them the `power to 
know and act upon an object' .67 
Such conditions ensure that the power of a counter -interpretation and counter - 
hegemony that can create a dialogue or, in Gramsci's words, `a battle for ideological 
hegemony' become relative. It depends not only on the ability to pursue a version as the 
ultimate, but also on material and political conditions,á8 on para political structures 
created by government, or in the words of David Wright- Neville on the `political 
infrastructure' of the society.69 If political and social conditions allow too much latitude 
for leaders of the ruling class to interpret symbols and rituals and to distribute their 
version as cultural knowledge,70 then little political space is left for open and 
rationalistic dialogues within the society. The state in this case becomes a dominant 
power in distributing knowledge and in imposing and scripting a particular discourse. 
64 Michel Foucault, `Afterword, the Subject and Power', in Herbert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow 
(ed.), Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: the University of 
Chicago Press, 1983), p. 212. 
69 Murray Li, op. cit., p. 510. 
56 Woods, op. cit., pp. 456 -457. 
67 Baykan, op. cit., p. 45. 
G8 Ibid. p. 45. 
e9 Wright- Neville, op. cit., p. 21. 
70 Ibid., p. 45. 
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In a society where there has been suppression of dissent, limitation of dialogue 
and different interpretations, and regulation of the political system, it is more likely that 
`a battle for an ideological hegemony'' that can create a reflexive political system 
cannot take place. In the words of Habermas, a new kind of public sphere capable of 
transforming the old public sphere dominated by the state or a kingdom cannot 
emerge.72 
The concepts of public sphere and public space are of particular importance in 
showing how the claims of `Asian democracy' have emerged, spread and dominated 
public discourse. The concept of the public sphere can show whether a society has space 
or not in the formation process of the claims The availability of space to discuss a 
public matter can encourage the emergence of an active citizenship and open a lively 
debate on political issues based on people's reflective reason. Similarly, the public space 
concept can also be used to show how people in a society can reach a somewhat 
informal agreement that can guide and rule them in their dialogues and exchanges of 
political ídeas.73 
It is important to note that the approach offered here does not deny the 
importance of a material base in a society. Gramsci, for example, recognizes the 
importance of these material contents but, for him, they alone are not a sufficient 
condition without the establishment of non -material bases.74 The material bases of 
hegemony will not contribute significantly to maintaining political hegemony without 
non -material bases such as the persuasive capacity of the hegemon to produce 
widespread social consent for the hegemon's plans, goals and norms.75 Through a 
Milner, op. cit., p. 3. 
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73 Migdal, op. cit., pp. 36 -42. 
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persuasive strategy, the subordinate groups will regard the domination of a hegemonic 
group as legitimate, even necessary, right and proper, or at least tolerable.76 
2. `Shared Norms and Values' in the International Society Context 
Given the above efforts to redefine state identity by creating a distinctive 
framework of `Asian democracy', the next question regarding the claims of `Asian 
values' and `Asian democracy' is whether the efforts upset shared norms and values in 
international society. There is no definitive answer to this question. The hegemony 
theory only shows that the claims have been used to redefine national identity in facing 
both domestic and international challenges. It also shows that the framework of 
democracy proclaimed by the leaders of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia is not a 
fixed one because of the likely challenges to the framework from various opposition 
groups and political figures within the societies. The Gramscian hegemony theory, 
however, does not discuss the implications of this domestic matter for debates about 
democracy in international forums. For critics of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy', 
the claims have negative impacts on the spread of democracy in the international 
community. The claims are seen by critics as a justification for authoritarian regimes, as 
a protection for authoritarian states,77 and as potentially instigating the rise of other 
authoritarian states in a region.76 The claims have ramifications for the discussion of 
democracy and democratisation in a broader international context. 
In addressing these ramifications, therefore, we need to see some efforts in 
international society which continually attempt to identify shared values and norms. 
Third World countries, including the countries studied here, have been included as part 
76 Robert B. Stauffer, The Marcos Regime: Failure of Trans -national Developmentalism and 
Hegemony -Building from Above and Outside (Sydney: University of Sydney, Research Monograph 
No. 23, October 1985), p. 2. 
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of international society because they have embraced some basic standards and norms 
such as sovereign recognition, from other countries and international laws. In the 
context of current developments, where the shared values in international society have 
changed and some values such as democracy and human rights have been continually 
embraced as its new evolving norms by Western states, the degree of the membership of 
some Third World countries has also been questioned. Third World countries, such as 
Libya, Myanmar and Iraq, have even been excluded from international society. They 
have been punished because they do not embrace shared norms and values as defined by 
the core members of international society. The core members since the inception of 
international society are Western countries, especially the US. 
In the following, I attempt to discuss the process of the inclusion and exclusion 
of membership in international society and the development of its shared norms. I 
attempt to illustrate some significant developments in the concept of international 
society and then explain how countries like Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia are able 
to offer a certain challenge to the efforts to find shared norms and values in international 
society. 
This part is divided into four sections. Firstly, I attempt to examine the 
importance of common cultures in international society. This is foIIowed by an 
examination of debates to find the basis for the common cultures in an international 
society. Secondly, I look at the expansion of the Western concept of the liberal 
democratic state to the non -Western state. Thirdly, I describe a redefinition of identity 
by Third World countries within changing norms of legitimacy in international society. I 
examine how a political framework based on the claims of `Asian values' and `Asian 
democracy has been campaigned to strengthen national identity. It is worth noting that 
the framework is not always built by fulfilling and adopting the standards of 
international norms themselves but by creating cultural boundaries, identifying `Asian 
values' and by strengthening the claims about the history of the nation. Fourthly, I 
explain further that the challenge is possible because of the inconsistency of hegemonic 
actors such as the Western states and the US in promoting the legitimate norms in 
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international society, and because of problems inherent in the applications of the norms 
and standards themselves. This has created opportunities for some political actors in the 
Southeast Asia region to offer alternative forms of political life. 
(a) The search for common values 
To be a member of the international system and then international society, it is 
argued that new states in the Third World have to change or adapt their political 
institutions and behaviours to fit the established norms and values of order in 
international society. This adaptation is important for those new states to acquire 
international legitimacy, or in the words of Martin Wight, to fulfill the `collective 
judgment of international society about rightful membership of the family of nations.'79 
Hedley Bull describes such a process, early on, as a kind of arrangement to join the 
`European club of states'.80 Historically, he points out that international societies have 
some `shared elements of a common culture as a basis for their ability to agree on the 
rules of international society'.81 By joining international society, non -Western states 
imply that they have given their consent to abide by its shared elements, basic rules and 
institutions.82 
It is noteworthy to see that not many changes are required to enter the 
international system, since it is only a system which depends on hierarchy of power, 
with the dominant power maintaining the stability of the system. But to be a member of 
international society a more complicated process, including an adaptation of cultural 
factors, takes place. As Bull argues, an international society is `a group of states (or, 
more generally, a group of independent political communities) which do not merely 
form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the 
calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common 
9 Quoted in Jack Donnelly, `Human Rights: a New Standard of Civilization', International Affairs, 
Vol. 74, No. 1, 1998, p. 2. 
80 Bull, `A Universal International ..., in Bull and Watson (eds.), op. cit., p 123 
81 Quoted in Shapcott, op. cit., p. 61. 
82 Bull, `A Universal ...', in Bull and Watson (eds.), op. cit., p. 124. 
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rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common 
interest in maintaining this arrangement'.83 
In recent works from the international society school, there have been attempts to 
further the values, norms and cultures which sustain order in international society, 
beyond the pioneering perspectives of Wight, Bull and Adam Watson. The debate 
continues with the assumption that order in international society requires a certain 
degree of shared values among its members. Nicholas Rengger, for example, argues that 
the notion of international society is `dependent on seeing society and culture as locked 
in a parasitic embrace'.S4 So the norms, values and shared understanding implied in 
international society need to be culturally generated and sustained by its members.85 
Similarly, Nicholas Wheeler argues that the `theory of international society depends 
upon the contention that state leaders are conscious of a minimal sense of moral 
community'.86 An identity as members of a community in international society is also 
referred to by Barry Buzan. He argues that international society in the Bullian sense 
implies a kind of gemeinschaft society', where shared identity and a sense of 
community are vital elements.87 
What kinds of principles can lead to shared values and a common identity in 
international society? To answer this question, it is important to look back at the 
fundamental values of international society formed in the sixteenth century. The 
principal characteristic of international society was drawn originally by Bull from the 
natural law tradition of the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. Bull notes that, at that 
time, international society consisted of five principal characteristics: `Christian values; 
the aforementioned ambiguity as to the membership of international society; the primacy 
of natural, as opposed to positive, international law; the assumption of universal society 
83 
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(the respublica Christiana); and the lack of a set of institutions deriving from the 
cooperation of states'.88 
Based on the above principles, Bull assumes that there was regularity and order 
in international society. He means order as `a pattern of human activity that sustains 
elementary, primary or universal goals of social life,'89 or in Rengger's words `a pattern 
of regularity of social life such that it promotes certain goals and values'.90 The goals 
and values promoted by all societies have three component parts: security against 
violence; consistency in applying an agreement once it is made; and relative stability of 
possession.91 
In a multicultural world after World War II, Bull maintains that the `culture of 
modernity' brought about by the West, which had a level of impact on non -Western 
countries, could be a starting point in defining methods to achieve the goals and shared 
values of order. Modernity, for Bull, was based on scientific method and was 
consequently distinct from Westernisation and Christianity. It is, therefore, acceptable 
and even compatible with non -Western cultures, religions and traditions such as Islam 
and Confucianism. This compatibility, for Bull, could become a common culture 
providing a shared perspective for states to preserve international society.92 
Apart from modernity, Bull is pessimistic about the possibility of including other 
values such as human rights as common values for international society.93 The fact that 
he priorities order over justice in international relations hints at this pessimism.94 In the 
Iight of world events after the end of the Cold War, however, there is a need to discuss 
more fully what cultures, values and norms can sustain a just order in international 
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society theory. This implies that the requirements to enter and participate in 
international society have also changed. It does not depend simply on traditional 
assumptions of absolute sovereignty, basic international laws, diplomacy and balance of 
power, but upon other norms which have not been examined during the Cold War. 
During the Cold War, such a breakthrough could be found in the concept of 
civilisation, developed by Gong's standard of civilisations. Gong argues that some 
standards of civilisation from the West implicitly became the `unspoken rule', 
obedience to which was required to enter international society. He noted that the 
Chinese, who regarded non -Chinese states as `uncivilised', had to change their view to 
enter the West's international society by conforming to the European standard of 
civilisation in its diplomatic practices and in international laws. It is by exhibiting this 
new conduct that China then was considered to be a `civilised' member of international 
society.95 In this expansion of international society, such adjustments, adaptations and 
changes have been made voluntarily or not by non -European countries.96 The changes 
and adaptation sometimes include not only Western political, economic and legal 
institutions, but also cultures and standards of `civilisation' 97 
In the post Cold War period, Jack Donnelly continues this effort by bringing in 
human rights as part of this standard of high culture or civilisation. This new standard of 
civilisation, according to Donnelly, includes a right of democratic government where a 
state has to accept an open and fair election system and to give political space to its 
citizens.98 This is followed, to a certain degree, by the treatment as international pariahs 
of those who do not adhere to that standard99 
In a similar vein, Barry Buzan attempts to incorporate the `world society' 
concept which tries to maximise conditions for individual and collective rights to self - 
determination into international society concept. He argues that such rights can develop 
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parallel to international society. Those who have identities developing within the 
framework of world society, such as individuals, social movements and non- 
governmental organizations can also have identities as part of their nation- states.10° 
This development may reflect Bull's notion of modernity as a common value 
uniting international society, since it is quite clear that the idea of democracy can be 
included as part of the modernity introduced by Bull. It promotes a protection of 
individual rights and adoption of some liberal democracy institutions. Although it does 
not have a direct correlation to the order in international society, it often becomes an 
`unspoken assumption'101 determining the legitimacy of a country before other members 
of international society. In addition, if this principle becomes a common view or a 
shared value, then those nations ignoring the principles and rights of democratic 
government risk becoming treated as an international pariahs. 
(b) The Expansion of the Liberal Democratic State 
In third World countries, the most contested aspect of the expansion of Western 
ideas is the modern liberal state. This is because democratic ideas of the liberal state 
have changed traditional concepts of government within various communities. With the 
expansion of the `Westphalian system of states' throughout the world, as Christopher 
Hughes points out, there is a growing need to see how domestic politics has been 
transformed by the expansion.102 Particularly important here is how modern concepts 
such as the state, government and the people, which have been unknown in local 
traditions of newly independent states, have changed political life. If there have been 
traditional understandings of leadership and the state, for example, they have had to 
adapt to Western ideas associated with organising the modern state. Anthony Milner, for 
example, shows how the concept of democracy has been modified within Asian 
i°o Buzan, op. ca., pp. 338 -339. 
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countries.1o3 There has been a redefinition, in particular, about what `people' means 
within these societies.1o4 Whereas `people' were once treated as `objects' before the 
King, they are now treated as `subjects' of development. Therefore, the way some 
academics have treated the state as having discrete cultural integrity and isolated 
national histories shows disregard for the influence of international processes of 
imitation and influence.1°5 
Concerning changes in cultural values, patrimonialism for example, which 
underpin `Asian democracy', Harold Crouch argues that such values will fall into 
disarray if two supporting conditions are not met.1o6 According to Crouch, if the first 
condition of homogeneity of ideology among elites has been eroded by division among 
those elites, the system is more likely to break down. Similarly the second condition, the 
isolation of the masses from political activities, is also likely to undermine 
patrimonialism. There has been a tendency towards the development of a highly 
politicised society despite strong control from the government. Even changes for the 
sake of development, such as bureaucratization and professionalism, lead to a 
technocratic society, and hence a decrease in patrimonialism.'°7 
There have also been significant changes in recent years in the value 
characteristic of Asian societies because of the intersection of these values with other 
values and cultures hence raising awareness about alternative values and technology. 
Under such conditions, it is difficult to see how claims of pure `Asian values and 
traditions' would work to support a political system. What is more likely to occur is a 
kind of `commodification', transformation and adaptation of the Western values.108 
Western values such as democracy, it seems, are only understood as symbols and as 
labels used as a kind of commodity to be sold to people by national leaders of Asian 
103 Anthony Milner (ed.), Comparing Cultures (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 158- 
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countries. Essentially the crux of democracy imported from the West often fails to 
impact on the rank and file of a society. It can, however, be claimed by both a regime 
and its opponents as justification for their behaviour. 
There exist, of course, basic values and norms accepted as pure, true and sound 
aspects of tradition. This fact becomes significant when leaders of various Asian 
countries create their own interpretation to serve their political ends. As Geir Helgesen 
points out, elites often interpret the past to serve their present needs as holders of power 
and to produce 'a culture as a common point of reference in the political processes'.109 
By looking at the complex process of the expansion of international society and 
its norms to non -Western countries, it can be concluded that the tendency to accept 
uncritically either the homogenisation or the rejection of Western values by endorsing 
`Asian democracy', disregards the phenomenon whereby cultures evolve and change. 
Such problems are evident in the theories of the end of history' and the `clashes of 
civilisations'. These theories do not pay enough attention to how cultural concepts have 
evolved after they intersect with external factors. As Michael Freeman explains, 
`Cultures are dynamic, heterogeneous, stratified, overlapping, interactive and internally 
negotiated'. 110 This dynamic aspect of culture must also have affected the formation of 
the `Asian democracy' discourse. This dynamic aspect also tends to be ignored in the 
debate about the role of culture in International Relations. In contrast to other branches 
of social sciences, in the study of International Relations, as Richard Shapcott observes, 
`there has been insufficient attention paid to the way in which confrontation and contact 
between states, cultures and civilisations may work to change the internal constitution 
and self- understandings of the "subjects" involved' .111 
(c) Challenges to Norms in International Society 
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The above actors have given various responses to the norms of democratic 
government as a new principle of legitimacy in international society. This is particularly 
because the norms in international society are not fixed and they have been contested by 
many Third World leaders. The norms of democratic government, for example, are only 
a tendency in the debate about values in international society. Still, whatever their 
formulations, they reflect the practical developments in the world after the end of the 
Cold War and have some implications for the Third World states in establishing the 
legitimacy of their own government in international society. 
Historical experiments can show how general norms in international society, 
particularly regarding the role of the state inform the understanding of the state in some 
Third World countries. The Third World states were included in international society as 
they gained independence particularly after World War II. Although they existed as, 
what Jackson called, `quasi- states' being unable to apply their fuII sovereign power, they 
were treated as equal partners with other independent states.112 This was provided they 
fulfill the formal criteria of statehood such as having `a government, a territory, a 
population, and a capacity to enter into international relations or fulfill international 
obligations' 113, they can be part of the international society. In its initial expansion in the 
early twentieth century, China and Japan changed their political and legal institutions to 
meet these minimal requirements so that they could join international society.t14 
In its development, as Bull also recognizes, this standard of civilisation coming 
originally from the 'West' has been challenged and questioned.115 Bull particularly 
mentions five phases and themes of challenges from the Third World countries.116 The 
first phase was the struggle of these countries to gain equal sovereignty with the core 
members of international society. The second phase included the struggle against 
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`Japan's Entry into International Society', in ibid., pp. 185-200. 
115 Bull, `A Universal...', in Bull and Watson (eds.), op. cit., p. 123. 
116 Bull, `The Revolt ...', in Bull and Watson (eds.), op. cit., pp. 220 -223. 
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colonialism. The third phase is a struggle to demand racial equality or a struggle against 
Western supremacy. The fourth phase demands economic justice. The final theme or 
fifth phase is marked by the struggle for the rights to express their culture and values as 
equal to those in the West. Bull describes this as a struggle for cultural liberation. It 
includes the struggle to change the intellectual ascendancy of the Western world so that 
the newly independent countries can assert their own identity and spirit. i17 
The challenges also reflect the need to reformulate political identity in the Third 
World countries. This reformulation has a long history. To build their own identity in 
the Cold War era, for example, was to build a middle way between the East and the 
West. This was materialised in, for example, the non -alignment movement. The 
movement voiced alternative concerns and attempted to reduce the tensions created by 
the Cold War between the Uni Soviet and the United Stated blocs. It also struggled for 
more justice in the economic, political and communications system in the world. 
Such an identity, however, has to be redefined with the end of bipolarity and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The issues which are relevant now relate to cultural 
identity. These countries have reached what Bull called the final theme or fifth phase 
marked by the claims of cultural strength and political identity. With the support of 
some intellectuals, these countries show their confidence in facing Western criticisms by 
offering their own concepts of human rights and democracy. It had been hoped that by 
promoting an alternative version of democracy and human rights, the countries would 
gain sympathy and support from other Third World countries. These so- called non- 
democratic countries would regain their confidence in international society. 
The above response to the changing structure of international society illustrates 
the problems with the common belief that the Third World countries as new actors in 
international society need to embrace basic structures and values of the `the nation -state 
in the European sense' .118 At least, not all norms and institutions have been embraced 
completely. The introduction of liberal states, ethics in good governance and ideas of 
117 Ibid., p. 222. 
118 Quoted in Jackson, ibid., p. 534. 
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democracy from the West, as mentioned, have brought about a redefinition of 
democracy and the role of the state. This, then, leads to the claims that the new 
definition and mechanism needs to be based on specific cultures and histories popularly 
labelled `Asian values' and `Asian democracy'. 
The concept of sovereignty given the above context is very important for these 
countries. It is not surprising that any change to the meaning of absolute sovereignty has 
been contested by Third World states. These countries regard sovereignty as the 
fundamental characteristic of international society. Although some cannot ensure their 
status as independent states without protection from big countries, they require equal 
treatment with other states. According to Jackson, such states apply a `negative 
sovereignty' rather than a `positive sovereignty'. The countries with a 'negative 
sovereignty' lack power to guarantee their sovereignty. Some of these states, notably in 
Africa, were seen as `quasi- states' which lacked `empirical criteria for statehood' such 
as clear authority, transparency, effective and clean government, all considered 
necessary for modern states. 119 
Some countries in the Third World have attempted to change their `negative 
sovereignty' to `positive sovereignty' by creating a `good government'. There have been 
some attempts to fulfill what Robert Jackson calls some basic `operative component(s) 
of empirical statehood'.120 Unlike some states in Africa in which their existence as 
states relies only upon international recognition of their sovereignty (international 
courtesy),121 some states like Japan and various Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) 
in East Asia, and some of the Southeast Asian states studied here, have attempted to 
build effective and legitimate government organizations.' 22 
However, the mechanisms to achieve good government in these countries are 
different from those in the West. They sometimes rely more on the leadership roles and 
Jackson, op. cit., pp. 526 -529. 
20 Ibid., p. 526. 
21 Ibid., p. 529. 
22 Christopher Clapham, `Introduction: Liberalization, Regionalism and Statehood in the new 
Development Agenda', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1996, p. 593. 
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personal powers in government, than on impersonal mechanisms institutionalized within 
a parliamentary system such as in Western liberal democracy. This particular example 
means that not all Western ideas of statehood originally deriving from the ideas of the 
liberal state, and particularly the `liberal concept of a civil state',123 are adopted. There 
have been adjustments and adaptations made by these countries. The most successful 
imposition of Western ideas is referred to `occultation'. Under this, new ideas in 
Western civilisation displace the old ideas, but the old ideas are not totally suppressed. 
As Kinhide Mushakoji argues, the old idea is still in the minds of the people and ready 
to manifest itself in time of crisis.124 
What is adapted, at least, is not as complete as it is imagined as part of 
international society in its original Western boundary. Liberalism, for example, is not 
adopted for the sake of individual freedom in domestic politics.125 Liberalism is not 
socialized as liberty for individual human beings but as a freedom of the state as an 
actor in international society.126 The idea of liberalism in politics, economy and the state 
is not rejected but reinterpreted for the need of national salvation.127 
In the post -Cold War period, such a narrative of national salvation relates closely 
to the politics of identity promoted to maintain the nation -building programs. National 
salvation means that the role of the state needs to be strengthened and its power needs to 
be concentrated in order to overcome the problems of internal disintegration let alone to 
counter external intervention. It also means that the state is free to choose alternative 
means of development. Particularly in the cases of China and the Southeast Asian 
countries, these states view the NICs' examples of economic success, and not the liberal 
democracy system in the West, as the best path for fulfilling progress and growth.128 
23 Ibid., p. 535. 
24 Robert Cox, `Civilisations in World Political Economy', New Political Economy, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
1996, p. 146. 
125 Hughes, op. cit., p. 428. 
126 Ibid., p. 430. 
127 Ibid., p. 428. 
es Ibid., pp. 432, 435. 
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In the national salvation concept, the government was given a mission or treated 
like a `trustee'129 to realize economic progress, survival of the state and political 
stability. The penetration of the state into the life of the individual is justified for this 
mission of the nation. Some states have taken the policy of depolitization, strengthened 
the authoritarian style of government, and chosen an orientation to development by 
adopting the state corporatism model. 
The challenges to this political restructuring process from opposition movements 
in domestic politics, in the above framework, are often not met by making the system 
more responsive to liberalization demands as suggested by some Western countries but 
by appealing for support from the masses of the necessity of such a system by using 
cultural idioms. Similarly the response to the changing norms in international society is 
not made by reforming the political system in line with common Western standards, but 
by using cultures and values to mobilize the attachment of people to the existing 
political institutions. The systems are described by their leaders as the most appropriate 
ones because they develop from the historical and cultural needs of their countries. 
From this action `boundary making'13o designed to define the identity of the 
state, takes place. It is often that in the process of strengthening identity, the leaders of 
the states in Southeast Asia, distinguish their political systems from those in the West. 
The Western systems, for example, are portrayed as different from their systems. They 
also attempt to illustrate and develop specific cultural contents of democracy in order to 
make their system distinguishable from other political systems. In particular, this kind of 
argument is invoked as a response to the demands for fulfilling the standards of 
democracy and human rights in international society after the end of the Cold War. 
(d) A Claim to a `New Identity'? 
The international environment has changed dramatically after the end of the Cold 
War giving new meaning to the importance of a distinctive claim of democracy such as 
129 Bilahari Kausikan, 'Governance That Work', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1997, p. 27. 
3° Friedman, op. cit., p. 129. 
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`Asian democracy'. The domestic context of the claims discussed in the first part of this 
chapter remains important and will become the main focus of the case studies since 
experiences with `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' take place mainly in the 
domestic context. It is from the domestic context that we can understand how far the 
claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' have challenged efforts to find `shared 
values' of democracy in the international context. 
In the international society perspective, the claims of `Asian values' and `Asian 
democracy' engage a social process designed to strengthen and renew state identity in 
the face of changing norms of international society. To illustrate how this `politics of 
identity' works, I outline the context of international society within which the identity is 
designed. 
The claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' can be seen as an attempt to 
strengthen state identity within the changing structures and norms of international 
relations. To survive and to be seen as legitimate actors in international relations, the 
countries need to adjust to their new environment. In the post Cold War era, this new 
environment comes into existence through the changing attitude of the Western media, 
parliaments and administrations with regard to human rights and democracy. While 
during the Cold War, these Western liberal democratic institutions tolerated 
authoritarian states as long as they were in the Western bloc, after the end of the Cold 
War, they no longer held this position. These Western governments now demonstrate a 
heightened concern for the problems of democratic government and violations of human 
rights in their former Third World allies. 
The perceptiveness to problems of human rights and democracy in the 
international environment has been a long term concern in international relations 
theories. The international society perspective may explain effectively this concern with 
human rights and democracy and the claims of 'Asian values' and `Asian democracy'. 
Within this tradition of thought, commonly labelled the `English school' in International 
Relations, the claims of `Asian democracy' can be understood as part of a reaction to the 
further expansion of international society from its original Western boundaries. The 
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countries promoting `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' have engaged and interacted 
with other states, particularly with Western states.131 The claims have been used as way 
to strengthen their national identity in response to this changing attitude of Western 
government to democracy and human rights norms in international society. The 
perspective of international society explains not only the strengthening of the national 
identity of Third World countries in the face of the universalisation of Western values 
and ideas, but also the adaptations and adjustments to the ideas. Such adjustments are 
made in order to be recognised as a legitimate member of international society. 
Given the fact that there have been some adjustments, adaptations and also 
rejections of some Western standards of civilisation, the last question which needs to be 
addressed in this approach is why and how the above politics of identity can take place. 
There are two possible answers. 
Firstly, new norms such as liberal democracy and human rights which become 
new requirements in international society are not consistently applied because of the 
pragmatic attitudes of Western countries as explained by Buzan. Buzan highlights the 
cul -de -sac nature of the international society perspective. He offers a solution through 
combining the Waltzian international systems concept with Bull's concept of 
international society. In his concept of concentric circles, Buzan argues that with the 
United States located in the center and other big powers in the European community 
situated in the core of the circle this can guarantee the implementation of shared values 
in this international society.132 However, in practice, as Fred Halliday'33 and Ken 
Booth134 explain, the guardian of international society is not always able to guarantee 
that the principle and norms of international relations can apply fairly to all members of 
international society. 
131 The strengthening of national and state identity, according to David Armstrong, takes place 
together with globalisation processes. The interactions one state with another have given them 
experience leading to a strengthening of their state identity. See, David Armstrong, `Globalization 
and the Social State', Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, 1998, pp. 461 -478. 
32 Buzan, op. cit., p. 349. 
33 Fred Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 102. 
134 Ken Booth, `Duty and Prudence', in L. Freedman (ed.), Military Intervention in European 
Conflicts (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 58. 
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The US has been able, in Buzan's view, to mobilise members of the international 
society to unite against Iraq's intervention in Kuwait. He said that `The Persian Gulf 
War in 1991 illustrates particularly clearly how the concentric circles of international 
society operated and identified themselves in relation to one violent and fundamental 
challenge to the existence of its accepted members.'115 But the system he attempts to 
build seems to legitimate domination by the West. The system, as he recognized, could 
not solve what he categorised as issues of the outer layer of the concentric circle of 
international society such as Bosnian case.136 In Bosnia's case, the system failed to 
adequately and quickly respond to the problem. 
Such issues bother the Third World countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia. 
For some leaders of these countries, Western states are seen as only pursuing their 
interests and strengthening their domination in the world rather than seriously 
implementing the norms of non -intervention and of non -use of force. In his speeches, 
Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, for example, criticized the West for not 
taking any action against the killing of Bosnians. Some Malaysian academics, such as 
Chandra Muzaffar, are also staunch critics of Western inconsistency in applying 
`accepted norms' in international society. He says that a lack of consistency in applying 
the principles of non -intervention, human rights and democracy, for example, will result 
in the 'West's' commitment to these principles being `totally discredited' in Third 
World countries.137 
Secondly, the continuing claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' are 
also made possible by critiques from within Western cultures and values themselves. 
One important criticism comes from the post -modern approach which attacks not only 
Western political practices but also the basic assumptions of Western modernity. The 
domination of Western modernity, for this approach, has silenced the rising up of 
35 Buzan, op. ct .., p. 349. 
36 Ibid., p. 350. 
37 Chandra Muzaffar, `Europe, Asia and the Question of Human Rights', Just Commentary, No. 23, 
March 1996. 
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alternative voices. That is why this approach welcomes the emergence of dissenting 
voices in various cultural systems in the world against Western values. 
Another problem inherent in Western modernity, which can weaken liberalism as 
a legitimising ideology for international order comes from cleavages within Western 
liberalism itself. James Richardson mentions that the political differences and tensions 
range, between, among others, Whigs and radicals, Girondins and Jacobins, and the 
liberalism of privilege versus the liberalism of egalitarian democracy. He argues that the 
resolution of these differences, will be necessary before the acceptance of Western 
liberalism's claims to universality. t38 
The tensions within liberalism itself may also explain why the West, as Bozeman 
argues, does not have `a globally meaningful system' which can inform the world.139 
She appears to strengthen Huntington's argument that the West is unique but not 
universal.140 In this case, one particular example of the universalisation of liberalism is 
discussed by Tanji and Lawson. In line with Richardson, these authors point out that 
liberal democracy as part of Western liberalism' s claims to universality has invited 
resistance in the non -Western world. They observe that liberal democracy as a specific 
form of democracy based on Western experience has been met by a particularisation of 
democracy in the form of the `Asian democracy' claims in some Asian countries.141 
This kind of criticism has left a space for non -Western states to reclaim the 
legitimacy of their current political system in facing globalised Western political 
institutions. This encourages these states to aspire to a position of equal status, 
irrespective of domestic problems, as a part of international society. There are two kinds 
of manoeuvers which they have pursued so far. Firstly, the countries have adapted 
minimal standards of Western liberalism so that they will be accepted as a part of 
international society. These countries, at least, try to avoid being treated as pariahs in 
138 James L. Richardson, Contending Liberalisms: Past and Present, Working Paper No 1995/10, 
(Canberra: Department of International Relations, ANU, 1995). 
39 Bozeman, op. cit., p. 404. 
140 Huntington, `The West Unique... op. cit., pp. 37 -41. 
41 Tanji and Lawson, op. cit., p. 136. 
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international society. Secondly, as Bull mentions, these countries aspire to a kind of 
cultural and intellectual equality as held by Western states.142 hi some cases, this is 
followed by the claims that `Asian values' sustains a communitarian system. For these 
countries, these aspirations are expected to also inform the practices of states in 
international society. 
C. THE USES OF THE FRAMEWORK 
To understand properly another form of `the revolt against the West' inherent in 
the claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy', this thesis will elaborate three case 
studies: Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. By using the framework discussed in the 
previous section, I attempt to explain the complex issues behind `Asian values'. The 
claims are not mainly about manipulation of culture to justify the need to maintain 
political power by certain elites in those three countries, as some notable critics have 
argued. It is also an effort to adapt culture to the need for modern economic and political 
systems, and to strengthen national identity. With regard to national identity, some of 
Singaporean and Malaysian leaders for example, confidently show their current systems 
as worthy of consideration as examples for other Third World countries. The complex 
ideas behind the claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy', however, have been 
contested and debated within the three countries themselves. Their values, usefulness, 
purposes and significance have been questioned by many opposition groups. 
International relations provides a context for the above debate. The rules, values 
and `shared norms' in international relations frame the importance of `Asian values' and 
`Asian democracy'. However, as explained below, the main concern for the debate in 
international relations so far is with the political and ideological aspects behind the 
claims. The debate has not really discussed the complex cultural and historical 
background behind the claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy'. To overcome 
these weaknesses, I will use the theoretical framework discussed above, Before looking 
142 Bull, `The Revolt...,' op. cit., pp. 222 -223. 
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at the applicability of the alternative framework as an explanation of these case studies, I 
outline some problems of generalisation created in perceiving `Asian values' and `Asian 
democracy' in international relations. 
1. The Problem of Generalisation 
In `Asian democracy' debates, there are two problems of generalisation which 
need to be critically examined with regard to both the proponents and critics of `Asian 
values' and `Asian democracy'. Firstly, the majority of the critics and proponents of 
`Asian values' tend to pick up on the statements and rhetoric of Asian policy makers and 
academics and label them as representing `Asians'. They tend to speak and represent 
'Asian' as a single category within which there are similar views of, and approaches to 
democracy.143 The rhetoric of `Asian values' as promoted by Southeast Asian leaders 
such as Mahathir, Anwar Ibrahim, Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Chok Tong is often seen by 
them in terms of a pan -Asian construct.'44 
Secondly, both the proponents and the critics of `Asian values' tend to select the 
sources of the claims of `Asian democracy' only to defend their positions. This selective 
reading of `Asian democracy' has introduced some simple generalisations of the claims 
of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy'. A majority of critics of `Asian democracy', 
for example, argue that the claims are only one way of authoritarian regimes to maintain 
power.145 However, the proponents of `Asian democracy' claim that there have been 
traditional values such as patrimonialism and communalism which support the existence 
of a so- called `Asian style democracy 146 
as See for examples, Kishore Mahhubani, `The Pacific Way, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1, January- 
February 1995; Bilahari Kaukasikan, `Asia's Different Standard', Foreign Policy, Vol. 32, No. 92, 
Autumn 1993; Aryeh Neier, `Asia's Unacceptable Standard', Foreign Policy, Vol. 32, No. 92, 
Autumn 1993; Yoíchi Funabashi, `The Asianization of Asia', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5, 
November- December 1993. 
wa Dupont, op. cit., p. 14. 
45 Chen Maiping, `What are "Asian values " ?' in NIASnytt, no 2, 1997; Aryeh Neier, `Asian Values' 
versus `Human Rights', FDL - AP Archives, <http: / /web. kyoto- 
inet. or. jp/ org /bigkarma/fdlap /fdessay2.html >; Christopher Lingle, International Herald Tribune, 
Friday 7 October 1994; Aryeh Neier, `Asia's Unacceptable Standard', Foreign Policy, Vol. 32, No. 
92, Autumn 1993. 
146 Neher, op. cit.; Pye, op. cit.; Reeve, op. cit.; Vatikiotis, op. cit. 
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The main problem with the above generalisations is that they fail to examine the 
claims and the counter- claims to `Asian democracy' and `Asian values' in individual 
countries. Since the claims have impacted on democratisation, particularly on the 
possibility of opposition to emerge in those individual countries, the political dynamics 
in the countries need to be examined thoughtfully. Without assessing the claims in 
individual countries, we cannot know the exact motivation and context of the claims. In 
particular, such a generalisation disregards the fact that the emergence of 'Asían 
democracy' may depart from different motivations and political situations in each of the 
countries studied. The discourses of `Asian values' in Malaysia and Singapore, for 
example, are influenced by their Ieader's assumptions about Western political, economy 
and cultural hegemony over Asia. Whereas in Indonesia, the same discourse is 
particularly influenced by cultures and nationalist sentiments. So the responses to the 
assumption of Western hegemony and pressures vary from one Asian country to 
another. Not all Asian countries and people consider it important to strengthen a sense 
of being Asians as a part of the Pan -Asian project against `the West'. 
There is a need, therefore, to study the kind of political system and society from 
which the claims emerge. In particular, we need to examine the complexity of culture 
and contesting ideas taking place in individual societies of Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore. Although, some facts show that many institutions and terms of the political 
system in these countries have actually been adopted from those in Western liberal 
democratic states, they do not reflect the essence of values and ideas of democracy in 
their original country in similar ways. Concepts such as general elections and political 
parties, for example, clearly follow Western ideas of democracy but their application 
differs from one Southeast Asian country to another. For example the degree of 
competition in general elections in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia (during the 
Soeharto years) varies greatly. 
In terms of opposition movements in the above societies, the general tendency in 
the debate to use the term `Asian', also neglects the fact that there have been those 
attempting to find a long term solution and the best form of political system in each 
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Southeast Asian society.147 These people might be neither liberal nor authoritarian in 
their political orientation. As Garry Rodan argues they can be non -state actors who do 
not necessarily follow liberal democratic ideas. Their organizational structure may not 
be democratic and egalitarian.148 Nevertheless, some of these actors attempt to do justice 
to their nation and to make the universal ideas of democracy blend with their cultural 
traditions.149 These societal dynamics might also be different from one country to 
another. 
The debate has located the fact that some leaders of these countries have talked 
about a common platform to counter `Western pressures' on issues such as human rights 
and democracy. On some occasions, as in ASEAN, a common attitude often emerges. 
The Bangkok declaration in 1993 is the best example of an Asian discourse on human 
rights and democracy. 
The countries studied here have been said to respond in rather similar ways to 
what they perceive as Western intervention in domestic problems. This applies, 
however, only in limited cases. In the discourses of `Asian democracy', there have been 
significant differences within the imperatives and elements elaborated. The historical 
background of `Asian democracy', the components elaborated in its discourses and the 
goals of its discursive practices differ from one country to another. In short, there have 
also been significant differences in the instrumental use of culture from one country to 
another. This difference, as Wright -Neville says, relates to the political infrastructure in 
each society which is defined by the degree of generic dialogue allowed in countries, 
and which determines decisively the form, characteristics and acceptance of `Asian 
cultures'.350 
The infrastructure of each society can be related to the history of the nation as 
well as to recent conditions. For example, how far dissent is tolerated and dialogue is 
47 Joseph Chan, `Hong Kong, Singapore, and "Asian Values "', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 
1997, pp. 35 -36. 
48 Garry Rodan, `Civil Society and Other Political Possibilities in Southeast Asia', Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1997, p. 157. 
49 Chan, op. cit., p. 36. 
150 Wright 
-Neville, op. cit., p. 21. 
64 
allowed to achieve consensus, and what is important in the formation of `a national 
culture' in a society, depends on historical and social conditions. In countries with little 
or no record of military intervention, and very little violent repression, contests of 
different ideological views aimed at achieving ideological hegemony, or what Gramsci 
calls `war of position', are more likely to take place and can Iead to the formation of a 
common discourse.f51 In contrast, in countries which have experienced military 
intervention and oppression, it is more likely that the formation of a `national culture' is 
directed from above. 
2. The Application of the Framework 
The theoretical framework discussed is useful, particularly to overcome the 
above misunderstandings of `Asian values' and 'Asian democracy'. The claims `Asian 
values' may have its roots in the social, political and historical conditions of the 
countries studied. The historical experiences of leaders have influenced the kind of 
political system they want to develop. Such experiences are also important in the nature 
of dialogue and discourse in a society. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore had different 
colonial experiences and inherited different political mechanisms. Malaysia and 
Singapore adopted British political institutions while Indonesia attempted to find its 
own system following the failure of a Western model of liberal democracy. In the 
Malaysian and Singaporean cases, there has been quite significant competition for 
public positions, which, to a certain extent, encourages different opinions on public 
si Anthony Milner, The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), pp. 2 -3. 
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issues. In Indonesia, mass -based political parties and competition among them have 
been banned so that competition only takes place at the elite level. 
National leaders of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, however, claim to share 
a common experience as former colonies. They regard themselves as having 
experienced democratic revolution, claim to have endorsed democratic values and 
adopted a liberal democratic system immediately after the independence of their 
nations.152 However, this experience did not necessarily lead to the formation and 
maintenance of a democratic political system. The system depended a great deal on the 
consensus among political leaders.153 For example, there has been a consensus among 
elites to maintain a modified Iiberal democracy system after the independence of 
Malaysia and Singapore, whereas this did not occur in the case of Indonesia.154 This 
complex process ensures that responses to `Western pressures' are also different from 
one country to another.155 It is by understanding this process, that a better approach in 
international relations toward democracy and democratisation in these countries may be 
discovered. 
152 About the emergence of democracy ideas in Indonesian revolution, see Syamsuddin Harris, 
Demokrasi di Indonesia, Gagasan dan Pengalaman (Democracy in Indonesia, Ideas and 
Experiences) (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1994). 
153 About the relations between elite consensus and the persistence of democracy, see Syed Farid 
Alatas, The Rise of Democratic and Authoritarian Post -Colonial States: the Case of Indonesia and 
Malaysia (A PhD Dissertation Submitted to the John Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, 
1991). 
154 Ibid. 
155 Freeman, op. cit., pp. 354 -355. 
Chapter II 
`ASIAN VALUES' AND `ASIAN STYLE DEMOCRACY' IN SINGAPORE 
Among Southeast Asian countries, Singapore is the country most vigorously promoting 
`Asian values' and `Asian democracy'. In spite of its tiny size and small population, 
Singaporean academics, diplomats and governmental officials voice their belief about 
the importance of `Asian values' behind the success of Asian political and economic 
system. In contrast to other Southeast Asían countries, their claims of `Asian values' are 
materialised in a national ideology of `Shared Values', which was formulated clearly 
and systematically. The so- called `Singapore school' is the strongest promoter of `Asian 
values' and `Asian democracy' both for Singaporeans and Asians in general. 
Some criticisms have been made of Singapore's claim of `Asian values'. Critics, 
particularly Western political leaders, human rights scholars and activists, are concerned 
with the political and ideological agendas behind the claim.' The pronouncement of 
`Asian values' and `Asian democracy' is seen particularly as an effort of the 
Singaporean government, under the single party rule of the People's Action Party 
(PAP), to maintain its political hegemony, vision and support from Singaporeans. More 
importantly, Singapore's advocates of `Asian values' are criticised as `apologists for 
tyranny'2 whose efforts jeopardise the role of opposition parties. Such criticism arises, 
according to Michael Leifer, because Singapore is seen as a soft authoritarian state 
which in terms of the global discourse on human rights, often abuses human rights.3 The 
claim of `Asian democracy' has also been seen as offering an alternative model for 
democracy and development which may contradict the general tendency to accept the 
Western notions of human rights and democracy as `shared values' and representative of 
new standards of civilisation in international society.4 
Joseph Chan, 'Hong Kong, Singapore, and "Asian Values "', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 2. 
1997, pp. 35 -36. 
The Straits Times, 28 January 1996: and see also Chen Maiping, `What are "Asian values " ?' in 
NIASnytt, no 2, 1997, p. 6. 
The Straits Times, 28 January 1996. 
° For a discussion of the emergence of new standards of civilisation, see, Jack Donnelly, `Human 
Rights: a New Standard of Civilisation', International Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1, 1998. 
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Other critics comment on the way the values have been defined. They argue that 
because of the limited space for political debates 'Asian values' have become a 
government model designed to serve government needs rather than the people's needs.5 
The critics argue that the values should be discussed and debated in Singaporean society 
if they are to he national values. In an international context, the discourses on `Asian 
values' and `Asian democracy' have been regarded as a construction of `Asia' 
introducing relative values instead of universal values needed to support necessary 
`shared values' in international society. It is, according to these critics, designed to 
contrast with `Western', particularly `American values' .6 
Many of the above critiques depart from the assumption that the claims of `Asian 
values' are a reaction to the spread of liberal democracy after the collapse of totalitarian 
governments in Eastern Europe. In an era where there has been a promise of the 
diffusion of liberal democracy, the claims of `Asian values' are regarded as a threat 
which can hinder the democratisation processes in some Asian countries. These 
critiques, however, disregard the fact that the search for a Singaporean identity suitable 
for achieving development targets, using, among others, the claims of `Asian values', 
have actually been taking place since the separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 
1965. A loss of `Asian values' among the Singaporean Chinese had been a concern of 
Singapore's first Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew since the end of 1970s, far before the 
end of the Cold War,7 The debate concentrating on the fundamental opposition between 
`Asian and Western values' where 'Western values' were represented as culturally 
s See International Herald Tribune, 2 August 1994, as reported by The Straits Times, 13 June 1995; 
see also James Minchin, `Internal Control and External Propaganda', a lecture given in Conference 
on `Political Dissent in Singapore', 29 November 1997, see 
( <http: / /www.pactok. net/docs/singapore/jrainchin.htm>). 
a The Straits Times, 15 October 1994; Aryeh Neier, `Asian Values' versus `Human Rights', FDL - 
AP Archives, <http: // web. kyoto -inet. or. jp/ org /bigkarma/idlap /fdessay2.html>, Christopher Lingle, 
International Herald Tribune, Friday 7 October 1994. 
Raj Vasil, Asianising Singapore, the PAP's Management of Ethnicity (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 
1995), p. 65. 
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polluting and 'Eastern values' were not, could be traced from Lee Kuan Yew's speeches 
from the middle of the 1970s.8 
This chapter, therefore, argues that it is important to see the claims of `Asian 
values' and `Asian democracy' in the broader social and historical context of the 
Singaporean state. Such an elaboration will help explain whether the claims contradict 
efforts to seek out `shared values' in international society. In this context, it is necessary 
to understand at least two factors behind Singapore's claims of `Asian values' and 
`Asian democracy', before judging whether the claims are harmful to democracy as one 
of the universal `shared values' in international society or not. Firstly, from the 
historical, political and social context of Singaporean society, the claims of `Asian 
values', reflect a long process of searching for national identity. As a multi- ethnic state 
dominated by Chinese migrants, claims such as `Asian values' can serve as an 
overarching concept accepted by various ethnic minority groups. The claims of `Asian 
values' are also part of a long ideological campaign to mobilise support for government 
policies. Among concepts used in this campaign were survivalism, pragmatism and 
Confucianism. The campaign is particularly aimed at keeping Singaporeans aware of the 
dangers faced by their country if they do not unite behind the government. `Asian 
values' and `Shared Values' are the latest ideological formulations of this mobilisation 
of support. 
Secondly, it is important to understand that the claims reflect the more assertive 
style of Singaporean academics and government spokespersons. The claims go so far as 
to suggest that Singapore's success can be a model for other developing countries. Some 
Singapore academics have identified the values behind this success, while others go 
further to formulate `Asian' concepts of democracy and an economic system based on 
those values. The definition of `Asian values' may be clear, but their interpretations as a 
philosophical support for a distinctive Singaporean model of democracy as an 
alternative to the dominant `liberal democracy' model is far from fixed. Except for the 
John Clammer, Singapore, Ideology, Society and Culture (Singapore: Chopmen Publishers, 1985), 
p. 22. 
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elites' rhetoric that Singapore is different from the West and therefore it has to reject 
'Westernisation', there is no final agreement either on an alternative system or on the 
applicability of Western concepts of democracy in Singapore. 
Given these two factors, Western governments' concerns that the Singaporeans' 
claims of `Asian democracy' may be detrimental to the spread of universal ideas of 
democracy are not justified. These concerns do not take into account the fact that this 
assertive style still leaves many unresolved issues of political development in Singapore. 
In addition, the formulation of a better political format for Singapore continues as a 
solemn debate among politicians and academics within that country. Similar claims 
about `Asian democracy' and Pancasila democracy in Malaysia and Indonesia (as will 
be discussed on Chapters III and IV), the claims of `Asian values' and Singapore's 
specific form of democracy are ways to respond and adjust to ideas of democratic 
government as conceptualised in the West within Singaporean context. This adjustment 
process has been continuously contested and questioned within Singapore. Given this 
open -ended and long -term process, it is difficult to see any direct theoretical and 
philosophical challenges to the Western models of democracy in the near future. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. Firstly, it examines the political and 
historical conditions that led to the formation of a soft authoritarian political system and 
a strong government in Singapore, or an `Asian style democracy'. Secondly, it 
elaborates the use of ideology as a mechanism mobilising majority support for 
government political restructuring policies. Thirdly, it shows further the way the PAP 
government socialises its concept of identity to Singaporeans by portraying the West as 
the main threat. This is followed by discussion of some challenges to both the concept 
of identity and the strategy to realise it as advanced by opposition leaders. Fourthly, it 
discusses the assertiveness of Singaporean leaders and academics in formulating 'Asian 
values' and their critiques in the international society context. 
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A. FROM A PART OF THE MALAYSIAN FEDERATION TO A `STRONG 
GOVERNMENT' 
The origin of a Singapore style of democracy can be found in a period when the 
country was still a part of the Malaysian Federation. There are at least two factors that 
lead to the PAP's claim about Singapore's specific model of democracy. The first factor 
was the experience with opposition and the second deals with the social and 
demographic reality of Singapore. After elaborating these two factors, I examine the 
depoliticisation process in Singapore and the justification used by PAP leaders for the 
process. 
1. Experiences with Opposition 
Lee Kuan Yew's experience with opposition parties led him to believe that 
Singapore does not need a strong opposition. The PAP's experience of bitter opposition 
from communist elements within its own ranks during the first years after independence, 
and Ifter from Barisan Sosialis in the 1960s, created a mind -set suspicious of the 
destabilising impact of opposition parties and their ability to disturb the process of 
governance. Lee even believes that opposition was `inimical to national unity and 
stability'. His attitude has been inherited by the second generation of leaders such as PM 
Goh Chok Tong. For Goh, Singapore has to have stability before people can talk about 
democracy. 
The friction between the PAP and Barisan Sosialis (BS) began in 1961. The 
source of the friction came from the leftist faction within the PAP, later known as the 
BS. This pro -communist faction nearly seized control of the PAP, and was only 
prevented from taking power by the military intervention of the British.9 At that time, 
Singapore's political life was praised by Chan Heng Chee as relatively open and 
competitive.10 In two general elections in 1959 and 1963, there was vigorous 
e James Cotton, `Review Articles, Singapore Scrutinized', The Pacific Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1991, 
p. 185 
to Chan Heng Chee, `The Political System and Political Change', in Riaz Hassan (ed.), Singapore: 
Society in Transition (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 41 -45. 
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competition among the main political parties. In the 1959 election, PAP won 43 of 51 
seats in Parliament with 54.1 per cent of total votes. However, its candidates were 
defeated in two by- elections in 1961. After the friction within PAP resulted in the 
formation of the BS, the PAP gained only 34 of 51 seats in Parliament while its total 
votes fell to 46.9 per cent in the 1963 election." In that year the central issue was that of 
the integration of Singapore into Malaysia. The pro -communist and chauvinist elements 
in BS opposed the integration with Malaysia while the PAP supported it.12 After 
integration, the PAP promoted equal rights among citizens and strongly opposed 
UMNO's policies of promoting special status for Malays. The clashes with BS ended in 
1968 when BS members who were affiliated with communist and pro -communist 
movements13 withdrew from the parliament. Many BS leaders were detained after 1963. 
This withdrawal and detention opened the way for the PAP to exercise full control over 
Singapore politics. 
The accusation of communist affiliation is only one way to discredit the 
opposition. There have also been other ways of discrediting opposition leaders. The 
PAP government, for example, succeeded in removing the only opposition member 
from parliament, JB Jeyaretnam of the Workers' Party (WP), by using the pretext 
criminal charges in collecting party funds in 1986. The leader of SDP Chee Soon Juan 
was sacked from his teaching position in the National University of Singapore for 
joining the opposition. In the 1997 election, Tang Liang Hong, a parliamentary 
candidate from the WP was accused of being a `Chinese chauvinist' and `anti- English 
educated and anti -Christian' because he used racial issues during the election 
Mid., p. 35. 
12 Raj K. Vasil, Governing Singapore (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1984), p. 22. 
s Ever since 1968, the PAP has dominated the parliament after the Barisan Sosialis boycotted the 
1968 general election. From 1968 till the Anson by- election in 1981 where JB Jeyaretnam defeated 
a PAP candidate, the PAP took all seats in the parliament. See, Hussin Mutalib, `Singapore's First 
Elected Presidency, the Political Motivations,' in Kevin Tan and Lam Peng Er (eds.), Managing 
Political Change in Singapore, the Elected Presidency (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 
p. 173. 
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campaigns.14 Being afraid of facing court, Tang left Singapore for Malaysia and Hong 
Kong, and now lives in Australia. 
The harsh measures against opposition figures, according to RS Milne and Diane 
Mauzy, are because the PAP leaders are convinced that a `responsible government' is 
more important than a 'representative government'. In a 'responsible government', a 
government does not necessarily follow what people want, but it has a responsibility to 
guide them by pursuing long -term development policies.15 People rely on an effective 
authority or a government which can overcome any crisis in a faster and more stable 
way than in liberal democratic countries.16 With control and order, the PAP government, 
particularly under Lee Kuan Yew, as fames Minchin argues, is able to implement its 
visions and policies however strange they are.17 Still in its political system, the PAP 
government provides some channels for alternative voices through opposition parties 
and the media which sometimes report complaints to the government from the people." 
The PAP government believes that `it alone should be responsible for laying down the 
broad lines of policy' or in the words of Hussin Mutalib `it alone knew the best answer 
to the myriad problems and challenges confronting Singapore'.19 
2. Social and Demographic Reality 
For PAP, the need to control opposition and to support the supremacy of one 
dominant party was also a response to social and demographic problems faced by 
Singapore as a small island state. PAP leaders found numerous problems consolidating 
power and convincing Singaporeans that their country was viable enough to be an 
James Chin, `Anti- Christian Chinese Chauvinist and HDB Upgrades: the 1997 Singapore General 
Election', South East Asia Research, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1997, pp. 227 -228; see also Michael Haas, 
`The Politics of Singapore in the 1980's,' Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1989, pp. 
49 -51; see also, Mark Barker, 'Against the Odds: One Man's Bid for Democracy', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 15 February 1997. 
s RS. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Singapore the Legacy of Lee Kuan Yew (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1990), p. 177. 
Raymond Lim, `Effective Authority, not Democracy, is What Counts', The The Straits Times, 1 
December 1998. 
Minchin, `Internal Control ....', op. cit. 
8 Interview with Chua Beng -Huat, October 1996. 
19 Mutalib, op. cit., p. 170. 
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independent nation. The separation from Malaysia in 1965 was one main factor which 
caused such uncertainty. A significant number of Singaporeans at that time were not 
sure whether Singapore, which lacked natural resources, could survive as an 
independent nation. The belief that Singapore was unique and unnatural as a country 
because of its small size and location among big neighbours still concerns in some 
quarter today.20 
Those doubts were reasonable as there were at least three social and political 
factors that could undermine Singapore survival at that time. Firstly, there were social, 
political and economic problems. Poverty presented significant obstacles because 
Singapore did not have enough resources to handle unemployment, health, housing and 
education. The level of income at that time was similar to other newly independent 
countries in Africa and Asia. Politically the PAP government had to face communist 
threats and possible threats from neighbouring Malay countries. By using the Internal 
Security Act (ISA), the PAP overcame the communist threats by detaining Communist 
political leaders, but the threats from its neighbouring countries remained. The location 
of Singapore between two powerful Malay neighbours, Indonesia and Malaysia, forced 
them to be careful in defining their identity. Singapore's leaders had to be sensitive to 
the interests of the minority Malays within the country if they wanted to have friendly 
neighbours. The experience with `Konfrontasi' (Confrontation) with Indonesia during 
1963 -1966, when Singapore was still part of Malaysia, also strengthened the sense of 
vulnerability. 
Secondly, the viability of Singapore was in doubt when some leaders compared 
their country to neighbouring countries which failed to build strong economic and 
political orders. Those neighbouring countries were considered to have enough natural 
and human resources. They had also been built with a strong nationalism and other 
nationalistic symbols inherited from their struggles for independence. These countries 
had been struggling to end exploitation against colonialism and then applied a liberal 
20 Interview with Daljit Singh, October 1996. 
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democracy model to realise their independent goals. The majority of these countries, 
however, failed to end exploitation when they gained their independence.Y1 The 
institutions of liberal democracy in those countries were often manipulated and used to 
satisfy the interests of the elites only.22 
These developments were uppermost in the minds of Singaporean leaders such 
as Lee Kuan Yew, Gob Keng Swee, and S. Rajaratnam when they started to build 
Singapore. In comparison to these newly independent countries, Singapore did not have 
the experience of struggling for independence which could unite the whole nation. A 
national identity for Singapore had to be found and formed after its independence. This 
ensured the longevity of Singapore as a nation. 
Thirdly, Singapore is a multi -racial, multi- ethnic and multi -religious society, 
making nation building very difficult. The lack of a historical spirit of nationalism, as 
mentioned above, has added to the complicated problem of building a national identity. 
The majority of Singaporeans are of Chinese descent. The Chineses comprise 78% of 
the population, the Malays 14 %, the Indians 6 %, and the Europeans and others 2 %. One 
commentator suggests that Singapore could copy Switzerland by building its identity as 
a Free City.23 Another comparison has been made to Israel which is surrounded by Arab 
countries. Neither of these comparisons, however, satisfactorily defines Singapore. 
3. Depoliticisation and the PAP Concept of Governance 
It soon became clear, however, that Singaporean leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew 
and S. Rajaratnam had a commitment to overcoming the above problems by pragmatic 
means. Lee recognised that building a nation -state under such conditions was 
extraordinary difficult.24 One of the most immediate factors necessary for the survival of 
Singapore was the restructuring of the political system. Singaporean citizens, according 
21 Vasil, Governing... op. cit., p. 5. 
22 Ibid., p. 6. 
23 Yong Mun Cheong, `Singapore, the City -State in History', in Ban Kah Choon (et. all), Imagining 
Singapore (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1992), pp. 26 -27. 
The Straits Times, 17 August 1987. 
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to these leaders, had specific problems and needed to be depoliticised so that they could 
concentrate on the tasks of achieving development targets set by the government. At the 
same time, the depoliticisation of society meant that the government could concentrate 
on formulating and searching for good programs without being afraid of harsh critiques 
from opposition groups. 
The depoliticisation process involved at least two broad strategies. Firstly, the 
government created its own channels for political participation. However, these 
channels were also manipulated to control dissident activities. They formally aimed at 
collecting `feedback' from society with regard to government programs. In reality, they 
were often used to explain government policies from the top. Labour movements, for 
example, have been controIIed through the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC) 
since 1960.25 The government also created Citizen's Consultative Committees (CCSs) 
which were officially designed to link PAP members of parliament with their electoral 
constituency. Rather than aggregating the interests of PAP supporters, however, CCSs 
mobilise support for PAP and for Singapore's political structure.26 This has further 
curtailed freedom in Singaporean society. 
The government keeps renewing the political system by creating political fora 
such as PAP City North Action Group, PAP City East District, the Feedback Unit and 
Select Committees and Residents' Committees. There have also been the Community 
Centre Management Committees and the Peoples' Association in addition to the NTUC 
and CCSs.27 The formal goals of these organisations are to gather and receive feedback 
from society, to ensure effective government responses to people's suggestions, respond 
to recommendations and complaints, and promote social cohesion and a community 
spirit. However, there has also been a goal 'to help generate greater public awareness of 
national issues and policies' within some of these groups. It is this last goal which is 
more often promoted by PAP members than the previous goals. Members of PAP are 
25 Chan, `The Political System ...' op. ci t, pp. 42 -43. 
26 Ibid., p. 44. 
n David Birch, `Talking Politics: Radio Singapore', Continuum: The Australian Journal of Media 
and Culture, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1992, p. 
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encouraged by government officials to defend and support the government policies 
publicly.28 
Secondly, to limit the role of opposition, some Acts have been maintained. The 
most important one is the ISA (Internal Security Act), used to detain not only the 
communists but also chauvinists and religious extremists. ISA is utilised as a legal 
power to allow detention without trial. It restricts any statements which can create racial 
and religious tensions.29 Newspaper and Printing Presses (Amendment) Bill was also 
designed to prevent foreign publications from interfering in Singapore's politics.3o 
A further measure to blunt political opposition was the introduction of the 
Societies Act (1967).31 This Act limited public debate by banning student movements 
and organisations which do not specifically identify themselves as political groups. 
Meanwhile the Employment Act 1968 and the Industrial Relations Amendment Act 
were introduced to limit further industrial actions.32 According to Gary Rodan, these 
laws have effectively inhibited the emergence of independent political opposition and 
pressure groups and so limited the emergence of civil society. On the other hand, they 
strengthen the monopoly of the PAP government, tighten its community -level links and 
its control on corporatist organisms like the NTUC.33 
The restructuring of the political system can be seen as an adaptation of the 
liberal democratic system inherited from the British. The restructuring process has taken 
place in the general election mechanisms and in the institution of the Presidency. The 
PAP government changed the rules of general elections by introducing the GRCs 
(Group Representative Constituencies) in which four to six members of one party 
compete as a group with other groups from other parties. In a GRC team, there has to be 
28 Ibid. 
2° Jay Branegan, `Can Singapore, Asia's Dream Country, be a Model for West ?', The Straits Times, 
28 January 1993. 
30 The Straits Times, 31 July 1993. 
31 Chan, `The Political System ...' op. cit., p. 43. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Gary Rodan, `State- society Relations and Political Opposition in Singapore', in Garry Rodan (ed.), 
Political Oppositions in Industrializing Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 100 - 
10I. 
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a person from an ethnic minority (Malay, Indian or Eurasian). This requirement is 
designed to ensure that minority groups in society will be represented in parliament, a 
scenario not guaranteed by a single- member constituency. In reality, however, 
opposition parties often have difficulty finding a qualified person from a minority group 
to join their team to compete against strong PAP teams.34 
In August 1993, the PAP government made Constitutional amendments to the 
institution of Presidency. The President who was nominated by government and 
approved by parliament, is now elected by popular vote. His or her role is not only as 
ceremonial head of state but also includes `veto power over budget decisions, the scale 
of spending from financial reserves, and the appointment of senior officials'.35 The 
objective, by investing more power in the presidential position, is to provide the 
president with a measure of control over the government. As long as the opposition is 
weak, the government is not seriously `subjected to parliamentary checks and balances', 
so it needs an elected presidency to take over this opposition role.36 However, as in the 
1993 Presidential election, since the candidate for President was clearly selected and 
approved by the government, opposition parties doubted whether the goal to create a 
check on government power could work. It is, rather, aimed at ensuring the domination 
of the PAP and the realisation of its visions in society.37 The PAP government was 
especially concerned about the potential economic impact on national reserves and the 
nature of civil service appointments if the opposition came to power in an election. 
PAP's vision of a good state and society are often formulated in concepts such as 
the soft authoritarian state, strong and effective government and the administrative state. 
The notion of a `soft authoritarian' state was introduced by Francis Fukuyama to 
describe a system that was `a kind of paternalistic authoritarian' system with a market - 
orientation. Another characteristic of this system, according to Fukuyama, is 
sa Chin, op. cit., pp. 218 -219. 
ss Michael Leifer, `Preface', in Kevin Tan and Lam Peng Er (eds.), op. cit., p. xi. 
36 Kevin Tan and Lam Peng Er, `Introduction', in Tan and Peng Er (eds.), op. cit., p. 4. 
37 Mutalíb, op. cit., pp. 168 -169. 
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communitarianism, which emphasises group interests over individual interests.38 The 
Administrative state is a term used by Chan Heng Chee to show the depoliticisation of 
the Singaporean citizens and the limitation of political competition.39 This implies the 
increasing power of bureaucratic and administrative sectors. The administrative state is 
designed as a goal- oriented system which can ensure an effective and efficient 
government to fulfil its programs. 
The administrative state believes in technocracy where different views among 
elites and the ministers are confined to the level of implementation and priority is not 
assigned in terms of ideologies and policies. The role of a dominant party system is 
essential. The architect of the system, Lee Kuan Yew, argues that a dominant party 
system is effective in delivering good policies for the people. Whereas the idea of a two - 
party system or a loyal opposition, for him, only brought about conflicts and delayed the 
decision -making processes. Lee Hsien Loong (BG Lee), former State and Industry 
Minister, states that `The only advantage which our tiny size confers on us is its 
nimbleness, and to be nimble we need a strong government, able not only to react 
quickly but also to act quickly to master events,'4° 
What is needed then is a good and strong government. This means a government 
which has, according to Tommy Koh, former Minister for Information, attributes like 
`wise and honest political leaders; a competent and clean bureaucracy; economic 
policies that promote growth and reward enterprise and achievement' 41 Academics such 
as Daljit Singh and Chua Beng -Huat argue that the government has been successful in 
implementing these principles of good government and a strong state. In Singapore, 
Singh mentions that `there is little corruption, everything is efficient and everybody has 
a place to live in' 42 Chua maintains that Singapore is a strong state because its 
38 Francis Fukuyama, `Asia's Soft -Authoritarian Alternative', New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 9, 
No. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 60 -61. 
v Chan Meng Chee, `The PAP and the Structuring of the Political System', in Kernial Singh Sandhu 
and Paul Wheatley (eds.), Management of Success, the Moulding of Modern Singapore (Singapore: 
ISEAS, 1989), p. 78. 
30 The Straits Times, 14 November 1987. 
41 The Straits Times, 16 May 1993. 
42 Interview with Daljit Singh, a researcher in ISIS Singapore, October 1996. 
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government is able to implement much of its policy successfully without using an 
extensive repressive mechanism.43 The PAP government, according to Chua, enjoys a 
high level of legitimacy because of its successful economic program and its relatively 
clean voting mechanism.44 
In such a system, according to Lee's successor, PM Goh Chok Tong, `the party is 
there not to change the system' but to ensure that the system continues to work.45 If 
there was a split within PAP, according to Lee, it would be over policies not 
personalities.46 As a consequence, the PAP government has to choose the right people or 
in the words of Lee Hsien Loong, it `must comprise some of the ablest people in the 
country with the dedication ... to set the direction for the nation'!" Singaporean leaders 
believe that by anticipating any challenges, The PAP can maintain itself as a national 
party which is able to absorb and accommodate new political trends and values'48 and 
no other parties will be able to challenge it. 
The above depoliticisation of Singapore's society shows that in the current 
political system, there are limitations on political freedom, with the elites playing a 
significant role in the design of their society by using ideological measures. These 
measures include centralisation and accumulation of power in key political and 
bureaucratic centers. The durability of such a system, according to Bilveer Singh, can be 
explained by looking at the political culture of the migrant Chinese in Singapore.49 
According to Singh, Chinese migrants have created a consciousness of migrant culture 
which supports preservation of their wealth and promotes the fear of losing this wealth 
if they switch to opposition parties. They are, according to Singh, not political animals 
but economic animals. They rely on strong leadership and a paternalistic style of 
government.S° Elites can develop their own criteria and make their own `culture of 
as Interview with Chua Beng -Huat, a lecturer in National University of Singapore, October 1996. 
44 Ibid. 
as The Straits Times, 18 November 1987. 
46 The Straits Times, 11 November 1989. 
°' The Straits Times, 14 November 1987. 
48 The Straits Times, 15 September 1987. 
°' Interview with Bilveer Singh, October 1996. 
50 Ibid. 
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elitism' --a culture based on a rationalistic bias in selecting the leadership in many 
sectors.51 The elites also tend to believe that they alone comprehend the complex 
problems of their country and they alone have viable solutions.52 
B. IDEOLOGICAL MEASURES: FROM SURVIVAL TO `ASIAN VALUES' 
The above political model has been justified by using some ideological 
measures. There have been ideological campaigns aimed at strengthening the people's 
approval of and attachment to the political system and to foster support for restructuring 
of the political system. These campaigns attempt to justify government's harsh policies 
in political life, particularly to its policies of using security laws and other repressive 
measures to control the opposition and virtually the whole of political life in 
Singapore.53 It was very clear to the PAP leaders that harsh measures alone would not be 
effective in attracting support from the majority of citizens without persuasion. The 
majority of citizens have to be convinced, whatever the policies they take, if the country 
is to survive. 
To achieve this purpose some political and ideological measures have to be 
renewed to guarantee that the government can ensure enough support to implement 
policies. In the following, I examine some ideological measures used to maintain 
stability and economic development. I start from the ideas of the `survival state', 
Confucian values, `Asian values' and 'Shared values'. 
1. The Ideology of Survival 
The political and social conditions, geographical location and multi -racial 
problems of Singapore were only some of the challenges the leaders of Singapore had to 
face. There were other problems which became immediate challenges to the survival of 
the state. Separation from Malaysia, which meant a loss of a potential common market, 
si Chan, in Sandhu and Wheatley (eds.), op. cit., p. 81. 
Z Milne and Mauzy, op. cit., p. 111. 
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was one of them. In addition, no commodity could be sold to Indonesia because of the 
Confrontation from 1963 -1966. Communism was another threat, although politically 
suppressed. Another problem was the Singapore Malays who had been highly politicised 
during the short integration with Malaysia.54 The experience with integration made them 
aware of their own interests and their position in a broader regional setting. This might 
be translated into disruptive demands on communal grounds which could then endanger 
the unity of the new Singapore state.55 
PAP leaders, according to Chua Beng -Huat, quickly translated these historical 
conditions into an `ideology of survival' to mobilise support.56 All the potential 
problems and weaknesses of Singapore became, for the PAP leaders, means by which 
they could mobilise their people behind the government. People were reminded that if 
they failed to build the nation, its survival would be in jeopardy. They were oriented 
toward progress and inscribed with the spirit of capitalism `to develop an economically 
viable, materially prosperous, politically stable and socially cohesive nation.'57 The 
assumption behind this campaign was that it was only by orienting the people to achieve 
economic progress and by getting rid of political and ideological conflicts that 
Singapore could be a viable state. As Chan Heng Chee states, the main issue for the 
survival of Singapore was unity and discipline of direction. They had to have `a sense of 
public spiritedness and self- sacrifice in the national interest' .5s 
A depoliticisation process was justified by the need to achieve the above 
conditions. This in turn created political stability which helped the government and 
people achieve their development targets. Such an emphasis, to a certain degree, still 
applies today. To achieve economic progress, it is argued, the citizens have to commit 
themselves to the government's goals. In short, it can be said that: `At the leadership 
54 Chan Heng Chee, Singapore the Politics of Sury ival 1965 -1967 (Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, 1971), pp. 48 -54. 
ss Chua Beng -Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1995), p. 18. 
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level it demanded unified purposefulness; at the administrative level, efficiency; and at 
the popular level, obedience'.59 Through an ideology of survival, translated into a 
pragmatic `siege' strategy, the population is urged to adopt scientific and rational 
policies which bring about economic success.60 The discussion of policies is limited to 
their implementation, while the discussion of their content and formulation is highly 
restricted.61 The emphasis on survival made it possible for the government to adopt 
unpleasant policies and to make necessary interventions in public affairs. 
Although its appeal declined in the 1980s, the theme of survival sometimes re- 
emerges and is particularly repeated by Lee Kuan Yew. For example, Lee quotes Robert 
Tilman in defining the model of a unitary nation. Outlining Tilman's ideas, he states that 
Singapore is an unlikely country by any definition. In terms of unity among its people, 
Singapore has different ethnic groups, religions and languages.ó2 Lee also reminds 
Singaporeans about other countries with similar backgrounds which face domestic 
turmoil. Sri Lanka serves an example of this difficult situation, particularly so when the 
majority Sinhala government adopted Sinhalanese as the national language.63 
2. Confucianism 
hi the early 1980s Singapore's situation changed. By then the Singaporean 
middle class had grown significantly. Even former PM Lee Kuan Yew and current PM 
Goh Chok Tong describe Singapore as a `middle class society' in which 80 per cent of 
the people belong to the middle class.64 More importantly, the influence of Western 
capitalism and culture has eroded Chinese and other traditional views of this middle 
class. It was argued that because of the encouragement to master English, most of them 
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forgot their first language and much of their heritage and culture. Raj Vasil said that 
Singapore had been modernised and the risk of deculturalisation could not be denied.65 
This was followed by a growing demand for a more open political system and a 
check on government power. In 1981, for the first time in thirteen years, an opposition 
member from the Workers' Party, JB Jeyaretnam, won a seat in parliament in a by- 
election.66 In the 1984 general election, for the first time since independence, the 
percentage of votes recorded a swing away from the PAP to opposition parties. This 
swing continued further in the later elections until 1997. Support for the PAP decreased 
by 12% in 1984, from 77.7% in 1980 to 64.8 %. It further decreased to 63.1% in the 
1988 election and 61.0% in the 1991.67 In the 1997 election, the PAP regained its 
support and took 64.98 per cent of the valid vote.60 The former Foreign Minister, S. 
Dhanabalan, recognised that there had been demands for a more liberal style of 
government and even the demands to adopt political models from the West.69 More 
specifically, the demands included the right to discuss policies before their 
implementation and to have a public debate on specific issues such as on Iaws regarding 
foreign investment.70 
Afraid of losing more support from their constituents in general and the Chinese 
in particular, PAP leaders attempted to find a new consensus for their leadership. They 
looked at the fact that changing attitudes were caused by social changes in Singaporean 
society, particularly changes caused by the influence of Western values on the Chinese. 
The leaders, including Lee, attempted to restore this situation by reinventing Chinese 
cultures and heritage. The PAP Government intensified a 'Speak Mandarin Campaign' 
which started on 7 September 1979. By mastering the Mandarin language, it was 
maintained that. the Chinese could have better and fuller access to their culture, heritage 
65 
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and values. The PAP government also introduced a Religious Knowledge curriculum at 
schools, in which Confucianism was taught together with other religions. As part of the 
general program of what Vasil called Asianising Singapore' and to .help the Chinese 
restore their Chineseness, the government created a Special Assistance Plan (SAP) for 
schools in 1980. The school project placed a clear emphasis on proficiency in English 
and Mandarin as a requirement to enter the SAP schools and introduced programs 
related to the preservation of the traditional character and ethos of Chinese schools.71 
However, after working for a few years, the emphasis on the Speak Mandarin 
and Confucianism teaching was seen by the minority of Malays and Indian communities 
as detrimental to their culture and religion. The programs and campaigns were seen as 
creating a Chinese Singapore while the teaching of Confucianism was seen as 
marginalising other religions. During the early 1980s the media were full of reports 
about Confucianism, thus exacerbating the concern about the possibility of Chinese 
domination among the Malays and Indians.72 The worry that the government might 
abandon its multicultural policy, promised by Lee Kuan Yew as the founding father of 
the nation, was widespread among Malays. It was also strengthened by the visit of 
Israeli President Chaim Herzog to Singapore in 1987. For Malays who were Moslems, 
such a visit was considered show of support by the government for the occupation of the 
Palestinian land by Israel. 
The growing criticism towards the above ethnic policy changed the 
government's position. In late 1989 it dropped the teaching of religious knowledge, 
including Confucianism teachings. In this respect, George Yeo, the Information 
Minister, stated that the promotion of Chinese culture was a very sensitive area. He said 
that there had been worries about Chinese chauvinism and racial and religious 
extremism as a result of the formal promotion of Chinese culture.73 The teaching of 
Confucianism as part of religious knowledge had precipitated religious competition 
Vasil,Asianising 
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among students at school. Due to growing challenges from the minority group, Yeo said 
that the government stopped promoting the Confucianism programs at schools.74 
The impact of such a curriculum on society went further as communities put 
more emphasis on their own ethnic community concerns than on larger national issues 
such as competitiveness in a global world. The Chinese were concerned with their 
language status and standards at schools, whereas the Malays and Indians were 
concerned with the specific social, moral and economic status of their communities.75 
3. `Asian values' and Shared values 
Given the above concerns, the search for national values or ideologies to 
mobilise a new Singaporean consensus then took another turn. The PAP government 
switched to a more inclusive strategy by revitalising what it called traditional Asian 
values'. The emphasis on national identity should be a national imperative. It, according 
to Goh Chok Tong, had to go beyond immediate ethnic concerns. In this case, he argues 
that `Asian values' have kept the Singaporeans ahead in international economic 
competition.76 
Values such as thrift, hard work and enterpreneurship are regarded by many 
commentators as part of 'Asían values`, and thus should be inculcated in the people.77 
The government also placed strong emphasis on the influences of the West on 
Singaporeans, and emphasised the need to maintain Asian communitarian commitments 
in the face of the individualistic sentiment of the West. There was an urgency, according 
to the Deputy PM at that time, Goh Chok Tong, to formalise these `Asian values' into a 
national ideology.78 The national ideology, according to BG Lee, the Trade and Industry 
Minister, was needed because the Chinese were particularly affected by 
`Westernisation', more so than the Malays and Indians.79 
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However, this time, in response to Malay and Indian complaints of the likely 
domination of the Chinese, the emphasis swung from Confucianism to the negative 
influence of Western values or Westernisation on the whole nation. Learning from the 
growing criticism about the introduction of Confucianism in schools, the proposed core 
values of the national ideology were opened to public debate. The PAP government 
wanted to make sure that the core values of the national ideology were acceptable and 
inclusive enough to cover and represent the diverse ethical values in the ethnic 
communities. 
During 1989 -1991, the opposition, and members of the Chinese majority in 
parliament debated which values should be included in the National Ideology. The 
Malays still raised their concern that the national ideology could be another tool of 
Chinese domination in disguise. Malay leaders, including those within the PAP 
government, shared the sentiments of their constituency that the National Ideology 
should not mean the imposition of majority values on the minorities. One Malay 
member of Parliament from PAP, Abdullah Turmugi, for example wanted to ensure that 
the National Ideology guaranteed an open and frank discussion of racial issues.80 
Responding to the above concerns, BG Lee stated clearly that `the National 
ideology was not Confucianism by another name'. It was not aimed at imposing Chinese 
Confucian values on the minorities either. It hoped `to preserve the heritage of the 
different communities and to ensure that each community also appreciate(d) and (was) 
sensitive to the traditions of others.'81 It aimed to find `a clear set of values, strongly 
held and shared by Singaporeans'. The ideology should also be non -political and non- 
religious. Although there had been emphasis upon Confucian concepts for the Chinese 
contribution to the abstract values of the National Ideology, this had to be done in 
combination with other ideas.82 BG Lee also recognised the heritage of other values, 
$0 The Straits Times, 17 January 1989. 
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such as the importance of parents in education, the mutual -help (gotong royong) 
principle, and consensus (musyawarah) within the Malay community 
When the need for a National ideology was announced formally by the First 
Deputy PM on 29 October 1988, and then for the first time in January 1989 formulated 
by BG Lee Hsien Loong, the Minister of Trade and Industry, it consisted of 4 principles: 
(1) community over self; (2) upholding the family as the basic building block of society; 
(3) resolving major issues through consensus instead of contention; and (4) stressing 
racial and religious tolerance and harmony.83 After a debate among community leaders 
in society as reported by the media, the government in its white paper in January 1991 
announced five elements of national values which were called Shared Values. There 
were some amendments to its original proposal. The full values as reported by the White 
Paper of 6 January 1991 are: `(1) Nation before community and society above self; (2) 
Family as the basic unit of society; (3) Regard and community support for the 
individual; (4) Consensus instead of contention; (5) Racial and religious harmony.i84 
Further social, political and global changes surrounding Singapore in the 1990s 
drove the PAP government to continue their campaigns to convince the Singaporeans 
about the appropriateness of their political system. The end of the Cold War, the 
collapse of the Communist system, the internationalising of a range of social issues 
including environmental concerns, communication and mass culture,85 and the demands 
for democratisation in China and Myanmar inspired Singaporean leaders and academics 
to think of what the impact of the wave of democratisation would have on their country. 
The campaign to convince Singaporeans about the appropriateness of the 
Singaporean system for its people continues. It is promoted by showing that the existing 
political system in Singapore works well and guarantees economic growth. The PAP 
government argues that there is no reason to change the system or to replace it with 
Western liberal democracy. BG Yeo, former Minister of Information, affirms that the 
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government is not thinking of changing the political system because the system has 
evolved from Singapore's history and in the context of the small and multi racial nature 
of the state. 
For PAP leaders, the system is suited to the culture of Asia. Democracy in the 
West, particularly that of Anglo -Saxon countries, according to Lee Kuan Yew, is not 
similar to democracy in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, or even in the Philippines. All of 
this, according to Lee, is because their cultures were different from those in Western 
Anglo -Saxon countries such as the United Kingdom, the USA and Australia.B6 For this 
reason Lee also reminded the West not to push liberal democracy in Asia as it did with 
China on democracy and human rights. According to Lee, such pressure could bring 
China to the same situation as that of the Soviet Union under Lenin before World War 
II, which led, ultimately, to the Cold War. The country led by Deng Xiao Ping, and 
others of the first generation of the revolution, would not behave like Gorbachev, who 
brought about prestroika in the Soviet Union. Deng, according to Lee, would respond to 
pressure by tightening control inside his country and by threatening countries in East 
Asia.87 
It appears, from the recent debate about particular cultures underpinning Asian 
and particularly Singaporean democracy, along with the attacks on the West, that the 
discourse of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' in the post Cold War era has reached 
an international audience. The debates have been raised both by Western medía and 
academics. In the next section, I elaborate further on the claims of `Asian democracy' 
and the nature of the criticism towards them. 
C. CONTENDING APPROACHES TO `ASIAN VALUES' IN DOMESTIC 
POLITICS 
In the post -Cold War world, the above ideological measures, which are, in the 
first instance, aimed at mobilising support for PAP policies, has instigated many 
86 The Straits Times, 26 May 1992. 
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reactions. The claims of `Asian values' reflected the concerns of the PAP leaders over 
what they perceived to be the growing influence of Western values on the political and 
social life of Singaporeans. As Wang Gungwu from the National University of 
Singapore argues, `Asian values' was originally a local issue dealing with education and 
culture, and intended for domestic purposes, which had been raised into the international 
context after the end of the Cold War.88 The anti- Western strategy was aimed 
specifically at maintaining consensus among Singaporeans. The campaign has been able 
to gain significant support from a majority of Singaporeans as shown by the results of 
every general election. 
However, Western governments, academics and medía strongly criticised the 
particular claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy'. The strategies of the PAP 
government to gain consensus within Singapore by rejecting liberal democracy, 
particularly by way of representing problems inherent in liberal democratic systems in 
the West, have been a source of controversy among opposition leaders and had 
ramifications in international relations. As Wang notes `What had begun as defence 
against detribalisation, an attempt at reculturation of young Singaporeans, became an 
object (of) fierce attacks in the Western media'.89 
In this section, I argue that although there have been some attempts from PAP 
leaders to represent the `West' as a danger and culturally polluting, this is also followed 
by an acceptance of some of `Western values'. This dual representation of the `West' by 
the PAP leaders and the criticism from opposition parties of such a representation may 
mean that the form of democracy espoused by the PAP leaders is subject to 
modification. More importantly, this promises a continuing debate about a better form 
and meaning of democracy for Singaporeans. I focus, firstly, on the use of the term 
`Westernisation' to justify the existence of the current regime in Singapore. This 
discussion is followed by analysis of how the opposition reacts to such strategies. This 
88 Wang Gungwu, `Reflections on Asian Values', a speech delivered at the 6th Sir Weary Dunlop 
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reaction, as will he shown, may check the tendency to relativise the meaning of 
democracy within PAP. 
1. Anti -Westernisation Campaigns 
The use of the West as `the Other' in PAP government discourse has meaning on 
two levels. The first level is the system in general in which the PAP leaders blame the 
`West' as a whole system. The second is at the values level where the leaders attempt to 
select from the `West' what is appropriate for their society and what needs to be 
rejected. It should be noted that Singapore's anti -West rhetoric is intended merely to 
reinforce the belief that the Singaporean model is better than the Western model. Unlike 
Malaysia's anti -West rhetoric, outlined in the next chapter, Singapore's policy is not 
based on anger toward the West. It is pursued in a manner that will not interrupt its 
reliance on pro -Western relations. 
Firstly, the West is represented as a single value system. To a certain degree the 
West has been generalised as a threat in order to unite diverse internal values and 
cultures (consisting of Chinese, Malay and Indian values). For the PAP leaders the main 
question is whether Singapore has to be more like the West or Iike Asia. S. Dhanabalan, 
the former Foreign Minister, for example, sees the current debate as analogous to the 
debate in the 1950s and early 1960s. At that time the question was whether Singapore 
should be communist or non communist, whereas now the question is whether 
Singapore should be like the West, or not. The simple answer to these questions, for 
PAP leaders, is that Singapore has to find its own way.90 BG Yeo said `we do not want 
to be a western society' because they have gone down hill since the 1960s accompanied 
by growing moral, criminal and leadership problems.91 Yeo expressed his conviction 
that `we must find our own solution to our problems and cannot accept Western model 
as ultimate or ideal.'92 Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, after a landslide victory for his 
90 The Straits Times, 29 July 1986. 
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party in the January 1997 general election, stated openly that the result of the general 
election showed that Singaporeans had `rejected Western -style liberal democracy and 
freedoms'.91 
The representation of the `West' as corrupt is not surprising given the need of the 
PAP to achieve ideological hegemony. It wants to ensure that people embrace only PAP 
concepts of governance and no alternative concepts work for Singapore.94 Lee Kuan 
Yew, has attacked efforts to copy the Western model. He not only blames the advice 
occasionally given by the West to Singapore regarding adoption of an open political 
system,95 but also claims that the system that Singapore has is efficient and competitive. 
Together with their criticisms of the West, PAP leaders regularly remind 
Singaporeans of the serious problems faced by other countries which have chosen the 
Western path of democracy. BG Yeo adds that the liberal democracy practiced in Japan 
and Italy does not prevent corruption,96 nor does the liberal democracy practiced in 
countries such as India and Pakistan. In general elections, PM Goh Chok Tong argues 
that because his country does not apply a fully liberal democratic model, it eschews 
money politics. Whereas in other countries labelled as democratic by the West, such as 
Taiwan and Thailand, vote buying becomes a normal part of their democracy.97 In short, 
PAP leaders argued that what was important for Singapore to develop was its own brand 
of democracy which took into account the country's needs and resources.98 
The Singaporean brand of democracy, according to PAP leaders, has also been 
shown to be supportive of political stability and economic development. According to 
Yeo Ning Hong, the Minister for Communications and Information, economic success 
could be achieved not only by adapting the Western democratic model, but also by 
developing a model unique to Singapore. Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, 
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Taiwan and Hongkong are examples of countries which have been able to attain 
economic success by developing their own distinctive models of democracy and by 
adapting the Western model of democracy and market systems to their own 
circumstances.99 The culture and history of Asia, according to Lee Kuan Yew, were 
important aspects that differentiate the West from Asia, and this meant that Western 
democracies would not work fully in Asia.100 Therefore, Yeo concludes, `Western-style 
capitalism and democracy are neither necessary nor sufficient ingredients for success. 
They are just incidental parameters. There are many parts to economic, social and 
political attainment'.1°1 
Regarding the press, Lee argues that the lack of freedom of the press, similar to 
that in the West is the result of latent problems with minorities and races. The 
Singaporean press, according to BG Yeo, does not adhere to the philosophy of the press 
in the West, but rather it follows Japan's example where the press `works very hard at 
accuracy and objectivity but ...does not try to lobby independent political positions'.102 
The task of the press, PM Goh asserts, is to help the government by informing people of 
government policies and of the problems the country faces.103 The foreign media on the 
whole operate under limitations in Singapore. Particularly those media organisations 
that attempt to interfere or `plan to influence the thinking' of local politics in their press 
policies will experience government pressure and are likely to be banned.104 
Part of the degeneration of the Western system was represented by some 
academics in public. Some academics argued that Western models were not the most 
effective model to represent Singaporeans. David Brown, for example, was quoted by 
the Straits Times as arguing that Western democracy might not be the best and most 
effective way to materialise the principle of rule by the people. The methods of 
democratic advocacy by the people, he argues, must be continually discussed. However, 
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Brown claims that 'Western liberal- democracy is not the only means of achieving these 
ends and might, indeed, not always be the most effective'.'05 
A proposal for a dominant -party system was also supported by some academics 
and the media. The interview of New Zealand academic Raj Vasil with First Deputy PM 
Goh Chok Tong in his book Governing Singapore, was reported by The Straits Times. In 
the interview, Goh defended Singaporean political behaviour and criticised the way the 
opposition worked in the West. Goh argued that opposition in the West only created 
cynical attitudes to the government. Such attitudes, according to Goh, were dangerous 
because governments became trapped in a short -term view of politicians.1°6 
Secondly, there has been a rejection of the `West' based on development 
priorities and on the different values of Singapore. The priority of Asians, it is argued, is 
economic growth which has to be supported by political and social stability. The 
economy comes first, or in the words of the Economist magazine, `a government's main 
duty is to keep the country competitive; democracy and all the rest should be thought of 
in terms of how well they serve the economic development'. 107 Lee told an audience in 
the Philippines that what was needed was not freedom, human rights and democracy but 
`saving, discipline, hard work and education'.108 He also mentioned that what people in 
Tiananmen Square wanted was the end of corruption and nepotism and the emergence 
of a just government.109 In other words, they wanted clean and good government. As 
long as democratic ideals like social justice, economic enfranchisement and equal 
opportunity could be fulfilled by `good government', as two Singaporean academics, 
Janadas Devan and Geraldine Heng indicated, there was no need to apply a maximal 
democracy, involving political competition as in the West.' 70 
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Other academics also support the priority of development over democracy in 
Singapore by comparing it with other Asian countries. Russel Heng agreed with the 
current attitude of Singaporean elite on democracy by saying that the states that have 
recently applied liberal democracy, like South Korea and Taiwan, are now experiencing 
difficulties. Too much liberty in both countries caused problems. Similarly, political 
liberties in Eastern European countries `seem to have an inverse relationship with 
economic efficiency' .111 Devan and Heng affirmed that the recent history of East Asia 
showed that `a fully functioning democracy' was not compatible with the political 
stability and the social discipline required for development.112 That is why, according to 
Daljit Singh, from the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore, `too much 
emphasis on the individual' is not desirable.113 According to him, `What is good for the 
group and community as a whole should be given more attention',114 
Competitiveness, progress, security, order and morality in the West, according to 
BG Yeo, have weakened in recent times. Liberal education without disciplining the 
children has resulted in a work force which cannot compete. This is followed by 
disorder in social and moral life, widespread crime, and broken families.115 Lee Kuan 
Yew further affirms that `The exuberance of democracy leads to undisciplined and 
disorderly conditions inimical to development'. 116 Kishore Mahbubani representing the 
`Singaporean School' mind -set argues that Western political development has 
`atrophied' and that leaders in the West have experienced a `massive social decay'.117 In 
this view, Singapore needs to prevent such problems which commonly give rise to 
excessive demands of rights in the West. That is why, according to Lee, values are learnt 
and inherited differently in Singapore. With this process, what Singapore leaders want, 
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according to Fukuyama, is to construct a modern, technologically based society and a 
highly educated and disciplined work force.118 
Despite these attacks on the West, however, the leaders keep promoting the 
West's `culture of capitalism'. The cultural commitments of capitalist development such 
as production orientations in the work place, where emphasis placed on mutual trust and 
cooperation between labour, employee and the state, continue to be promoted as one 
important aspect of capitalism. Other values such as competitiveness, and meritocracy 
are also part of the social inscription of capitalism. The result of this inscription is an 
orientation toward capitalism and a better educated and disciplined work force in 
Singapore.119 For these leaders, this seems to be the answer to the survival of Singapore. 
It is clear that to be popular, `Asian values', and particularly Confucianism, needs to 
accommodate capitalist and democratic ideology. Singaporeans need to revitalise 
traditional Asian (Confucian) values and cultures to meet the challenges of global 
capitalism. 
In spite of the strong repression of the opposition and a heavy emphasis on 
consensus and harmony, the PAP government still holds a relatively competitive and 
clean general election. PAP leaders stress the importance of strong and idealistic 
leadership which can `combine political power and philosophical wisdom' .12° There 
must be a strong moral commitment on behalf of the people for democracy to work 
properly. A democracy which emphasises rights only, without obligations, will 
eventually destroy itself.121 Democracy in Singapore evolves to suit its own history and 
culture and must serve the people, selecting what is good and bad from the West. This 
evolution was reflected in an editorial in the Straits Times which asked Singaporeans to 
keep searching for the political system which would serve them best. It says 
Singaporeans `must decide whether they want a system based on an a priori distrust of 
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an elected government. They must ask themselves whether opposition politics per se is 
good. Do they want open confrontation or consensus -building as a means of settling 
disputes? Above all, Singaporeans must decide whether individual freedom should be 
put above the society's collective good ?' 122 In this process, the leaders remind people to 
look at their history and to find in it the strength to face their future.123 It can be argued 
that the result of this process is no longer a Western product, but something unique to 
Singaporean people and society. 
2. The Challenges from Opposition 
The opposition to the government's emphasis on the importance of the current 
system departs from the assumption that by using the West as an enemy, the government 
elites disguise their main agenda of maintaining power and justifying its strict political 
policy. Three main opposition Parties, National Solidarity Party (NSP), Singapore 
Democracy Party (SDP) and Workers Party (WP) in particular have attacked the anti - 
Western campaign of the PAP government. Although they were only represented by two 
members in the 1989 parliament and four members in the parliament of 1992, they could 
express their concerns on the use of the West as `the Other' quite effectively by focusing 
on two main themes. 
Firstly, in contrast to the claim of Singaporean leaders about the specific system 
of democracy in Singapore, the opposition leader from the Workers' Party, JB 
Jeyaretnam, argues that there is no such thing as different types of democracy, because 
democracy is a universally valid and timeless concept.1Z4 In Singapore, according to 
him, there is no democracy because there is a `culture of acceptability'. He argued that 
`Grassroots' Ieaders, trade unionists and other political groups had to be politically 
acceptable under government criteria before they could serve the country'.125 
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Regarding the role of the media, opposition leaders criticise the government's 
monopoly of the flow of information. They stress the importance of a more balanced 
news media. Keen Sunn, NSP's Secretary General, said that alternative views should be 
reported by the media so that people could compare them with the government's views 
and decide which was the most useful policy.126 
Opposition figure such as Chiam See Tong, one of only two opposition members 
in the parliament in 1989, argued that it was Westernisation, not the National Ideology, 
which could answer Singapore's problems. He disagreed with the government's claim 
that there should be a national ideology because of 'Westernisation'. Chiam. stated that 
there was nothing wrong with `Westernisation'. Western ideas and concepts, if properly 
promoted would, according to him, be good for the future of Singapore.127 Chiam also 
claimed that the government's proposed national ideology was only one way for the 
PAP government to maintain political power and to stop more opposition members 
entering the parliament.128 Concerning minority rights, he stated that the PAP should not 
promote the teaching of Confucianism at the national level, because it could promote 
Chinese chauvinism which was considered dangerous for Singapore's multi -racial 
political platform.129 
Secondly, the opposition leaders challenge the government's restructuring of the 
political system by highlighting the long -term impact on society. They point out that a 
materialistic culture has developed in Singapore primarily due to the massive campaigns 
to support the government and its economic rationale. In its platform for the 1997 
general election, the NSP, for example, argued that the average Singaporean was now 
less friendly and less likely to respect social values. It further blamed the negative 
attitudes of people caused by a series of PAP policies, notably the glorification of 
material wealth, the lack of political participation, the dramatisation of fear, doubts and 
uncertainties, and the discouragement of individual thought. The important 
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consequences of such policies, according to this party, were a lack of creativity thus 
increasing the dependence of people on government initiatives, support and direction.13o 
Similarly, a SDP leader, Chee Soon Juan, argues that the government's direction 
and campaign in many aspects of Singaporean political life, does not support the unity, 
identity and character of Singaporeans. Singaporeans are alienated from the political 
process and do not have a strong commitment to participate in politics. Their main 
concern is with short term goals of maintaining prosperity, and not with the long term 
future of their country.131 This has been illustrated also by a survey showing that most 
Singaporeans do not want to get involved in shaping their communities. They prefer to 
be `onlookers' rather than participate in public affairs.132 For Chee, people need to be 
given `a bigger and stronger say' in the running of the country. This, for him, will create 
a sense of belonging to the country and can foster support for a nation building 
program.133 
It is not only opposition leaders who are concerned with the government's tight 
control of society. Some intellectuals also wonder whether the strict punishment of 
opposition leaders and other critics benefits the future of Singapore. Walter Woon, a 
lecturer at the National University of Singapore, for example, argues that however weak 
the opposition is, it is needed to check power which otherwise can produce a dishonest 
or intellectually flabby government apparatus because there are no challenges and 
contrasting views.134 Under such a political climate, the question as Russel Heng 
argued, was whether enough political talent would appear to run the country.135 The idea 
of opposition, for academics such as Amartya Sen, a Harvard University Professor, can 
even be found in Confucianism.136 For him an interpretation of Confucianism which 
30 A statement by National Solidarity Party, `The Negative Impact of the PAP Regime', 1996. 
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emphasises the authoritarian aspect and denies the function of an opposition does `not 
survive scrutiny' since Confucious himself advises people to tell the truth before their 
prince.137 Sen implies that what the government really needs now is honesty and 
frankness which, he argues, can be found in a greater majority role for opposition in 
parliament, irrespective of the views of the incumbent regime. 
The opposition is discredited through a calculated campaign organised by the 
PAP government, aimed at issues such as economic investment. In this campaign 
against the opposition, as James Jesudason argues, people in general and the middle 
class in particular, are led to believe that many problems -economic, social, political - 
will emerge if they vote for the opposition in the general elections. The middle class, in 
particular the businessmen, are not keen to take a risk on the opposition, especially 
because of uncertainty as to whether the opposition can guarantee conditions for 
business as good as those offered by the current PAP government.13s 
In 1975, ten years after the PAP formally became the government in Singapore, a 
Singaporean academic, Chan Heng Chee, examined where politics had gone wrong in 
daily life. What had happened in Singaporean society, according to her, was a 
depoliticisation of society. There were no more open political contests. Political groups 
could not `compete, bargain and negotiate in shaping and sharing of political power to 
influence or control policy direction . 139 This depoliticisation was pursued to switch the 
debate from policy alternatives to the administrative bureaucracies where the focus was 
on the best way to implement government policies.140 
Adapting this framework of the depoliticised citizen concept, Asad Latif from 
the Straits Times questioned whether, in fact, civil society had disappeared in Singapore. 
He analysed future possibilities for Singapore without an effectively functioning civil 
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40 Ibid. 
loo 
society. As with the civil society in the West, he argues that civil society should be one 
of the pillars of democracy in Singapore. This civil society should be strongly 
autonomous from the economic system and the state.141 
However, rather than supporting a climate for the emergence of autonomous 
professional groups, political parties, trade unions, the media and NGOs as in the West, 
the government restricts them. By using laws such as Newspaper and Printing Presses 
(Amendment) Acts, the PAP, Latif argued, gradually limited the emergence of 
autonomous groups in civil society142 and consequently a people -based interest group 
could not hope to emerge. The government then relies on a corporatist -style system 
which allows it to interfere in the leadership and policies of trade unions, media and 
other professional groups. To harness the peoples' aspirations, the PAP government 
espouses a `consultative style of government',143 accomplished by creating Consultative 
Groups in various electoral districts. 
A further consequence of the reduced role of an independent civil society and the 
limited role of the opposition in Singapore has been pointed out by Daniel Bell. He 
argues that the system has produced people who lack patriotism and pursue only 
economic interests and benefits. People withdraw from the public realm, become 
apathetic and economically focused citizens. He adds that the average citizen of 
Singapore looks at the state with cynicism, not aware of national issues and alienated 
from and by the political system. The large majority of Singaporeans devote `their time 
and energy first and foremost to the accumulation of material goods or the five C's as 
Singaporeans put it: cash, credit card, car, condo, and country club'.144 In a similar vein, 
James Gomez, a researcher at ISEAS, argues that the strengthening of a national identity 
needs political aspects.145 He implies that Singaporean citizens who have been 
141 Asad Latif, `Whither Civil Society in Singapore', The Straits Times, 31 July 1993. 
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disadvantaged politically need to be brought into the mainstream political system by 
giving them greater political representation and more say in their political system.146 
This political involvement, according to Gomez, can `keep the citizenry committed to 
political authority' as well as to the national territory.147 
Given the above criticisms, one can conclude that the Singaporean political 
system and the government's claim that its system is the most appropriate one have been 
challenged from several fronts, both from opposition parties and intellectuals. It is clear 
that intellectuals support many of the government policies, but at the same time they 
carefully criticise government policies and examine the impact of the policies in the 
long term on the political and social system of Singapore. 
It is also interesting to note that the government sometimes responded to the 
opposition and other critics at a rather basic level. It is, indeed, responsive to the daily 
social and economic demands of the people. The PAP government improves housing, 
transportation and other public facilities and creates a clean environment for Singapore. 
But its responses are different when faced with the demands of improving the long -term 
political climate. The opposition, which supported a more open political system and an 
improvement in human rights, is criticised by the PAP government for following 
Western concepts of democracy and human rights which is not compatible with 
Singaporean society and culture. The opposition, it was claimed, disregarded the need of 
Singaporeans and only served Western interests represented by `American human rights 
groups' in Singapore.146 
Indeed, some PAP leaders recognised problems faced by their country as 
highlighted by opposition leaders. Goh Chok Tong, for example, reminded people of the 
dangers of materialism which might lessen the sense of belonging to the country. Goh 
further said that, 
`As a society we must be willing to respect and accept a greater diversity of ideas. 
Why do some societies, like the United States, produce more ideas and innovation 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
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than others? Education systems have something to do with it. But the broader 
social environment is critical in supporting creativity and innovation, whether in 
the arts, sciences, research, industry or politics.' 149 
He further encouraged Singaporeans to take part in solving local issues and 
shaping their own communities. Government, according to Goh, should `take a step 
back' and allow people to participate in local community issues. While supporting more 
openness in society, however, Goh stressed the importance of responsibility among 
people. He declared, 
`We have to move beyond tolerance, to respect the different cultures in our midst, 
and to gain strength from diverse ideas. But there must be individual responsibility 
and a sense of accountability to the broader community Rights and duties are 
inseparable, two sides of the same coin. This is the way to become a cosmopolitan, 
creative and cultivated society which attract top talent from all over the world.' 150 
This kind of speech is quite representative of those given by Singaporean 
leaders, and particularly representative of Goh's early years as Prime Minister. 
However, the speech, which welcomes and encourages greater participation by the 
people, is not without warning. After showing a sensitivity to the problems 
Singaporean's could face with the current political system in the future, Goh reminded 
the people of the danger of having too many individual freedoms in society. The loss of 
4 PAP candidates in the 1992 election appeared to reinforce the relevance of Goh's 
warning, and also indicated the educated elite's disapproval of the new policy direction 
initiated by Goh. 
In spite of the fact that there have been no changes to the government's political 
policies, what is promising is that there has been growing criticism from within society 
of the government's restructuring policy. It illustrates that the debate over the future of 
democracy in Singapore is ongoing. Claims of the success of Singapore's system are 
contradicted by the damage these caused to the people's culture and to society itself. For 
example, the agreement on a National Ideology, was achieved through a long and risky 
debate threatening the basis of the multi -racial state itself. The government also declares 
149 A speech at the opening session of a newly elected Singapore's Parliament, June 5`h, 1997; see 
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Singapore to be `a beautiful pattern out of the different pieces of mosaic or 
communities'. 151 Despite attempts to overcome problems with the common theories of 
integration,152 the Singaporean model of integration is still trapped within the `melting 
pot' theory of integration. As in the melting pot, there has been a tendency for other 
races and nationalities in Singapore (Malays and Indians in particular) to be submerged 
and assimilated into the dominant Chinese view of the PAP government. 
For some time into the future, the problems of national ideology and national 
integration are likely to persist, especially since different ethnic and religious leaders 
still retain concerns about some aspects of Chinese domination. Similarly, there is no 
fixed settlement on the notion of Shared Values except in vague and general terms. 
Briefly, it can he concluded that the process of identity forming and the formation of a 
political system in Singapore, as in Malaysia, is still underway. I will elaborate further 
on this point in the next section. 
D. `ASIAN VALUES' AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
The debate explored above highlights areas of moderation, which may modify 
some of the extremism found in the conflict of `Asian values' versus 'Western values'. 
As discussed in the first chapter, a numbers of academics were concerned, that the 
formation of 'Asian values' might contradict mainstream liberal democracy. It might 
also be seen as pursuing relativist understanding of democracy which could hinder 
efforts to find universal principles of democracy. 
I argue that the `Asian model of democracy', as initiated by Singaporean officials 
and academics, reflects their interpretations of Singaporean success; but it is nowhere 
near the end of the process. The claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' are 
designed especially to show the independence rights and ability of Singaporeans to 
develop a system based on their needs without denying the influence of Western values. 
151 The Straits Times, 9 September 1998. 
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The claims of `Asian values', according to Singapore ambassador -at -large Tommy Koh, 
are to show that there are positive values offered by Asians. Although the claims cannot 
be entirely accepted as a whole, they attempt to elevate Asia to a position of equality 
with countries in the West.153 
To understand clearly the assertive style of Singaporeans with respect to their 
success, I take an example of the formulation of the claims of `Asian democracy' as 
promoted by the Singaporean school: what it argues for and against.154 Furthermore, I 
then discuss Western reactions to this. Finally, I survey the consequences of the debate 
on international relations in general. 
In Management of Success, the Moulding of Modern Singapore,155 a number of 
academics identify various factors underpinning the success of Singapore, also putting 
forth for evaluation a range of challenges likely to be faced by Singapore in the future. 
In an extract from the book, the Singapore's main newspaper, the Straits Times, reported 
that the term `Asian -style democracy' is one formulation of democracy for 
Singaporeans. It recognises the difficulties in formulating precisely what style this 
`Asian democracy' might take. On the Singaporean experience of success, the extract 
reports that the `Asian style of democracy' `would surely involve some way of 
reconciling competitive political bargaining with consensus building, while proving 
congenial to the distinctive Asian modes of advanced industrial capitalism'.156 
The values, ideas and aphorisms behind the claims of `Asian style democracy' 
can be identified in the so- called Singaporean school. This school reflects the belief that 
the government and the people know best their needs and pace of progress. It argues that 
there are cultural, historical and practical reasons that suggested a country in Asia `will 
not and should not follow the Western democratic model in every respect'. It maintains 
53 The Straits Times, 20 February 1999. 
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the importance of some Western norms but certain traditional values like respect for 
elders and authority, family unity and hard work have also been preserved. Individual 
responsibility must also be encouraged through welfarism.157 
The members of this school are also quite specific with regard to the kind of 
democracy their country wants to develop. They emphasise the importance of an orderly 
society instead of `a natural state of contention and anarchy'. They also argue that 
`Democratic institutions such as the press, public opinion and special interests must not 
prevent leaders from taking decisions that are unpopular in the short term but necessary 
in the long run' .158 
The above emphasis was often examined under communitarian standards such as 
deference to elders and authority, and civic responsibilities rather than civil rights.159 
The clearest formulation of communitarian democracy is presented by Singaporean 
sociologist Chua Beng -Huat. For him the criticisms the government issues of Western 
decadence and the lack of competitiveness have provided an opportunity to develop a 
communitarian democracy in Singapore. The two pillars of 'Shared Values': `Nation 
before community and society above self' and `Regard and community support for 
individual', according to Chua, are a kind of reinvention of Asian communitarianism to 
counter the above effects of Western cultural and consumer industry, manifested in 
`hyper -individualism' within their population.160 The need for communitarian principles 
justifies the strong role of the state and the priority of community over individual_ 16I 
However justifiable the communitarian democracy may be based on cultural 
traditions, history and values, it has to be continually institutionalised. There should be a 
guarantee that the strong role of the state does not extend to applying an authoritarian 
style of government. Chua argues that while such institutionalisation is still weak, some 
aspects have been established such as general elections. But others, such as the notion of 
15' The Straits Times, 15 October 1994. 
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consensus, have not been appropriately formulated. t62 For him, the government needs to 
institutionalise consultation methods, bringing together significant groups in an effort to 
gain consensus. Another pillar of communitarian democracy, according to Chua, is the 
press. He maintains that a pro -government press is not synonymous with pro- consensus 
or pro -nationalist interests. The press has to instigate a debate for a strong consensus 
based on the national interests. That is why, according to Chua, it needs to be 
independent.161 
The above set of principles for organising a modern society and a more moderate 
position labelled as communitarian democracy are not directed primarily at suggesting 
that `Asian values' are superior to `Western values'. Nor is it aimed at attacking the 
West. One proponent of the `Singapore school', Chan Heng Chee, states that the claims 
are to show their cultural independence and their intellectual conviction about what their 
cultures are.164 She attempts to show that democracy has developed according to the 
culture, history and tradition of her country and been `modified to suit the contours of 
the host setting'.'61 In the process of enmeshing Western political institutions, variants 
of democracy may arise which do not necessarily look like versions of Anglo- American 
democracy or liberal democracy.166 
Singapore, as other countries, according to Bilahari Kausikan has to find 'its own 
specific solution to the problems of governance' because of its unique set of 
circumstances and historical experiences.167 Devan and Heng conclude that the 
advocates of `Asian democracy', 'do not reject democratic ideals as such, but offer 
rather a re- reading of democratic ethos that they believe fits better the specifics of Asian 
cultures' .165 
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The claims of `Asian values' are also aimed at bridging `the political and 
ideological divide between the mature industrial democracies of the West and Asian 
societies in transformation'.'69 Kausikan argues that they seek a balance between 
different values, rights, duties and freedoms, as well as a balance between individualism 
and communitarianism. The result of this process may produce a dynamic equilibrium. 
The outcome depends on the particular circumstances of the society; it shifts over time 
and will be open- ended.170 Another member of the Singaporean school, Kishore 
Mahbubani, contends that the emergence of East Asia as a cultural power primarily 
comes from the ability of the people and the governments in the region `to create a truly 
universal civilisation that blended the best from both Western and Eastern 
civilisation'. 171 As Tommy Koh, affirms, `Asian values' should not create a simplistic 
dichotomy that `Asian values' are good and `Western values' are bad. He states that 
`On the contrary, Singaporeans should be critical of bad Asian values and 
practices. 
We should praise the good Western values and institutions which East Asia should 
adopt. While proud to be Asians and of our cultural heritage, we should be 
apostles of the cosmopolitan values and multiculturalism which are the hallmarks 
of Singapore.'172 
The best elements from Eastern civilisation capable of integration, as Albert 
Chen argues, include aspects of government which have also been adopted in the West. 
According to Chen, such elements include, 
the Confucian principle of benevolence as the basic norm governing relations 
between human beings, the ethics of benevolent rule ... the ruler who must 
cultivate his virtues and serve as a moral exemplar for his subjects, the recognition 
of the importance of consultation by the ruler and his (people)... following the 
wishes of the people and wining their hearts instead of just their outward 
submission, the affirmation of the moral autonomy and perfectibility of each 
human being, the idea of the equality of all human beings in terms of the capacity 
for moral cultivation and growth, the humanistic conception of the human beings 
as the noblest creature in the natural and cosmic order, and the recognition of the 
169 The Straits Times, 15 October 1994. 
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existence of transcendent principles of Heaven (tianli) which govern the universe 
and which constitute the source of the principles of justice and ethics.173 
Chen, however, also argues that some elements in the Confucian tradition are 
opposed to the principle of modern human rights and democracy. Elements such as the 
despotic power of the emperor, paternalistic practice, the denial of individual rights, 
absolute authority and subordination, and cruel punishment of opposition, according to 
Chen do not contribute to modem conceptions of human rights and democracy.174 These 
elements need to be transformed and people need to be educated with regard to more 
appropriate values in order that they can change their attitudes and are able to support 
modern concepts of human rights and democracy. Chen also argues that transformation 
and education do not necessary lead to an erosion of the tradition and spirituality 
because the transformation still relies on moral and spiritual resources within the 
tradition and can be assessed by using progressive aspects of the tradition such as 
`Confucian principles of benevolence and righteousness and the Confucian belief in 
each human being's rational propensity, moral autonomy and spiritual capacity for 
growth and perfection' .175 
The Singapore illustrates the blend, transformation and adaptation of Western 
democratic ideas into a `hybrid political system'. In this system there are both Western 
democratic styles and authoritarian styles of government. PAP leaders claims that they 
gain power through general elections and that leaders in the PAP government consists of 
the best people who can represent, translate and implement the interests of the people. In 
the words of Robert Rothstein, it looks like a `government of and for the people but not 
by the people', but it is acceptable because some leaders are genuinely committed to 
political and economic development.i76 In this hybrid political system, aspects of an 
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authoritarian style of government, such as control over political participation and debate 
on ethnic and religious issues, and aspects of democratic styles of government mix 
together.177 Currently Singapore's leaders are attempting to demonstrate that their 
hybrid system performs better than Western-style liberal democracies. 
However, with the end of the Cold War era and the victory of capitalism and 
liberal democracy over other ideological systems, the above explanations fail to 
convince some academics and government officials in the West. The basic objective of 
`Asian values' is seen as part of a campaign against `Western values'.'78 There is a 
certain apprehension, as Samuel Huntington declared, that the emergence of East Asia 
would intensify conflict with the West. Reaction to `Asian Occidentalism', he argues, is 
one possible cause of this uneasiness where Asians portray the West negatively, as the 
Western orientalist portrayed the East.t79 The claims that Asia is superior to the West, if 
it is followed by other states like India and particularly China, can be transformed into a 
military threat, particularly from China to the West.180 Huntington called the claims of 
Asian values by Singapore as a `Singaporean cultural offensive'.18I A harsher criticism 
of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' concepts comes from Joakim Ojendal and 
Hans Antlov. The claims of `Asian values', for them, have not only helped soft 
authoritarian regimes such as those in Singapore and Malaysia to survive, but have also 
paved the way for the return of other authoritarian governments such as in Cambodia 
under Hun Sen in 1997.182 
Huntington, resembling Chua's criticism or critiques of the communitarian 
democracy in Singapore, also argues that an authoritarian system, such as in Singapore, 
lacks the institutional basis for self reform. The absence of civil society, public debate, a 
free press, opposition political parties, protest movements and competitive elections can 
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make the system static and vulnerable to injustice. That is why, according to 
Huntington, it is a democratic system not an authoritarian system which can produce 
good government. Huntington adds that an authoritarian system may do well in this 
regard, but it is only in the short term.'83 
From this debate, some conclusions can be drawn with revealing implications for 
international relations. Firstly, it can be concluded that Singapore is in the process of 
nation building. The debate initiated by the claims of `Asian values' arose as a reflection 
of the worries on the part of Singaporean leaders about the loss of traditional values, 
particularly Confucian values among the Chinese. Traditional values were expressed in 
the general and all encompassing term `Shared Values' largely to make them more 
acceptable to the minority Malays and Indians. Concerns about Chinese cultural 
domination among minority groups could be reduced, but they could not be dissolved 
totally. 
Secondly, the claims of `Asian values' are advanced by PAP leaders in the name 
of protecting Singaporeans against the `influence of the Western values' or 
`Westernisation', both in terms of social and political values. However, there has 
operated a disguised goal of maintaining consensus among the Singaporeans to support 
the existing political system. The demands for a more open political system and the 
critiques from Western governments, academics and media of the restricted system of 
Singapore have been countered by using the specific cultural and historical conditions of 
Singapore as justification for the type of political system. This is followed by attempts 
to revitalise traditional culture and values which can prevent the effects of the so- called 
`Westernisation' from spreading throughout Singaporean society. 
Thirdly, although there have been many attempts and much rhetoric used to 
revitalise `Asian values', there have been few efforts to formulate these views into a 
philosophical foundation which has as its principal purpose the construction of a 
Singaporean equivalent of the Indonesian Pancasila values system. The claims of `Asian 
1ß3 ' Huntington, Democracy....', Y ap. cit. 
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values' are limited merely to efforts to justify the current system, and provide a strong 
role for the government in guiding public debate and limiting freedom. Strong 
government does not deny the importance of freedom of speech and press, but they have 
to be limited and directed to support government policies. This is the PAP mind -set 
employed on this issue. Freedom and equality alone, it is argued, would not necessarily 
result in a better society. It is suggested that the highly esteemed freedom and equality as 
practiced in the West can undermine respect for authority and be dysfunctional to the 
system. 184 
One of the very limited attempts to formulate what the distinctive system of 
Singapore offers comes from the `Singapore school'. They have identified what `Asian 
values' are. But they do suggest the institutionalisation of those values in certain key 
political institutions. Their conclusions are limited only to the claim that Singapore has 
its own rights to develop a specific system established in relation to its social and 
political context. Only Chua Beng -Huat goes further by suggesting that such a system is 
a communitarian democracy. This form of democracy, he asserts, departs from the 
weaknesses of the liberal -individual system of the West, which leaves room for 
communitarianism to manoeuvre. However, in his view, the danger of a communitarian 
system is its lack of appropriate institutionalisation of political and opposition parties 
and the existence of a parliament which, together, may be able to curb the tendency 
towards authoritarianism among its leaders. 
Given these three points, the apprehension of some academics like Fukuyama 
and Huntington of the threat from `soft authoritarianism' may be too extreme at the 
moment. The system is in no way offering a clear alternative. The alternative, if there is 
one, is still in its formative years and extensively debated both within and without the 
country. Thus far the proponents of `Asian values' have simply attempted to revitalise 
their traditional concepts of values, cultures and justice, as well as incorporate certain 
cultural elements from Western liberal democracy. 
184 The Straits Times, 25 January 1996. 
Chapter III 
`ASIAN VALUES' AND `ASIAN DEMOCRACY' IN MALAYSIA 
The claims of `Asian values' and of the existence of a specific `Asian democracy' model 
in Malaysia have attracted the attention of the media and scholars in international 
relations since Mahathir Mohamad's administration began in 1981. Although a similar 
phenomenon of `Asian democracy' may be traced back to 1969, when riots resulted in a 
modification of liberal democracy, it is in the Mahathir period that such a claim has a 
significance in international society. Mahathir argues that `Asian values' are key factors 
in successfully maintaining the social and political order and the economic growth of 
some Asian countries, including Malaysia.' He criticises the excesses of freedom and 
democracy in the West, and because of that he argues that Malaysia and other Asian 
countries `are not convinced that the Western form of democracy is the ultimate and the 
best form of democracy. And so they [these countries] have begun to define their own 
interpretation of democracy'.2 He further said that, `Malaysia must admit without any 
apology that its democracy is not of the Western variety'.3 
In the post cold -war international setting, in the absence of Communist threats, 
the above claim which relates to problems of culture, values, democracy and human 
rights has, to a large degree, gained the attention of Western liberal states.4 Concepts 
such as human rights and liberal democracy tend to become `shared values' accepted by 
See, Mahathir Mohamad, "Nilai Asia' (Asian Values)', speech in Senate House, Cambridge 
University, London, 15 March 1995, see Dewan Budaya, April [995, pp. 6 -8. For critiques of the 
claims of `Asian values', see Richard Robison, `Looking North: Myths and Strategies', in Richard 
Robison (ed.), Pathways to Asia, The Politics of Engagement (St. Leonard, NSW: 1996), p. 4; 
With regard to the ability of Asia to modernize and build their society, Mahathir said that 
`Beginning with South Korea and Taiwan's bid to replicate Japan, the process (of learning from the 
success of other Asian countries) has spread to the countries of Southeast Asia. The effect of 
Southeast Asian countries succeeding in industrializing is even more profound. If largely brown 
Southeast Asian can do it, then everybody should be able to do it. Development and progress is no 
longer a mystery.' See Mahathir's speech The Future of Asia', at the International Conference of 
`the Future of Asia', Tokyo, Japan 19 May 1995. 
Mahathir's speech `The Future of Asia', ibid. 
Ibid. 
° Carolina G. Hernandez, ASEAN Perspective on Human Rights and Democracy in International 
Relations: Divergences, Commonalities, Problems and Prospects (1995), pp. 1 -2. 
il 
113 
Western states as the core members of international society.5 In this view, claims of a 
distinctive style of democracy such as `Asian democracy' are perceived by many in 
Western nations as potentially deleterious to the spread of this `shared value'. Of 
particular importance in such a contention is Mahathir's indictment that values of 
Western liberal democracy bring about chaos, immorality and criminality, whereas 
`Asian values' bring about harmony, hierarchy and consensus. 
Not unexpectedly Mahathir's rhetoric of 'Asían values' and `Asian democracy' 
is regarded by many commentators simply as one way for an authoritarian leader to 
justify his authoritarian style of government, particularly in the face of domestic political 
demands for democratisation .6 The goals of `Asian values' promoted by Mahathir and 
other Asian leaders, according to this interpretation, are far from authentic.? Rather these 
values are seen to be defined by the elites, and without roots in Malaysian society. 
To a certain degree this chapter agrees with the above criticism. In particular, 
some elements of `Asian values', such as consensus, are defined more in terms of the 
views of government elites rather than as a result of a process of dialogue in society.8 To 
understand precisely the intentions of the claims of `Asian values' and `Asian 
democracy' in Malaysia, however, they must be scrutinised in the broader historical and 
political context of Malaysian society. Many critics have thus far failed to do this. It is 
also necessary to evaluate how the Malaysian elites have supported these claims. Unlike 
critics who look at the relativistic presumptions behind the challenge of `Asian values' 
Donnelly, Jack, `Human Rights: a New Standard of Civilisation', International Affairs, Vol. 74, 
No. 1, 1998. 
a Robison, Pathways to Asia..., op. cd., p. 4; and see also his article, `Introduction' to special edition 
of The Pacific Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1996, p. 305; Aryeh Neier, `Asia's Unacceptable Standard', 
Foreign Policy, Vol. 32, No. 92, Autumn 1993; Walden Bello, ''Asian Values" Democracy', The 
Nation, Bangkok Newspaper, 20 July 1998; in Australia, criticisms toward Mahathir come from a 
Member of Parliament. Mahathir has been seen as Malaysia's Pauline Hanson -leader of the One 
Nation Party -- who tries to invoke nationalism to solve complex national problems. See, for 
example, Victor Perton MP, `The Asian Values Debate', paper delivered on Annual Conference of 
Asian Pacific League for Freedom and Democracy, Melbourne, 18 October 1997 
( <http_ / /home.vicnet.net.au/- victorp /speeches /aplfd.htm>)_ 
Robison, Introduction...,' Pacific Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1996, p. 305; David Wright- Neville, 
`The Politics of Pan Asianism: Culture, Capitalism and Diplomacy in East Asia,' Pacifica Review, 
Vol. 7, No. 1, May /June, 1995. 
$ Neier, ibid., pp. 42 -43; Robison, Introduction...,' op. cit 
114 
to the West, this chapter argues that the claims better serve the requirement of domestic 
politics. Specifically, they are intended as a measure to find a rationale for Malaysia's 
current political system defined commonly as an authoritarian system, rather than to 
challenge `Western values' and Western liberal democracy. 
In this sense, the `Asian values' phenomena in Malaysia resonate on at least 
three different levels. Firstly, the claims of 'Asian values' and `Asian democracy' are 
deployed to gather support and consensus for the government's development policies 
and for the political system itself. For this purpose, the discourse of `Asian values' is 
promoted by selecting cultural, historical and societal sources in Malaysian society. 
Secondly, there has been growing confidence within Malaysian elite circles about the 
durability of their political system, particularly after the system has managed to bring 
about successful economic development and political stability. Thirdly, based on this 
confidence, some attempts have been made by Malaysian leaders to conceptualise the 
most appropriate value system needed to maintain their country's progress. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. Firstly, it explains the origins of the 
modification of the liberal democracy system in Malaysia. Emphasis is given to the 
visions of Malaysian elites in justifying their re- structuring of Malaysia's political life. 
Secondly, it examines the birth of the claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' 
during Mahathir's administration, which have been used to strengthen the need for the 
restructuring of Malaysia's political life. Specially it highlights the developments and 
changes in Mahathir's visions about the Malays culture and political position in 
Malaysia and about the claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy'. Thirdly, it 
reveals different views that support, counter and modify the claims espoused by elites 
and those with political power in Malaysian society. Fourthly, it examines the 
implications of the claims in the context of the international society. I attempt to show in 
this section some common misleading responses presented by academics and Western 
policy makers to the claims of `Asian values'. 
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A. THE ORIGIN OF A MODIFIED LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
In this section, an attempt to examine the origin of `Asian democracy' is made 
by looking at the modification of liberal democracy in Malaysia after the May 1969 
riots. Since these riots, the liberal democracy model inherited from the British colonial 
period has been modified to suit Malaysian social and historical contexts. The strong 
role of the state was designed to support political stabilisation and racial harmony. Apart 
from the use of Acts and Laws allowing the government to suppress political dissidents, 
there have also been massive ideological campaigns delivered by Malaysian elites 
aiming to preserve political stability and the current political system. Additionally, 
limitations were imposed on the freedom of the press to report and discuss sensitive 
political matters. 
Malaysia is one of the most pluralistic societies in the world. Of its total 
population, Malays together with other indigenous groups (the Malays and the 
indigenous people of Sabah and Sarawak) make up 60% of the population, while the 
rest are of Chinese and Indian origin. This demographic composition has changed from 
just 45% of Malays during the earlier period of independence. The change in the racial 
balance of Malays was caused by their high birth rate, and the influx of immigrant 
workers from Indonesia, some of whom became Malaysian citizens and were therefore 
considered Malays. To a certain degree, also, the migration of Chinese to other countries 
has influenced the balance in favour of the Malays. 
From its independence in 1957 until 1969, Malaysia's political system was based 
on a form of consocíational democracy, where there had been a consensus among elites 
within the Alliance government, consisting particularly of the main Malay party, United 
Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the Chinese party, Malaysian Chinese 
Association (MCA), and the Indian party, Malaysian Indian Congress (NEC). They 
shared views on some important political issues and were able to negotiate the 
allocation of positions in the government. Some important positions at the ministerial 
level were divided based on the result of general elections and by considering the 
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representation of ethnic composition. Under this regime, many observers believed that 
the Malaysian political system was quite open. Significant freedom was given to the 
political parties and the press. 
However, after working for twelve years, some problems in the consociational 
system began to develop. Since the system was mainly based on agreement among 
elites, it was vulnerable to mass dissatisfaction. A loss of significant support from the 
masses to their ethnic leaders in the system could place the system in jeopardy. This 
process built up slowly in the years leading up to the May 1969 crisis. The consensus - 
based power sharing by the elite was attacked on two fronts. On the one hand, non - 
Malays, who had just received their citizenship rights, demanded political equality 
including language and educational equality with the Malays. This issue was captured in 
the platform of the main opposition party, the Democratic Action Party (DAP), with its 
concept of `Malaysian Malaysia'. The concept, inherited from Singapore's People 
Action Party (PAP) after Singapore's expulsion from Malaysia, promoted a multi- racial 
and multi -cultural society fostering the sense of Malaysia nation belonging to the whole 
population, and not only to a specific community. With the same political rights, it was 
argued, every citizen would have the same `duties and responsibilities to the country as 
the Malays' . 
On the other hand, this concept, and the subsequent massive campaigns which 
supported it, were perceived as a threat to the special status of the Malays, particularly 
their political dominance and privileges in Malaysian society. This threat aggravated 
Malay's disappointment in the government, which many considered had not improved 
their economic and education status, or sufficiently promoted the Malay language as the 
national language. Improvement of the economic condition of the Malays was also very 
slow. The majority of the Malays still worked in the agricultural sector and stayed in 
rural, and poor, areas. In short, the Malay political dominance before 1969 had not led to 
an improvement in the economic condition of the Malay community. 
9 Hock Guan Lee, Ethnic Conflict and the Development of Citizenship in Malaysia, A PhD thesis 
submitted to the Brandeis University (Ann Arbor: UMI Microform, 1995), p. 210. 
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The Malays' anxiety and the non -Malay challenge to the existing consensus of 
power sharing resulted in the May 13, 1969 riots. These riots could be described as the 
culmination of the breakdown of consensus among elites which had been built since the 
independence of Malaysia. As a result of these riots 196 people were reportedly killed 
and 439 wounded. Among the dead, the majority were Chinese (143), 25 were Malays, 
13 Indians and 15 others.10 The government then announced a state of emergency, 
temporarily suspended parliament, and appointed a National Operations Council (NOC) 
as a temporary government to restore order and to deal with the fear created by the 
riot.]1 
Before and following the riot, the so- called Malay `ultras' group within the 
Malay's largest party UMNO emerged strongly as a political force.12 This group 
criticised the ignorance of senior leaders in UMNO of the real and imagined Chinese 
threats to the `special position' of the Malays. The group also accused the government 
of not significantly improving the economic condition of the Malays. Mahathir 
Mohamad emerged from this group as one who blatantly criticised the tendency of the 
Prime Minister (PM) Tunku Abdul Rahman to give too many concessions to the 
Chinese. In a letter to the Prime Minister, Mahathir complained that the PM's attitude of 
accepting the excessive demands of the Chinese had provoked Malay anger toward the 
Chinese and Ied to the May 13`h riots.13 
When order was restored, it was clear that some of the aspirations of these Malay 
`ultras' were realised through the NOC. As with the `ultras', the NOC argued that the 
source of the problem resided in the Chinese challenge to Malay domination and the 
problem of backwardness among the Malays. UMNO leaders within the NOC then 
demanded that the special position of the Malays be signified clearly. They argued for 
° Ibid., p 249 
Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics The Second Generation (Singapore: Oxford university Press, 
1991), pp. 10 -11. 
12 This group consisted of Malay politicians. Apart from Mahathir, the most well known among them 
were Syed Ja'afar Albar, Syed Nasir, Harun Idris, Musa Hitam, and Abdullah Ahmad See, Khoo 
Boo Teik, Paradoxes of Mahathirism, an Intellectual Biography of Mahathir Mohamad (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 18. 
13 Khoo, Ibid., pp. 22 -23. 
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the Malays' rights to create a Malay -style polity, culture and institutions, based on the 
fact that Malays were the `prior occupants' and had `ownership of the country'. Indeed 
the Malays claimed that Malaysia was `the land of the Malays'.14 Other ethnic groups, in 
this view, had to respect Malay dominance (ketuanan Melayu) in politics and, according 
to Hok Guan Lee, were regarded as `immigrant' communities.15 In economy policy, the 
NOC members, particularly Tun Razak and Tan Sri Gazali Shafie, supported a policy to 
resurrect the Malay economy. The policy which was called `A New Economic Policy' 
(NEP) was launched with a target of achieving 30 percent Malay ownership of the 
corporate sector, up from just 2 -3 percent in 1971, in all industrial and commercial 
activities by 1990.16 
Given the domination of NOC by UMNO leaders17, the above proposals were 
readily agreed upon.18 What was interesting, however, was that legislating the Malays' 
status could not be achieved simply by disregarding the interests of other ethnic groups. 
The above pro -Malay policies were promoted by redefining the national interest. 
UMNO Ieaders argued that the problems of the Malays were also national problems and, 
as a consequence, they had to be solved as part of the problems of the nation as a whole. 
The improvement of the Malay economy, for example, was justified as part of 
the NEP concept of eradicating poverty for all citizens, restructuring and building a `just 
society'. The NEP stated that the eradication had to be applied to all citizens irrespective 
of race within 20 years, together with the restructuring of society which would obliterate 
the identification of race with economic function.19 These programmes were certainly 
a William Case, `Malaysia, Aspects and Audiences of Legitimacy', in Muthiah Alagappa, Political 
Legitimacy in Southeast Asia, The Quest for Moral Authority (California: Stanford University 
Press, 1995), p. 72. 
5 Hok Guan Lee, op. cit., p. 259. 
16 Means, op. cit., p. 24. 
7 Some NOC leaders such as Tun Razak were also a Cabinet member. The NOC co- existed with the 
government. 
e NOC was dominated by UMNO members, while other ethnic groups were only represented by their 
moderate leaders. DAP leader, Lim Kit Siang was detained at that time. NOC then created the NCC 
to provide a non public forum, see Means, op. cit., 10 -11. There was manipulation by Malays to 
strengthen their various claims. 
Means, op. cit., p. 24; and Ghazali Shafei, Leadership, Development, Evolution of Culture: the 
Malaysian Experience, Speech for Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad Memorial Lecture, New Delhi, 
India, 12 January 1995. p. 11. 
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directed to Malays, the majority of whom were poor and living in rural areas. When the 
programmes later on showed some success, the belief that `if the Malays feel safe and 
happy, then everybody feels safe and happy too' became commonly accepted. 
hi line with this redefinition of the national interest, it was argued that setbacks 
in achieving the NEP programme could threaten the stability of the nation. Pursuing this 
line of argument, the NOC promoted racial economic differences as the core problem 
threatening the unity and stability of the nation. The May riot was seen as a defining 
moment requiring the building of a new consensus. It was not perceived merely as a 
ethnic clash, but as a kind of political crisis threatening the authority and legitimacy of 
the government20 and the unity of the country. 
The new assumption of threats to the country also had an impact on the way the 
elites interpreted the meaning of democracy for Malaysians. The NOC stated that 
democracy in Malaysia had to be based on the real political and social environment. It 
further claimed that Malaysia possessed `her own distinct characteristics based on her 
history and present racial composition.'21 As a consequence, Malaysia had to `find a 
solution to her problem -a solution that [would] provide a guarantee that in future racial 
sensitivities [would] never be provoked by the operation of normal democratic 
processes, eg., election campaigns' .22 
In reforming the political system, the main departure point of the government 
was based on the new national agenda. The Alliance became the Barisan Nasional 
(National Front -BN), which was a more inclusive and broader -based coalition 
government in Malaysia than that of the Alliance. The core parties were still those in the 
former Alliance: UMNO, MCA and MIC. However, some local -based parties such as 
Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People Movement), PMIP (Pan -Malayan Islamic 
20 Hock Guan Lee, op. cit., p. 250. 
21 Federation of Malaysia, 1969 the may 13 tragedy : the report of the National Operation Council, 
Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1969, p. 80, quoted in Hok Guan Lee's thesis, op. cit., p. 
262. 
22 Ibid. 
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Party) or, in Malay, PAS (Parti Islam Se- Malaysia), and some local parties in Sabah and 
Sarawak were also included. Notably, the PAS was expelled in 1977. 
Almost 20 years later, Mahathir observed that the Alliance was too narrow and 
only pursued race interests rather than national interests. According to Mahathir, the 
BN, which is more broad -based, is much more effective.23 Although both the Alliance 
and BN attempted to build a grand coalition through elite compromises, power sharing 
and accommodation,24 the Alliance was seen as too Iimited in scope to bring about the 
common interests of the people. The BN intended to overcome this problem by 
recruiting other parties including some local -based parties so that it could be a more all - 
inclusive party. 
The new national interest aimed at justifying the Malays' special position was 
reflected in the formulation of the national ideology. The legalisation of special status 
within a national ideology was represented as a necessity in order to safeguard the 
stability of the country.25 Some of the Malays' special status, then, was written formally 
in the national ideology -Rukunegara. It consists of five principles: Belief in God; 
Loyalty to King and Country; Upholding the Constitution; Rule of Law; and Good 
Behaviour and Morality. In the commentary to the meaning of Rukunegara, Islam is 
recognised as an official religion but freedom to practice religion for non Islamic 
followers are guaranteed as long as the religions are practiced in harmony. Loyalty to 
King means true allegiance to the traditional Malay monarchy represented by the Yang 
di- Pertuan Agong.26 These new principles were regarded as fundamental for the social 
and political order in Malaysia and as a formal declaration of `National Compact' or the 
`Racial Bargain'.27 
The above political restructuring created a new political framework and had a 
massive impact on the political behaviour of Malaysians. In this new framework. 
23 Business Times, 21 January 1988. 
Stephen Chee, `Consociational Political Leadership and Conflict Resolution', in Stephen Chee, 
Leadership and Security in Southeast Asia, Institutional Aspects (Singapore: ISEAS, 1991), p. 74. 
zs Interview with Zalcaria Ahmad, Kuala Lumpur, September 1996. 
zc Means, op. cit., pp. 12 -13. 
27 Ibid. 
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freedom of the press and freedom of speech was limited. The experience with the former 
Alliance government convinced the new government that they had to limit debate on 
communal issues that might instigate another crisis. Rukunegara was regarded as a new 
consensus which everybody had to accept before he /she could participate in the 
Malaysian political system. Although it was not as important as Pancasila in Indonesia, 
by using the Rukunegara principle, the Malaysian government could outline accepted 
political behaviour. The elite sometimes referred to it to define and marginalise political 
extremists who raised sensitive communal issues and threatened the stability of the 
nation .28 
Various restrictive legislation such as the ISA has been constructed to limit the 
role of opposition parties and other political groups in society. In other words, the 
government's control of civil society, following Stephen Chew,29 can be seen as a part 
of a depoliticisation process. Debate of sensitive issues is limited, particularly those 
regarding `the power and status of the Malay Rulers, citizenship rights of non -Malays, 
Malay special rights and privileges, the status of Islam as the official religion, and the 
status of Malay as the sole national language .30 As a consequence, as Chew notes, 
political participation is limited and decision making is centralised in Malaysia. Only 
moderate numbers of the elite who supported the new rules of the game and limited 
their ideological differences, would be allowed to share power in the level of policy 
makers. 
The freedom of non -government organisations and political activists which 
could strengthen the rise of pluralistic civil society was also limited.31 By using some 
Acts like the ISA, the Sedition Act, the Societies (Amendment) Act, the Universities 
and University College Act, and the Printing and Printing Presses Act, as limitation 
strategies, the government was successful in reducing socio- political mobilisation while 
28 Ibid., p. 111. 
29 Chew, op. cit., pp. 72 -77. 
30 Means, op. cit., p. 14. 
31 Means, ibid., p. 111. 
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strengthening the process of political institutionalisation. With all of these measures the 
government attempted to install a more explicit form of social guidance.32 
Apart from the above restructuring policy, however, significant leeway has been 
given to citizens, both Malays and non -Malays, to organise their political parties, 
professional associations, trade unions and cultural groups. There have also been 
competitive and free general elections. A Malaysian political observer, Rustam Sani, 
argues that Malaysia's political system is not clearly authoritarian. He asserts that 
Malaysia had, indeed, more freedom during the period after its independence in 1957 
than now, but this has to be explained through a certain sociological process which 
allows Malay elites within UMNO to consolidate their power.33 According to Sani, 
during the 1950 -1960s the Malay bourgeoisie was very weak, but from this point it 
consolidated its power so that it was able to deal with opposition within society - 
especially opposition parties, students and workers. This bourgeoisie was also less and 
less tolerant of alternative views.34 
William Case describes such a system as `semi-democratic'. Although the 
government can control freedom by using the ISA and other Laws, according to him, 
liberal participation is quite extensive. To a certain degree the government has to be 
responsive to people's demands due to the fear of losing votes in general elections.35 
Similarly, Harold Crouch argues that the government in Malaysia has been both 
responsive and repressive. Both aspects, according to Crouch, cannot be separated in 
Malaysian politics. Therefore, it is better labelled as `neither democracy, nor 
authoritarian system'.36 
The above concept also implies that the system not only satisfies Malay interests, 
but also provides significant scope for non -Malays and opposition parties to maintain 
32 Chew, op. cit., p. 75. 
33 Interview with Rustam Sani, Kuala Lumpur, September 1996. 
34 Ibid. 
35 William Case, `Malaysia: the Semi- Democratic Paradigm', Asian Studies Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 
pp. 76 -77. 
36 Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 
1996). 
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their freedoms and activities. There are, for example, chances to criticise the 
government and to form new political parties, as long as these do not reject the 
fundamental principle of the system and adopt a moderate position with regard to the 
Malay special status. Given the special position of the Malays, the system is called a 
quasi- democratic system. By quasi- democracy, Zakaria Ahmad means that there have 
been some basic facts in Malaysian society, such as the supremacy of the Malays in 
politics, which cannot be denied. This maintains the Malays' privilege to rule the 
country.37 
The terminology used above shows that the system has changed significantly 
from pre -1969 crisis situation. The executive has been given a greater capacity to guide 
and control political debates and to manage change compared with the situation before 
1969. As will be demonstrated in the next section, this change took place principally 
during the Mahathir administration. With its domination of the media, the Mahathir 
government can pursue an overwhelming discourse of nation building and development, 
and marginalise alternative discourses which might challenge it 3ß 
B. MAHATHIR'S `ASIAN VALUES' 
The above restructuring of the political system, however justified it is in terms of 
cultural, historical and social factors of Malaysia, continues to be criticised by 
opposition groups as well as by the international community. In particular, the privilege 
given to Malays in the system is seen by some Chinese in the country and some Western 
leaders as a policy of discrimination. A special priority allocated to Malays in higher 
education, public services and economic opportunities has created strong resentment 
from the Chinese community.39 This priority towards and against non -Malays has also 
Interview with Zakaria H Achmad, a Lecturer in the Political Department, Universiti Kehangsaan 
Malaysia (National University of Malaysia), Kuala Lumpur, September 1996. 
$ Chandra Muzaffar, `Civil Society in Malaysia', paper delivered on Konvensyen Masyarakat 
Madani - Pembinaan Masyarakat Madani Model Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur 19 -21 September 1996, 
pp. 3 -4. s Because of Malaysia's affirmative action program which is seen as delivering Special Rights for 
Malays after the 1969 crisis, significant improvements in Malays economic condition have been 
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attracted criticism from leaders within Western countries.40 The policy was also seen as 
categorising the non -Malays as a `segmented citizens' which put non -Malays in an 
unequal political status compared with their fellow Malays.41 
During the Mahathir administration, these criticisms increased in scale. This 
happened, in large measure because of the emergence of a highly educated middle class. 
Consisting of a mixture of working, business and farming classes, this class is aware of 
their political rights and determined not to be left enfranchised from the political 
process 42 Although a large proposition of the members in this expanded middle -class of 
Malays owe their new status to government affirmative action policy, a significant 
number of them, along with members of the Chinese middle class, are among the 
trenchant critics of the government. They join non -governmental Organisations 
dedicated human rights and environmental issues and play an important roles in 
achieved. But this has also produced increased concern from non -Malays, particularly Chinese, that 
the program has gone too far and is detrimental to their future. In higher education, universities 
favored applications by Malays students and restricted acceptance of Chinese students. This has 
pushed some Chinese to send their children to study overseas. Chinese then proposed the 
development of a private University funded by their community, but this has been rejected by the 
government. See, Alan Collins, `The Ethnic Security Dilemma: Evidence from Malaysia', 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 20, No. 3, December 1998, p. 266. In economic terms the 
ownership of small and large businesses by the Malays has grown significantly and some have 
surpassed non Malay ownership level. In the public service, the Malays also enjoy more 
occupational mobility than non -Malays. This Malay success, however, has been criticised because 
it is based on specific ethnic Malay interest rather than on a universal basis of economic justice and 
distribution to the whole of the Malaysian community. See, Lim Mah Hui, `Affirmative Action, 
Ethnicity and Integration: The Case of Malaysia', Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, April 
1985, pp. 272 -273. 
40 In April 1996, Bill Hayden, a former Australian governor- general, and Mahathir Mohamad, the 
Malaysia's Prime Minister, exchanged words. Mahathir labelled Australians as racists whereas Bill 
accused Malaysian leaders as racist because they apply a discriminative policy against the Chinese. 
See, Straits Times, 9 April 1996; and James V. Jesudason, The Management of Segmented 
Citizenship in Malaysia, (Kandy, Sri Lanka: International Center for Ethnic Studies (ICES), 
Pamphlet Series 5, 1996), p. 1; for issues that sparked elite conflicts based on cultural differences 
between Malaysia and Australia, see Harold Crouch, `Understanding Malaysia', in Anthony Milner 
and Mary Quilty (eds.), Australia in Asia, Episodes (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
pp. 37 -60. 
at Jesudason defines segmented citizenship as `the differential relationship of individuals to the state 
along ethnic lines (or other ascriptive criteria) in regard to formal political rights and cultural 
primacy'. See Jesudason, op. cit., p. 3. 
42 Harold Crouch and James W. Morley, `The Dynamics of Political Change', in James W. Morley 
(ed.), Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia -Pacific Region (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 
1992, p. 282. 
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opposition parties such as the DAP and PAS.43 Mahathir has to face this criticism and to 
find a legitimate basis on which he can endorse the necessity of the current political 
system and direct changes within Malaysian society. 
The claim of `Asian values', consisting of a set of values such as hard work, 
family unity, discipline and deference to authority, is one way used by Mahathir for this 
purpose. It is clear, however, that Mahathir's goal in deploying the `Asian values' 
concept is not only to assert the durability of the existing Malaysian political system but 
also to formulate and imagine what kind of Malaysia society should evolve. Through 
this and other concepts such as the Look East policy, Melayu Baru (New Malay) and 
Vision 2020, Mahathir attempts to realise these ambitions. In formulating `Asian 
values', he has made comparisons with other values, particularly `Western values', and 
revitalised various local and traditional values. Such methods designed to calm down 
domestic criticism have, to a large degree, invited much criticism from Western media 
and policy makers. 
To understand further Mahathir's discourse of `Asian values' and its relation 
with the Malaysian political system, I elaborate, firstly, on the background leading to the 
birth of the claims of `Asian values'. Secondly, I examine how the `Asian values' 
concept has been represented by Mahathir. Thirdly, I Iook at how the concept operates in 
Malaysian society. 
1. The Background 
Following the restructuring of the political system, in 1971 the so- called second 
generation of Ieadership in Malaysia replaced the first generation of leaders led by first 
Prime Minister (PM) Tunku Abdul Rahman.44 Starting from Tun Abdul Razak (1971- 
1976), Datuk Hussein Onn (1976 -1981) and carrying through to Mahathir Mohamad 
(1981 -), this second generation had to face new challenges in Malaysian society. During 
4' Harold Crouch, `Malaysia: Neither Authoritarian nor Democratic', in Richard Robison, Kevin 
Hewison and Garry Rodan (eds.), Southeast Asia in. the 1990s, Authoritarianism, Democracy and 
Capitalism (St. Leonard, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1993), pp. 143 -144. 
44 Means, op. cit., p. 19. 
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the Mahathir administration there were at least two important challenges to be faced. 
Firstly, the administration had to realise its visions and a programme of Malay economic 
improvement. This vision was linked explicitly with Mahathir as one of the so- called 
Malay `ultras' during and after the May 1969 riot. Clearly, he had to prove that he could 
fulfil his plan and vision for improvements in the Malays' economy. 
However, secondly, as part of the Malaysian political and economic 
development, the Mahathir administration also faced dynamic changes within the non - 
Malay ethnic communities. Non -Malays were concerned that the emphasis on the 
specific interests of the Malays might disadvantage them. There had also been a 
psychological impact on non -Malays as a result of the emphasis on Malays as the 
rightful owner of Malaysia during the Razak administration. It was assumed that other 
ethnic groups were only second -class citizens or `visitors' for employment.45 Given 
these issues, the Mahathir administration sought to address the problems seen to have 
been caused during the years in power of Prime Minister Tun Razak, as well as during 
the period of Tun Abdur Rahman.46 
These problems were addressed quickly. It was clear that when Mahathir became 
Prime Minister, he attempted to maintain the national consensus in Malaysian society by 
including the interests of both the Malays and non -Malays. The efforts to maintain 
consensus, or at least to maintain momentum for development a decade after the riot, 
was considered important for continuing development in Malaysia. The riot had made 
people aware of the necessity for moderate political behaviour. 
Moderation, however, was achieved through the implementation of harsh 
policies applied by Mahathir's predecessors, This was why at his early years of 
administration Mahathir with Musa Hitam as Deputy PM attempted to attract support by 
instituting a more liberal style of government. During a very brief honeymoon period 
under the `2M Administration' (a term used to refer to Mahathir and his deputy Musa 
°$ V. David, Freedom that never Came (Kuala Lumpur, Kong Lee Printers, 1989), p. 108. 
46 Chandran Jeshurun, `Malaysia: The Mahathir Supremacy and Vision 2020', Southeast Asian 
Affairs 1993, p. 203. 
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Hitam), Mahathir and Musa Hitam tried to attract support by softening some of the 
harsher aspects of the policies of the previous governments.47 They allowed public 
debates on some political matters and let political parties debate communal issues in 
their political agendas. The opposition parties, particularly the Democratic Action Party 
(DAP), used this chance to question the special status of the Malays and the second - 
class non -Malay status as `immigrant citizens'. This political openness then raised new 
communal tensions in society. People started to worry that something such as the May 
1969 riot might happen again.48 
It soon became clear that such a strategy did not work well at the end of the 
1980s. Reflecting on 10 years of the application of liberal policy, Mahathir pointed out 
that people misinterpreted the freedom he had given. There had been people who 
wanted to create instability and not give constructive criticism. Mahathir said that he 
wanted to be liberal but people did not fully appreciate it. He then made an analogy 
about the monkey being given flowers, declaring that, `unable to appreciate their beauty 
the monkey simply (tore) them to bits' 49 The government, then, decided not to tolerate 
the `destructive criticism' levelled at it. By using the ISA and what was called 'Operasi 
Lalang' (Tall Grass Operation), the government detained 119 political activists and 
opposition leaders who were suspected to be behind the rise of communal tensions in 
October 1987.5° 
Stemming from this experience, Mahathir, inevitably it seems, came to limit the 
freedom he had given. Up to this point, it seemed that he had to come back to the earlier 
statement of the NOC about democracy -that democracy had to be carried out within the 
Malaysian context. But to do so, taking into account the context of rapid changes both in 
° Before Mahathir, harsh measures such as the Iimitation of freedom, and political detaining of 
radical students who demonstrated because of the slow process of improvement of the peasant 
economy, had been taken to ensure that the restructuring policy of the NOC could be applied. The 
detaining of students included those such as Syed Hussein Ali, Lim Mah Hui, and Anwar Ibrahim 
who led student demonstrations on 3 December 1974. See, Means, op. cit., pp. 36 -37. 
48 About the general communal tensions, see for example, Crouch, Government and Society..., op. 
cit., pp. 106 -110. 
49 Straits Times, 25 January 1988. 
so Crouch, Government and Socie ty...., op. cit., p. 109. 
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international and domestic society, he had to find new justification. This was because in 
international society, there had been changes in understanding state autonomy and 
sovereignty, and in understanding the norms of intervention in other states. Western 
states, particularly the United States and Western European states, are now very much 
concerned with limitations of freedom, sometimes using economic and political 
sanctions to influence political changes in Third Word countries. At the same time, on 
the domestic front, there have been growing demands for freedom of speech and to 
participate in policy making. 
Some common justifications used previously to reject demands for freedom and 
democratisation no longer seemed appropriate. For example, the developmentalist 
argument based on the assumption that people need development not democracy, and 
the tutelary argument that the government knows best while the people are not ready for 
democracy,51 could not be used before international and domestic audiences alike. As 
K.S. lomo argues, in new circumstances where average Malaysians have become 
affluent and the middle -class has grown significantly, such justifications have lost their 
appeal in society. The only justification Mahathir can use, according to Jomo, is a 
cultural justification that emphasises the claims that Malaysia is different from Western 
countries.52 
Claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' promoted by Mahathir and his 
supporters advances an appropriate justification of the practice of an authoritarian style 
of government. This is a cultural argument departing from the assumption that Malaysia 
has different values from those of the West so that it has to develop its own distinctive 
model of democracy.53 This last justification has been used extensively in the Malaysian 
context recently. The discourse of `Asian values', as will be discussed, is one example 
51 
52 
53 
`Democracy' in Anthony Milner (ed.), Comparing Cultures (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
1996), p. 150. 
Interview with lomo Kwame Sundaram known also as K.S. Jomo, lecturer and Professor at the 
Economics Department, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 6 September 1996. 
Ibid. 
129 
of the use of values and culture as justification for the claim of a distinctive model of 
democracy. 
2. `Asian values' and `Western values' 
The effectiveness of the claims of `Asian values' in explaining the need for a 
distinctive style of democracy depends both on the content of the values and how 
Mahathir and his supporters promote it. Mahathir praises `Asian values' because he 
believes that the values will lead Malaysians to a harmonious society. He is critical of 
some `Western values' because these values, according to Mahathir, often lead to 
violence and immorality. In Mahathir's eyes the claims of `Asian values', should not 
completely deny `Western values' but, rather, comprise efforts to select and combine 
them with notable `Asian values'.54 
It is important to note that there is no fixed list of `Asian values'. Mahathir 
deputy Prime Minister (until September 1998), Anwar Ibrahim, when asked what `Asian 
values' were, answered the question ambiguously. He stated that `they are not 
monolithic and that they are tied to a nation's history, culture and tradition'.55 For 
Anwar, they include a wide -range of ethical principles ranging from virtue, abhorrence 
of corruption, regard for the rights of others, and liberty to inculcate knowledge.56 
However, to start a discussion about `Asian values', it is important to examine 
some common assumptions about Mahathir's `Asian values' which are frequently 
misunderstood by its critics. There have been at least three general themes commonly 
attached to Mahathir's `Asian values'. Those themes include the attachment to 
patrimonial /patriarchal states, the importance of family and community, and `the 
54 Mahathir Mohamad, "Nilai Asia' (Asian Values)', speech in Senate House, Cambridge University, 
London, 15 March 1995, see Dewan Budaya, April 1995, pp. 6 -8. 
ss Straits Times, 3 December 1994. 
se Charles Alexander (et. al.), `What is Success without Freedom, Anwar on Currency Woes, Elders 
and Asian Values', Time, 6 October 1997. 
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religious tradition of non -separation between a secularised public space and religious 
privatization' 57 
In some ways, the label patrimonial state, was attached to Mahathir's `Asian 
style democracy' because of the tendency to give a great role to government to direct 
changes in Malaysian society. Such a role has been criticised by some Western 
academics and media because of the government's repressive policies towards political 
dissidents and opposition parties and its limitation of freedom of the press. In a recent 
criteria of Freedom House, Malaysia scored 5 out of 10 both for political rights and civil 
liberties and was categorised as partly free. According to this report, there are basic 
political rights and civil liberties, but the press and independent civic life is limited.58 
For Mahathir, however, the strong and firm role of government is needed to prevent the 
seeds of disunity, chaos and violence from sowing in society. He maintains that 
'Developed countries can do with weak governments or no government. But 
developing countries cannot function without strong authority on the part of 
government. Unstable and weak governments will result in chaos, and chaos 
cannot contribute to the development and well -being of developing countries.' 5' 
The Malaysian government in this case has detained many political opponents by 
using the ISA, limiting the freedom of the press, and banning certain Islamic groups 
because they threaten the peace and stability within the community. For Mahathir, 
freedom should come with responsibility because without responsibility freedom is 
dangerous. He uses the example of the experiences of former communist states which 
open their society and give freedom to their people. Those states, according to Mahathir, 
face anarchy and the problem of crime and corruption. As a consequence, he says, 
`Governments have become weak and less durable. Unfamiliar with the rule of 
law, they find themselves unable to enforce it in the way liberals are supposed to 
enforce the law.... Even the old democracies are not quite capable of handling 
democracies. The rights of citizen are so honoured that they can form armed 
militia with the expressed intention of over -throwing the Government by violence. 
... Already those Asian countries which have adopted Western ideas about 
Joel S. Kahn, `Malaysian Modern or Anti -anti Asian Values', Thesis Eleven, No. 50, August 1997, 
p. 18. 
a Adrian Karatnycky, `The 1998 Freedom House Surveys, The Decline of Illiberal Democracy', 
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1999, pp. 124 -125. 
9 Mahathir Mohamad, "Nilai Asia' (Asian Values)', .. op. cit., pp. 6-8. 
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democracy wholesale are finding ruling their country rather difficult. Disruptive 
strikes and riots undermine the economy and make Iife difficult for the citizens' 65 
Malaysia itself faced civil unrest with the riot in May 1969. Violence erupted 
because the Malays were disadvantaged in the economic system, and because the 
Chinese were disappointed with their political position. This is an important context for 
the development of Mahathir's ideas of stability and order. As explained above, 
Mahathir blamed the government under PM Abdul Rahman at that time for the lack of 
anticipation in addressing the tensions between the Malays and Chinese. Mahathir 
believes the riot was caused by an acute imbalance in economic ownership between the 
Malays and Chinese. The improvement of the Malay economy, therefore, became a 
prerequisite for harmonious race relations in Mahathir's mind. Mahathir in his recent 
book, praised what his government has achieved in this matter. He stated that, 
`Today, Malaysia is politically much more stable even than countries with 
homogenous populations. We are apt to take this for granted, but we must never 
forget that in the past racial clashes were not uncommon in Malaysia. We must 
take the present racial harmony and political peace for granted. We must be 
conscious of the need for balance and equity if the country wishes to remain stable 
and prosperous.'61 
For the purpose of stability, in the case of religious groups, Mahathir argues that 
the government should scrutinise these groups' tenets and ban those that deviate from 
the true faith. In defending the ban of a religious group, Mahathir said that 
`The action to bring back these deviationists was taken fairly early, Had they been 
allowed to go on until they stage some form of violent attacks on the people. It 
would have been too late. ...many felt that the action of the Government was 
undemocratic. But Malaysia believes it is democratic to anticipate violence and 
protect the people'.fi2 
To support his argument, Mahathir continues by criticising the practice of 
democracy in the West. He says, 
`Whether the West admits it or not, David Koresh and the Jones cult were the 
products of the Western form of democracy. So also is the recent bombing in 
Oklahoma. The Michigan Militia Corp has as yet done no real harm. But you can 
60 See, Mahathir's speech at the International Conference of `The Future of Asia', op. cit. 
51 Mahathir Mohamad, The Way Forward (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998), p. 65. 
62 Mahathir's speech, `The Future of Asia', op. cit. 
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bet that sooner or later they will be using those guns which they democratically 
own.' 
63 
The second theme in the `Asian values' concept, the superiority of family and 
community over the individual, starts from the belief that individual freedom should not 
be allowed to disturb peace and stability in society. In this case Mahathir does not 
disregard the rights of the individual but argues that these rights should be applied in a 
responsible way so that they do not undermine the mores of society.G4 He states that 
..the community, the majority comes first. The individual and the minority must 
have their rights but not at the unreasonable expense of the majority. The 
individuals and the minority must conform to the mores of society. A little 
deviation may be allowed but unrestrained exhibition of personal freedom which 
disturb the peace or threatens to undermine society is not what Asians expect from 
democracy',65 
He further asserts about the importance of balance between the rights of the 
individual and the community, and between political rights and economic rights. He 
declared, 
`The real challenge to those who believe in democracy is how to balance between 
the administration of democracy with its contents, between the competing wishes 
of the people and what is desired by the people and what ought to be given' ... The 
real challenge also depends on the abolition of oppression by the majority and by 
the minority and how political rights can be balanced with economic rights'.66 
The third characteristic of `Asian values' -no separation between state and 
religion- is drawn from speeches of Malaysian leaders, particularly Mahathir and Anwar 
Ibrahim who emphasise the applicability of religion, particularly Islam, in social and 
political life. Mahathir believes that religion plays a pertinent role in various aspects of 
Malaysian society. He argues that, 
`Religion should never be regarded as simply the rituals which affect people only 
at the individual level. Religion which seeks truth to establish justice in all aspects 
of societal life should be regarded as beneficial to society. It is religion which acts 
63 
64 
65 
66 
Ibid. 
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Mahathir's speech delivered at Trinity College, Oxford on 19 April 1985, quoted in Zainudin 
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as the anchor or underlying principle that governs not only the physical and 
material well -being but also the spiritual growth and upliftment of man.'67 
With regard to relations between Islam and social life, Anwar states: 
`Muslims in Southeast Asia ... do not consider socio- economic programmes such 
as the eradication of poverty, the provision of basic necessities including quality 
education and health care to every citizen, and the cultivation of learning as purely 
secular pursuits'. On the contrary, we consider them as central to the endeavour to 
realize the Muslim vision of justice and compassion.'68 
In light of the above quotations from Mahathir's speeches, it can be concluded 
that in contrast to reports in the Western media that the `Asian values' concept has been 
mainly constructed for a campaign against the West, Mahathir's speeches have actually 
delivered more complicated messages. Certainly there has been a de- construction of 
`Western values' and then a re- construction of `Asian values' in his speeches. The de- 
construction is particularly required to formulate a new challenge for his nation. 
Malaysians, in Mahathir's view, need to understand the excesses of Western 
modernisation in order to formulate their own values. `Western values' as well as 
traditional `Asian values', for Mahathir, are values that need to be defined, moulded and 
located for Malaysia to progress.69 
For this purpose, some `Western values' have been represented as having 
negative influences resulting from modernity. `Western values', according to Mahathir, 
are in decline because their original values such as `orderliness, discipline and firm 
social organisation', have faded away and, in turn, resulted in social problems where 
there are no rules about what is bad and what is good.70 
He needs to denigrate some of these `Western values' for the ultimate purpose of 
creating equality for his country on the international stage. His attacks on the West, are 
in response, partly, to the limitations placed on Asians searching for and constructing 
67 Mahathir Mohamad, `The Role and Influence of Religions in Society', speech addressed at the 
Opening of the Seminar Jointly Organised by IKIM and the Goethe Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 14 
September 1993. 
68 See Anwar Ibrahim, `Islam and Confucianism: A Civilizational Dialogue', speech addressed at the 
Opening of the International Seminar on Islam and Confucianism: A Civilizational Dialogue, Kuala 
Lumpur, 13 March 1995. 
o° Straits Times, 31 January 1994. 
70 Ibid., p. 43. 
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their own values. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of a unipolar world, 
the powerful Western states claims that their views and values should be adopted by 
other countries. He said that 
'A new international order was enunciated in which the powerful countries claim a 
right to impose their system of Government, their free market and their concept of 
human rights on every country.... All countries must convert to the multi -party 
system of government and practise the liberal views on human rights as conceived 
by the Europeans and the North Americans.'71 
By championing `Asian values', Mahathir complains that he, together with other 
supporters of `Asian values', has been accused of doing no more than attempting to 
corroborate authoritarianism, dictatorship and uncivilised government.72 The 
unwillingness to follow Western values on human rights for example, `has brought on a 
tirade of accusations about Asian recalcitrance.'73 Mahathir regrets that the rights of 
Asians to define and practise their own set of values, with regard to human rights or 
democracy, have sometimes been ignored.74 
The above representation of Western experiences with democracy and what 
Malaysia could learn from them have become a general outline of the appropriate values 
Malaysians should adopt. Thus the accusation of a Western hegemonic attempt to spread 
their values about human rights and democracy necessitates a counter from the 
Malaysian nation. According to Mahathir, the outline of `Asian values' can be 
constructed on a particular country's experiences. Some Third World countries, 
according to Mahathir, have failed to apply the principles of Western liberal democracy. 
These countries fail to build order and stability which are conducive for their 
development. 
The experiences of liberal democracy in the Western countries has also brought 
about many social and moral problems. In those countries, Mahathir argues, individuals 
Mahathir Mohamad, Speech at the Just International Conference on Rethinking Human Rights, 
Kuala Lumpur, 6 December 1994. 
2 Mahathir Mohamad, Nilai Asia ... op. cit. 
3 Mahathir Mohamad, Speech at the Just International Conference on Rethinking Human Rights, op. 
cit.. 
4 Ibid. 
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tended to break rules and codes governing the society. The system in Western countries 
often results in a denial of the marriage system, allowing extra -marital sex, changes of 
partner, hedonism and total immorality. All of these problems, according to Mahathir, 
are caused by the norms of absolute freedom 75 In one of his speeches, Mahathir says 
that: `Too much democracy leads to homosexuality, moral decay, racial intolerance, 
economic decline and single -parent families'76 
In addition, it is important to note that Mahathir comes to the above construction 
of `Western values' through a process of learning and experience dealing with Western 
liberal democracy. At the beginning as Khoo Boo Teik argues, Mahathir even praised 
`Western values', such as organisation, discipline, hard work, Protestant ethics and spirit 
of capitalism." Mahathir criticised characteristics of Malay culture such as feudalism 
and fatalism which were not compatible with the above values. In the Malay Dilemma, 
he considered that Malay attitudes which had many formalities and ceremonies but did 
not respect time and material things, were not congruous with a modern economy which 
priorities money as one of its central elements7$ Malays, he argued, need to transform 
such cultures and adopt the above `Western values'. 
Only around the mid 1980s, after seeing the emergence of student, civil rights 
and feminist movements, which challenged the religious and social structure of 
Malaysia society, did Mahathir construct the notion that `Western values' were harmful 
to the future of his society.79 In some speeches he mentioned the decline and moral 
decadence of Western countries, which had to be avoided by Malaysians. Values in the 
5 Ibid. 
6 Canberra Times, 31 May 1993; `Voice of Malaysia radio', 29 May 1993, quoted in BP, 22 March 
1994; and also see Stephanie Lawson, "Political Myths about `Asia' and the `West -, in Richard 
Robison, op. cit., p. 121. 
77 Interview with Khoo Boo Teik, Canberra, 21 November 1997; see also, Mahathir Mohamad, The 
Challenge (Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 1986), pp. 45 -46, 130 -132. 
a Mahathir Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma, op. cit., particularly Chapter IX. 
9 Interview with Khoo Boo Teik, Canberra, 21 November 1997; in The Challenge, Mahathir criticize 
the development of values in the West. He particularly paid attention to Western liberal democracy 
and its political institutions which allow the development of some `bad values' within liberal 
society. According to him, values which used to be considered bad in society such as drinking 
alcohol, smoking marijuana, having sex without marriage, because of weaknesses of social control 
of individual freedom, become a common phenomenon. See, Mohamad, The Challenge, op. cit., 
pp. 91 -94. 
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West, according to Mahathir, change `more towards bad than good, and as it is easier to 
copy the bad, Malay society is showing definite signs of changing for the worse' 80 He 
further stated that `there are ... examples of good Malay values having been replaced by 
bad ones from the West. Some of the Western values assimilated are of small 
consequence but there are others that will destroy Malay society'81 
It is also interesting to see that in his last book, The Way Forward, Mahathir no 
longer blames 'Western values'. He makes a comparison with cultural changes in 
medieval Europe, especially French and Russia.82 But this is mainly used to show that a 
reformation of culture is important in the progress of a society. The comparison is also 
meant to encourage his fellow Malays and other bumiputeras to learn and gain 
confidence in business by abandoning their old conviction that they are not capable of 
doing business even if they were given a chance.83 
Thus, in a sense, it can be concluded that Mahathir does not really reject 
`Western values'. What is central for Mahathir is the `correct' values and cultures 
needed by Malays for developing an efficient and productive economy. He argues that `a 
people's culture, rooted in the sum total of the values believed in by that community, is 
truly the determinant of their performance in any activity'.84 Malay's farmers and petty 
traders who are culturally unsophisticated, according to Mahathir, cannot be expected to 
succeed only by giving them opportunity.85 It is only by having `value systems and the 
sophistication of a complex commercial and industrial community', that the 
bumiputeras can survive and compete against other countries.86 
In terms of `Western values', therefore, what was criticised in Mahathir's attacks 
against Western values in Asia, as Shoaib Naqvi's argues, was not necessarily the 
essence of Western civilisation, but the excesses and the results of Western institutions. 
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These institutions, according to Naqvi, suffered from the disease, labelled by Aristotle 
as `being too much of itself', which could lead to chaos.87 
Mahathir's acceptance of Western values is especially evident if we examine a 
broader range of his speeches. For example, he clearly states that some Western values 
are behind the East Asian economic success. The majority of `Asian values' are values 
which used to be Western values. By following David Hitchcock,88 Mahathir asserts that 
values such as the search for knowledge, hard work and self -discipline used to be 
Western values are now highly respected and are appropriated in Asia.89. Other Western 
values, such as the respect of new ideas and public accountability, to a lesser degree, are 
beginning to be adopted.90 
At the same time, Mahathir is also critical of many `Asian values'. He asserts 
that people need to get rid of values which place an extreme emphasis on materialism 
or, in contrast, on anti -materialism and extreme spiritualism. These values do not 
support progress in society so they need to be eradicated. Mahathir also affirms that 
other values such as feudalism, beliefs based on destiny, and arrogance after success are 
not conducive for development.91 
Despite his enthusiasm for constructing `Asian values' as a significant base for 
progress in Asia, Mahathir denies the possibility of the emergence of an `Asian century' 
or Abad Asia. This is particularly so if the `Asian century' means that `Asians' will 
dominate and threaten the world as did the Europeans in nineteenth century and the 
Americans in twentieth century, in the so- called `European century' and `American 
century', respectively.92 If there will be an `Asian century', according to Mahathir, then 
that should pose no threat to anyone. Rather than making a myth of the `Asian century', 
87 Shoaib Raza Naqvi, `...But the Institutions of Development Are', Asian Wall Street Journal, 8 
November 1995. 
88 David Hitchcock, Asian Values and the United States: How Much Conflict? (Washington, D.C. : 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994). 
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91 Ibid. 
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what is more important, Mahathir argues, is building a `World century' where there will 
be prosperity, responsibility, democracy and respect for human rights for everyone in the 
world. This new world should be a world that has self- respect and mutual understanding 
of values, styles and ways of life among different people and states in the world.93 
3. `Asian values' in Malaysian society 
Mahathir's methods of representing `Asian values' by selecting the good aspects 
of Western values and by reforming traditional values serve the purpose of maintaining 
support for his leadership and for his plans for the future of Malaysia. Mahathir 
attempted to mobilise support from within Malaysian society and eradicate his image as 
a Malay- ultra. The so- called `Asian values' are promoted before both Malay and non- 
MaIay audiences. These values can be any values that are useful for motivating progress. 
In one of his national day speeches, for example, Mahathir urged his countrymen to 
build a culture of discipline and responsibility in their society, By discarding habits that 
are detrimental to the country, according to Mahathir, Malaysia will not only progress, 
but can also overcome the negative trends of social and moral development in the West, 
such as drug addiction, moral decadence and laziness.94 
There have been other benefits for Mahathir in delivering these general values as 
part of his `Asian values' campaigns. They have helped Mahathir to revise the 1970s 
image of his Malay group as `angry Malay'. By interpreting culture for purposes of 
progress, Mahathir now takes a general and nation -wide view that he believes can unite 
and represent all important aspects of ethical values in Malaysia in facing challenges 
and competition in the international world. 
In line with the need to revitalise traditional `Asian values' which should be 
embraced by the whole of society, Mahathir is particularly concerned with the attitude of 
the Malays towards progress. For example, he criticises how some Malays have used the 
NEP benefits merely as gifts and do not work hard to develop their businesses. He 
93 Ibid.; and see also Kompas, 25 October 1997. 
94 Straits Times, 31 August 1994. 
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reminds those kinds of middle -class Malays and rich Malays to be aware of the trouble 
they may face if the economy slides or if `there are no more free gifts' 95 
This approach is vastly different from his attitude in the 1970s when he blamed 
Chinese domination of the economy for the Malay plight. In the 1980s it was quite 
common for Mahathir to emphasise the need for the Malays to improve their ability to 
develop business skills. This attitude was a departure from his tendency to see the 
Chinese as a threat as reflected in his comments before and after the May 1969 riots. He 
is now keen to suggest that the Malays dispense with their traditional culture so that they 
can compete with other ethnics groups in modernisation. In his three books the Malay 
Dilemma The Challenge, and The Way Forward he clearly argues that there is a need for 
the Malays to discard their attitudes of fatalism, passivity, lack of appreciation of 
money, time and property to adopt new values which can make use of opportunities in 
modern economic progress.96 He recommends the values of hard work, self discipline 
with responsibility toward society, and strong and firm leadership. 
The revitalisation of such values, for some academics, is interpreted as 
Mahathir's grand vision.97 They note that Mahathir has been able to inculcate new 
values and a new spirit among the Malays by going beyond the economic and equity 
targets of the NEP. What is more important for Mahathir seems to be a vision for 
modernisation where `the Malays are ... required to be efficient, hardworking, and 
disciplined capitalists and workers' 98 By adopting universal capitalist principles, the 
transfer target of economic equity which may disadvantage some Chinese has become 
less controversial. This, in turn, will hopefully create the emergence of real Bumiputera 
businessmen. 
95 Straits Times, 25 January 1988. 
96 Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma (Singapore: Times Books International, 1979), particularly 
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97 Khoo Kay Jin, `The Grand Vision: Mahathir and Modernisation', in Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh 
Kok Wah, Fragmented Vision, Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia (Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 1992). s Francis Loh Kok Wah and Joel S. Kahn, `Introduction: Fragmented Vision', in ibid., p. 4. 
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The promotion of new values for progress was formulated in the Melayu Baru 
(New Malay) concept. Unlike the assumption in the Malay Dilemma, with the `New 
Malay' concept Mahathir revises his argument that the genetic factor is behind the 
Malays' backwardness. He now believes that the Malays can transform and change 
themselves to become an internationally significant civilisation.99 Some academics in 
Malaysia also support this concept. In general, they argue for the necessity that the 
Malays transform themselves in order to be able to create new opportunities. too 
The root of such a transformation, it is argued, can been traced back to Abdullah 
Munsyi, a 19`h century Malay writer. Munsyi criticised both the laziness and the simple 
attitudes of Malays in facing life, and the attitudes of Malay rajahs who were greedy and 
took people's belongings. Munsyi suggested that the Malays learn and adopt new 
knowledge and technology and embrace progress and diligent attitudes brought by the 
British colonials to early 19`h century Malay kingdoms.101 Virginia Hooker describes the 
`New Malay' as a kind of mental revolution for the Malays to redefine their identity.102 
Among the wider population of Malaysians, such a promotion of values was 
preceded by the Look East Policy. The policy encourages Malaysians to look at the 
progress and spirit of the Newly Industrial Countries (NICs) in East Asia in managing 
economic and political life. It suggests that the work ethic'behind the progress of NICs 
and the management methods of East Asian capitalism remain examples which should 
be followed.103 It is also implied that economic growth needs a strong and stable 
government which can set up a long term outlook on macro -planning and which is not 
distracted by campaigns to win the next general election. The experience of NICs, 
9e Mafoot Simon, 'Dr Mahathir Revises Dilemma', Straits Times, 29 June 1997. 
goo Abdul Rahman, The New Malay', speech in Australia- Malaysia Conference, Malaysia and 2020: 
the Dynamics of Change, Canberra, 19 -21 November 1997; and see also Rustam Sani, Melayu 
Baru: Beberapa Persoalan Sosio -budaya (New Malay: Some Socio- culture Problems) (Kuala 
Lumpur: Institut Kajian Strategik dan Antarbangsa -ISIS, 1992). 
01 See for example, Siti Aisah Murad, Abdullah Munsyi dan Masyarakat Melayu (Abdullah Munsyi 
and Malay Community) (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1996). 
102 Virginia Hooker, speech in Australia -Malaysia Conference, Canberra 19 -21 November 1997. 
103 Business Times, 21 January 1988. 
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according to Mahathir, has shown a strong correlation between rapid economic growth 
and a strong and stable government.1o4 
The methods of revitalising `Asian values' by blaming the West, and by 
promoting the Look East policy, as Khoo Boo Teik argues, has rechannelled Malay 
nationalism away from the preoccupation with Chinese and other non -Malay threats to a 
new attitude of improving themselves and preparing for international competition.'°5 
The preoccupation illustrated above was established by the perception developing prior 
to, and during, the 1969 riot. Mahathir's `Asian values' campaign, subsequently seemed 
to have reduced the worries among non -Malays regarding the Malay `ultra' sentiments. 
The campaign, it is assumed, can mobilise all ethnic groups to accept a new attitude of 
progress for Malaysia. 
Certainly, there are many weaknesses and simplifications in Mahathir's 
representation of Western values. Sometimes it shows the limited knowledge Mahathir 
has of the West. Much of Mahathir's criticism is based on simple excesses of modern 
societies in Western countries. Nevertheless, as Khoo mentions, what is important is the 
timing and the messages they bring. The attacks on the West have switched Malay 
nationalism from an inward anti -Chinese attitude to an outward anti -Western values 
campaign.106 By using this anti -Western rhetoric, Mahathir has effectively managed to 
build his own vision and image of what kind of Malaysian society there should be in the 
future. 
A further interpretation of `Asian values' is Mahathir's views on industrial 
society in Malaysia in the year 2020, which is commonly called `Vision 2020'. Under 
this new vision, Mahathir plans to bring Malaysian society into a fully industrialised 
state infused with strong moral and ethical values. Vision 2020 is based on an internal 
104 Mahathir Mohamad, Regional Business Collaboration, speech at the opening of the Pacific Rim 
Business Collaboration Symposium, Kuala Lumpur, 5 December 1994. 
os Khoo Boo Teik, op. cit., p. 42. 
106 Ibid., p. 47. 
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concept of the nation, characterised by `national confidence in Malaysian values and 
general acceptance if not tolerance of Malaysian -style democracy.' i07 
There has been an indication of the importance of local values in `Vision 2020', 
While it is clear that with the `Vision', Mahathir attempts to maintain consensus in his 
society, he undeniably departs from some `Asian values' he has promoted previously. 
Former Malaysian Foreign Minister, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafei, mentions that the 
accomplishment of Wawasan 2020 will be guided by values within Rukunegara. He 
argues that values of success and progress within a communitarian framework will 
become the guidelines to manage growth and distribution in the economy. 108 The role of 
Ieaders in this framework is a traditional role whereby the leaders and the general 
population work hand in hand in the social engineering of society. The leaders are also 
responsible for the management of value changes in society .109 
C. SUPPORTERS, COUNTERS AND MODIFICATIONS 
The reconstruction of Western culture and revitalisation of traditional culture in 
terms of Melayu Baru, for an example, in an effort to mobilise a consensus is an 
ongoing process. Mahathir's visions of `Asian values' and 'Asian democracy' in 
Malaysia have certainly gained support as well as opposition and modification. After he 
sets up his grand vision, it is left to the people to accept or reject it. One way to look at 
the dynamics of this process is by looking at how the vision circulates among 
intellectuals, significant elites and political forces in Malaysia society. It has to be noted, 
however, that none of these responses has seriously challenged Mahathir's grand vision 
of the Malaysian polity. 
107 K.S. Nathan, `Vision 2020 and Malaysian Foreign Policy, Strategic Evolution and the Mahathir 
Impact', Southeast- Asían Affairs 1995, p. 226. 
108 Ghazali Shafie, Leadership, Development, Evolution of Culture: the Malaysian Experience, 
Speech for Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad Memorial Lecture, New Delhi, India, 12th January 1995, 
pp. 11 -12. 
109 Ibid. 
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1. Supporters 
As mentioned above the `Asian values' concept was constructed by Mahathir to 
face various challenges to and within Malaysian society and growing demands for a 
more liberal and open political system. By using `Asian values', Mahathir's 
administration has attempted to counter these demands. The uses of culture and the 
imagination of the negative impact of Western values are considered a means to 
mobilise support for government policies and to maintain a general consensus among 
Malaysians. 
In general, it can be stated that at both the theoretical and practical levels the 
claims of `Asian values' have motivated public debate. In the discourse of `Asian 
values', Mahathir's encouragement to adopt progressive values has been welcomed by 
both Malays and non Malays alike. In this campaign, Malaysians, particularly the 
Malays, are urged to abandon their backward attitudes, such as lack of discipline and 
feudalism, and to adopt progressive attitudes such as hard work. The stress is also given, 
as Minister of Agriculture Sanusi Tumid notes, to the revitalisation of traditional values 
so that Malaysians `do not lose what is precious for us [Malaysian society] just for 
material gains'.10 
Some non -Malays, particularly those within BN like MCA, welcome `Asian 
values', because it encourages a switch of emphasis among Malays from seeing the 
Chinese as a threat to their identity, to perceiving them as a partner in facing global 
competition. It has been shown that the 1969 crisis put the non -Malays in a difficult 
position, accused of instigating the conflict and ensuing crisis. The switch is, therefore, 
not only a rehabilitation of Chinese existence and identity but also, following the 
objectives of Mahathir in Wawasan 2020, a recognition of the Chinese as equal partners 
with the Malays in Malaysia. 
10 Straits Times, 31 August 1994. 
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The MCA leader, Ling Liong Sik, for example, states that each community has 
to play its part in the pursuit of Vision 2020.111 The Chinese community should 
modernise their businesses and upgrade their technology to compete in the market and 
follow the experience of the NICs of Asia, such as Japan, Taiwan and Korea.112 He 
further claims that 'We must work together with our fellow Malaysians so that everyone 
can share in the rapid economic growth...' .113 
In practical terms, the promotion of `Asian values', the Look East policy and 
Wawasan 2020 can all be seen as a turning point in Malaysian society because they push 
the Malays to develop and to gain confidence that one day they could compete equally 
with non -Malays. Some leaders in UMNO have actually been concerned about such 
emphasis because the target of economic distribution suggested by NEP in 1971 has not 
yet been achieved. But that seems to be, for Mahathir at least, the only way to improve 
the Malays' condition and to reduce the concerns of non -Malays. This is also in 
accordance with the main theme of national policies, namely the eradication of poverty 
for all citizens. The affirmative action in support of the Malays is also implemented in 
the context of unity under the Rukunegara principle where there should not be `an 
excuse for robbing Peter to pay Paul' .114 
After 20 years of operation (1970 -1990), as Sanusi Junid comments, arguably all 
ethnic groups received benefit from the NEP programme. `Bumiputeras would benefit, 
but not at the expense of the other races.' 115 The fact that the programme did not take 
the Chinese wealth for the benefit of Malays can be seen by the following fact. The 
Chineses could still develop their businesses despite of some restrictions from the 
government, and they even increased the share of private wealth from 25% to 38 %, or 
equal to M$49 billion.116 The Malays, during the same period have improved their share 
11 Ling Liong Sik, The rvlalaysian Chinese Towards Vision 2020 (Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Pelanduk 
Publications, 1995). 
112 Ibid., pp. 117 -118. 
3 Ibid., p. 29. 
14 Shafie, op. cit., p. 11. 
tis Far Eastern Economic Review, December 21, 1995, p. 24. 
116 Ibid., p. 26. 
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of national wealth from 2 -3% to 18.2 %. The losers, in relative terms, were foreign 
holdings, which declined from 70% to 32%.1t7 In absolute terms, however, everyone 
gained. 
Some academics also welcome government efforts to locate `Asian values', 
although they believe they may reflect Mahathir's fundamental interest in maintaining 
power. Some of them, for example, view the claims of `Asian values' as limited to 
rhetoric and political games at the elite level. The importance of such an effort, as Jomo 
Sundaram argues, relies on the fact that a multi- ethnic and pluralistic society like 
Malaysia needs a popular consensus.us Chandra Muzaffar also supports the promotion 
of some `Asian values' such as the respect of authority and the rule of law as values 
important to Malaysia. That is why, as Khoo Boo Teik has argued, `Asian values' as a 
concept is not an empty rhetoric, but an attempt to find some ideological constructs to 
accompany the sort of state development that Mahathir and his supporters desire. The 
constructs, according to Khoo, also give direction to the sort of political, economic and 
social transformation they want to adopt.119 An academic from the University of 
Malaya, Lee Poh Ping, argues that the claims of `Asian values' is not aimed at justifying 
authoritarian government in Malaysia but at maintaining social cohesion in Malaysian 
society. Although there have been limitations on freedom, he argues that this is 
acceptable because the Mahathir government needs to ensure harmonious relations 
among ethnic groups.12° 
The Malaysian government's switch of emphasis from a very parochial 
protection of Malay interests during the 1970s to a more broad -based policy based on 
the ideas of `Asian values', and followed by Vision 2020, has to a certain degree, 
influenced the performance and popularity of BN in general elections. In the 1995 
"' Ibid., p. 26 
118 Interview with Jomo KS, Professor of Economics, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 6 
September 1996. 
119 Interview with Khoo Boo Teik, Canberra, 21 November 1997. 
120 Interview with Lee Poh Ping, Kuala Lumpur, November 1996. 
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general election BN gained 65.1% of the national vote, increasing from 58.1% in 1985 
and 55.3 in the 1990 general election.121 
2. Counters 
Mahathir's `Asian values' have received critical responses from both domestic 
and international audiences. Some of these criticisms, coming mainly from the principal 
opposition party, DAP, attacked the contents of `Asian values'. DAP leaders try to 
gather from the international community support for their challenge to `Asian values'. 
Others like the Islamic opposition party, PAS, attempt to counter the values from an 
Islamic perspective. The challenge from DAP is interesting, because it invokes 
international elements. While the second challenge from PAS Iacks such international 
dimensions, it still gains support from Moslems within Malaysian society. 
Regarding the challenge from the DAP to Mahathir's `Asian values' and its 
international ramifications, the criticism of `Asian values', is interesting because `Asian 
values' have been represented both to domestic and international audiences. As an all - 
embracing concept, `Asian values' is used to incorporate all the different interests and 
ideologies within Malaysian society in order that the government might maintain its 
hegemony. It is also represented to an international audience as part of Asian self - 
confidence and awareness in dealing with modernisation and globalisation. 
Interestingly the challenges to the `Asian values' concept from opposition groups 
such as the DAP, NGOs and some intellectuals brings the case of `Asian values' to 
international fora. The DAP and some NGOs have attained some success in this context 
and have attempted to use their limited success to gain significant support from within 
Malaysian society. 
To regain support for his party, DAP leader Lim Kit Siang, for example, 
claimed, as international critics also claimed, that `Asian values' are only a disguised 
form of power used by an authoritarian regime, whether it is described as soft or 
121 Crouch, Government and Society.... op. c  p.p. 126-127. 
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benevolent authoritarian. For Lim, the claims that Asians have different values from the 
West are used to `justify widespread restriction on political rights and civil liberties as 
the necessary price for economic development'. 122 Similarly, in their activities to protest 
the building of the Bakun Dam, NGOs benefit from the international discourse on 
environmental problems which tends to blame the destruction of the environment on 
Third Word countries.123 
However, the use of the debate in international fora did not significantly impact 
on the opposition's performance in domestic politics. The DAP, for example, suffered a 
strong defeat at the 1995 elections by only gaining 12.1 per cent of the national vote, a 
decline of almost one third compared with the 1990 general election result.124 The main 
DAP concept of a `Malaysian Malaysia' which was very popular among non -Malays 
during the 1960s and 70s seemed to have lost its appeal since the launch by Mahathir of 
`Asian values' and particularly `Wawasan 2020'. `Wawasan 2020' is seen as so 
inclusive that it includes almost all of the DAP's main ideologies and political platforms 
such as building a multi -racial, multi -lingual, multi- cultural and multi- religious society. 
In the DAP's last political platform, the leader of DAP, Lim Kit Siang clearly 
recognised that the concept of multi- ethnic community in `Wawasan 2020' was similar 
to what the DAP pushed for in Malaysia.125 
Threatened by the loss of its ideals and identity as the main opposition party, the 
DAP now promotes a new phase of struggle known as the `full liberalisation' of 
Malaysian society.126 It is not clear how far such a concept may attract support from 
Malaysian society. So far, reflecting on the last General Election, people are quite happy 
with the government's policies and promises such as the concept of `Wawasan 2020'. A 
central plank in the `Asian values' campaign is that the `full freedom' concept 
122 Lim Kit Siang, Human Rights and Democracy in Asia Pacific, Speech at the Tokyo meeting of the 
Asia -Pacific Committee of the Socialist International on 28 -29 .Tune 1996. 
zs For the challenges toward Malaysia's government project of Bakun Dam, see Aliran, Vol. 16, No. 
5, 1996; see also statement of Malaysia NGO5 led by SUARAM (Voice of the Malaysia People) on 
Bakun on <http: / /www.irn.org/irn/ programmes /bakun/coalition.html >. 
124 Crouch, Government and Society ...., op. cit., p 128. 
m DAP, DAP Policies for Malaysia, Full Liberalisation <http: / /www malaysia.net/dap /poll- I.htm>. 
126 Ibid. 
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advocated by DAP unimportant and, moreover, unnecessary provided that the 
government runs effectively and the economy grows significantly (until 1997). Some 
intellectuals such as Chandra Muzaffar argue that a full liberalisation, particularly if it 
only copies the Western concept of democracy and civil society, is not a popular theme 
and is not an ideal one for Malaysians.127 
The only hope for the opposition, whether the DAP or NGOs is, therefore, to 
bring their critiques of Mahathir's Asian values to an international audience where they 
have been appraised particularly well by Western governments and media. By 
characterising the case as part of the general wave of democratisation in the world, the 
DAP may hope to gain a warm response, particularly before audients in Western states. 
However, this may not necessarily transfer to influence on the DAP's or NGOs 
performance in domestic politics. 
The second significant challenge to Mahathir's `Asian values' comes from the 
Islamic opposition party, PAS. PAS challenges the Mahathir administration, particularly 
his party UMNO, but in a way which hardly counters `Asian values' directly. What this 
party proposes can be compared with Mahathir's proposal of `Asian values' and `Vision 
2020'. Mahathir's `Vision 2020', for example, has been countered on the bases that it is 
too secular, materialistic and lacking in spiritual (Islamic) principles. Together with 
Semangat 46 (Spirit of `46) party128, PAS offered an alternative idea called Wawasan 
Akhirat or `vision hereafter', which is less materialistic and more spiritual in nature.129 
The challenge of PAS to the `Vision 2020' can be traced back to PAS's attitude 
to nationalism. It sees nationalism as a Western concept which is in contradiction with 
the universalism of the Islamic concept of Ummah.130 `Vision 2020', which proposes a 
multi- ethnic society as well as the term `national' as used in United Malays National 
127 Muzaffar, speech in Konvensyen Masyarakat Madani, op. cit. 
128 In 1997, Semangat '46 folded. Its main leaders such as Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, Rais Yatim and 
many others were back to UMNO. 
29 Business Times, 29 -30 January 1994; Chandran Jeshurun, `Malaysia: The Mahathir Supremacy and 
Vision 2020', Southeast Asian Affairs 1993, p. 206. 
130 Simon Barraclough, `Malaysia in 1985, A Question of Management', Southeast Asian Affairs 
1992, p. 197. 
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Organisation (UMNO), has been seen as promoting a kind of Western identity for 
Malaysians. Such a concept, nationalism in particular, is regarded by PAS as redolent of 
Western- inspired concepts and therefore un- Islamic. 
This clash of views also stems from the continuing debate between PAS and 
UMNO as to who is the principal representative of the Malays and Islam. Both have 
claimed to be the real representative of the Malays, and the only `truly Islamic' party.131 
UMNO under Mahathir's leadership offers a liberal interpretation of Islam, sensitive to 
the needs of governance in a multi -religious context. PAS, on the other hand, is 
inflexible in its interpretation of Islamic teachings. It even implements strict rules about 
women, bans gambling and alcohol, and attempt to introduce the most controversial 
element, Sharia (Islamic) laws, including the implementation of Hudud (mandatory) 
punishment in Kelantan.132 hi short, PAS advocates Islam as the supreme foundation for 
their government in Kelantan.133 At the end of the 1970s, PAS even supported an 
Iranian revolutionary model of government and this caused the breakdown of its 
coalition with UMN0,134 
At the national level, the pragmatic and moderate interpretations of Islam 
promoted by Mahathir are more strongly supported by Moslems than those offered by 
PAS. A growing middle and business class of Moslem- Malays are particularly 
impressed with Mahathir's firm belief that economic development and material strength 
have to develop alongside spiritual aspects. This will help Islamic development and 
Malaysia's development in general.135 However, part of UMNO's success in gaining 
support is due to the fact that almost all major channels of communication are controlled 
by the government. The UMNO -led government also uses political measures such as the 
3 Ibid. 
132 Maria Luisa Seda- Poulin, Islamization and Legal Reform in Malaysia, the Hudud Controversy of 
1992, Southeast Asian Affairs 1993, p. 244. 
1J3 Shafruddin Hashim, `Malaysia 1991, Consolidation, Challenges and New Directions, Southeast 
Asian Affairs 1992, p. 195. 
sa Rerita Harlan, 14 September 1998. 
35 Kikue Hamayotsu, A Third Wave? Islamic Resurgence and the Emergence of Malaysian 
Nationalism, paper presented at lots Colloquium of the Malaysia Society, ANTI, Canberra, 22 -23 
November 1997, pp. 9 -10. 
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ISA to ban radical PAS preachers and to detain them. The government also attempts to 
portray images of PAS as a quasi subversive organisation.136 
As Raymond Lee argues, there are at least two common measures taken by the 
government to discredit radical Moslem movements.137 Firstly, the government has used 
the media and other legal institutions to discredit these movements `as deviant cults that 
disseminate false teaching', thus providing rationalisation for the government to justify 
punitive actions against what it calls 'un- Islamic activities' among Muslims. Secondly, 
the government has interpreted and implemented its own version of Islamic values and 
reformation manifested in Muslim banks, Islamic universities and welfare and 
missionaries' policies, all designed to marginalise the impact of alternative programmes 
and interpretations in the mind of the Muslim public.138 By using these two measures, 
the Malaysian government has been largely successful in convincing Moslems that the 
UMNO -led government still represents their aspirations. 
But this has not completely reduced the influence of PAS as an alternative party 
for the Malay constituency. The simplest way to understand this is through the 
consistent support for PAS in Kelantan state. Together with the `Semangat 45' Party, 
PAS retained and even consolidated its power in this state in the 1995 General Election 
by defeating UMNO.139 This shows that PAS has its loyal followers and has been able 
to keep its programmes relevant to the needs of its members. UMNO and PAS actually 
speak to a similar audience among Malays (who are overwhelmingly Moslem), so it 
becomes a competition of sorts to demonstrate which one is the best in representing the 
Malay and Moslem interests. At the national level, UMNO has defeated PAS by 
creating the image that PAS promoted radical Islamic beliefs which attempted to apply 
strict Sharia laws in Malaysia. But in Kelantan and some other states, like Kedah, this 
136 Barraclough, op. cit., p. 197. 
137 Raymond L. M. Lee, `The State and New Religious Movements in Malaysia', Sociology of 
Religion, Vol. 55, No. 4, p. 476. 
38 Ibid., p. 476. 
139 Crouch, Government and Society...., op. cit., pp. 127 -128. 
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UMNO strategy does not work. PAS maintains its strong position by gaining national 
and local seats in parliament based on its support in Kelantan state. 
In order to maintain their existence, PAS leaders attempt to attract support from 
a wider audience, not only the Malays, but so far this policy has operated without much 
success. They try to convince other ethnic groups that their government will also protect 
non -Moslems. Although they formally aim at building an Islamic state, and attack the 
inheritance of Western (British) democracy and its practice, they promise to guarantee 
non -Moslem rights and privileges. PAS argues that Islamic rule has a universal 
applicability so that it can protect non -Moslems. As one of PAS's parliamentary 
members argued, it was in Kelantan that non -Moslems were protected in the 1969 riot 
with the result that no one got killed.140 PAS also shows its moderation by supporting 
some government Islamic policies including the ban of Al Arqam which it accuses of 
violating Islamic teachings. 
Distinctive from the challenges of DAP to UMNO, however, PAS does not 
attempt to Iink the rejection of UMNO's secular ideology with an international debate. 
Indeed, there have been international dimensions in this debate, in that the debate about 
Islamic values here could be seen as a part of the resurgence of Islam around the world. 
However, there is no clear link such as in the case of DAP's vision of democracy versus 
BN's vision on democracy in international forums. In terms of ideas, one may associate 
UMNO with modernist Islamic movements, whereas PAS maintains an orthodoxy of 
Islamic thought. But this category does not fit precisely since both aspects are elements 
emerging in the awakening Moslem world. 
3. Modification 
The `Asian values' discourse has produced many responses and has had an 
impact on the image of Malaysia both outside and inside the country. Many of the 
writings in the Western media depict 'Asian values' as merely one method by which 
tao Speech of Abu Bakar Chik, The Youth PAS leader, at Konvensyen Masyarakat Madani - 
Pembinaan Masyarakat Madani Model Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur 19 -21 September 1996. 
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authoritarian regimes deal with the demand for democratisation within their countries. 
From `Asian values' debates reported by the Foreign Affairs journal, The Economist141, 
Financial Times, and Time to the reports on the recent Asian economic crisis, the 
assumption that 'Asian values' is merely a justification for authoritarian behaviour 
prevails. In the `Asian values' debate, Ayeh Neier for example, has argued that the 
claims of `Asian values' may bring about different and unacceptable standards of 
democracy and human rights compared with those in the West.142 Recently in the 
Mahathir and George Soros debates on the source of the current Asian monetary crisis, 
Soros, following the pattern outlined above, argued that Mahathir's attacks on the West 
as the source of the Asian economic crisis was just an excuse to maintain his power.143 
Inside Malaysia, as shown above, the `Asian values' concept represents a 
development in Mahathir's thoughts -it is an attempt to find shared values that can not 
only maintain consensus but also promote progress in Malaysian society. Those efforts 
are continued in his subsequent concepts such as the Look East policy and Wawasan 
2020'. The latest concepts are designed to turn Malaysia into a fully industrialised 
nation by 2020. As highlighted above, support and criticism have resulted from this 
effort. 
From these reactions to `Asian values', attempts to overcome the confusion and 
misunderstanding created by `Asian values' debates have been made. One of the 
proponents attempting to clarify `Asian values' is Malaysian Deputy PM Anwar Ibrahim 
(before he was sacked by Mahathir in September 1998). He supported some of 
Mahathir's ideas, but as deputy PM and a likely successor of Mahathir at that time, he 
ambitiously tried to create a new image of himself before Malaysian and international 
society. His speeches show that he wanted to create a new image from the negative 
impression caused by the 'Asian values' debate, particularly the impression that `Asian 
values' is only an authoritarian justification. 
'a[ The Economist, May 28th 1994. 
142 Neier, op. cit. 
143 George Soros, `Mukjizat Ekonomi Asia Tertutup Awan (Asian's Economic Miracle is Covered by 
Cloud)', Jawa Pos, 2 -3 October 1997. 
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The two main themes of Anwar's thought are the creation of civil society within 
Malaysia and the concept of `Asian renaissance'. What is interesting in this case is the 
way Anwar represents his ideas. Anwar adopts a different approach compared to 
Mahathir's style of constructing his arguments. He neither blames some Western values 
nor criticises the excesses that have been created by full freedom and democracy in 
Western society as Mahathir usually does. He argues that it is unfair to compare the 
excess of the West with the ideals of Asia." The following is an elaboration of 
Anwar's ideas on civil society and `Asian renaissance'. 
(a) Civil Society 
hi promoting his concept of civil society, which is commonly called rnaryarakat 
rnadani, Anwar looks at the importance of certain universal Western values regarding 
democracy and individualism. He urges Asia to prepare for universal ideals such as 
freedom which, for him, is also a living value in traditional Asian culture. As he says, 
`to say that freedom is Western or un -Asian is to offend our own traditions.' In general, 
. 
Asians, for Anwar, place an emphasis on order, stability and the importance of 
community, but this does not mean that individual rights are denied.145 That is also why 
he argues that Asian countries should retain an open -mind toward the institutions, 
practices and standards of political cultures in Western countries which have evolved 
and often been proved to be `effective in preventing injustices towards individuals and 
minorities' .146 
He further cites the need to build institutions resembling those in the West. 
Malaysians, according to him, have to establish a representative participatory 
government, to develop a civil society, to promote the rule of law and to `cultivate a free 
and responsible press'.147 But their application, according to Anwar, who quotes Alexis 
de Tocqueville (a nineteenth century French thinker), has to be based on `customs -the 
44 Straits Times, .5 August 1994. 
as Straits Times, 3 December 1994. 
46 Straits Times, 5 August 1994. 
4T Ibid. 
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whole moral and intellectual condition', including `the habits of the heart' of the 
society.148 These habits are mental attitudes, psychological tendencies and norms in a 
society which have become the `guiding ideas' in the development of civil society. For 
Malaysia, these habits need strengthening based on consensus, justice, moral principles 
and wisdom.149 
The `habits of the heart' and `the sum of moral and intellectual disposition' in 
multi- ethnic and multi- religious Malaysia, according to Anwar, have influenced the 
discourse of democracy and civil society in Malaysia.150 Its peculiar norms and mores 
might be different from those in the West so that, according to Anwar -again quoting de 
Tocqueville- `what happens in the American democracy would teach me nothing about 
what might happen in democracies elsewhere'.151 In this respect, Anwar makes the point 
that each country may have their own different experiences in implementing democracy 
and civil society. This experience sometimes departs from a priority of achieving 
political and economic development. According to Anwar, some Asian countries have 
to build strong economic foundations before they can have freedom and democracy.t52 
Anwar does not simply criticise the excesses of Western democracy as Mahathir 
does, rather he offers some solutions. About the media, for example, what he proposes is 
a kind of `middle ground between the Western model of unconstrained freedom and 
(Malaysian) developmental journalism'.153 Anwar argues that the media needs to be 
guided in certain issues, such as strong racial and religious statements that may cause 
problems. But he said that he has never disputed the rights of the media to criticise as 
long as those who are criticised are also given the chance to explain themselves.154 
148 Anwar Ibrahim, Islam dan Pembentukan Masyarakat Madani (Islam and the Formation of Civil 
Society), speech at the convention of ` Masyarakat Madani', `Pembinaan Masyarakat Madani Model 
Malaysia', Kuala Lumpur, 19 -21 December 1996; see also Anwar Ibrahim, The Asian Renaissance 
(Singapore: Times Books International, 1997), p. 48. 
49 Ibrahim, Islam dan Pembentukan..., ibid. 
so Anwar Ibrahim, The Reawakening of Asia, speech at the School of Advanced International Studies, 
Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC, 10 October 1995. 
L51 Ibid. 
'52 Ibid. 
153 Straits Times, 3 December 1994. 
154 Ibid. 
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To overcome the excess of `too much democracy' in the West, Anwar sees the 
importance of religious values being incorporated in the development of a civil society. 
Religious values, according to him, are an important aspect within society because they 
may guide a society and give meaning to democracy.155 Religious values can overcome 
the excesses associated with too much democracy, like moral decadence, corruption, 
ahuse of power, and domination by the rich. In the past, according to Anwar, religion 
and spirituality have been the source of strength and `the bulwark against moral and 
social decay'.156 For Anwar, faith renewed and revitalised could become a cultural force 
`liberating man from ignorance and intolerance, injustice and greed, domination and 
exploitation' .157 
(b) `Asian Renaissance' 
In the concept of `Asian renaissance', a further elaboration of Mahathir's `Asian 
values' can be recognised in Anwar's thoughts. As with Mahathir, Anwar also 
recognised the contribution of `Asian values' to Asian economic success. However, 
what is interesting in Anwar's ideas is that this success has created a new understanding 
and self -confidence among Asians in facing global changes in their social and economic 
environment. Mahathir constructs `Asian values' particularly by describing the failure of 
some Western nations in maintaining their values for progress, whereas Anwar's 
emphasis is on the parallels of the `Asian renaissance', the `European renaissance', and 
the indebtedness of Asia to European experiences. This is notwithstanding the fact that 
the religious and traditional foundations of Asian renaissance (Islam, Confucianism, 
Buddhism, Hinduism and Christianity) differ fundamentally from the bases in 
Europe.158 Anwar also places more emphasis on the values inside Asia and on the 
155 Anwar Ibrahim, `Asian Renaissance and the Reconstruction of Civilisation', Just Commentary, No. 
26, May 1996, p. 4; See also Jawa Pos, 12 October 1997. 
156 Anwar Ibrahim, `Asia's New Civility', Far Eastern Economic Review, October 6, 1994, p. 34. 
157 Anwar Ibrahim, `Asian Renaissance...', op. cit. 
158 Ibid., pp. 17 -18; and also Allan Patience, `Book review: the Asian Renaissance and 
Democratisation', The Age, 20 September 1997. 
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growing self -confidence among Asians themselves, compared to Mahathir. As Anwar 
states, 
`The economic rise of Asia though critical and fundamental, is only a dimension of 
a much deeper, more profound and far- reaching reawakening of the continent 
which may be called the Asian Renaissance. By Asian Renaissance we mean the 
revival of the arts and sciences under the influence of classical models based on 
strong moral and religious foundations; a cultural resurgence dominated by a 
reflowering of art and Iiterature, architecture and music and advancements in 
science and technology.' 159 
Anwar's 'Asian renaissance' moves one step further than Mahathir's `Asian 
values'. If Mahathir suggests that Malaysia has to embrace values for progress such as 
the Look East policy, then, Anwar posits that the economic success of some Asian 
countries has to be a starting point for contributing towards the building of a better 
civilisation in the world. The richness of the moral, religious and cultural values of Asia 
needs to be revitalised to support this goal. The experience of tolerance in multicultural 
Asia is a good example of how to live in a multicultural universe.160 To start such a 
contribution Anwar suggests `Asia' and also the `West' need to transcend their 
differences and discover shared values among themselves. To start a dialogue between 
Asian and Western civilisations, he proposes that, `...Asians must transcend the pain 
and bitterness following the earlier encounters, while the West needs to adopt other 
languages of discourse apart from the one presented since the Renaissance and the 
Enlightenment'.161 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
The Malaysian leaders' claims about `Asian values' are generally perceived in 
the West as an attack on `Western values'. Indeed, Mahathir has grossly simplified 
`Western values'. As Khoo Boo Teik argues Mahathir does not investigate closely at the 
concept of `Western values'. Furthermore, it is also true that there have been signs of 
159 
160 
161 
As in fn 157. 
Patience, op. cit. 
Anwar Ibrahim, The Asian Renaissance, op. cit., p. 43. 
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Occidentalism. As Stephanie Lawson points out, in picturing `the West', Asian leaders 
reverse the process of Orientalism pursued by Western colonialism in the past.162 
However, as elaborated above, Mahathir's main aim in espousing 'Asían values' 
is actually to build and to maintain consensus inside his country. The claim reflects his 
long search for shared values which can become a platform for a multi- ethnic country. 
To this purpose, as has been shown, he switched from being a Malay -ultra, as some of 
his opponents called him, to being a supporter of `Asian values'. This switch was the 
starting point for the gaining of support from non -Malay groups. 
Mahathir's attacks on the West are integrally a part of his general project in 
which he attempts to convince his domestic audience that the value systems the 
Malaysians have to build should be better than those that have been practised and 
applied in the West. The emphasis of his attack is on the excesses of liberal democracy. 
Unlimited freedom in Mahathir's view will bring about chaos. Similarly, in the name of 
freedom, Mahathir criticises the tendency in the West to disregard moral and social 
problems such as homosexuality and single -parent families, which are certainly 
uncommon in Malaysian society. 
The effort to build a value system for Mahathir has to take place within the 
Malaysian context and should be advocated by Malaysians. Mahathir frequently reminds 
the opposition parties, DAP in particular, that they should not just copy what Western 
leaders, academics and media have said about democracy in Malaysia, in criticising the 
government. Mahathir's intention is to build such a platform where political elements 
and groups can discuss their political ideologies, values and interests within the 
Malaysian context. The non -interference principle in the domestic affairs of Malaysia 
has been a very sensitive issue and become a basic principle accepted by both 
government and opposition groups in discussing democracy.163 
162 Stephanie Lawson, `Democracy and the Problem of Cultural Relativism: Normative Issues for 
International Politics', Global Society, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1998. 
163 In a speech at the International Human Rights Conference on `Universal Rights and Human 
Values', Lim Kit Siang, for example, called for the promotion and protection of human rights 
anywhere in the world in a way which do not `interfere in domestic affairs of nations'; see 
<http://www.malaysia.net/dap/sg1386.htm>. 
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The feeling of being insulted by Western leaders commenting on and preaching 
about democracy in Malaysia is shared not only by Mahathir and other government 
leaders but also by members in opposition groups. In commenting on US Vice President 
Al Gore's speech which supported the political reform movement in Malaysia and 
blamed the Malaysian government for detaining Anwar Ibrahim, DAP Ieaders Lim Kit 
Siang, for example, described the speech infelicitous which took place `in the 
inappropriate choice of venue and use of words' .164 He maintained that such a comment 
on democracy in Malaysia had the opposite effect to the one originally intended, namely 
to foster solidarity for the reformation-movement and the democratisation process.165 
In illustrating the importance of democracy as discussed within the Malaysian 
social and political context, a comment of DAP leader Lim Kit Siang who is very 
critical of almost all government policies, is useful. Lim argues that democracy has to 
emerge as a result of the efforts within Malaysian society itself. He said, 
'In the final analysis, the struggle for justice, human rights and democracy in any 
country must be achieved through the efforts and sacrifice of the people 
themselves and not through the intervention of any foreign power, and although 
international support and solidarity is most welcome and even needed as part of 
the international promotion and protection of human rights, it must be extended 
without undermining the local movement for change and reform' .166 
Such an assumption echoes the broader objective of the Malaysian government 
to promote harmonious change and development within the existing socio and cultural 
context in Malaysia. As Mahathir argues, Malaysians need to modernise because it is an 
inevitable stage in their history as an independent people. The need for modernisation is 
not because Malaysians were `Europeanized or Americanized'. 167 In a similar vein, after 
criticising the Western model of change and development which is based mainly on 
materialistic and economic terms, and which rejects ethical and moral considerations, 
former deputy PM Anwar Ibrahim, asserted that Malaysians (and Asians) should believe 
164 
165 
166 
167 
Lim Kit Siang' media conference statement, `Proposed Formation of an Asia -Pacific Parliamentary 
Union (APPU) for Parliamentarians to protect and promote human rights and democracy in the 
region', 25 November 1998); see < http:// www .malaysia.net/dap /sg1387.htm>. 
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Asiaweek, 8 September 1995. 
159 
in their own concept of humanity and development. He said that, `Development should 
not focus on economic problems in isolation, but in the context of an active social 
system and as part of the overall socio- cultural problem.' 168 Freedom and democracy, 
according to Anwar, also need to be put in the context of economic progress within a 
country. Countries which experience poverty and inequality of economic opportunities 
can fall into the trap of `discontent, frustration and anger, and can destroy the very fabric 
of society'.169 
A debate about the political platforms for Malaysia have developed in a way 
which can conceivably merge views of both government and opposition groups. The 
DAP as the main opposition party (together with PAS), for example, claimed that 
Mahathir's Wawasan 2020 is similar to the DAP idea of a `Malaysian Malaysia' which 
from 1960s onwards has proposed equality for all Malaysian citizens in all areas of 
political and economic life. In particular, the DAP points to its success in preventing the 
implementation in Malaysian of the highly pro -Malay policy `One Language and One 
Culture' of Mahathir, proposed in 1982. However, it is interesting to note that the DAP 
also incorporates part of Mahathir's `Asian values' campaign in its political platform. 
Ideals such as `strengthening of family values and social order', `emphasising the 
importance of tolerance in a plural society', and `striving for material advancement to be 
pari passu with spiritual advancement', have been promoted by DAP.170 
If the `Asian values' concept is directed to the creation of a political platform for 
democracy domestically, the question then is why it attracts debate in the media, and 
among academics and policy- makers in the international fora. There are two possible 
answers to this question. Firstly, it attracts debate because the communist threat of the 
Cold War is over. The triumph over communism has instilled a new desire for Western 
68 Anwar Ibrahim, `Religion in the Formation of Asian Society -Islamic Perspective', in Yong -Bock 
Kim (ed.), Asia Forum on Justice and Development (Singapore: Christian Conference of Asia - 
WWC/CCPD, 1984), p. 108. 
69 Anwar Ibrahim, The Asian Renaissance... op. cit., p. 48. 
10 See, Lim Kit Siang's speech at the launcing of the DAP nation -wide 'Justice for All' Campaign 
<http: // www .malaysia.net /dap /sg1442.htm>; DAP Policies for Malaysia, Full Liberalisation, 
<http: / /www.malaysia.netldap /poll- 1.htm>; and DAP Declaration 1996, Malaysia To A New Era, 
<http: / /www. malaysia.net/dap/poll-2.htm>. 
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policy makers, as well as some academics, to see the spread of liberal democracy to the 
undemocratic and authoritarian regimes in Third World countries. Mahathir's 
arguments, for example, which are fundamentally directed to the building of a strong 
consensus within his society, have been interpreted as a challenge to this new wave of 
democratisation. 
It is important to note that in the 1970s such a debate about democracy might not 
have happened. When Tun Razak restricted the application of Westminster democracy 
during his priode of rule, the international media, for example, did not react as it might 
do now. Tun Razak, with a different tone and in a different context, stressed that too 
much freedom led to the instability. The main differences between Mahathir's and Tun 
Razak's approaches to democracy are most marked in the reaction of the international 
community. Razak had been criticised by Western countries especially regarding the 
management of racial issues, but he could pursue his reorganisation policy within the 
Malaysian political system as long as his country was still within the US block. This is 
understandable because the main concern of Western states at that time was with the 
threat of Communism. 
Secondly, some academics both in the West and in Asia have taken seriously the 
debates over `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' contextualised it as a contest of 
values and civilisation after the end of the Cold War.171 There are three general 
problems with this. Firstly, most of them tend to misinterpret the main priority of the 
claims of `Asian values'. Following the end of the Cold War, they view the `Asian 
values' claims as a challenge toward Western values and political institutions.172 
Michael Freeman, for example, argues that the likely emergence of counter hegemony 
171 Peter R. Moody, Sr., 'Asian Values', Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 50, No. I, Summer 
1996; Robison, The Pacific Review..., op. cit.; David Wright- Neville, op. cit.; Michael Freeman, 
"Human Rights, Democracy and `Asian Values -, The Pacific Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1996; Alan 
Dupont, "Is There An `Asian Way -, Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2, Summer 1996; William A. Callahan, 
`Rescripting East/West Relations, Rethinking Asian Democracy', Pacifica Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, 
1996. 
172 Almost all commentators cited in footnote 102 consider the implication of the claims of `Asian 
values' on international relations, particularly on the challenges it might have on Western values 
and civilization. See particularly Freeman, op. cit., p. 354; Callahan, op. cit., pp. 4 -11; Moody, op. 
cit., pp. 165 -I67. 
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behind the claims of `Asian values' could replace `one form of hegemony for another'. 
Callahan examines the way the term `Asian' has been discursively deployed against the 
`West'. Moody looks at `Asian values' as an alternative provided by Mahathir and Lee 
Kuan Yew to the Western norms. By approaching the issue this way these commentators 
conclude that Mahathir, and proponents of `Asian values', have been determined to 
negatively portray the West; namely as being riddled with conflict, anarchy, moral 
decay, homosexuality, racism, individualism and hedonism while Asia, by contrast, is 
characterised as moral, religious and culturally pure. 173 
The above views have clearly misled their audience as to the importance of 
`Asian values'. As this chapter argues, `Asian democracy and Asian values', first of all, 
are better seen as efforts by Malaysian leaders to build a domestic consensus by 
searching for appropriate values for their multi- ethnic and multi- religious societies. The 
fact that the claims reach an international audience, is a ramification and reflection of 
the domestic needs, in particular the need to reconcile different ethnic groups in 
Malaysian society. For the purpose of nation building, Mahathir has highlighted 
problems in Western society in a bid to help Malaysians understand that those values 
can not become the ideals for their society. 
Secondly, adding to these problems, is the fact that a number of commentators 
are too selective in their use of Mahathir's speeches, particularly those aspects which 
support their arguments. They pick selectively the discourse promoted by Mahathir and, 
based on this, conclude that there has been a tendency in the formation of `Asian values' 
discourse to reject `Western values'.174 
Some of Mahathir's speeches were clearly loaded with these kind of attacks on 
the West. But a closer look at the speeches shows that they are not simply attacks which 
can be understood as a black and white contrast between the good and bad aspects of 
`Asian' and `Western' values. The attacks on the `Western values' were more a product 
173 Yao Souchou, Mahathir's Rage: Media and the West as Transcendental Evil, Murdoch University 
Asia Research Centre, Working Paper, No. 45, 1994. 
174 For examples, see Neier, op. cit.; Callahan, op. cit. 
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of the injustice in the relations between the West and the Third World countries and 
resulted, in part, the failure of some Western leaders to recognise and respect key 
elements and values in Asian countries which have furthered their success. 
Injustice in the world, for Mahathir, can be seen from the double- standards of 
Western countries. Bosnia and Rwanda are current examples of Mahathir's focus. He 
has particularly attacked the failure of the West to take any action to alleviate the misery 
of people in these countries.175 In terms of economics, it is the dependency of the South 
(the Third World countries) on the North which is fundamentally Mahathir's concern in 
this issue. The domination of Western nations, according to Mahathir, manifested itself 
in efforts `to impose their values and standards in total disregard for the cultures and 
traditions of others'.176 He assumes from this that the South is dependent and cannot 
decide what its future will be. His rejection of IMF aid to overcome the Malaysian 
economic crisis starting in 1997, and his accusations that there has been a conspiracy to 
damage Malaysia's economy through currency trading, are examples of Mahathir' s 
concerns about the `new imperialism' of the West that he believes is worse than the old 
style imperialism.177 
Therefore, equality is one of the most important issues in Mahathir's speeches. 
However, his advocacy of these and other issues has sometimes increased tensions 
between Malaysia and other states. Mahathir, for example, criticised the British for 
treating his country like a colony, not as an equal sovereign state. As a consequence, he 
launched the Buy British Last (BBL) campaign urging Malaysians to buy British 
products last. Britain, in turn, changed its attitudes to Malaysia and since 1988 the BBL 
has been reviewed and hardly heard in public debate.178 
175 See for , , exam le Mahathir Mohamad, Human Rights and Democracy,  , speech at the Opening of the 
Plenary of the 48th session of the United Nation General Assembly, New York, USA, 1 October 
1993; Issues on Bosnia -Herzegovina, speech at the Opening of the International Conference of 
Parliamentarians on Bosnia- Herzegovina, Kuala Lumpur, 22 January 1994; Contradictions in 
Development, speech at the United Nations World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen, 
Demark, 11 March 1995. 
176 Mahathir Mohamad, Promoting a Common Agenda, speech at the 11th Conference of Heads of 
State or Government of the Non -aligned Countries, in Cartagena, Colombia, 18th October, 1995. 
177 Reuters, 3 November 1997. 
178 Straits Times, 25 January 1988. 
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Thirdly, most of the international commentators raise the claim of `Asian values' 
because of their concern that the claims will hamper the democratisation process. The 
claims, if strictly implemented, can prevent the emergence of a non -elite interpretation 
of culture and values in Malaysian society.L79 Such concern is warranted given that 
Mahathir's rhetoric of 'Asían values', to a certain degree aims to secure hegemony in his 
society and tends to prevent alternative views arising. But as mentioned above, the 
`Asian values' discourse circulating among Malaysian elites proves that there exist 
various levels of criticism and alternative views which have emerged from elements 
within the elite and at the societal level which oppose or at least seek to modify 
Mahathir's views. 
Lively debate regarding 'Asían values' may mean in the long run that the process 
will not produce an undemocratic style of government. In Malaysian history, a form of 
public sphere has developed where a meaningful dialogue between different ideological 
views might occur. Anthony Milner illustrates how Malaysians invented politics so that 
they can debate and transform their ideological views of one another. This, for example, 
has happened in three mainstream views of Malay ideologies: nationalism, Islam and 
kerajaan (kingdom), which until today have chaIIenged each other for hegemonic 
control.180 The ideologies of these three groups contradicted each other in ethical and 
epistemological principles. Still the proponents of these ideological views: the raja, 
ulama and nationalist, were able to exchange their views and, as a result, adapt their 
rhetoric, vocabulary and themes to keep their ideological views relevant for Malay 
society.181 
In recent political debates, some leaders like Anwar Ibrahim has modified 
Mahathir's vision of `Asian values'. His `masyarakat madani' and `Asian renaissance' 
concepts, as shown above, clearly reflect a modification of `Asian values'. Anwar's 
179 About the worries that `Asian values' can impede the democratisation process, see for examples, 
Freeman, op. cit., pp. 357 -358; Callahan, op. cit., pp. 7 -11; Wright -Neville, op. cit., pp. 20 -21; 
Dupont, op. cit., p. 21. 
180 Anthony C. Milner, `Inventing Politics: the Case of Malaysia', Past and Present, No. 132, August 
1991, pp. 104 -129. 
Ibid. 181 
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views, to a certain degree, are more acceptable in the international fora. Such contrasting 
views have clearly developed in Malaysia and this may in the future suggest that the 
leaders cannot force their own particular views on others. This may also lead to less 
individual decision making and more consensual politics. 
In other cases Islamic and NGO views, have to some extents, also been adopted 
by the government. According to Chandra Muzaffar, the New Development Policy 
which replaced the New Economic Policy in the 1990s, for example, adopted the ideas 
of some NGOs particularly regarding the priority to a de- ethnicising of economic 
policy.182 Similarly, according to Zainah Anwar of `Sisters of Islam' -an NGO 
promoting women's rights through re- interpretations of Islamic teachings -, her group's 
interpretation of women's role in society has been discussed in parliament and achieved 
some significant results. A number of members of the parliament at least were aware 
that there should be some revision of the role of Muslim women in society.183 Even 
DAP leader, Lim Kit Siang, recognised that their political platform of pursuing a multi- 
racial, multi -lingual, multi -cultural and multi -religious society had been incorporated 
into by Mahathir's `Wawasan 2020' concept.184 In short in Malaysian politics, as 
Crouch argues, the government has been responsive in certain ways to maintain its 
electoral support.'85 
Therefore, the concerns in international relations that `Asian values' might 
hinder the process of democratisation are not wholly justified in the Malaysian case. The 
development of a space for expression in Malaysian politics, promises that the threat of 
creating a specific standard of values which may be assumed to contradict `shared 
values' in international society, may be an empty one. Similarly, concerns over the 
development of `Asian values', particularly from those fearful of the potential of `Asian 
182 Chandra Muzaffar in panel discussion of Non- government Organisation as a Vehicle of Change, at 
Australia- Malaysia Conference 19 -21 November 1997. 
183 Zainah Anwar, in ibid. 
184 DAP Policies for Malaysia <http: / /www.malaysia.net/dap /poll- l.htm >. 
as Crouch, Government and Society..., op. cit. 
165 
values' to create a distinctive `Asian values' versus `Western values' battle, as such, 
may only be valid for a small portion of Mahathir's rhetoric. 
This chapter does not claim to provide a complete representation of `Asian 
values'. It focuses mainly on Mahathir's ideas and the views of elite leaders such as 
Anwar Ibrahim because they are the central figures behind the claims. However, it 
nonetheless hopes to capture a general picture of the operation 'Asian values' claims in 
Malaysia. It also hopes to clarify confusion caused by an incomplete reading and 
understanding of Mahathir's rhetoric of `Asian values'. The representation of `Asian 
values' which picks up only the sentiment of outrage against the West in Mahathir' s 
rhetoric, clearly misleads both domestic and international audiences about the real 
intention, and impact, of `Asian values' in Malaysia. 
Chapter IV 
PANCASILA DEMOCRACY' DURING THE NEW ORDER IN INDONESIA 
The promotion of a specific `Asian' model of democracy based on Indonesian traditions 
and cultures was manifest in the concept of Pancasila democracy. Pancasila was 
promoted by the New Order government under President Soeharto from 1966 till May 
1998, as the main principle and philosophical basis for the moral, political and 
economic system of the country. The New Order claimed that the model of Pancasila 
democracy was non -Western in origin and that it was different from authoritarian and 
liberal democratic systems.' 
Pancasila consists of five principles: `(1) (The Principle of) One Lordship; (2) 
(A) Just and Civilised Humanity; (3), (The) Unity of Indonesia; (4) (The Principle of) 
Peoplehood which is Guarded by the Spirit of Wisdom in Deliberation/Representation; 
(5) Social Justice'.2 It was agreed to as the national ideology and philosophy by the main 
leaders of the country immediately after these leaders proclaimed Indonesian national 
independence on August 17f", 1945. Those leaders represented nationalist, religious and 
ethnic leaders3 who had been struggling against Dutch colonialism. The Pancasila was 
3 
Pancasila, literally embodies 5 tenets. It is derived from Western democratic, Hindu, Buddhist and 
Islamic tradition. George Kahin argues that Pancasila is `the synthesis of Western democratic, 
Modernist Islam Marxist, and indigenous -village democratic and communalistic ideas' which 
dominated the thoughts of Indonesians' nationalist leaders during both pre and post independent 
Indonesia. See, George McTuman Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 123. The tenets of Pancasila are (1) The belief in the one 
and only God; (2) A just and civilized society; (3) The unity of Indonesia; (4) Democracy guided 
by the inner wisdom of deliberation among representatives; (5) Social justice for all the people of 
Indonesia. See, Thomas E. Sidwell, `The Indonesia Military: Dwi Fungsi and Territorial 
Operations', Foreign Military Studies Office Publications, Department of Defense USA; see also, 
E. Darmaputera, Pancasila and the Search for Identity and Modernity in Indonesian Society 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), p. 155. 
Ibid. p. 155. 
Pancasila was formulated by the so- called Ad -Hoc Committee within the Investigating Body for 
the Preparation for an Independent Indonesia (Badan Penyelidik Usaha -usaha Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia) which was formed under Japanese authority on 28 April 1945. There were nine 
members of this Ad -Hoc Committee representing nationalist and religious and ethnic leaders. They 
were Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, AA Maramis, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Abdulkahar Muzakir, A. 
Salim, Achmad Subardjo, Wachid Hasjim, and Muhammad Yamin. See, E. Darmaputera, ibid., pp. 
150 -151. 
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accepted as the philosophical foundation and identity for the new nation after a long and 
frustrating debate not without disagreement but ultimately promoting compromise! 
Although there were some attempts to introduce Pancasila in international fora, 
or at least some efforts made to demonstrate that Indonesia had its own specific model 
of democracy,5 Pancasila itself during the Soeharto's era was not as strongly promoted 
internationally as it was during Soekarno's guided democracy period (1959 -1965).6 In 
contrast to the political rhetoric of `Asian values' in Malaysia and Singapore, which has 
been promoted in international arenas and which have identified Western democratic 
polity and oppositions as the `Other', the Indonesian government's discourse of 
Pancasila democracy was much more domestically oriented, and was justified mainly in 
historical and nationalistic terms. The promotion of Pancasila democracy in 
international fora only arose sporadically in reaction to specific political pressures from 
Western governments. It was not promoted as part of the `Asian values' debate which 
dominated discussion about democracy, human rights and economic progress in the East 
Asian region. Indeed, the Western media has hardly paid any attention to Pancasila in 
the context of the `Asian values' debate. 
In spite of these differences, however, the primary purpose of creating distinctive 
models of democracy such as the `Asian democracy' model promoted by Mahathir 
Mohamad and Lee Kuan Yew, still remained. Indonesia's Foreign Minister, AIi Alatas, 
in an interview with the Australian Broadcasting Commission, clearly stated that there 
° Moslem leaders who previously attempted to include the words `with the obligation to carry out the 
Islamic ahari'a for its adherents', in the first principle of Pancasila: The principle of One 
Lordship, had to drop these words due to the protests from non -Islamic groups who did not want an 
Islamic state nor Islam as a state religion. After the compromise, the first principle became 
Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa (One Lordship). See, ibid, pp. 152 -153. 
Statement by Ali Matas, Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Second World Conference 
on Human Rights, Vienna, 14 June 1993. 
6 See Soekarno's speeches, for examples, Republik Indonesia Memberi Konsepsi -Konsepsi kepada 
Seluruh Dunia (The Republic of Indonesia Gives its Conceptions to the World) . (Jakarta: 
Department of Information, 1965); Let Us Transform The World (Jakarta: Department of 
Information, 1963); Revolusi Kita Rerdasarkan Pancasila (Our Revolution Based on Pancasila) 
(Jakarta: Department of Information, 1959). 
In Indonesia the `Other' was domestically oriented. It was the Islamic State. 
167 
were many forms of democracy, and Pancasila democracy was one of them.8 In 
response to a question as to whether Indonesia would move towards real democracy, he 
replied, 
.. if you mean that democracy is the rule of the people as expressed in the form 
of peoples' representatives properly and regularly elected, with a press which 
operates to facilitate discussions in the community, with an executive which is 
responsive to the will of the people. In this sense we have a democracy, known as 
the Pancasila democracy. But you see, democracy has many forms and different 
countries have their own forms of democracy. We have our form; you have your 
own form. r9 
Some non -Indonesian academics have argued that Pancasila democracy has 
affinities with `Asian values'.10 These academics, particularly Richard Robison, go 
further and argue that, as in Malaysia and Singapore, the Pancasila model also reflected 
a form of cultural relativism,tt which attempts to define what democracy means by 
using a specific understanding of cultures and experiences and by rejecting liberal 
democracy. There has also been an assumption that the culture supporting Pancasila 
democracy is a finished, settled and unchanged product.t' Under such an assumption, 
the New Order government possessed a fixed concept of culture not unlike that adopted 
by Samuel Huntington in his famous `clash of civilization' statement. This has been 
accompanied by claims about differences in values between the West and the East.l3 
Given the key protagonists, goals and strategies of this model, Pancasila 
democracy can reasonably be considered to belong to the `Asian democracy' model. 
This culturally specific claim was used by New Order leaders to justify the restructuring 
Lambert Kelabora, `The Problem of Images in Australia Relations with Southeast Asia, with 
Particular Reference to Indonesia', in Don Grant and Graham Seal (eds.), Australia in the World, 
Perceptions and Possibilities (Perth: Curtin University of Technology - Black Swan Press, 1994), 
pp. 366 -367. 
9 ibid. 
0 See, for examples, Richard Robison, `Looking North: Myths and Strategies'; and Garry Rodan and 
Kevin Hewison, 'A "Clash of Culture" or the Convergence of Political Ideology', both in Richard 
Robison (ed.), Pathways to Asia, the Politics of Engagement (St Leonard, NSW: 1996). 
Robison, `Looking North...,' op. cit., pp. 3 -4. 
12 Republika, 1 September 1998; and see also, Taufiq Abdullah, `Sastra, Ideologi Kebudayaan, dan 
Harmoni - Arts, Cultural Ideology, and Hegemony', Horison, Vol. 33, No. 9 -10, 1998, p. 13. 
13 Richard Robison, `Indonesia: Tensions in State and Regime', in Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison 
and Garry Rodan (eds.), Southeast Asian in the 1990s, Authoritarianism, Democracy and 
Capitalism (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1993), p. 42. 
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of the political system. The system strengthened the power of the President and 
weakened the power of parliament. As in the `Asian values' model promoted by 
Mahathir and Lee, the New Order's interpretation of Pancasila espoused distinctive 
claims about Indonesian culture and the Indonesian political and economic system. In 
this sense, the New Order's claim of Pancasila democracy is also a form of challenge to 
the universalising of liberal democracy by Western states,14 and thus a concern for 
international society. 
Along with critics like Robison, I argue that some within what broadly may be 
described as the New Order elite under President Soeharto attempted to relativise their 
understanding of democracy by making use of the Pancasila discourse. These elite 
members and groups attempted to present their interpretation of Pancasila democracy as 
the most appropriate model for Indonesia, thus making any opposition to this 
interpretation akin to opposition to the Pancasila, the ideological and philosophical 
basis of the Indonesian state. 
However, I also argue that the claim of Pancasila democracy has to be seen as an 
attempt to manage political life by adapting and interpreting ideas of the modern 
democratic state to the Indonesian cultural context. The experiment with some models 
of democracy such as `liberal' and `guided' democracy strengthened the belief among 
the New Order elites that the country needed to adjust the Western notions about 
modern state and democracy to local needs. Pancasila democracy was formulated by the 
so- called `the New Order' government as a means of overcoming the failure of the 
above two models, although it too ultimately also failed to fulfil its promises. 
In this chapter, I attempt to scrutinise the reasons why, as with the two previous 
attempts to adjust and apply Western notions of a modern state, New Order's Pancasila 
democracy model also failed. There are two principal reasons for this. Firstly, the 
promotion of Pancasila democracy as a distinctive political system founded on a 
distinctly Indonesian cultural and historical heritage was in fact a tenuous postulation. 
Miyume Tanji and Stephanie Lawson, -Democratic Peace" and "Asian Democracy ": A 
Universalist- Particularist Tension', Alternatives, No. 22 (1997). 
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To ensure consensus on certain important political issues - even the existence of the 
New Order regime itself - the New Order government under Soeharto rested more on 
coercive than hegemonic strategies. Without any dialogue implicit in the hegemonic 
process, a consensus on the Pancasila democracy had Iimited appeal and attracted 
limited support from society. 
The failure of Pancasila democracy as an effective system during the New Order 
can be seen in the continuing societal resistance to the government's version of 
Pancasila democracy which offered alternative approaches to democratic government. 
The hegemonic attempts, based on a top down model of consensus applied by the New 
Order did not stop opposition groups and certain intellectuals from finding outlets to 
express their grievances. In the beginning these opposition groups directly challenged 
controversial policies such as the simplification and de- ideologisation of political 
parties, and the legalisation of Pancasila as the sole governing principle (asas tunggal). 
This strategy, as shown in the 1970s and early 1980s, had limited success because of the 
government's strong control over society. Effectively the only means of opposition in 
such a situation was to adapt to the government's political platforms and to locate 
opportunities within this structure through which opposition groups could promote their 
alternative ideas of democracy, whether they be political, economic or moral. In the 
middle of the 1980s, opposition groups became more adept at adapting to the situation, 
and understood more clearly what they could criticise and what they could not. By 
choosing to make low -level criticism but nonetheless universal political issues such as 
corruption, nepotism, political openness and transparency in government, the New 
Order could not marginalised these groups simply by branding them as `anti- Pancasila'. 
Secondly, as a successful hegemonic attempt depends not only on its ideological 
persuasiveness but also on its material capability, the New Order's hegemony rested 
greatly on its economic success. As long as a regime can guarantee a certain degree of 
economic development and bring about an improvement of people's living standards, its 
hegemony can be ensured. However, when this success is threatened or uncertain, the 
existence and the legitimacy of the regime is called into question. Such a scenario may 
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explain the 1998 crisis leading to the fall of Soeharto and the reformation of the New 
Order regime in Indonesia. 
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. Firstly, I discuss the emergence of 
the New Order regime in 1966 and initial ideas of Pancasila democracy. Secondly, I 
examine the uses of government interpretations of Pancasila to justify its political 
structure. Thirdly, I illustrate problems with the hegemonic attempts by the New Order 
to justify Pancasila democracy. Fourthly, I discuss the continuing challenges to the New 
Order's attempts to impose hegemony. Fifthly, I examine the adaptation of some groups 
and intellectuals from the early New Order to the end of the 1980s to the political 
framework set up by the New Order. They had offered an alternative understandings of 
the Pancasila and used this understanding as a way of expressing their concerns about 
certain political problems. Sixthly, I highlight the need for a new political consensus and 
the growth of civil society in Indonesia. Finally, I address concerns about relativism in 
understanding democracy in Indonesia and its implication for international society. 
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW ORDER 
The New Order regime arose as a response to problems with the systems of 
government during both the `liberal democracy' (1950 -1959) and `guided democracy' 
(1959 -1965) periods. In this section, I survey, firstly, the political background Ieading to 
the emergence of the New Order regime and, secondly, the initial ideas of Pancasila 
democracy as a middle way between authoritarian and liberal democracy during the 
early New Order regime. 
1. The Political Background of the New Order 
The problems arising during the liberal democracy period created the belief that 
the political system was ineffective. As Daniel Lev has noted, the liberal system was 
seen by government elites at that time as a Iegacy of colonialism and a tactical strategy 
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to gain international support, but lacking roots in Indonesian society and culture.15 
Indeed, from the time of the revolution in 1945, when elite groups sought to identify the 
ideological foundations of the state, the parliamentary system was the focus of 
continuous conflict between elites. The system was regarded as the main cause of the 
stalemate which prevented agreement from being reached on the identity of the new 
nation.16 Moreover, the shift of the government to the Left after the 1955 general 
election and regional imbalances in distributing the economic benefits from natural 
resources between Jakarta, the center of government, and regional provinces such as 
West Sumatra and Riau, heightened the feeling of uneasiness during this period. 
With respect to Indonesia's economic development following independence, 
certain problems arose because both the general public as well as politicians were 
preoccupied with ideological struggles and the campaign against Dutch rule in West 
Irian. This meant, essentially, that government officials were unable to focus on the 
`serious business of government'.17 While the economic deterioration which took place 
during this period of parliamentary democracy (the `liberal' period) should not be 
overstated,18 it might be acknowledged that economic progress fell far short of meeting 
public expectations and demands. During the guided democracy period which followed, 
it was quite clear that the Indonesian economy had suffered from inattention. By the end 
of this period, national reserves had run out, and the production of rice as the staple food 
had declined. In addition, corruption at virtually all levels of government meant that 
most government sectors were unable to operate effectively. 
In the political arena, despite many restrictions on public criticism of the 
government during the Guided Democracy period, political stability had never been 
s Discussion of the validity of this claim is found in Daniel S. Lev, `On the Fall of the Parliamentary 
System', in David Bouchier and John Legge (eds.), Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s 
(Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Monash University, 1994), pp. 39 -42. 
15 Robert Cribb, `Legacies of the "Revolution.", in ibid., p. 77; one of the main frustrating issues of 
identity debated at the time is about whether Pancasila or Islam would be the foundation of the 
Indonesian state. Nationalists supported a secular Pancasila state while Moslem groups pushed the 
idea of an Islamic state. 
n Ibid., p. 74. 
18 Ibid., p. 75. 
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maintained. In the 1960s, violent clashes, such as those between the army and the 
Communist Party, were common.19 Conflict and violence also regularly occurred 
between peasants and land holders. Political and economic stability was further 
undermined by Soekamo's campaign to `crush Malaysia' in 1963 and his decision to 
ally with China (1963 -1965) while withdrawing Indonesia's membership of the United 
Nations in 1965. These policies effectively isolated Indonesia from the rest of the world. 
In an attempt to overcome the worsening situation, Soekarno promoted certain 
ideas, in particular the notion of the `unfinished revolution', within political doctrines 
such as Nasakom (Nasionalisme, Agama dan Komunis or Nationalism, Religion and 
Communism).20 Together with other projects such as regaining control over West Irian 
and attacking imperialism (reflected in the confrontation with Malaysia), Nasakom was 
directed at gaining national consensus and drawing together conflicting ideological and 
political interests in Indonesia. At that time there were intense ideological clashes 
between Islamic groups represented by large parties like Masyumi and Nandatul Ulama 
(NU), Communist groups represented by the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian 
Communist Party - PM), and nationalist groups represented by the Partai Nasional 
Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party - PM). However, given that Nasakom itself 
contained contradictory ideological elements, it could not possibly have similar appeal 
to opposing Moslem, Communist and nationalist groups. 
Soekamo's real intention in promoting Nasakom and other ideological projects 
was in fact to mobilise support for his fragile position in domestic politics, rather than to 
regain national consensus. So, while some of Soekamo's doctrines and campaigns had 
strong appeal among the masses, they were regarded by politicians and academics more 
as a reflection of conflicts between elites, involving the military (particularly the army), 
the Indonesian Communist Party (PHI), and Soekarno himself. Soekarno played the role 
e Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1978), p. 21. 
20 Nasakom stands for Nationalisme (Nationalism), Agama (Religion) and Korn unis (Communist) It 
was a slogan developed by Soekarno to unite mainstream of ideologies in Indonesia under one 
banner, Nasakom. 
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of mediator while trying to gain support from all factions. Particularly for anti - 
Soekarnoists and Soeharto's supporters in the early New Order, Soekarno's rhetoric of 
uniting the nation and crushing Malaysia was cynically understood as a power game 
aimed at maintaining his position. As such, it made no contribution to the realisation of 
the ideals of economic prosperity and political stability as promoted by the rhetoric of 
independence. Soekamo's Nasakom doctrine and other mobilisation programmes were 
not successful in generating a consensus on ways to address the problems of the country. 
The result was that the nation faced a state of crisis. 
This was aggravated by Soekarno's support for the Communist party. This 
became the main issue for Soekarno in his struggle to maintain power during the 
upheavals of 1965 -1966. During this period, the military and civilian groups consisting 
of students, Moslem political activists and other members of the New Order coalition 
demanded the resignation of Soekarno because of his support of the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI), which was accused of being behind the coup attempt of 30 
September 1965. In particular, after the killings of six generals in the September 1965, 
the second layer of the army, led by Mayor General Soeharto, was able to face up to the 
consequences of confronting Soekarno and challenged his legitimacy. Soeharto was able 
to mobilise a coalition of the main political interest groups, such as the students and 
Moslem activists, which then became the early New Order coalition and led the reaction 
to the coup attempt allegedly designed by the Communist Party. 
The above crisis, marked by division, conflict, political corruption and 
bureaucratic weakness, enabled the military, particularly the army, to strengthen its 
image as an anti -Communist power. It later claimed itself to be the only defender of the 
nation and the only organised group with the capacity to save the nation from 
disintegration. Indeed, it was recognised that the military and the civilian population 
worked together during 1945 -1949 revolutionary period, but initially it was only the 
military that was able to maintain unity.2' Civilian organisations, particularly political 
21 Crouch, The Army and Politics...op. cit., p. 21. 
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parties, were in disarray, and only promoted their own limited interests. The experience 
of guided democracy, according to Harold Crouch, resulted in the military being seen by 
some elites as the main hope to bring about national progress and prosperity.22 The view 
that the military was a key agent for development and modernisation was also 
strengthened by various political analysts early in the New Order.23 
2. The Initial Ideas of `New Order' Pancasila Democracy 
It is reasonable to state that, to a large degree, the conditions before the birth of 
the New Order regime were sufficiently conducive for it to produce its own style of 
democracy and implement underlying hegemonic strategies. Two significant factors at 
that time -the coup attempt and the economic situation- provided sound preconditions 
for the regime to convince the people of the worthiness of the New Order' s objectives. 
The emergence of the New Order during this time was represented by the military elites 
and some intellectuals as coinciding with the interests of society as a whole. Except for 
Soekarnoist groups and the Left, almost all interest groups during this early period 
(1966 -1971) such as students, intellectuals and Moslem groups supported the 
emergence of the New Order under General Soeharto. 
Some of these groups supported the need for an open political system which 
would allow free expression of different world views within political parties. The so- 
called `political reform now' group, for example, argued that there should be reform 
which would overcome the party oligarchy of the Soekarno era. This could be done by 
introducing an `electoral system based on a single- member district representation 
system, as opposed to the existing proportional one'.24 By introducing a single- member 
district system, party leaders would be more responsible to the rank -and -file members of 
their parties. Some leaders of political parties who had been detained or their activities 
22 Ibid., pp. 21 -22. 
23 Ibid., p. 22. 
24 Mas'oed, Mohtar, The Indonesian Economy and Political Structure During Early New Order, 
1966 -71, a PhD thesis submitted to Ohio State University (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University 
Microfils International, 1983), p. 182. 
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restricted during the Old Order, such as those from Masyumi, were encouraged to 
reassume their positions. There had been widespread hope that the New Order would 
allow greater political freedom than had been allowed during the Soekarno era. 
Prominent academics and political leaders supported the creation of Pancasila 
democracy. An influential political scientist in the 1970s, the late Alfian, emphasised 
the importance of a flexible ideology which could renew consensus in Indonesian 
society.25 He implied that Pancasila should become an open ideology admitting various 
interpretations thus renewing its relevance to Indonesians. He argued that if the 
government welcomed new demands and considers them in the formulation of its rules 
and policies, then a new equilibrium and consensus in Indonesian society could be 
achieved.26 Similarly, a Christian leader, T.B. Simatupang, argued that Pancasila should 
be open to various interpretations and became a modus operandi within which different 
ideologies could interact.27 NU's leader Abdurrahman Wahid believed that the 
Pancasila system was a middle way between the authoritarian style during Soekarno 
and the liberal system during the liberal democracy period in 1950 -1955. It was 
generally regarded as a middle way, and a solution to the negative effects of liberal 
democracy and guided democracy.28 
The New Order actually attempted to follow the middle way in its early years. 
The New Order claimed that there had been mistakes in the application of Pancasila in 
the past. For the New Order leaders, as Darmaputera argues, the `liberal democracy' 
period was understood as `a mistake because it had gone too far to the right', while the 
'guided democracy' period `was regarded as a mistake because it had gone too far to the 
25 Alfian, `Ideology, Idealisme dan Integrasi Nasional (Ideology, Idealism and National Integration)', 
in Yahya Muhaimin and Colin MacAndrews, Masalah- masalah Pembangunan Politik (The 
Problems of Political Development) (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1977), p. 91; 
See, also Alfian, `Pemilihan Umum dan Prospek Pertumbuhan Demokrasi Pancasila (General 
Elections and the Prospect of Pancasila Democracy)', Prisma, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1977. 
26 Alfian, `Ideology...op. cit., p. 91. 
27 In Darmaputera, op. cit., pp. 161 -162. 
28 Muhammad Ryaas Rasyid, State Formation, Party System, and the Prospect for Democracy in 
Indonesia: The Case of Golongan Karya (1967 -1993), a PhD thesis submitted to the Graduate 
Division of the University of Hawaii (Ann Arbor. University Microfils International, 1994), p. 218. 
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left'.29 Pancasila, according to Soeharto's regime, was a middle way which attempted to 
achieve harmony and balance in Indonesian society.30 Soeharto argued that 
`In it ( Pancasila) there is awareness that in the end a human being depends on the 
balance among essential values, a balance between man and his nature, a balance 
between man and his community, a balance between man and his God, a balance 
between spiritual and physical progress.'31 
What is interesting, is that the `middle way' notion of democracy was, in fact, 
also the reason given by former President Soekarno for his dissolution of the 
parliamentary system, banning certain political parties and for the introduction of 
`guided democracy' in July 1959.32 Soekarno proposed that the middle way should be 
between liberal democracy ideas as propounded by Thomas Jefferson and communist 
ideas promoted by Karl Marx. Indonesia, according to Soekarno, should learn from 
countries applying the above two systems of thought. He stated, `...we use their good 
experiences to build up our community and country, and cast away the bad 
experiences' 33 As in the New Order regime, Soekarno praised his `guided democracy' 
as `a true Indonesian democracy' -a democracy which was in line with Indonesian 
identity and personality. Soekarno blamed the excess of liberal democracy which 
created, in Soekarno's words, `an atmosphere of free -fight liberalism'.34 
In light of the above, when enunciating their form of democracy which referred 
to Pancasila, both Soekarno and Soeharto actually experienced difficulties within their 
countries. Soekarno faced problems of order and disunity because of conflicts among 
political parties which delayed development programs, while Soeharto inherited from 
Soekarno a similar threat to his country because of conflicts among elites, dissatisfaction 
in regional provinces and economic mismanagement. There have been ideals in their 
29 Darmaputera, op. cit., pp. 164 -165. 
30 Ibid 
31 A translation of Soeharto's speech addressed at Australia- Indonesia Business Cooperation 
Committee, in Sydney, 9 February 1972, in Krissantono (ed.), Pandangan Presiden Soeharto 
tentang Pancasila (Soeharto's Views on Pancasila) (Jakarta: CSIS, 1979), p. 10. 
32 Soekarno's lecture to the Students of Hasanuddin University, Makassar, 31 October 1958, in Paul 
E. Sigmund, Jr. (ed.), The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1963), pp. 56 -62. 
" Ibid., p. 58. 
34 Ibid., p. 60. 
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enunciation of their style of democracy, at least at the beginning of the regimes, to bring 
a better condition for Indonesians. Soekarno stated that Indonesia needed capital, 
managerial know -how, and `a political atmosphere which is conducive to 
reconstruction' as reasons why he chose `guided democracy' for Indonesians.35 
Similarly, when Soeharto enunciated Pancasila democracy, he emphasised the 
importance of stability and harmony in society and the need for development. In 
Soeharto's vision of the pursuit and realisation of development, the way to realise it `... 
has to guarantee the realisation of manusia Indonesia seutuhnya (holistic Indonesian 
self) and the development of the whole Indonesian society' .36 
The initial idea of Pancasila democracy as a middle way between the freedom of 
the liberal democracy of the 1950s and guided democracy which closed the freedom of 
expression, was an important idea for the supporters of the New Order.37 It reflected the 
need to build a system which was compatible with the Indonesian cultural context and 
national character (jati diri bangsa). Pancasila recognises the Indonesian cultural 
heritage and its traditional civilizations. With Pancasila as national character, Indonesia 
could also develop as an equal state with other states in the world.38 
Articles emerged regarding the compatibility of Pancasila democracy in 
Indonesian culture with democracy in general. For example, attempts had been made to 
invent a traditional concept of democracy. These attempts were manifested in concepts 
musyawarah dan mufakat (consensus by deliberation), pepe tradition (demonstration 
against injustice decisions) and mutual -help (gotong royong) in solving problems.39 
These efforts aimed at finding a 'specific' Indonesian democracy and at adjusting the 
concept whereby the people were traditionally viewed as the objects of kings, noblemen, 
35 Ibid., pp. 59 -60. 
36 A translation of Soeharto's speech addressed at The 25`h Anniversary of Gadjah Mada University, 
Yogyakarta, 19 December 1974; quoted in Krissantono, op. cit., p. 17. 
37 Darmaputera, op. cit., pp. 164 -165. 
36 See, for an example, Ismaun, Pancasila sebagai Keprihadian Bangsa Indonesia (Pancasila as the 
Indonesian National Character) (Bandung: Carya Remaja and IKIP Bandung, 1971), p. 1. 
39 Deliar Noer, `Perkembangan Democrasi Kita (The Development of Our Democracy)', Prisma, Vol. 
6, No. 2; Mattulada, ` Demokrasi dalam Tradisi Masyarakat Indonesia (Democracy in the Tradition 
of Indonesian Society), ibid. Parsudi Suparlan, ` Demokrasi dalam Masyarakat Pedesaan Jawa 
(Democracy in Javanese ViIlage), ibid. 
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and village leaders, and transformed this into a modern democratic concept of `people as 
subject' in politics.40 Javanese political cultures which saw a leader as a king with a 
supra -natural power were also considered as not conducive for the growth of 
democracy.41 In other words, this showed an awareness that culture needed to be 
adjusted and adapted to ideas of democracy and the modern state.42 
The political system that arose after 1966 was based on a common belief within 
the New Order supporters that the aliran politics of the Old Order, a kind of sectarian 
politics based on ideological, religious and race affiliations, brought the country to the 
edge of economic disaster and disunity. The New Order supporters claimed that 
Pancasila during the Guided Democracy era had not been applied appropriately because 
of the continuing clashes of the aliran politics. In the language of the New Order, the 
goal of the regime was to lay a base for a return `to the originality of Pancasila and the 
1945 Constitution'.43 Political programmes under the New Order were aimed at 
convincing the Indonesian people that they needed political restructuring and economic 
development as a new vision which would unite the nation and bring about stability, 
tranquillity and prosperity, free from politík aliran. 
The version of the middle -way for the New Order elite, was applied in the 
restructuring of the political system. The restructuring was needed to maintain social 
stability and to support economic development. Mass politics had to be 'de- politicised' 
or `de- ideologized' so that political affiliations were based not on ideologies but on 
development programmes. To sever the link between ideologies, ethnic and regional 
identity and religious loyalties, the masses had to be disconnected from political parties 
through the application of the concept of a `floating mass'.44 The `floating mass' 
concept meant among other things, that the two remaining political parties, the PPP 
4° Mattulada, op. cit, p. 42. 
41 interview with Isbodroini Suyanto MA, a lecturer of the University of Indonesia, November 1996. 
42. Ibid. 
43 See, for example, State Speech (Pidato Kenegaraan), Jakarta, 16 August 1967 in Krissantono (ed.), 
op. cit., p. 17. 
44 Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 29. 
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(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan - Indonesian Development Party) and PDI (Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia - Indonesian Democracy Party), were not allowed to have 
branches at the village Ievel. This meant that they could neither keep in touch with nor 
mobilise their grassroots supporters. According to this view of development, all the 
power and energy of the nation should be devoted to achieving national development 
goals. 
In contrast to the catastrophic political conflicts caused by popularly -based 
political parties, the New Order promoted a functional group, Golongan Karya (Golkar), 
as a quasi -government party. Political parties early in the New Order were branded as 
remnants of a system which had caused chaos and delayed development. They were still 
allowed to exist in a highly restructured form, as long as they had no direct Iinks with 
their grassroots supporters.45 The restructuring of these political parties started at 
February 1970 when Soeharto ordered ten parties to reorganise themselves into three, 
representing spiritual, material and functional elements in society. Under heavy 
government intervention, in January 1973 four Moslem parties, the NU, Parmusi 
(Indonesian Moslem Party), PSII (Islamic Indonesian Unity Party) and Perti (Islamic 
Education Party), agreed to form a spiritual unity group, while Christian and Catholic 
parties (Parkindo), together with nationalist parties IPKI (Association of Indonesian 
Independence), Murba (Socialist Party) and PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party), agreed 
to form a materialist group. Until 1998, these two parties survived under government 
control. 
Golkar represented itself as a functional group, and formally did not want to be 
called a political party 46 Its leaders were keen to campaign on the basis of Golkar as a 
non -political party which could implement Pancasila and as the only group possessing 
the spirit and orientation of development. It was, according to government rhetoric, a 
Ken Ward, `Indonesia's Modernization: Ideology and Practice', in Rex Mortimer (ed.), Showcase 
State, the Illusion of Indonesia's `Accelerated Modernisation' (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 
1973), p. 7I. 
4s Geoffrey C. Gunn, `Ideology and the Concept of Government in the Indonesian The New Order', 
Asian Survey, Vol. XIX, No. 8, August 1979, p. 760. 
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functional group which was not polluted by ideological conflicts and was free from 
ideological conflict. In reality, however, Golkar was created as the main vehicle by 
which the government could gain legitimacy through general elections. Since 1973, 
Golkar contested elections opposed only by the two remaining political parties, PPP and 
PDI. Civil servants who had various political affiliations during the liberal democracy 
period had to give their loyalty to Golkar. 
The whole restructuring process and development orientation were represented 
as the new national interest aimed at to fulfilling rising expectations for political 
stability and economic improvement. The new national interests were represented as 
reflecting the needs of the whole nation, and not specific interests as had been promoted 
by the political powers in the Old Order. To fulfil these new national interests, the New 
Order rhetoric announced the end of ideology and followed in the steps of the political 
development school, as articulated in American political science,' as well as promoting 
a focus on economic development. To a large degree, the word `development' became a 
concept used to restrict any opposition towards government policies. With regard to 
participation in the indoctrination of Pancasila, for example, those who refused to take 
part were accused of Iacking commitment to development (pembangunan) and to 
Pancasila democracy.4s 
The concept of development had been used as a criterion to judge whether 
political activities were consistent (cocok) with the new government orientation towards 
development.49 The New Order had often used modernisation values, for example, to 
justify its tightening control on political parties and mass organisations. According to 
Ali Moertopo, the most important Soeharto adviser in the 1970s, Indonesian society was 
generally traditional, so the government needed to replace traditional values with a new 
orientation toward modernisation and political stability. This meant that the government 
47 Ward, op. cit., p. 74. 
°$ Mackie, op. cit., p. 82. 
49 Gunn, op. cit., p. 760. 
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needed to form socio- cultural institutions which were conducive to development 50 The 
basic idea behind this `new society' was the separation of decision making from public 
discussions, and therefore the prevention of what the New Order called `conflicts of 
ideology' 51 
According to a team led by Anthony Milner, such a justification to restructure 
political society started from a `tutelary argument' wherein people were seen as 
unprepared for democracy.52 The people were largely regarded as under -developed, 
illiterate and as a consequence they were not allowed to express their will and contribute 
to the nation freely, particularly through choosing their own representatives and 
leaders.53 They needed guidance in politics, or in the New Order's terminology, they 
needed to be `depoliticised'. The priority of economic development over political 
development became a weapon to dismiss any demands for an open political system. It 
became a kind of justification for banning any opposition or independent political 
parties. The government relied on technocrats who lacked political orientation and 
committed themselves only to economic development. 
B. PANCASILA AS THE SOLE FOUNDATION 
The ideal of Pancasila democracy as a middle way, however, reached the end of 
its usage when the New Order regime started to claim the sole interpretation of 
Pancasila. In the middle of 1970s, the New Order came to see its cultural interpretation 
of Pancasila democracy as the fixed and final one; no alternative readings of Pancasila 
were allowed. For this purpose, in 1978, the government proposed the Guidelines to the 
Living and the Implementation of Pancasila (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan 
Pancasila) which had been thought and indoctrinated largely in all level of education 
and government officials. The New Order government emphasised its responsibility not 
° Ali Murtopo, Strategi Politik National (National Political Strategy), (Jakarta: Center for Strategies 
and International Studies, 1974), p. 56. 
1 Mas'oed, op. cit., p. 173. 
5Z Anthony Milner (ed.), Comparing Culture (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 150. 
53 Abdul Mun'im Dz, `Tradisi yang Hilang - The Losing Tradition', Kompas, 6 July 1996. 
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only to purify the meaning of Pancasila but also to make sure that there should be one 
common interpretation, understanding and application of Pancasila within Indonesian 
society.54 Of the importance of a single interpretation and explanation of Pancasila, 
Soeharto stated that 
... the different interpretations and expositions of Pancasila is similar to disguises 
the meaning of Pancasila. ...In spite of that, our differences in understandings and 
interpretations of Pancasila can result in conflicts among us.'55 
As such, the New Order under President Soeharto attempted to convince people 
that the government's version of Pancasila democracy not only originated from within 
Indonesian culture, but, as William Liddle notes, was a permanent and suitable solution 
to the political problems and conditions of Indonesia.56 In addition, unlike other models 
of military dominated regimes, the New Order elite `never promised democracy and 
freedom in the future'.57 By monopolising the interpretation of ideology, as Taufiq 
Abdullah argues, the New Order claimed to have power to determine the parameters of 
appropriate and rightful political and cultural behaviour.58 To be heard in such a 
political system, other political interests had to link themselves to the New Order's 
formal discourse of politics.59 In the words of NU's leader Abdurrahman Wahid, `those 
who wanted to enter the New Order political system could not bring about their own 
political agenda. They had to adjust to the New Order's political agenda, in order not to 
be marginalised politically.'6o 
I attempt to elaborate below some further ways the New Order regime 
represented itself and its political system as the final and fixed solution for Indonesia's 
political existence. This representation incorporated the claim that the New Order's 
54 Krissantono (ed.), op. cit., pp. 81 -83. 
ss A Translation of Speeches before the Musyawarah Kerja Pramuka (National Scout Workshop), 
Jakarta, 12 April 1976), quoted in Krissantono, ibid. p. 83. 
56 R. William Liddle, `Indonesia's Democratic Past and Future', Comparative Politics, Vol. 24, July 
1992, p. 450. 
Ibid. 
58 Abdullah, op. cit., p. 12. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Abdurrahman Wahid's lecture delivered at Seminar on Pembangunan Hukum dan Politik di 
Indonesia, Peluang Reformasi (The Development of Laws and Politics in Indonesia, Chances for a 
Reformation), Solo, November 1997. 
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interpretation of Pancasila was the only interpretation. It was supported by the New 
Order's version of history, the dual function of military, cultural aspects, and 
sovereignty. 
1. Representation of the Pancasila System 
The mobilisation of Pancasila as a single national ideology was the main tool 
used to keep people on track and to marginalise alternative views. At the centre of this 
representation, emphasis was placed on the creation of discourses of Pancasila 
democracy, aimed at constructing a New Order identity, which consciously 
differentiated itself from the Old Order. Together with efforts to promote the view that 
the political and economic situation during the Old Order represented a betrayal of the 
ideals of independence, the New Order elite created a discourse around the purification 
of Pancasila values. This was an ideological step taken to mobilise support for the New 
Order's political and economic policies. According to various members of the New 
Order elite, the objective of the New Order regime was to implement Pancasila and the 
1945 Constitution in a genuine and consistent manner. Pancasila, in New Order 
rhetoric, had not been implemented according to its main principles, so they needed to 
make a `total correction' to the deviation which had taken place during the Old Order 
and liberal democracy periods.6' 
The New Order regime was committed to the project of constructing Pancasila 
as the only national ideology, to be used as a platform for political and ideological 
matters in Indonesian society. In adhering to the Pancasila way, the government 
channelled the aggregation of people's demands through various kinds of corporatist 
mechanisms. This meant that functional groups and associational organisations created 
by the government became the means of channelling any demands. Regular general 
elections took place every five years, but their principal function was to give legitimacy 
to the government's position. Voters were only allowed to choose parliamentary 
61 See, for an example, Undang -undang Dasar 1945, Bahan Penataran P -4 Pola Terpadu - The 1945 
Constitution, Sources for Pancasila Indoctrination (Jakarta: BP7 Pusat, 1993), p. 44. 
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candidates from one of three official political parties which were officially selected and 
approved on the basis of their loyalty to the government. 
There was a systematic effort to weaken what Jamie Mackie called a strong 
society in favour of a `strong state'.62 The state apparatus and military strengthened their 
political, financial and administrative muscle, while societal powers had been 
systematically excluded from the direct political process.63 Some New Order supporters 
who believed in the need for an open political system had to step aside because of the 
priority placed on economic development. What was commonly called the `reform -now 
group' in the early `New Order' era had to give way to groups of leaders who supported 
a `reform later' position.64 
2. A Representation of History 
The New Order discourse on Indonesian history reflected the efforts of elites to 
define their own status and ideology within Indonesian society. The historical sources, 
following Foucault, are `a kind of power to be seized' in a struggle with other political 
forces in society 65 By capturing and reformulating history in the form of a coherent 
political discourse, the New Order attempted to strengthen its moral claims and 
reposition the people according to its vision of appropriate political behaviour. 
The New Order leaders appeared to make good use of the knowledge that 
history, as James Wertsch notes, can be used `for shaping ideas and emotions that 
underlie the actions of a citizen of a nation state'. 66 The New Order, in this case, 
represented and defined itself as the defender of `normality' and `the rule of law',67 and 
52 Jamie Mackie, `Indonesia: Economic Growth and Depolitisation', in James Morley (ed.), Driven by 
Growth Political Change in the Asia -Pacific Region (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), p. 77. 
63 Ibid., p.77. 
64 Mas'oed, op. cit., p. 180. 
63 Michael Foucault, `The Order of Discourse' in M. Shapiro (ed.), Language and Control (London: 
Routledge, 1984), p. 110. 
66 James V. Wertsch, 'Narrative Tools of History and Identity', Culture and Psychology, Vol. 3, No. 
1, March 1997, pp. 5 -6. 
7 Ruth T. McVey, `The Case of the Dissapearing Decade', David Bouchier and John Legge, 
Democracy in Indonesia, 1950s and 1990s (Monash: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash 
University, 1994), p. 6. 
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as bringing about a `total correction' to all forms of deviation by the Old Order from the 
1945 Constitution and Pancasila.68 According to the New Order, during the period prior 
to its emergence, there had been chaos and anarchy which severely constrained 
economic development. Consequently, according to this discourse, the establishment of 
the New Order, including the involvement of the military in government, was very 
important to ensure the `correction' of society, politics and the economy in Indonesia. 
The historical discourse was constructed to discredit other periods and leaders in 
Indonesian history for having produced or not achieved the ideals of prosperity, peace 
and harmony as idealised by the generation of 45 founders of the nation. In particular, 
the discourse was designed to gain full support for the New Order's policy of political 
restructuring. As noted above, the New Order's representation of history was initially 
effective to a certain extent in generating the support needed to continue its 
programmes. Students, intellectuals and Moslem activists at the end of 1960s and earlier 
1970s, for example, aligned themselves with the New Order coalition to oppose and ban 
the Communist Party and to plan economic development. At critical points in its 
development, reference to the past `failure' of liberal democracy was often made when 
key sections of the New Order elite felt it was necessary to discredit demands from 
different quarters for a more open political system. 
In one of the most comprehensive narratives of the history of the nation, which 
became a major source of the public discourse of the New Order, the late General Ali 
Moertopo, a chief New Order strategist, identified three periods prior to the birth of the 
New Order.69 The first period took place during the struggle to gain independence, from 
1945 to 1950. This period was represented in positive terms because it was during this 
period that Indonesians fought unequivocally and with unity for independence. 
However, the adoption of a federal system, Republik Indonesia Serikat (Federal 
Republic of Indonesia - RIS), as the result of the agreement with the Dutch in 
December 1949, was represented as a `deviation'. In the history books of elementary 
68 Murtopo, Strategi Politik... op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
69 Ibid., pp. 6-8. 
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and high school student, the federal system is regarded as part of the colonial heritage 
and is therefore incompatible with the principle of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, or 
Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI).70 
When NKRI was chosen by the parliament as the system of government to end 
RIS in 1950, it was regarded as a good solution for the country. However, according to 
Ali Moertopo, many Indonesians were still attracted to the liberal democratic system. In 
New Order discourse, the period 1950 -1959 was represented as one of liberal 
democracy, characterised by instability, anarchy, rebellion, and providing the 
opportunity for Communism to survive. As David Bouchier notes, liberal democracy, 
both in public discourses and in school texts, had been represented as `Westernism, 
national disintegration, economic backwardness and chronic political instability', in 
contrast to images of the New Order in which were promoted notions of `indigenism, 
national unity, development and political stability'.71 This period was often used to 
illustrate the dangers of rebellion, separation of power, regional autonomy and any 
demands for more political freedom.72 
The third period (1959 -1965) was known as the period of `guided democracy'. 
When it started with the President's decree to `Return to the 1945 Constitution', it was 
regarded as a positive step by Moertopo and an important point in the historical journey 
of the Republic of Indonesia. However, according to this discourse, this implementation 
of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution was far from the `true' path. Moertopo argued 
that during this period Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution were wrongly implemented, 
resulting in that in the end Pancasila becoming a meaningless symbol.73 
By representing history in these terms, the New Order seemed to offer new hope. 
What was important about the New Order, according to Moertopo, was that it 
70 
72 
73 
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challenged the morality of society, put national interests before private interests, and 
promoted the spirit of development based on a programme rather than simply on an 
ideological orientation: Until the fall of Soeharto, public discourse continued to be 
dominated by this discourse. Any discussion of democracy in contemporary Indonesia, 
to be heard in mainstream political debates, had to refer to the government's version of 
the nation's history. The government discourse then sanctioned forms of knowledge and 
the meaning of history for the nation. 
3. Military Dual Function 
In relation to the role of the military (usually called ABRI - Angkatan Bersenjata 
Republik Indonesia) in politics, the two main themes to be considered are the 
representation of the unique role of the military in the history of the nation, and the 
disappointment with civilian rule. In the public discourse, this role had been formulated 
as dwi-fungsi, or a dual function role. This kind of role was often described as starting 
from the period after the proclamation of independence in 1945, when civilians and the 
military worked hand in hand in maintaining independence against Dutch attempts to 
regain Indonesia. Because ABRI played an integral part in this struggle then according 
to this representation, ABRI had `the responsibility to join in the struggle in the social, 
political, economic, and cultural fields in order to secure, defend and fulfil national 
independence'.74 Some academics also supported this interpretation. Yahya Muhaimin, 
from Gadjah Mada University, argues that the military has been long committed to 
political matters since the time of the struggle against Dutch military action and the PKI 
rebellion in Madiun in 1948.5 In addition, according to Muhaimin, the Indonesian 
military has adopted an attitude of `noblesse oblige' as a Messiah for their country, as 
the people's protector and as a pioneer of development.76 
4 Ali Murtopo, The Acceleration and Modernization of 25 Years' Development (Jakarta: CSIS, 
1972), pp. 23 and 45. 
Yahya A. Muhaimin, Perkembangan Militer dalam Politik di Indonesia 1945 -1966 (The 
Development of Military in Politics in Indonesia 1945 -1966) (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada 
University Press, 1982), p. 223. 
6 Ibid., pp. 5 -6. 
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The military expressed disappointment with civilian rule in the context of public 
discourse, particularly during the liberal democracy and guided democracy periods." 
Because of this, ABRI believed that a system of competing political parties working 
within a Western-style parliamentary democratic system was inappropriate for 
Indonesia.78 During these periods, the formal New Order government's discourse 
claimed that civilians had been fighting each other to promote their individual interests, 
rather than working towards the national interests. According to military leaders, the 
achievement of independence had long been delayed because of the struggle between 
different political parties, opposing ideologies and narrow sectional interests. The 
function of ABRI, therefore, according to the formal representation enunciated by Ali 
Moertopo and other political strategists of the New Order, was to defend Pancasila both 
as a philosophy and state ideology and to guarantee its purity79 `from all kinds of 
deviation and attempts to undermine it - either by extreme right or extreme left' 
forces.80 In short, it attempted to present itself as the only strong and stable organisation 
which was always ready to save the nation from any threat. 
The above themes were reinforced during recent challenges to the dual- function 
concept. The military continued to argue that there was no dichotomy between civilians 
and the military because of the history of military involvement in civilian (political and 
social) matters. Juwono Sudarsono, an academic from the University of Indonesia, 
blamed civilians for inconsistency and for being disorganised, in contrast to ABRI 
which was the most professional organisation and ready to bring about development.ß1 
He argues, as do other academics and supporters of the New Order, that the presence of 
the military was significant in building national consensus and stability for 
development. This was commonly followed by the claim that no civilian power, 
particularly political parties such as the PM, Masyumi, and the NU, had been 
Ibid., p. 7. 
° Mackie, op. cit., pp. 75 -76. 
9 Gunn, op. cit., p. 755. 
80 Murtopo, The Acceleration ... op. cit., p. 45. 
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sufficiently broad -based to implement national programmes. Only since 1967 under 
ABRI, so the argument runs, has there been significant broad -based national 
development in Indonesia.52 
4. The Claim of Authentic Culture 
Together with the representation of history and the dwi-fungsi concept or 
military dual function, the New Order also represented Pancasila democracy as 
reflecting the original cultural identity and national character (jati diri) of Indonesia. 
During both the guided democracy and New Order periods, Pancasila had been 
described as being based on national traditions that bind Indonesians together against 
foreign elements.83 One good example of the perceived superiority of Pancasila 
democracy was provided by an Indonesian ambassador. He stated that Indonesia sticks 
to Pancasila democracy because it was `the kind that is rooted in the tradition, values 
and cultures of its people. It is a dynamic form of democracy ... but always anchored to 
their values.'84 
Another cultural characteristic which New Order elites often raised was the state 
as a family system. This was often enunciated by government officials to illustrate the 
integration of elites (the leaders) with society (the led). Some of these ideas referred to 
the integrated concept of state suggested by Soepomo and Ki Hadjar Dewantoro prior to 
the national Constitution in 1945. The leader who first supported this idea was actually 
Soekarno. He claimed that these values were reflected in his guided democracy. He 
offered a political representation through the construction of functional groups, rather 
than political parties, and argued that such a representation not only served the people 
better, but was also in accord with the Indonesian national character and values.85 
82 Ibid. 
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What is important about the idea of an integrated state is how it was, in the case 
of the New Order, updated and represented by New Order elites. The idea of the 
integrated state had been used, for example, as the ideological basis of the Indonesian 
organic state system. According to Robison, in this organic state there have been 
functional representations in social structure and organisation, and the state is assumed 
to be able to transcend particular vested interests.86 The idea of organic totality also 
justified the existence of strong leadership and the rules of politeness, deference and 
harmony in every political field.87 
Within this ideological spirit, representation is channelled through corporatist 
organisations, whose leaders are appointed by government. As in a family system 
(sistem kekeluargaan), corporatist style critiques have to be made within the system, and 
more importantly have to be deployed in a 'family' style, such as between a father and 
his children.88 Ideals of harmony, hierarchy, authority, order, mutual help (gotong 
royong) and consensus are often deployed to rebut many criticisms of government 
policy. 
Following this argument, opposition parties could not exist because they would 
be inconsistent with the national culture. According to Soeharto, Indonesians did not 
recognise opposition parties because they did not fit in with the national character.89 
Soeharto stated that `Pancasila democracy does not recognise opposition groups as in 
the liberal democracy system, but only recognises musyawarah leading to mufakat 
(discussion leading to consensus) through representation in both the DPR and MPR',90 
Government programmes, under the logic of language of the New Order, were the result 
of MPR meetings whose members were chosen from the people, and for this reason the 
n Robison, op. cit., p. 42. 
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University Press, 1996), p. 128. 
88 Hans Antlop, 'Enchanted Power and Crude Rule: Legitimization and Domination in Rural Java, in 
01le Tornquist and Karl Reinhold Hallquist (eds.), Asian Societies in Comparative Perspective 
(Copenhagen, NIAS/NASEAS, 1991), p. 416. 
89 Republika, 8 September 1995. 
90 Krissantono, op. cit., p. 61. 
191 
people should not criticise the programme which they themselves supported.91 The late 
Mashuri, a former New Order Information Minister, declared that the operative principle 
in the MPR was harmony and balance, and rejected open conflict and confrontation as 
characteristic of the liberal period. According to Mashuri, harmony would put an end to 
the seeds of destruction and division in society.92 Such divisions, according to New 
Order discourse, had taken place during the 1950s, when liberal ideas based on Western 
ideology had spread throughout society. Liberalism, according to that representation, 
was not compatible with Indonesia's national character (jati dirt) and development 
(pembangunan).93 
With the ability to signify its distinctive cultural identity, the New Order labelled 
any form of opposition outside the government framework as being inspired by alien 
and foreign models of democracy, particularly liberal democracy. It was also possible 
for New Order leaders to construct and maintain their version of democracy. Their 
ability to differentiate between New Order ideals and those opposed to these made 
repression of other forms of democracy and their supporters not only possible, but also 
(apparently) sensible and sometimes even necessary. 
According to Jordan and Weedon, the above was a kind of `cultural politics' 
defining meanings according to the interests of particular elites.94 People were 
identified, directed and controlled in certain ways by sections of the New Order elite. By 
using cultural symbols, the government attempted to discredit other interpretations that 
were inconsistent with New Order thinking. Under such a system, it was the government 
alone which determined what constituted correct political behaviour and what role 
opposition groups, state institutions and organisations should play. 
41 Pikiran Rakyat, 12 March 1997. 
92 Mashuri, `Pancasila Democracy', The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. IV, October 1977. 
93 Abdullah, op. cit, p. 13. 
94 Jordan, Glenn, and Chris Weedon, Cultural Politics (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995), p. 
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5. Representation of the Sovereignty Principle 
The principles of sovereignty and nationalism cannot be separated from a 
discussion of the New Order's claim that Indonesia has a distinctive system of 
democracy. These two ideas together constituted the starting point used by the New 
Order to relativise the meaning of democracy for Indonesians. To a certain degree, the 
claim to sovereignty came from Indonesia's fragile position as an archipelago with a 
history of long -term colonial invasion and occupation, and from the spirit of 
independence and nationalism resulting from the struggle for freedom as a nation. Such 
conditions made successive generations of the political elite aware of Indonesia's fragile 
position and led to the stress on the importance of sovereignty and the principle of non- 
intervention in its international relations.95 
However, apart from the non -intervention imperative in maintaining the 
sovereignty of the nation, the sovereignty principle had also been used by Indonesian 
elites to justify the existence of a uniquely Indonesian political system. The sovereignty 
principle as a political tool had been raised on a number of occasions and had become 
one basis on which some New Order leaders rejected what they perceived as Western 
pressure on issues of democracy and human rights in the country. Together with 
nationalism, sovereignty became the main principle used to emphasise the differences 
between Eastern values underlining a distinctive Indonesian political system, and 
Western values supporting liberal democracy.96 The New Order assumed that its 
interpretation and construction of Pancasila democracy was part of its general state 
functions, alongside the building of the nation and developing an effective state system. 
To strengthen Pancasila democracy, was, as President Soeharto said, to `maintain 
national character (jati diri) as an independent and sovereign nation' .97 
In building New Order identity, the President and his government failed to 
differentiate between three aspects of politics: the government he led, the state, and the 
95 Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy (London: Allen & Hnwin, 1983). 
96 Robison, `Indonesia: Tension...', in Hewison, Robison and Rodan (eds.), op. cit., p. 42. 
97 Kompas, 4 April 1997. 
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regime. The state and the regime should exist under whatever conditions, whereas the 
government can change 98 Soeharto claimed to represent the state, and consequently to 
oppose him was to oppose the state. According to Lawson, this is characteristic of 
authoritarian leader where differences between the state, the regime and the government 
are not clear and tend to be blurred.99 
By emphasising that Indonesia is an independent and sovereign nation, the New 
Order highlighted its right to decide which model of democracy was appropriate. This 
kind of nationalistic fervour emerged as a counter to what had been seen as growing 
Western pressure on democracy and human rights. The main goal of this sovereignty 
discourse was to fix the meaning of state sovereignty, which was sometimes not clearly 
differentiated from regime authority, and to remind some Western states of the 
importance of the sovereignty principle in managing their international relations. This 
was clearly reflected in a speech by Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas: 
... while we in the developing world do understand and appreciate the genesis of 
the thinking and motivation underlying present -day Western policies and views on 
human rights, we should at least expect similar understanding and appreciation of 
the historical formation and experiences of non -Western societies ... For many 
developing countries ... have not gone through the same history and experience as 
the Western nations in developing their ideas on human rights and democracy.100 
The emphasis on specific historical experiences and sovereign equality emerged 
clearly in Soeharto's speech before the 47th meeting of the United Nations General 
Assembly. He said, 
... I am sure we all agree that international cooperation presupposes as a basic 
condition respect for the sovereign equality of states and the `national identity' of 
the peoples. In this spirit of cooperation and mutual respect there should be no 
98 The definition of the state and regime here follows Peter Calvert and Stephanie Lawson's 
definitions. According to Calvert, `The state is the community organized for political purposes; the 
government is the individual or team of individuals that takes decisions which affect the lives of 
their fellow citizens. Governments succeed one another; the state endures...', quoted in Stephanie 
Lawson, `Conceptual Issues in the Comparative Study of Regime Change and Democratization', 
Comparative Politics, Vol_ 25, No. 2, January 1993, p. 186. Lawson argues that `regimes embody 
the norms and principles of the political organization of the state, which are set out in the rules and 
procedures within which governments operate'. See, Lawson, ibid., p. 187. 
99 Ibid., p. 201. 
100 Statement by Ali Alatas, Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Second World Conference 
on Human Rights, Vienna, 14 June 1993. 
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place for the practice of exchanging unfounded accusations or preaching self - 
righteous sermons to one another.101 
This rhetoric clearly upholds the importance of sovereignty for developing 
nations with regard to human rights and democracy. The word `we' is used to define all 
developing nations, in contrast to the West which is portrayed as having not understood 
and appreciated the unique historical conditions of the Third Word. The discourse then 
rewrites `the rights of contemporary men and women to live as members of an historic 
community and to express their inherited culture through political forms worked out 
among themselves...' .102 
It attempts to fix the meaning of sovereignty as something given and immutable. 
`An historic community' is assumed by these newly independent nations as given. 
Alatas said, 
...they [Third Word countries] often developed different perceptions based on 
different experiences regarding the relations between man and society, man and his 
fellow man and regarding the rights of the community as against the rights of the 
individual.103 
He added, 
(I)t is now generally acknowledged that their (human rights) expression and 
implementation in the national context should remain the competence and 
responsibility of each government... This national competence not only derives 
from the principle of sovereignty of states, but also is a logical consequence of the 
principle of self- determination.104 
In other words, it is only the people of an independent country who know best 
what needs to be done, because there is a sense of one community and a certain `fit' 
between the community and its government.105 The consequence of such a discourse is 
quite clear. It claims that there should be no moral obligation for the people of the 
independent country to apply `Western norms of democracy'. The assumed fit prevents 
`foreigners' (in this case the West) from intervening in the domestic problems of Third 
101 Department of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, `The Dynamics of Democracy in an 
Indonesian Setting', ( http: / /www.dfa- deplu.go.id /english/demol.htm). 
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World countries, simply because they have to respect `the historic community' of these 
countries and their internal affairs. This is the essential meaning of sovereignty which 
the discourse attempts to fix in international society. 
Two important cases show how the principle of sovereignty was given priority in 
the discussion of democracy in Indonesia. The first one is the IGGI (Inter Governmental 
Group on Indonesia) case, where President Soeharto rejected the membership of the 
Dutch in the group by disbanding the group and proposing the formation of another 
group called the CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia). The Dutch were regarded as 
interfering too much and using aid as a way of applying pressure with regard to 
Indonesia's human rights problem. The Dutch, therefore, were accused of violating the 
sovereignty of Indonesia. In another case, the President put a stop to the American 
International Military Education and Training Scheme (IMET) and cancelled the 
purchase of F -16 fighters from the United States. It was stated that the cancellation was 
due largely to the pressure from US Senate members with regard to human rights in 
Indonesia. In his letter to President Bill Clinton, President Soeharto stated that the 
criticism of Indonesia in Congress was `wholly unjustified criticism'.1°6 
In both cases, reference was made to the principle of equality and the right to 
non -interference in the problems of other countries. These decisions can be seen as part 
of many strategies employed by the Soeharto government to gain popular support by 
appealing to nationalistic sentiment. Such an appeal, for example, was able to inculcate 
national pride and to increase anti -Western sentiments within the Moslem middle class, 
particularly among Moslem intellectuals. 
Reference to Indonesia's history of struggle for independence and the immediate 
consensus on Pancasila as the basis of the state was often made to support the claim 
that Indonesia was a country which struggled for justice and democracy. This was 
emphasised by Indonesian diplomats and by President Soeharto himself in relation to 
106 FEER, 19 June 1997. 
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Indonesia's experience of colonialisation: in other words, Indonesians knew very well 
what human rights and democracy were all about.107 
C. MANIPULATED CONSENSUS 
Until the 1980s, to a certain degree, the mobilisation of Pancasila ideology and 
the uses of the above justifications had provided a relatively stable political system 
which had presented the opportunity for the New Order to improve Indonesia's 
economic situation. However, in reality, this mobilisation could not overcome many real 
political and economic problems faced by Indonesians. Alternative discourses to 
Pancasila democracy had been repressed but they remained latent and sometimes 
emerged to challenge the formal discourse of Pancasila. In what follows, I discuss, 
firstly, the impression created by the New Order of its superiority from other forms of 
government and, secondly, the subsequent failure of the New Order to address the real 
economic and political problems of Indonesia. 
In general, indeed, by using the discourses on culture, history, sovereignty and 
the military's dual function, the New Order regime had created the impression that the 
rejection of the government version of Pancasila meant a rejection of the basic 
legitimacy of the regime. As Donald Weatherbee has said, the New Order regime 
created a condition where `(00 oppose the regime is to oppose Pancasila. To oppose 
Pancasila is to oppose the constitutional foundation of the state'.108 In short, the 
government monopolised the interpretation of what was good and consistent with 
Indonesian culture and national character, and what was based on foreign ideologies, 
such as individualism and liberalism, and therefore invalid.109 The discourses they used 
had not only strengthened the New Order's identity, but had also been promoted in such 
07 See interview ABC Radio National with Indonesian Ambassador to Australia, S. Wiryono, 24 
August 1997, <http: / /www. abc. net. au /rn/talks/bbing/bb970824.htm>; see also, Kompas, 19 
November 1997. 
108 Donald E. Weatherbee, `Indonesia: the Pancasila State', in Southeast Asian Affairs 1985 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 1995), p. 134. 
109 Reeve, `Indonesia', op. cit., p. 127. 
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a way as to leave a restricted space for alternative views. For the entire period of the 
New Order, these discourses had dominated academic as well as public discourses. 
Pancasila had been used by the government, particularly its military component, to 
measure whether or not the political activities of citizens constituted a threat, or, in the 
government's terms, whether they represented the extreme left or right (ekstrim kiri atau 
kanan).t10 
These discourses arose continually when the government promoted its 
programmes in response to criticism from intellectuals, members of political parties and 
supporters of a more open political system. In general, the discourses framed the public 
debate and determined what political behaviour was appropriate and acceptable in 
relation to the state. In particular, people were required to put national interests before 
personal/group interests. They were also required to reject aliran (sectarian) and 
ideological conflicts, and to concentrate their energies on development. With the 
parliament under government control, it was not difficult for the government to gain 
consensus on many policies and legislation. Such actions were legitimated by deploying 
a mass public campaign emphasising the necessity of Pancasila for the good of the 
nation. 
With this ability to discredit opposition groups and critics, the government and 
its technocrats operate relatively free from political disturbances. It could concentrate on 
what, after all, was its declared policy objective: economic development. The record of 
economic development in many sectors was amazing. During 1969 -1982 when oil was 
the main source for the Indonesian economy, the average annual growth rate was nearly 
8 percent before it dropped slightly to 7.4 percent in 1989.111 The annual per capita 
income increased from about US $75 in 1966 to US $670 in 1992 and was expected to 
110 Douglas Edward Ramage, The New Order: State Ideology and the Beliefs of an Elite, 1985 -1993 
(Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI Dissertation Services, PhD thesis University of South Carolina, 1993), 
pp. 282-285. 
William Liddle, `The Relative Autonomy of the Third World Politician: Soeharto and Indonesian 
Economic Development in Comparative Perspective', International Studies Quarterly, No. 35, 
1991, pp. 403 -404. 
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reach US $1,000 by the World Bank'12, before the monetary crisis in July 1997. It had 
also been able to overcome dependency on oil and natural gas by diversifying its export 
products in the early 1990s. According to a 1989 government report, the number of the 
poor people had been reduced to 30 million out of a 200 millions Indonesian population. 
In its report in 1990, this success was praised by the World Bank as a model of 
development success. One section of its report in 1994 was titled, in reference to 
Indonesia, `The Great Ascent: How the Poor Rose Out of Poverty' .113 William Liddle 
argues that economic achievement was one of the most important legitimating principles 
for the New Order and constituted a source of support from many groups in society 
particularly the military and civilian bureaucracy.114 
The political stability which supported this economic progress was, however, 
based on shaky ground. Many grievances still existed in society and these had few if any 
outlets in such a closed political system. This process of economic development without 
participation by society meant that benefits flowed only to certain groups and created an 
unfair distribution of wealth between the provinces. Incidents of corruption, cronyism 
and nepotism were common place during the New Order. 
This ultimate form of Pancasila democracy was far from the concept envisaged 
by scholars and students who used to be the supporters of the birth of the New Order, far 
even from the vision of founding fathers of the nation such as Soekarno. For Soekarno, 
Pancasila, in particular the fourth principle (Democracy guided by the inner wisdom of 
deliberation among representatives) means representative government or consent. He 
did not support an Islamic state but gave room for the all elements in society, including 
Moslem's parties, to participate in politics and to compete with each other for a position 
in the people's representative body."5 Although Soekarno himself betrayed this main 
uz Jeffrey A. Winters, `Soeharto Indonesia: Prosperity and Freedom for the Few', Current History, 
Vol. , December 1995, pp. 421 -422. 
s Ibid. 
114 Liddle, The Relative...', op. cit., p. 413. 
us About Soekarno's view on Pancasila, see for an example, Soekarno, Commemorating the birth of 
Pantjasila: excerpts of speeches delivered by President Soekarno, (Jakarta: Ministry of 
Information, 1958); and Soekarno, The Birth of Pantjasila (Jakarta: Ministry of Information, 
1950). 
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principle of democracy in Pancasíla during guided democracy period, the original idea 
of democracy in Pancasila is stiII valid. 
The hoped for balance between participation and control to overcome the excess 
of freedom and no freedom as espoused by Alfian116 was not realised either. Instead of 
opening space for public aspirations, the government dominated the decision making 
process. Political and military control dominated the political programmes of the New 
Order. This was implemented particularly through the powerful security agency, the 
Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) until 
1988, which then was replaced by a new body called Bakorstanas (Badan Koordinasi 
Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional - Coordination Body for Strengthening 
National Stability). Consensus, as conceived by Alfian, was created more from above 
than from below and involved only certain member of the elite and disregarded popular 
leaders in society. A middle way as suggested by Wahid has not been realised either. 
The emphasis was on political stability at the cost of limiting freedom of expression in 
society. 1 17 
Together with its political campaigns to apply Pancasila morality, the New 
Order used manipulation and threats to retain consensus and support. The parliament, 
the DPR/MPR, was clearly coopted into supporting government policy and to gain 
consensus on controversial decisions such as the legislation of Pancasila as the sole 
ideology (asas tunggal) in 1985.118 When the government was sure of getting enough 
support from the legislative bodies to legalise a decision, it employed its political 
rhetoric to claim that the decision was the product of national consensus and to stress 
that consultation with the people had occurred. The consensus was proclaimed as the 
result of the people's aspirations. The rhetoric went further by using Indonesia's unique 
cultural and political situation to strengthen its claims. Those who were against the 
decision were accused of violating the Pancasila or acting against Indonesian culture 
116 Alfian, `Pemilihan Umum...', op. cit. 
On Wahid's views, see Rasyid, op. cit., p. 218. 
118 In this legislation, all mass and political organizations have to adopt only Pancasila as their 
philosophical base. 
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which held that the President should be trusted and respected as the highest leader or 
Bapak (Father). In the popular conception he was the source of wisdom and therefore 
should not be criticised or blamed.119 To maintain the `consensus' in the face of possible 
criticism and protests, the government claimed that no other ideologies except Pancasila 
could solve the country's political and social problems. 
With regard to consensus, it frequently happened that attempts were made to 
enforce a decision through acclamation without any challenges. Direct voting was 
rejected on the grounds of reaching a decision (although it was theoretically permitted as 
a last attempt to reach an agreement if there had been an impasse in the discussion). In 
such a situation, to make sure a decision could be made by acclamation, the government 
selected its own supporters who could be trusted to support all the government plans and 
to marginalise its opponents. This selection process particularly operated for the 
members of New Order political institutions such as the political parties and the 
DPR/MPR. 
The choice of Soeharto as Indonesia President in 1998 is a case in point. AlI 
members of the PPP, PDI and Golkar as well as their sub -organisations were mobilised 
to support Soeharto as President. At the general session of the MPR in March 1998, all 
representatives chose Soeharto by acclamation.129 This kind of consensus was clearly 
preferred by Soeharto. Soeharto adheres to an inherited Javanese political style where a 
`king' needs the support of all the people, thus he wanted to ensure that everybody 
would support him as President.121 Those, such as Megawati and Sri Bintang 
Pamungkas, who challenged him as President, faced harsh anti -opposition policies and 
limitations on their political activities and positions. However, with the fall of Soeharto 
in May 1998, only two months after being elected by acclamation as the President, it 
119 
`Wawancara Sejarawan Taufiq Abdullah: "Order Baru itu Kurang Humor, Kurang Hangat- Tempo 
Interactive, < http : / /www.pdat.com/tempo /nasl.htnv 
120 The mobilisation of support was very clear when two months after the standing ovation to 
congratulate Soeharto as Indonesian President before the Parliamentary General Meeting (Sidang 
Liman MPR) in March 1998, the same members of the parliament who chose Soeharto asked him 
to step down after growing protests and demonstrations throughout the whole of Indonesia. 
121 Harold Crouch, "Intervensi dalam Urusan Interen. PDI', Tempo Interactive, 19 July 1996, 
<http:www.idola.net.id/tempo/anggotahmgguan/ed2191/koloml.htm> 
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was clear that such a consensus was an artificially mobilised one. Soeharto's style of 
consensus was not really supported by all the members of the MPR. 
It is worth noting the fact that room for open political debate was very limited. 
Newspapers, magazines, books and television -regarded as social and technological 
prerequisites for a sort of `public sphere'- were under strong government control and 
surveillance.122 This meant that the government gave little opportunity for alternative 
discourses to challenge its vision directly, so that a `war of words' and struggle for 
ideological hegemony in the Gramscían sense to contest government ideology could not, 
in fact, take place -at least not publicly. The New Order regime was clearly the only 
dominant player using the public space and defining what democracy meant for 
Indonesians. In Indonesia, adopting Habermas' concept, there was no such thing as a 
`public' which could lead to the rise of civil society. The regime, for example, could ban 
newspapers such as Tempo, Detik and Editor in 1993, and create laws such as the 
Fundamental Press Laws, which limited the freedom of the press and gave the 
government the right to ban a newspaper or magazine. This enabled the New Order to 
control the production and circulation of the dominant discourse of democracy. It 
determined the meaning of democracy and at the same time defined, marginalised and 
controlled other meanings which were not in line with its own interpretation. 
Through the use of these ideological discourses, power in this sense meant 
determining how democracy was to be defined, and setting the parameters for good and 
appropriate political behaviour for Indonesians. As Hans Antlov states, in terms such as 
noblesse oblige and bapakisme, the disguising of worldly power in Indonesia was a well 
known phenomenon.123 
The process of `fixing' a particular interpretation of democracy was also very 
clear in the case of opposition groups. Academics like Amien Rais and Nurcholish 
122 J. Errington, Indonesian Cs) authority', in Paul Kroskrity (ed.), Language and Culture: Symposium 
I, (http: / /www. 
123 Hans Antlov, `Enchanted Power and Crude Rule: Legitimation and Domination in Rural Java', in 
O11e Tornquist and Karl Reinhold Hallquist (eds.), Asian Societies in Comparative Perspective 
(Copenhagen, NIAS/NASEAS, 1991), p. 414. 
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Madjid, even Sudrajat Djiwandono from the CSIS (Centre Strategic for International 
Studies) Jakarta which was a major supporter of the New Order until the 1980s, have 
suggested that opposition should play an important role in Indonesian politics, for, as in 
other political systems, power without any form of control tends to become corrupt. 
However, according to the hegemonic political discourse of the New Order, any form of 
opposition was incompatible with Indonesian culture. Even the two official parties 
allowed to compete against Golkar were not considered opposition as much as 'political 
partners'. The knowledge produced and popularised by the government stated on the 
one hand that opposition political parties were bad and only caused conflict and 
disintegration within Indonesian society, and, on the other, that the New Order promised 
a future free from ideological and ethnic conflicts. These two key messages propounded 
by the New Order were sufficient justification to counter any form of opposition. 
Soeharto' s government, as Mark Thompson argues, had never given its people 
the chance to experience real democracy, and explicitly claimed that its interpretation of 
democracy was different from that of the West.124 It seemed that the possibility of an 
alternative political system beside the government' s version of Pancasila democracy was 
closed. Apart from the government's version, there were very limited public dialogues 
about democracy. A series of dialogues was organised and designed by the New Order 
government as an instrument of socialisation to propagandise its version of Pancasila 
democracy. What were commonly called pro- democracy movements were regarded by 
the government as 'people outside the system'. 
The use of scape goats was a common phenomenon during the New Order 
period. The government attempted to create a siege mentality about threats to national 
stability which potentially could endanger the development process. From the late 1960s 
to the mid 1980s, for example, Islam was presented as the main threat to the New Order, 
ranking second after Communism and the PKI.125 The idea of creating an Islamic state, 
124 Mark R Thompson, `The Limits of Democratization in ASEAN', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 14, 
No, 3, 1993, p. 475. 
125 R. William Liddle, `The Islamic Turn in Indonesia', The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 55, No. 3, 
August 1996, pp. 614 -615. 
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despite the fact that it was not clearly advocated any more during that period, was 
revived by the government itself several times to prevent Moslems from acting on the 
main political stage.126 It was reported that preachers in mosques had to send transcripts 
of their sermons to police before they could deliver them before their congregation. The 
manufacturing of the Islamic threat culminated in one example the suppression by force 
of a protest by poor people led by Islamic preachers in Tanjung Priok in 1983, killing 
more than 100 demonstrators. 
Another scapegoat during the New Order was communism. While the real threat 
of communism was mitigated to some degree by the detention of activists, the 
government attempted to show that there were communist remnants both in terms of 
those with real power and with respect to communist ideology which infiltrated the 
societal mind -set. This was commonly described as `the latent danger' of communism 
every where, and the people were urged to be aware of this. When such an accusation 
could not be proved, government officials used terms such as KGB (Komunis Gaya 
Baru - New Style Communism) used in 1974,127 the 1980s, and in 1995, OTB 
(Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk - the formless organisation)128 and in 1996, `communist style 
activities' to remind people about the threat to the stability to the nation. These terms 
were used to discredit academics and people who adopted socialist and leftist ideas of 
development and who were critical of the government. They also justified the detention 
of a group of students from the Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD) which had mobilised 
political support against Soeharto. 
Finally, the Chinese minority was another New Order scape -goat, particularly in 
relation to the failure to address economic inequality. To a certain degree, the image 
126 Although it is far from clear what is meant by an Islam state, the idea of setting up an Islamic state 
was promoted by Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia during Guided Democracy under President 
Soekarno (1959 -I965) and also by the Masyumi party during the liberal democracy period. It 
become clear that during the New Order, many Islamic leaders and academics dropped these ideas. 
The reasons were, firstly, it was not clear whether there should be an Islamic state in Islamic 
thought or not; and secondly, because the government pushed a modernisation programme which to 
a certain degree had to be adopted by Islamic parties. 
127 Crouch, op. cit., p. 312. 
128 Gerry van Klinken, Will the Next Indonesian succession be Violent ?', Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 3, 1997, p. 363. 
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created was that the Chinese controlled the economy and were responsible for collusion 
and corrupt practices in gaining wealth. The government neither attempted to remould 
this image nor did it attempt to address the inequality in income in society. The result 
was that the Chinese were blamed for inequalities and become vulnerable to the 
people's anger, especially during social disturbances. They often became victims in riots 
caused by the failure to address prosperity issues. 
Given this fact, it can be concluded that the effectiveness of the Pancasila 
national ideology and other New Order discourses, in justifying Pancasila democracy 
was achieved by means of the government's ability to dominate and manipulate the flow 
of information in society. A consensus supporting the government's restructuring 
policies could only be achieved in such a situation at the most abstract and general level. 
Pancasila might, then, be regarded as the lowest common denominator for integrating 
widely diverging views contained in Indonesia's multicultural society. Pancasila was 
used by the New Order to differentiate its new visions and promises from what the 
regime calls the Old Order, aliran politics, instability and the liberal democracy period. 
When referring to the liberal democracy period of 1950 -1959129, senior figures in the 
New Order always described it as a period of anarchy and disorder.13o By representing 
the Old Order in this way, the New Order government could legitimate its actions and 
secure support from a broad base. 
At this abstract level, government discourses on history, culture, nationalism, the 
role of ABRI, the role of opposition and development prompted various concerns. On 
some points, no one seriously disputed the government discourses on nationalism and 
sovereignty in relation to democracy. In public debates, people tended to believe that 
Indonesia was in a unique position and had the right to develop its own model of 
democracy.131 Pancasila, for example, was widely recognised as a symbol of local 
129 
130 
131 
Bourchier, op. cit., p. 51. 
Ibid. 
Franz Magnis -Suseno from a Jakarta Philosophy College, for example, argues that democracy 
should be discussed and understood from an Indonesian context. See, Franz Magnis- Suseno, 
Mencari Sosok Demokrasi, Sebuah Telaah Filosofis (A Search for a Form of Democracy, a 
Philosophical Analysis) (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1995). 
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invention formulated by national heroes, and a source of national pride. The history of 
the struggle for independence, and consensus based on the Pancasila as the basis for the 
state following the proclamation of independence, together strengthened the view that 
Indonesia was a sovereign and equal state similar to other independent states. Pancasila 
was regarded as a unique symbol which differentiated Indonesia from other political 
systems, particularly from Western political systems which had been directly adopted by 
some post- colonial states in Asia. 
Pancasila, as Ramage has shown, became a major concern of Indonesians and a 
foundation spring for political views. A number of writers attempted to justify the links 
and establish a `fit' between cultural traditions in many parts of Indonesia and the 
current Pancasila system of democracy.132 In a highly regulated political system, 
Pancasila became the only Iegitimate vehicle through which one could express one's 
views.133 To be regarded as a good citizen, one had to participate in and adhere to the 
discourse of Pancasila democracy. 
However, at the practical level, the common themes of correcting the deviations 
of the Old Order underlying the implementation of the Pancasila,134 was nothing more 
than rhetoric. The New Order, according to the regime, intended to implement Pancasila 
in a `correct' and `pure' manner. For that purpose it had enforced ` Pancasila morality', 
particularly tolerance and respect for government. In practice, many policies had been 
formed and applied without any consultation with the people and without effective 
control by the people. Unsurprisingly there occurred mismanagement and corruption in 
their implementation. 
Without debating its interpretation and allowing room for participation and 
dialogue, it is difficult to see how rational debate, as suggested by Habermas, on public 
32 Yahya A Muhaimin, `Bisnis dan Politik'; Yahya Muhaimin, Perkembangan Militer..., op. cit. 
133 Ramage, Politics in Indonesia... op. cit., p. 4. 
134 Mark R. Thompson, `The limits of democratisation in ASEAN', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 14, 
No. 3, 1993, p. 479. 
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issues and on `rules about how to give- and -take', could take place.135 For as long as 
there was no dialogue in the sense advocated by Habermas, then it remained difficult to 
detect the presence of a real democracy in Indonesia. The government's claim of an 
indigenous model of Pancasila democracy was only a version of `Asian democracy', and 
it was not a real reflection of public debates contested in a public sphere. National 
consensus about political structure existed only by virtue of government control, and 
virtually denied the existence of other views expressed by various political and social 
groups. It was a government -controlled model of democracy that was, at least partially, 
incorporated into public consciousness through the use of both cultural and 
developmental symbols. 
The rules for public debates determined by the New Order government made it 
very difficult for people to assert their own interpretations of democracy, since the 
government had the final word and a created set of criteria to decide whether an 
interpretation was `correct' or not. Under New Order hegemony, the only alternative 
views possible had to start with the government's formal interpretations of democracy. 
As Ramage had shown, the only legitimate way to get involved in the interpretation of 
democracy was through the adoption of Pancasila.136 
According to Gramsci, the main problem in using political control and physical 
enforcement to achieve consensus, particularly in the repression of dissidents and anti- 
government movements, relates to political legitimization. If the government is not able 
to clearly justify its actions, for example, by implementing alternative programmes and 
reforms which can meet the demands of the majority of people, then dissidents will 
continue to search for their own alternatives to satisfy their aspirations. In the case of 
Indonesia, it was clear that the restructuring of society, for example, through the 
ideology of Pancasila, had not been as successful as it was originally envisaged. There 
had been moral campaigns appealing to the spirit of Pancasila, notalby anti -corruption 
ss Joel S. Migdal, Why Do So Many States Stay Intact ?, paper presented at the Australian National 
University Workshop on Weak and Strong States in southeast Asia and Melanesia, August 12 -14, 
1997, p. 38. 
36 Ramage, Politics in Indonesia... op. cit., p. 4. 
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rhetoric and putting the interests of society first. But in practice, corruption and 
economic -corporate monopolies had become one of the major economic problems faced 
by Indonesia, and these had come under attack from various social groups. To follow 
Gramsci's theory, this meant that the ideology had not been successfully translated into 
everyday life as a guide for social action. The rhetoric of the government urging the use 
of `common sense' to solve current problems, such as the need for political and 
economic improvement, is not convincing. 
It is in this sense that Pancasila means different things to different people and 
groups, and their acceptance of this ideology is also based on different reasons.137 As 
being described below, members of one group can claim that they are more 
`Pancasilaist' than members in other groups and often accused one another of not 
having applied Pancasila in their daily life.138 In such a situation, as Chua argues, no one 
believes in Pancasila as the moral authority for society. Rather, everyone exploits 
Pancasila for their own interests.139 PancasiIa in this sense does not occupy a hegemonic 
position. A hegemonic practice involves dialogues and mutual acceptances of competing 
ideological positions. 
D. DIRECT CHALLENGES TO THE NEW ORDER HEGEMONY 
The failure of the hegemonic attempts by the New Order can be seen clearly with 
the continuing challenges from the so- called politik aliran (sectarian politics) which the 
New Order attempted to suppress. From the beginning, attempts to overcome politik 
aliran had proven incomplete and ill- conceived. There had been at least two examples 
of broad -based ideological opposition which continued to pursue direct challenges to the 
government's position on ideological issues concerned with the polity. These forms of 
opposition indeed had difficulty surviving under the New Order political hegemony. 
Under strong government control, and dominated by the hegemonic Ianguage of the 
°' Ramage, The New Order: State Ideology... op. cit., p. 6. 
138 [bid., passim. 
139 Interview with Beng -Huat Chua, October 1996. 
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New Order, they struggled to publicly voice their views. However, they remained a 
strong power source below the surface and were ready to appear whenever the New 
Order's control mechanisms were relaxed. The first group to express this kind of 
opposition came from aliran (sectarian) forces which expressed Islamic and Soekarnoist 
ideologies. The second opposition faction was, to a certain degree, influenced by the 
spread of ideas of liberal democracy, particularly after the end of the Cold War, 
1. Challenges from Aliran Politics 
The New Order government claimed to overcome ideological conflicts between 
people and political parties. According to the New Order, aliran politics, generally 
defined as politics based on affiliation to religious and sectarian ideologies such as 
Islam, socialism and Soekarnoism, had to end. However, the goal to end aliran politics 
had not proved as successful as was originally intended. Ideological affiliations, 
particularly to Islam and Soekarnoism, were still part of the agenda of the PPP and PDI 
respectively, and were often deployed during general elections. Particularly, 
Soekarnoism were still part of the mentality of the poor and oppressed people (rakyat 
kecil). 
This was demonstrated in the 1977 general election where the PPP appealed to 
Islamic ideological affiliations to gain support from the Moslem population, and, as a 
result, gained significant support in some provinces. The government and the military - 
backed party, Golkar, was defeated in the national capital, Jakarta, and were left behind 
in the traditionally PPP -based Aceh and South Kalimantan. In retrospect, the 
government had stated that it regarded the use of ideological affiliations to gain political 
support as inviting violence. Soeharto, in his state speech before the DPR in August 
1982, for example, made it very clear that the social disorder during the last election 
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campaign was caused by the appeal to Islamic ideology by the PPP.140 Indeed, this may 
have inspired legislation which supported Pancasila as the sole ideological basis for 
political and mass organisations. 
Perhaps the most serious challenge to the de- ideologisation project of the New 
Order came from protests against this legislation. Moslem organisations and Ieaders, in 
particular, expressed strong opposition to this legislation. One of the most critical views 
came from Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, former head of the 1947 emergency government 
of the Republic of Indonesia during the revolution against the Dutch. He argued that the 
legislation would put an end to the political and social dynamics of society. 
Prawiranegara described the future of Indonesia as being like `a barren Sahara desert, 
consisting of only stones and undifferentiated particles of sand',141 if the legislation 
continued to be imposed on social and political organisations. The legislation, according 
to him, was not in line with the real intention of the Pancasila when it was formulated 
in 1945. The real intention of Pancasila, for Prawiranegara, had been outlined by 
Soekarno. Pancasila was meant to be the Foundation of the State which recognised 
different identities and personalities of religious and political groups within a gotong- 
royong (mutual assistance) state'.142 The use of Pancasila by the President as a way of 
justifying and strengthening his political power was also criticised by these ex- generals 
and some civilians who signed the so- called Petisi 50. 
It was not only Islam which was considered a threat to the government's vision 
of political life. Soerkanoism was also regarded as a ideological challenged to New 
Order ideology. Soekarnoism (sometimes called marhaenism) was very strong during 
the Soekarno era. It was often referred to as an ideology which supported and protected 
poor people. Although it was never clearly defined, marhaenism nonetheless had a 
strong appeal among the PDI masses. The PDI under the leadership of Megawati (1993- 
140 Muhammad Ryaas Rasyid, State Formation, Party System, and the Prospect for Democracy in 
Indonesia: The Case of Golongan Karya (1967 -1993), a PhD thesis submitted to the Graduate 
Division of the University of Hawaii (Ann Arbor. University Microfils International, 1994), p. 183. 
141 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, `Pancasila as the Sole Foundation', Indonesia, p. 78. 
142 Ibid. 
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ousted in 1996), for example, made populist appeals, while Megawati was believed by 
her supporters to have inherited the charisma of her father, Soekarno and the ability to 
mobilise mass support.143 
The legislation of Pancasìla as the sole ideological principle in 1985 was also 
directed against the PDI, which still used `Soekarnoism' in its general election 
campaigns. Pictures of Soekarno, which were used as political symbols to gain the 
support of the young, were regarded as threats to the programme -based ideology of the 
New Order. The government in 1992 made it clear that the use of such pictures was 
prohibited during general election campaigns. 
Serious concern about this issue arose after the 1987 general election. For the 
first time, after a fall in support in the 1977 and 1983 general elections, the PDI gained 
more than 10% of the vote. Although it is not clear whether Soekarnoism played an 
important role in this increase, it was quite clear that some elements in the military 
supported the PDI because of their concern about the increasing support for the PPP in 
general elections. Indeed, the government attempted to counter this increase by 
strengthening the PDI, perhaps with the idea, as some people suggested, of the PDI 
acting as a buffer. 
Increased support for the PDI in the 1987 and 1992 general elections, due to 
ABRI's preferential treatment did, however, worry the government, particularly Golkar. 
This support was seen as going too far, particularly since some of Soekarno's children 
were getting involved in the party. The involvement of Megawati, Guruh and 
Sukmawati (all children of Soekarno) in the PDI clearly added support to the PDI and 
increased the numbers of PDI parliamentary seats in 1987 and 1992. Using Soekarnoism 
and rhetoric such as the protection of poor people and through its representation as the 
voice of change and democratisation, the PDI gained significant support in the 1992 
general election. 
I43 Kuntowijoyo, `Implikasi Teoritis Kemelut PDI (Theoretical Implications of PDI Conflict', 
Kompas, 20 July 1996. 
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Certain steps were taken at that time to ensure that this support would not go too 
far. In particular, the government was concerned about the possibility of the PDI 
becoming truly independent party. The main strategy adopted by the government was to 
oust Megawati from the chairmanship of the PDI and support Suryadi who was a pro - 
government leader. Megawati and her supporters were excluded from participating in 
the Iegitimate arena of the New Order's political structure. As discussed later, however, 
this action became an important step in the democratisation process in Indonesia. 
These forms of opposition which posed a direct challenge to government policies 
were often regarded as `anti -Pancasila', anti -development, Western -influenced 
movements or communist -style activities directed at disrupting development 
programmes. The accusation of being `anti -Pancasila' was made when a group or an 
individual refused to conform to New Order ideals of political behaviour and acted like 
an independent political party. This applied to Nandatul Ulama (NU), for example, one 
element in the Development Party (PPP) which refused to confer on Soeharto the title of 
`Father of Development', by walking out during the MPR session in 1978. According to 
Soeharto, this kind of opposition was proof that there still existed political forces which 
had not fully accepted Pancasila as the basis of the state.'" 
2. Challenges from Liberal Democratic Ideas 
The second direct challenge to the New Order's Pancasila democracy came from 
the ideas of liberal democracy. Within a political climate where the government was 
capable of discrediting any interpretation of Pancasila which differed from its own, this 
style of opposition had difficulty countering the government's arguments dismissing the 
need for a liberal democratic system. New Order elites commonly rejected liberal 
democracy as a deviation from the true intent of Pancasila, and described it as a `foreign 
ideology' which promoted Western-style opposition political parties.145 The government 
also stated that liberal democracy was not in accordance with the national character. 
144 Ramage, Politics in Indonesia... op. cit., pp. 32 -33. 
las Ibid., pp. 26 -27. 
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Moreover, those in the New Order regime accused supporters of liberal democracy of 
using Pancasila for purposes other than those for which it was originally intended. tab 
These groups who advocated a form of liberal democracy, however, found 
support within the international community with many nations applauding any form of 
opposition to authoritarian systems in the Third Word. Following the common trend 
towards democratisation after the end of the Cold War, certain groups and academics 
clearly advocated political openness in Indonesia, based on a form of liberal democracy. 
This directly challenged the ideological project of the New Order, because these groups, 
which usually associated themselves and were seen as being associated with pro - 
democracy movements (gerakan demokrasi) by the Western media and some academics, 
promoted democracy at a time when the demand for democratisation was gaining 
massive support in international circles. No matter what kind of interests and ideologies 
these groups pursued against the Indonesian government, in the view of some Western 
academics and medía, they were still regarded as pro- democracy movements. 
Some members of these groups advocated liberal democracy as the ideal form of 
democracy for Indonesia. Indeed pursuing the argument in Fukuyama's book on The 
End of the History, Arief Budiman, a prominent Indonesian academic and political 
activist, believes that democracy is necessary because it is capable of overcoming almost 
all problems, including poverty and the disparity between rich and poor in Indonesian 
society.147 Those joining new groups and political parties, such as Aliansi Jurnalistik 
Indonesia (AJI), Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD), and Partai Unì Demokratik 
Indonesia (PUDI), clearly also echoed Budiman in their demand for a liberal political 
46 Kompas, 1 February 1997. 
47 Although Budiman has not clearly stated the kind of democracy he prefers for Indonesia, his strong 
support for Fukuyama's argument that liberal democracy is the last stage in the evolution of the 
Western model of government, can be seen as an indication that he prefers liberal democracy to 
other models of democracy. In a dialogue with Indonesian students in Canberra in November 1996, 
as a strong proponent of socialism, he said that he still had some objections to capitalism but 
tended to accept democracy in the liberal sense. See also, Arief Budiman, `Democracy as Historical 
Necessity', Jakarta Post, 31 December 1996; and 'Prospek Democracy Indonesia - Negara Kuat, 
Arus Bawah Riga Makin Sukar Dibendung' (Prospect of Democracy in Indonesia - Strong State, 
but Mass Demands Cannot be Stopped', paper delivered in a conference held by Institut Studi Arus 
Informasi, Jakarta, 15 January 1997. 
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system in Indonesia. Other people who were labeled as pro- democracy activists ranged 
from academics such as Sri Bintang Pamungkas, social activists such as Adnan Buyung 
Nasution, student activists, NGOs, certain reporters whose newspapers have been 
banned, and those involved in Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD) under the leadership of 
Budiman Soejatmiko. 
Issues such as the number of political parties that should be allowed, the role of 
political opposition and the system of general elections in Indonesia, were often 
criticised by pro -democracy groups. The question of the number of political parties 
invited debate because it related to the government's claim that the three existing parties 
had been settled according to the 1973 consensus, and to the claim that the existence of 
opposition groups went against the Indonesian cultural and political system. Suggestions 
were made regarding the introduction of other political parties in addition to the 
government- engineered three -party system. For example, Bintang Pamungkas attempted 
to form a new party, Panai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia, and Budiman Soejatmiko with 
Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD). Independent journalist groups such as the AJI and the 
labour union SBSI (Serikat Buruh Seluruh Indonesia), challenged the government - 
engineered journalists' union PWI (Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia) and the labour 
union, SPSI (Serikat Pekerja -Seluruh Indonesia). 
The emergence of pro- democracy activities clearly challenged the government's 
vision of controlling all aspects of political life - so much so that the regime was 
prepared to take any measure to prevent such ideas from gaining strength among 
Indonesians. Leaders were detained and parties such as the PRD were banned, while 
other groups such as the All were obliged to pursue their activities underground because 
of the government ban. However, in certain cases, such movements could not be easily 
discredited by the government. Strong support from the international media and from 
certain Western policy makers, particularly in the United States, made it difficult for the 
government to detain pro- democracy leaders for a long time. 
These harsh measures were reinforced by New Order ideology and political 
rhetoric. The government often stated that opposition in the liberal democracy sense 
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constituted dissident activities, which contradicted the ideas of musyawarah 
(discussion) and mufakat (consensus). Attempts to revive the role of opposition as a 
counter to the hegemony of the executive power in government and as a check -and- 
balance mechanism were rejected on the basis that in the Indonesian political culture 
there was no place for opposition.148 Pancasila democracy, according to Soeharto, does 
not recognise opposition, because all decisions are taken through consultation in the 
People's Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat -DPR) and the People' s 
Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaraatn Rakyat - MPR). 
Since the end of the Cold War, the government has increasingly accused these 
dissident groups of being influenced by liberal democratic ideas, or at least of holding 
attitudes considered inconsistent with the development values and the spirit of 
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.149 Some younger officers in the army, for 
example, expressed this concern by saying that 'ABRI was obliged to ward off the 
ideology of liberal democracy which had penetrated into the minds of a small part of the 
younger generation in people's politics'.150 In the same tone, the late General Soesilo 
Sudarman, Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs during the 
1993 -1998 Cabinet, reminded people of the dangers of liberal democracy ideas. He 
said, `be aware of national disintegration because of remnants of liberal democracy that 
has its roots in the political culture of the West'.'51 
E. ADAPTATION AND CONTESTING INTERPRETATIONS OF PANCASILA 
The second model challenging New Order hegemony emerge from amongst 
groups which were in fact loyal to Pancasila, but who were very critical of the ways the 
New Order government had interpreted and implemented it. This kind of challenge 
appeared to accept and adapt many of the government's policies of political system 
148 Republika, 11 September 1995, Kompas, 1 February 1997. 
149 See for example the statement of Military Commander Feisal Tanjung in Kompas, 14 June 1996. 
u° Kompas, 5 October 1996. 
151 Antara, 27 -2 -1996. 
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restructuring. A number of these groups had learned from past failures and opted not to 
challenge the government's hegemonic position directly. Clearly people had to learn 
how to deliver critiques in the so- called New Order political culture. A military thinker, 
the late General Soemitro, argued that in the New Order culture it was not necessary and 
even unacceptable to criticise a person in office if he or she made mistakes. According 
to him, the criticism should be directed to his or her institution, the decisions made and 
policies adopted.152 
Such critiques of government policies and their implementation could not be 
countered simply by saying that they supported liberal democracy or communism, 
because these groups and intellectuals in fact still supported, officially or otherwise, the 
New Order's idea of Pancasila democracy. What the government often said to discredit 
these groups was that they were frustrated ex- generals, such as in the case of members 
of the Group of Fifty, and sometimes they were accused of being critical because they 
did not hold any position in the government. This kind of opposition was commonly 
supported by prominent figures in society such as academics, former military and 
civilian officials. Petisi 50 or the Group of Fifty, and the Forum Demokrasi (Democracy 
Forum) are two high profile examples. Recently, public figures like Nurcholish Madjid, 
and Muhammadiyah's leader Amien Rais could be seen as expressing this kind of 
opposition. 
Petisi 50 was the most powerful critic of the New Order government's 
interpretation and implementation of Pancasila. Consisting of highly- respected generals 
like Ali Sadikin, the late FIR Dharsono and influential intellectuals it attacked 
Soeharto's use of Pancasila for the sake of maintaining power. According to the Group 
of Fifty, Pancasila was most often used to threaten New Order opponents, rather than 
implemented according to its principles. The group also criticised both the tendency of 
the President to regard himself as the personification of Pancasila and to regard any 
critics against him as therefore being against Pancasila.153 
152 Interview with General Soemitro, November 1996. 
(53 Rasyid, op. cit., p. 271. 
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The Democracy Forum consists of a group of academics under the leadership of 
Abdurrahman Wahid. Similar to Petisi 50, the Democracy Forum recognises Pancasila 
as a middle way, a solution to the negative effects of liberal democracy and guided 
democracy. Its members focused their criticism of government propaganda on such 
issues as political stability, the rule of law and freedom of expression. By promoting this 
propaganda, Wahid argued that the government wanted to give the impression that it 
cared about freedom and democracy, without taking any action to realise these goals. He 
said, `We live in a situation as if there was the rule of law, as if there was democracy, as 
if all the regime's actions were constitutional, as if there was freedom of expression, 
etcetera.'154 
Apart from the Group of Fifty and the Democracy Forum, several prominent 
intellectuals also criticised the government publicly. For example, the `unique concept' 
of the military's dual function (dwi fungsi) had been interpreted in many ways. This 
concept was questioned not only by some academics but also by certain government 
officials. The key issue, however, was not that the military should `go back to the 
barracks', but how this dual function could be maintained in a changing environment. 
The historical claim that ABRI joined with the people during the military conflict 
against the Dutch had lost much of its appeal since most members of the generation 
involved in that struggle had retired or passed away. Even former Minister of Defence, 
General (retired) Edi Sudrajat questioned the applicability of the ideal of dual function 
as practised during the revolution. He said that ABRI did not have enough personnel to 
appoint civilian positions such as district chiefs (bupati) and governors. A decade ago, 
according to Sudrajat, there were not many civilians capable of filling these positions, so 
ABRI had to occupy them.155 He also criticised the current tendency to no longer report 
political matters to the military, a situation which had changed since the time when the 
civilian population and the military had joined forces in the struggle to gain 
independence during the 1940s. General (retired) A.H. Nasution, an ABRI thinker who 
54 Ibid., p. 283. 
155 Tiras, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1995. 
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designed the middle way military concept which had been developed into the dual 
function doctrine by the New Order regime, said that ABRI should participate in politics 
at the national level, and not the regional level which was responsible for the day -to -day 
political business of local politics. It was therefore unnecessary for ABRI officers to be 
appointed as governors and district chiefs.156 
Given the fact that ABRI has been a dominant power since 1966, some 
commentators have expected ABRI to act as a control on the government and not as a 
tool used by the New Order regime. They emphasise the independent role of ABRI. In 
particular, minority groups such as Christians, express the hope that the military will 
play a role in transcending the particular interests of political, social, ethnic and 
religious groups in society.157 Except for some minor voices who blamed the military 
for hindering democratisation,158 however, only a few seriously questioned whether the 
military should retain its social and political role. Its role just needs to be evaluated and 
adapted to new demands in society.159 
The fusion of political parties into two groups to complement the government 
party Golkar had been also criticised. According to Yusril Mahendra, a lecturer at the 
University of Indonesia, the agreement was enforced, and the reasons given for the 
fusion -that Indonesia needed spiritual, material and functional parties- were regarded 
by many as strange.160 The two Christian and Catholic parties should have been united 
within the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). Instead they were included in the 
material -based parties, together with the nationalist Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), 
the socialist Trotskyist- oriented party (Murba), and the Supporters of Indonesian 
Independence Association (IPKI) were integrated within Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
(PDI). Although the government later dropped the notion that the fusion was due to 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
Gatra, Nomor 16 /III, 8 Maret 1997 
Kompas, 5 October 1996. 
Gatra, Nomor 16/III, 8 Maret 1997 
Ibid. 
Yusril Ihza Mahendra's lecture delivered at Seminar on Pembangunan Hukum dan Politik di 
Indonesia, Peluang Reformasi (The Development of Laws and Politics in Indonesia, Chances for 
Reformation), Solo, November 1996. 
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material and spiritual reasons, chiefly because of protests from the parties, it was clear 
that Golkar - which had no ideological affiliation - was at a distinct advantage. Only 
Golkar fitted into this restructuring plan because it represented functional groups and 
was oriented towards development, as outlined in the government plan. 
On the issue of the role of opposition, one of the main proponents of an active 
role for opposition parties in Indonesia is the Moslem intellectual, Nurcholish Madjid.161 
He argues that the Indonesian political system needs an opposition to act as a check and 
balance for government policies,162 Madjid makes an interesting argument against the 
government' s position that opposition is inconsistent with Indonesian culture. He says 
that in Javanese culture there existed the tradition of mope in which people assembled in 
an open place and stood in the sun for a long time to protest against the government. He 
adds that musyawarah and mufakat actually came from the Minangkabau tradition in 
Sumatera. According to this tradition, musyawarah -mufakat does not mean total 
consensus as applied by the New Order regime. It means that people agree on something 
after seriously discussing and debating the problem, and that agreement can be achieved 
by voting. In the process, different opinions might be expressed, but once agreement 
was reached, according to Madjid, it had to apply whether or not it was reached by 
voting.163 
Abdurrahman Wahid notes that two decisions always emerge from a 
musyawarah or surah system: one that comes from a majority and another from a 
minority which becomes a dissenting voice.164 The majority decision is accepted 
because of its applicability, but this acceptance should be dependent on people's 
knowledge of the debate and on consideration of the opinion of the dissenting voices. 
This, according to Wahid, is different from the idealised harmony and consensus applied 
6 Media Indonesia Minggu, 17 September 1995; Jawa Pos, 28 -29 December 1997. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid.; see also, Nurcholish Madjid, `Tantangan Demokrasi Pancasila di Masa Depan' (The 
Challenges for Pancasila Democracy in the Future), in Alex Lanur (ed.), Pancasila sebagai 
Ideologi Terbuka - Pancasila as an Open Ideology (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1995), p. 65. 
164 Abdurrahman Wahid, a speech delivered at a seminar on CiviIizational Dialogue, World Trade 
Center, Jakarta, December 1996. 
219 
during the New Order government which, basically, realised the imposition of decisions 
made by the government.165 
Ismail Suny also supported the need for opposition parties in Indonesia, but for 
reasons which differed from those given by Madjid and Wahid.166 Indonesia's 1945 
Constitution, according to Suny, formally recognised the possibility of opposition. Some 
parts of the Constitution, he said, acknowledged the existence of parliamentary 
mechanisms to select the President and Vice President and to change the Constitution 
itself. He argued in particular that opposition was needed to scrutinise government 
proposals before they became law.167 
With regard to general elections, concerns centred around the mechanisms used 
to select candidates, the lack of genuine alternatives offered by parties, and above all the 
subordination of parliament, both the MPR and DPR, under the President. Elections 
during the New Order were described by J. Soedjati Djiwandono as having lost any real 
meaning. He said that the people had no part whatsoever in choosing the President, they 
voted either to fulfil their obligations as a `good citizen', or because they considered the 
poll to be just `for fun', as suggested by the government term, `festival of democracy'. 
Civil servants went to the polls because of pressure to vote for the government party, 
Golkar.168 Many people also regarded the candidates as of poor quality because they 
were selected merely on the basis of their support for New Order programmes, or 
because of their political and family connections with the President, ministers and other 
high -ranking military and civilian officials. Under such circumstances, as Beng -Huat 
Chua posits, no one in the world believed that Indonesia under the Soeharto regime had 
a `real' general election.169 
In the 1990s, a prominent critic of the government has been Amien Rais, the 
leader of Muhammadiyah, a modernist Moslem organisation, who is concerned with the 
bs Ibid. 
166 Jawa Pos, 28 -29 December 1997. 
67 Ibid. 
168 J. Soedjati Djiwandono. `Election in the Political System of the New Order', The Indonesian 
Quarterly, Vol. XXV, No. 2, 1997, pp. 94 -95. 
169 Interview with Beng -Huat Chua, October 1996. 
220 
morality crisis in the government. He proposes that the government needs to form a new 
coalition consisting of the main political powers in society to overcome the fundamental 
problems of extreme corruption and collusion within government circles. Prior to this, 
he has suggested limiting the Presidential term of office and conducting a political 
debate on the succession process. 
All these critics expressed real concern about the problems faced by their 
country. They no longer questioned, as such, the basic ideology of the New Order. In 
general, these critics looked at the tendency of the New Order regime to abuse power 
and the need to control it. In other words, what they were saying was that Indonesia 
needed a more open and transparent political system where critical voices could be 
channelled and heard. 
However, not only did the government, the people and political organisations 
differ in their interpretations of Pancasila democracy, but differences in interpretation 
also existed among the people and within the political organisations themselves. 
Different interpretations were used by different groups to reinforce their political 
interests or even their existence at the expense of other political groups. Ramage 
identified at least four main groups with different interpretations and expectations of 
what they hoped from Pancasila. These groups consisted of the largest Moslem 
organisation Nandatul Mama (NU), under its leader Abdurrahman Wahid, the Moslem 
intellectual organisation, Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI), the Indonesian 
armed forces and secular nationalists. Interestingly, these groups each used Pancasila to 
accuse one another of having not been `Pancasilaist' enough. For example, some 
military officers, secular nationalists and NU activists claimed that they were committed 
to Pancasila as a basis for a secular democratic state, in contrast to the tendency in ICMI 
which showed, according to them, sectarian activities which contradicted Pancasila.17° 
no Ramage, Politics in Indonesia... op, cit., passim; see also Abdul Munir Mulkan, 'Visi Kerakyatan 
Kaum Intelektual (Intellectual Vision about People)', Kompas, 5 January 1996; Inspired by ICMI, 
some other intellectual organisations were also set up. Those were, among others, Yayasan 
Kerukunan Persaudaran Kebangsaan (YKPK), New Masyumi and New Partai Nasional Indonesia, 
see Kompas, 24 and 27 October 1995. 
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For some secular nationalists, in particular societal minority groups such as Christians, 
the interpretation of Pancasila should mean that it could guarantee the rights of ethnic 
and religious groups in society to live equitably, and to ensure that dominant Islamic 
ideologies would not apply, or at least not dominate, Indonesian society.171 
Almost all of the above criticisms of the government had become part of the 
discourse of public debate during the New Order period. This was the case, for example, 
in relation to the call to end corruption in government, and to review the succession 
process and the limitation of Presidential terms of office. Although it had been claimed 
by government officials that all these matters had been dealt with in the New Order 
national consensus, and that appropriate procedures and rules already existed, people in 
general were aware that these problems had not yet been resolved. 
In addition, we have to bear in mind that these alternative views have, at least, 
offered a new vision to the people. The courage of Amien Rais, Sri Bintang Pamungkas 
and Megawati, for example, in standing for the Presidency is now regarded as 
representative of a breakthrough in Indonesian political discourse, which has been 
dominated for so long by a system of consensus with a single Presidential candidate.L72 
As Madjid often noted, the alternative voices promoted by these critics of the New 
Order provided a way of learning how to behave in a democratic way of life. 173 
In short, there were at least three reasons why these criticisms of government 
gained support amongst the people. Firstly, their views could not simply be discounted 
by reference to traditional justifications such as the Islamic threat, liberal democracy and 
communist- inspired activities, because all the critics had been supporters of the 
establishment of the New Order, and they also supported the broad political framework 
of the New Order. Secondly, the issues promoted by these various groups could not be 
Ramage, Politics in Indonesia... op. cit., pp. 200 -202; and for current worry of sectarianism see, A. 
Ramlan Surbakti, `Pembangunan ataukah Pengendalian Politik (Development or Political 
Control)', Kompas, 3 January 1996. 
nz According to Sri Bintang Pamungkas, his party PUDI was the first party which challenged the party 
system under the Soeharto regime. His courage in challenging President Soeharto, resulting in his 
imprisonment was the first open challenge to Soeharto as President. Personal Communication, 
Canberra, 4 August 1998. 
173 Jawa Pos, 22 September 1997; 28 -29 December 1997. 
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regarded as reflecting aliran politics, principal concern of the New Order so far, but, 
rather, as representing a general and universal concern about a fairer, more equitable and 
democratic style of government. Thirdly, the main proponents of these alternative views 
came from various sectors, sometimes even from within government circles. For these 
reasons, it was very difficult for the government to prevent these critical views from 
gaining support. 
F. TOWARD A NEW CONSENSUS 
The fall of Soeharto in May 1998 marked the end of the hegemonic construct of 
the New Order. In light of the New Order's failed experience, a new consensus in 
Indonesian politics was needed. Consensus only on non -aliran politics was no longer 
adequate for supporting the political dynamics of contemporary Indonesian society. The 
New Order consensus was based only on the fact that the current system contrasted with 
previous systems in Indonesian politics -not that it offered any kind of political platform 
which could guarantee an effective, equitable and transparent process of governance. 
Neither could it guarantee an untroubled process of Presidential succession. This had 
been proved by the demonstrations to overthrow President Soeharto which then 
broadened to the demand for `total reformation' of political life. 
In this section, I discuss further the need for this new consensus by specific 
reference to the 1998 economic and political crisis ending with the resignation of 
President Soeharto and the appointment of Bacharuddin Jusuf (BJ) Habibie as the new 
President. 
1. The Crystallization of Demands 
The demand to establish a new consensus, formulated in a campaign for the 
'total reformation' of both the political regime and government, increased in the 1990s 
and culminated in the resignation of President Soeharto on May 22, 1998. The 
emergence of this demand indicates that the New Order `consensus' on political system 
was not fully accepted by the people. It was an enforced consensus designed by the 
223 
government. The demands for reform of the system crystallised in the anti `Corruption, 
Collusion and Nepotism' campaign, or popularly known as the anti Korupsi, Kolusi dan 
Nepostisme (KKN) campaign. Corruption, according to Transparency International in 
Berlin, riddled virtually all levels of bureaucracy, and collusion was ripe in economic 
projects where privileges were given to those who had a close connection to Soeharto 
and his family. The demands for reformasi (reformation) included the right of political 
expression, the need for control of the government, and the establishment of good and 
clean government. 
During the 1990s, there have been increasing signs that such demands were 
becoming a counter -discourse to the government's claim of Pancasila democracy. As 
shown above, this reflected in terms of a call for the right of to self expression, in 
criticism focused on the weaknesses of the parliament and manipulation of general 
elections and in the control of political parties.174 The attempt to form a new political 
party like PUDI and PRD, and the rise of an independent commission for monitoring 
general elections was the culmination of this process of criticism. The Independent 
Election Monitoring Committee (Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu - KIPP) 
functioned as another attempt at challenging the government's rhetoric about the 
application of the principles of langsung, umum, bebas dan rahasia (direct, general, free 
and secret) in general elections. This rhetoric was misleading given that fraud, namely a 
lack of transparency in counting votes and manipulation of votes to ensure victory for 
the government party, Golkar, took place in some electoral areas.175 
The toppling of Megawati from the leadership of the PDI and the banning of 
three magazines, Tempo, Detik and Editor, invited the strongest protests. 
Demonstrations were arranged in aII major Indonesian cities including Jakarta, 
na Syamsuddin Hans, `Birokrasi, Politik dan Pemilu (Bureaucracy, Politics and General Election)', 
Kompas, 10 June 1996. 
175 About the fraud in the last 1997 general elections, particularly about the vote count, see Kompas, 
19, 20, 21, 22 June 1997; See also, Stefan Eklof, `The 1997 General election in Indonesia', Asian 
Survey, Vol. 37, No. 12, December 1997, pp. 1192 -1193. 
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Bandung, Yogyakarta, Semarang and Ujungpandang.176 Supporters of Megawati, were 
unwilling to leave their headquarters and were eventually removed when the 
government used considerable force against them. In defending Tempo its editor, 
Gunawan Mohamad, set up Tempo interactive on the internet and campaigned 
vigorously against the government' s ban on many fora both inside and outside 
Indonesia. 
Several new mass organisation were formed. A Moslem intellectual 
organisation, ICMI was formed in 1990. As a reaction, similar organisations such as 
PCPP, Masyumi Baru, PNI, YKPK (Yayasan Kerukunan Persaudaran Kebangsaan - 
The Foundation for National Solidarity) were also set up by independent groups in 
society. These groups rose in a reaction to ICMI commonly accused of being a 
government- sponsored construct.t77 Robert Cribb notes that the emergence of these 
organisations suggests that Indonesia is 'beginning to develop a kind of multi -party 
system -in- waiting' .178 
Critics of the excessive role of the government also created an alternative 
discourse. Part of this is the belief that Indonesia needs a smooth mechanism of 
succession and a limitation of the period of the Presidency to two terms. As mentioned 
above, one of the main figures behind this demand was Gadjah Mada University Senior 
Lecture and Muhammadiyah (a modernist Muslim Organisation) Chairman, Amien 
Rais. He stated that the unlimited time frame for the Presidency provides the 
opportunity for whoever holds this position to use and abuse the power for his or her 
own group and family benefit. Cronyism and collusion is more likely to develop if a 
President is in power for a long time. Rais's demands gradually moved to the 
176 For the protest against the topple of Megawati, see Human Rights Watch/Asia, Press Release 26 
July 1996; and Hans Antlov, `Revolution or Peaceful Evolution in Indonesia ?', NIASnytt, No. 3, 
1996, p. 9. For the protests against the ban of Tempo, see Bambang Bujono, `Surat dari Pengelola 
(Letter from the Editor)', Tempo Interactive, Edition I710I, 
<http://www.idola.net.id/tempo/sdr17.htm>. 
"' See, for example, Surbakti, op. cit.; Abdul Munir Mulkhan, `Visi Kerakyatan Kaum Intelektual', 
Kompas, 5 January 1996. 
178 Robert Cribb, `Megawati and the PDI Affair: Implications for Indonesian Politics', NIASnytt, No. 
3, 1996, p. 7. 
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foreground of alternative discourses challenging the Soeharto regime. The government 
had been able to stop Rais at the end of the 1980s but he came back with many more 
supporters during the era of keterbukaan (openness) in 1990 -1994. 
Rais also demanded a good and clean government. Especially after stepping 
aside from his ICMI leadership position, he has criticised the exploitation of copper 
mining in Busang (Kalimantan) and Timika (Irian Jaya) where foreign companies and 
government officials collude to exploit the copper without passing on the benefits to the 
people in the surrounding area, and moreover cause environmental and social problems 
for the people. As the leader of Muhammadiyah, the second largest Moslem 
organisation in the country, Rais has a quite significant base of support comprising 
members who are mainly middle -class Moslems located in the formal sector areas such 
as the bureaucracy, academia and informal sectors like business. This support made it 
difficult for the government to ban Rais's activities. The New Order regime was afraid 
of losing credibility with its Moslem supporters if it banned Rais. 
Clearly the above demands reached the rank and file on university campuses and 
the public in general. These demands became common discourse in many public places. 
During the 1990s, when information technology like television, the internet, newspapers 
and magazines widely reported the political debates of prominent academics and 
politicians, people and students did not have to rely primarily on government sources in 
making judgments about political issues. There are many instances of government 
intimidation such as how the government controlled the PDI,179 banned Tempo, 
manipulated culture to discredit opposition, and threatened Amien Rais. All of these 
quickly became the political resources used by students and political activists to 
mobilise the masses against the government. The views of academics and politicians, as 
reported in the media, clearly became alternative discourses to the dominant one offered 
by the government. 
19 Antlov, `Revolution ...,' op. cit., p. 10. 
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Indonesia's economic crisis started in July 1997, which seemed to provide the 
alternative discourse with the leeway and impetus to dominate the views of various pro - 
reformation movements in Indonesia. The monetary crises has made the Rupiah, the 
Indonesian currency, lose almost 80 percent of its value. This brought about the collapse 
of many banks, as well as state corporations and private companies. Inflation and 
unemployment have also rise rapidly. The percentage of poor has also increased 
dramatically during the crisis, estimated now to be some 50% of Indonesia's 210 
million. The lack of supply of staple foods has deepened the crisis and may, eventually, 
bring about a social revolution. 
The crisis, which according to Soeharto, impacted on the legitimacy of the 
government, actually strengthened the feeling of anger toward the New Order regime, 
particularly towards corruption, the gap between the rich and poor and cronyism. This 
further accentuated the lessening legitimacy evident in the protest over the 1997 general 
election result. The election was viewed as pointless because it offered no hope for 
change.180 The courage and anger of the people against the government's plot to topple 
Megawati was shown not only through demonstrations by Megawati supporters but also 
by protests from academics. Megawati supporters did not want to accept the 
government- created new leaders of the PDI led by Suryadi.'81 
The protest against the New Order regime culminated in large demonstrations 
against the government in 1998. Students in almost all universities made `open forums' 
where they could talk and discuss political matters and called for an end to corruption, 
nepotism and collusion and the loosening of political control. It was clear that students 
became the main agents for translating the demands for reformation and for mobilising 
mass protests to support the demands. At the beginning the protests were located within 
university campuses. The military had set up a restriction that demonstrations could not 
8° Dan Lev tentang Politik Paska Pemilu, Indonesia Daily News Online, <http://www.uni - 
stuttgart. de /indonesia/news /95/9730/S aturday /26. html>. 
Ibid. 181 
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take place outside campuses for fear that they would be manipulated by `irresponsible 
elements' which could threaten the stability of the country. 
Interestingly the military did not crush the student demonstrations but offered 
them a solution through dialogue. Although not all student representatives agreed to the 
dialogue, because some of them regarded it as aimed at silencing their protest, some 
attended the dialogue in an open forum in Jakarta in February 1998. The proposed 
dialogue, as Ian Chalmers argued, demonstrated changing attitudes among the military 
elite in handling the people's demands.182 The military did not, as in the past, accuse the 
demonstrators of threatening stability, but instead welcomed a national dialogue. 
Similarly it also welcomed Amien Rais's September 1997 proposal for a national 
dialogue held by the MPR with regard to the national leadership.183 Although the MPR 
failed to arrange such a dialogue, the attitude of the military showed that it welcomed 
the idea. 
However, all these demands were ineffective. The demands grew stronger and 
received solid and widespread support from social and political groups including youth 
and student organisations gathering in the Cipayung group including HMI, PMII, 
PMKRI, GMKI and GMNI. Almost all private and state universities in Indonesia, about 
one hundred universities, continued their protests and demanded the resignation of 
Soeharto and total reformation. Others, notably academics, also became involved in the 
forums and seized the moment to express their long held grievances against the New 
Order's political control. The culmination of the student protest was the occupation of 
the parliamentary building, and the calling for the resignation of Soeharto and 
reformation of the political system. Even the influential Yogyakarta Sultan, 
Hamengkubuwono X, led a one -million -strong demonstration, demanding the end of the 
Soeharto era on 20 May 1998. 
Following these large protests, various elite factions surrounding Soeharto 
started surveying alliance possibilities in society and rapidly deserted Soeharto. As the 
182 Personal communication, 5 June 1996. 
183 Republika, 25 September 1997. 
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demand for Soeharto's resignation was mounting, elite groups and Cabinet ministers left 
with any other alternative. They had to think about their political future. When some of 
Soeharto's Cabinet ministers were not and former allies like MPR/DPR speaker 
Harmoko resigned, and clearly opposed him, and others proposed measures to restore 
legitimacy such as the formation of a reformation committee which was ultimately 
rejected, Soeharto did not have any more room for manoeuvre. He finally resigned on 
May 21, 1998. He was replaced by his vice President BJ Habibie. A new era for 
Indonesian politics appeared to have opened under Habibie. 
2. The Rise of Civil Society ( ?) 
In truth, Soeharto's fall from grace constitutes the solution to only one problem 
among the many problems facing the process of democratisation in Indonesian politics. 
One important question concerns the existence or creation of a civil society which can 
support the long -term process commonly described as `total reformation' in every aspect 
of government and politics in Indonesia. The replacement of five political laws which 
became the main pillar of Soeharto's political control over society is one of the main 
legislative tasks of the current government under President Habibie.184 Whether this 
transformation can be implemented in an orderly and constitutional way, however, 
depends on the readiness of the social base in the political system, namely civil society. 
The rise of civil society may be seen in relation to the three kinds of ideological 
challenges to the New Order discussed earlier. The first two, aliran politics and liberal 
democracy, to a large degree directly challenged the New Order's grand visions of 
polity. This kind of challenge largely failed to maintain significant levels of support 
within society. None the less they provided a strong indication that there should be 
alternative voices and limitations on the centralisation of power during the New Order. 
184 The five political laws were inherited from The New Order regime and had been used to strengthen 
the power of the Soeharto regime. The Laws include: Law No 1/1985 about General Elections; 
Law No. 2/1985 about People Consultative Assembly, Parliament and District Parliament; Law No. 
3/1985 about Political Parties and Golongan Karya; Law No. 8/1985 about Mass Organisations; 
and Law No. 5/1986 about Referendum. 
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During this period, the third kind of challenge to the New Order, which came 
from those who embraced Pancasila but also offered an alternative interpretation to that 
ideology, was the most acceptable to New Order elites. Learning from previous failures 
of challenging the government's grand visions directly, intellectuals and social forces in 
this third group voiced their concerns within the framework of Pancasila democracy, 
while at the same time raising universal and general issues of democracy, such as 
accountability in government, anti -corruption and transparency in the bureaucracy. Over 
the last ten years, leaders of social organisations, both secular and non -secular, have 
focused their criticisms on the above issues. 
Although, in the beginning, their efforts did not have much impact, they have, 
over time, clearly created greater awareness of possible alternatives to the monolithic 
system created by the New Order. The supporters of this kind of opposition hoped that 
the government would listen to and make some effort to be more responsive to these 
concerns. Such a hope, however, was never realised until the demands turned into a real 
political movement in 1998. These groups consisted of many elements in society 
ranging from Islamic to nationalist groups. 
The role of Islamic groups may be seen from the rise of Moslem intellectuals on 
to the main political stage, particularly those affiliated with ICMI. In the beginning, 
Soeharto himself supported the formation of ICMI. This political strategy has enormous 
implications for the relationship between the government and the Islamic community. 
The discourse on Islam has changed from treating it simply as a threat to the unity of 
Indonesia, to recognising its potential as an agent of development. To a certain degree 
this has given the Islamic community an opportunity to become more deeply involved in 
political and social life than it had been in the past. 
Such a strategy, to a large degree, had a kind of negative boomerang impact for 
the continuity of the New Order. Bringing Islamic power to the front of the stage of 
political power means bringing forward various aspirations from civil society in general. 
Islamic power has been spreading to almost all sectors of society and ICMI, once 
created, then become one of the most important channels for Moslem political 
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aspirations.185 It is also clear that ICMI consisted of various interests. A part of the 
interest is designed to serve the government's interest in coopting Moslem movements, 
but another part was more individual and did not blindly offer their support for the 
Soeharto government.186 This other part was evident in the resignation of Amien Rais 
from ICMI's expert body. Rais then became, as shown above, a very critical 
commentator and critic on the corrupt practices of governance within the New Order. 
Therefore, the seeds for a strong civil society, to a certain degree, are born in the 
growth of Moslem political and social power. The growing Islamisation of society 
which has occurred mainly among the urban middle class in 1980s- 1990s, according to 
Jacques Bertrand, has created `pressure for political change'.187 Some ICMI members 
(and ex -ICMI members) like Nurcholish Madjid, Amien Rais, Adi Sasono and Dawam 
Rahardjo have certainly played a pioneering role in lessening the strong control of 
information and knowledge by the New Order. In addition, within Islamic -based 
organisations such as ICMI, NU, Muhammadiyah and PPP, a democratic climate has 
grown where competition to select leaders takes place regularly and competitively in a 
peaceful manner.188 
185 The marginalisation of Islamic political power during the whole of the New Order period, has 
provided opportunities for Moslems to concentrate their energy on developing social and 
educational resources. An Islamisation process took place in campuses, within social organisations 
and in Moslem middle class sectors in society. Nurcholish Madjid, who set up Paramadina as a 
centre of Moslem middle class activities, states that there has been a kind of boom of Moslem 
educated middle class occupying various sectors of bureaucracy, universities, economy and 
industry. This kind of Islamisation then is channelled through the government-designed ICMI 
organization. See, for example, Bertrand, `False Starts,...', op. cit., pp. 322 -333; AM Fatwa, 
`Pendekatan Kultural atas Signifikansi Dunia Islam Dalam Order Baru', Republika, 22 Agustus 
1997; Suryohadiprojo, op. cit.; and Robert W Hefner, `Islam, State, and Civil society: ICMI and 
the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class', Indonesia, No. 56, October 1993, pp. 1 -36. 
186 Daniel Lev tentang Politik Paska Pemilu, Indonesia Daily News Online, ehttp://www.uní- 
stuttgart. de /i ndonesia/news/95 /9730/S aturday /30. html>. 
187 Bertrand, `False Start...', op. cit., p. 322; Nurcholish Madjid states that the transformation of 
political Islam started in the 1950s with the rise of Masyumi. It has needed 40 years for the Islamic 
group to emerge again as a political power, particularly with the birth of ICMI. In another 40 year 
duration from 1970 to 2010), Madjid argues, those from a traditional Moslem organisation, NU, 
will transform itself into the next Islamic political power in Indonesia. See Nurcholish Madjid, 
Dibanding KeIompok Lain, Ummat Islam Lebih Siap Berdemokrasi (In Comparison to Other 
Groups, Moslem Groups are More Ready for Democracy)', Ummat's interview with Madjid, 
Ummat, Vol. 4, No. 29, 1 February 1999. 
188 Madjid, ibid. 
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Their target is a socialisation of alternative discourses from those offered by the 
government. Amien Rais, for example, proposed himself as a Presidential candidate 
within a system that was only used to endorsing Soeharto for this position. Within such 
a `neurotic' political system, where to propose himself as a Presidential candidate was a 
surprise, as Frans Magnis- Suseno, a philosopher from Driyakarya College Jakarta, 
argues, Amien Rais's action could be considered as politically educative for the creation 
of a democratic system in Indonesia.189 Madjid is a consistent supporter of the need for 
political opposition in Indonesia. Adi Sasono and Dawan Raharjo before getting 
involved in ICMI were long time activists of NGOs attempting to empower grass -root 
movements. Sasono was very critical of economic inequality between rich and poor and 
the ownership of economic wealth by the minority Chinese who owned more than 70% 
of the capital in the Indonesian economy. Along with Sritua Arief he also wrote a book 
examining Indonesian dependence on capitalist countries.190 
Madjid in particular, through his lectures and speeches, mentions the importance 
of recognising pluralism in Indonesian society and of fostering the democratic attitude 
of society to accept such a plurality. The recognition of pluralism followed by an 
attitude to respect it, as Madjid pointed out, encourages familiarisation with living in a 
democratic way.191 These views coming from prominent. Moslem leaders, to a certain 
extent, have supported the awareness of civil society and produced various alternative 
discourses to those offered by the government. Themes such as the limitation of 
Presidential terms, the transparency of the government and the need to address 
economic inequality between the Chinese and indigenous Indonesians, are among the 
views campaigned for by the above Moslem leaders. 
189 Frans Magnis -Suseno SJ, `Pendidikan Politik dari Amien Rais (A Political Education from Amien 
Rais)', Kompas, 4 October 1997. 
190 Adi Sasono and Sritua Arief, Indonesia, Dependency and Underdevelopment (Kuala Lumpur: 
Published for the Institute for Development Studies, Jakarta, Indonesia by META, c1981); and 
Sasono and Arief, Foreign Capital, Foreign Debt Burden and the Indonesian Economy (Jakarta: 
Institute for Development Studies, 1987). 
191 Madjid, `Tantangan Demokrasi...', op. cit., pp. 65 -66; see also Suara Independen, Vol. 2, No. 8, 
1996. 
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The growth of civil society, however, cannot be gauged solely from the growth 
of ICMI. Another Moslem social and political power is the NU (Nandatul Ulama) 
organisation which has a traditional base among villages and pesantrens. Its leader, 
Abdurrahman Wahid, is one of the most vocal leaders voicing the need for a pluralistic 
society. Beside promoting a more open political system, as mentioned above, he also 
encourages ICMI to have a more tolerant attitude toward non -Moslem views and their 
presence in society. Unlike the views of some former ICMI leaders such as Amien Rais 
who support the need for Moslems to have political power to bring about political and 
social changes, Wahid, during the New Order era, was concerned more with the cultural 
and moral control of the government. Wahid, for example, led many groups in society to 
express their apprehension about the situation of political life in 1996, in a statement 
known as Pernyataan l Juli (1 July statement) which is also referred to as Petisi 
1996.192 He also led Forum Democracy which became a body critical to New Order 
manipulation of Pancasíla. 
The growth of civil society also emanates from more secular elements in society. 
It begins with sporadic protests against government tyranny toward political parties, 
press and social organisations. The anger toward this authoritarian style was expressed 
in mass anger and the many protests against government control of the PDI and with the 
banning of Tempo, Editor and Detik. The growth of alternative social and political 
organisations such as SBSI, PUDI, PRD and AJT to government- created corporatist 
organisation such as SPSI, PPP, PDI and PWI, KORPRI (Indonesian Civil Servant's 
Organisation) showed the growing awareness of civil society in Indonesia. This is a 
reflective of a broad and dynamic demand for more freedom to form political and social 
organisations. 
Demands from this growing civil society, if it continues to attract support in the 
post -Soeharto period, have the capacity to keep the current government honest in its 
promises and to be more aware of the demands for real democracy in the country. This 
192 Those involved in Petisi 1966 are academic and prominent people such as Abdurrahman Wahid 
and Ali Sadikin who has joined Forum Demokrasi with Wahid. See, Kompas, 17 July 1996. 
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is important because of three realities in current Indonesian politics. Firstly, there have 
been signs that the current government under President Habibie promises to reform laws 
regarding political freedom, to hold a free and fair general election in 1999 and to end 
corruption, cronyism and collusion. Secondly, there have also been those who are 
against the Habibie government and prefer to maintain the political and economic 
policies of the Soeharto government. These groups have attempted to create anarchy 
while hoping, in turn, that the military will take over the power vacuum and restore 
order. Thirdly, the current government is also seen to a large degree as a continuation of 
the Soeharto government. Habibie's cabinet is regarded as still dominated by some 
similarly inclined ministers as those in Soeharto period. And the bureaucracy still has 
many changes to make. This third problem makes some political groups associated with 
Megawati, Abdurrahman Wahid and the Catholic leader the late JB Mangunwijaya, and 
political activists like Sri Bintang Pamungkas and Amien Rais, doubt the commitment 
of the Habibie government to reform the New Order political system. 
In such a situation, a push from the above groups, as well as critical figures and 
students in the civil society, which is now supported by a relatively free media, may 
keep the current government on track and force it stick to its reformation promises. They 
assure current elites that accountable and responsible government, a regular and 
peaceful succession process, and transparency in decision making for effective 
governance is needed for a prosperous and stable Indonesia. Clearly many Indonesians, 
as with people in a number of other places in the world, aspire to a modern government 
such as those which operate relatively successfully in Western societies. 
G. PANCASILA DEMOCRACY IN AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
The failure of the Soeharto government to maintain its version of Pancasila 
democracy demonstrates a failure to adjust to the demand for democracy and the 
management of a modern state. As with `guided democracy', Pancasila democracy also 
relied on the claim of a distinctive Indonesian culture and on the mobilisation of 
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Pancasila as the national ideology. However, it failed to address the real problems of 
democracy such as political representation and fair general elections. 
The formal claim of Pancasila democracy by the New Order was challenged by 
many fronts. The one that finally shook the New Order's hegemony was not manifested 
in the form of an Islamic state or in marhaenism advanced by Soekarnoìst but from the 
demand for a responsible, clean and transparent government and associated principles of 
a modern state. This demand includes measures for how the government should be run 
and regulated. The main lesson to be drawn from the New Order relates to the need for 
greater participation of the people in controlling the government. Nowadays, many 
people are keen to dispose of the governmental model developed by the Soeharto 
regime. Soeharto's New Order is seen, in retrospect, as a corrupt regime and one that 
manipulated Pancasila ideology to justify almost all of its policies and even its 
existence. 
In the long run, however, this does not mean that Pancasila as the philosophical 
foundation of Indonesian society has been rejected. According to Hadi Soesastro, a 
researcher from CSIS Jakarta, the fact that Pancasila is hardly discussed in Indonesia at 
the moment does not mean that it will be forgotten and discredited by Indonesians. It is 
only temporarily replaced by more immediate issues faced by people such as the 
economic crisis and the general election. It is still an acceptable ideology as the main 
political foundation for Indonesian society, but it needs to be revived as a living 
concept.193 For those who claim to represent ethnic, religious and secular powers in 
Indonesia society, it is still regarded as a useful framework facilitating discussion of 
their political and ideological differences.194 For them, Pancasila does not necessarily 
contradict political and economic democratisation; furthermore it may even contribute 
93 Hadi Soesastro made this comment in a speech delivered at Indonesian Study Group seminar, 
Canberra, 31 March 1999. 
l94 Even for Amien Rais, once regarded as the supporter of sectarian Islam in Indonesia, the 
ideological debates about Pancasila have ended. Too much energy has been devoted to discussing 
Pancasila with the result that people forget to develop Indonesia. Pancasila, for him, is seen as the 
only political principle which can unite Indonesia. Dialogues with Indonesian Students in Canberra, 
24 September 1998; and also see Republika, 21 October 1998. 
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to the development of modern government in Indonesia. Pancasila, as Dawan Raharjo, a 
leading Moslem intellectual proposes, has to be followed by the principle of social 
justice enabling fair distribution of the result of economic development.C95 Even for 
various ethnic groups which were disadvantaged by the New Order's development 
programme in Indonesia, Pancasila is still valid. In their last joint statement, Pancasila 
was still recognised as a starting point for the future of Indonesia and it was recognised 
that it needed to be reinterpreted to express its justice principle.196 
The persistent mention of Pancasila as part of the reformation process in 
Indonesia fits well with the classical claim of Indonesian leaders that the reformation 
process, meant the adoption and transformation of Western notions of democracy and 
government and should not remove Indonesia from its traditional roots. Such an attitude 
can be seen as the product of the nationalistic sentiment based on the experience of 
Indonesia's leaders in historical struggle against Western colonialism and domination. 
Indonesian leaders feel the need to position the debate about democracy within 
Pancasila context. By doing this, they are attempting to articulate a new national 
identity which, according to Lucian Pye, `would be loyal to traditional cultures and 
reputable to the modern world culture exemplified by the West.'197 Although the 
meaning of Pancasila is now more symbolic than it was during the New Order, it is still 
useful as a broad framework assisting discussion of political issues in a multi- ethnic and 
multi -religious society like Indonesia. Another important argument in favour of the 
adoption of Pancasila is that Indonesian Ieaders need to ensure that their country has its 
own national identity in relation to other states in international society. 
195 M. Dawam Rahardjo, 'Pancasila dan Masalah Hak -hak Asasi Manusia (Pancasila and the 
Problems of Human Rights), in Lanur (ed.), op. cit., p. 29; see also Syamsuddin Haris, op. cit., p. 
179. 
9e See AMAN's (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara - The Alliance of Indonesian Traditional Ethnic 
Groups) declaration and its dialogue with Komnas -HAM (Indonesian's National Commission for 
Human Rights), Jakarta 21 -24 March 1999. 
197 Lucian W. Pye, `The Asian Values Ballyhoo', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 6, 
November/December 1998, p. 140. 
Chapter V 
`ASIAN VALUES' AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
In this chapter, I compare the three countries studied, their claims and implementation of 
`Asian values' and 'Asían democracy' and the implications for international society. It 
has been argued that `Asian values' and Asian style democracy are not necessarily 
irreconcilable with the search for universal values of democracy in international society. 
The claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' have been introduced by the 
leaders of the countries studied to strengthen the loyalty of their citizen to the political 
systems. They have been used to explain why Western mechanisms of democracy such 
as the unlimited individual freedom of opposition groups and media, and the 
parliamentary check and balance system of government cannot work fully within their 
countries. 
In this chapter, I attempt to examine further the consequences of the process of 
rejection, selection and adaptation of liberal democratic ideas from the West for our 
understanding of democracy in the countries studied. In particular I attempt to locate 
what form of government is acceptable to the countries studied. This chapter argues that 
the idea of `good and strong government'[ have become one significant issue for both 
the government elites and prominent opposition leaders. While they agree upon the 
necessity of such `a good and strong government' for their multi- ethnic societies, there 
have been differences among them about the ways to achieve this idea. In this chapter, I 
also focus the discussion on the implication of the concept of `strong and good 
government' and the claims of `Asian democracy' as understood within these countries, 
on a broader debate about `shared values and norms' in international society. 
A government or an executive is seen here as a part of `a state as a multifaceted organization with a 
legitimate monopoly over the use of violence'. In this perspective, a strong government depends, 
among other things, on the ability of the government `to maintain social control, ensure social 
compliance with official laws,... and retain legitimacy'. See, Peter Dauvergne, `Weak States, 
Strong States: A State -ín- Society Perspective', in Peter Dauvergne (ed.), Weak and Strong States in 
Asia -Pacific Societies (Canberra: Allen & Unwin in Association with Department of International 
Relations, RSPAS, ANU, 1998), p. 2. 
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Before examining how the idea of `strong and good government' has circulated 
and gained support within the countries studied, I summarise the adaptation of Western 
ideas of democracy and government and the uses of the claims of 'Asian democracy' to 
justify the forms of the government adopted. The organisation of this chapter is as 
follows. Firstly, it generally compares the three countries' adaptation to Western 
democratic institutions. Secondly, it highlights different uses of ideologies, particularly 
the uses of `Asian values' and 'Asian democracy' in adapting the ideas of modern 
statehood to local situations. Thirdly, it examines various chaIIenges to these 
governments' tendency to blur the meanings of democracy resulting in the necessity to 
find a synthesis between `Western' and `Asian values'. Fourthly, it examines how the 
countries have adopted and fulfilled the criteria of modern statehood such as a good and 
strong government. Fifthly, it attempts to place the claims in the context of searching for 
`shared values' in international society. In this section, it also illustrates some theoretical 
implications of the `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' debates for the discussion of 
democracy in the Asia -Pacific region. 
A. THE ADAPTATION OF WESTERN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
Experiences with various models of government played an important role in the 
formation of the current political systems in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Various 
conflicting demands and clashing political interests which had brought instability in 
their prior experiences with liberal democratic systems provided lessons for how the 
leaders of those countries should govern. These conditions, as will be discussed, played 
an important roles in strengthening the government as an executive power. 
In my Introduction, I surveyed some political institutions designed to guarantee 
democracy. These institutions cover various minimal standards commonly used by 
academics, the Western media and policy makers to measure whether a country is 
democratic or not. In the cases of countries studied here, however, such standards have 
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been questioned by some leaders and academics. The standards do not work well if they 
are applied to the Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean cases. 
In terms of freedom of expression, the press in Indonesia both before and after 
Soeharto's New Order, had more opportunities criticise the government if compared 
with the press in Malaysia and Singapore. There have been various newspapers and 
other media in Indonesia and they report differing views about government policies and 
democratic ideals. Indeed, the New Order government imposed some general controls 
and banned certain magazines and newspapers that they believed were opposing the 
government's policies. However, in general, the fact that there are many more 
newspapers and other media, and more freedom for foreign journalists in Indonesia 
compared with their counterparts in Singapore and Malaysia, demonstrates that various 
views can circulate in Indonesian society.2 This also means that there have been various 
critiques and views from the media with regard to government policies. 
Does this mean that `New Order' regime in Indonesia is more democratic than 
the regimes in Malaysia and Singapore? There is no straight answer to this question. In 
the case of other institutions of democracy, such as free and clean general elections or 
political participation in general, there has been more evidence of these activities in 
Malaysia and Indonesia than in Indonesia. 
In such cases, the question is not whether one country is more democratic than 
another, but whether it has democratised its social and political institutions. In terms of 
ideas and institutions of democracy, the leaders of these countries have adjusted and 
adapted original ideas and institutions of democracy from Western liberal society to 
their Iocal circumstances. The basic principle of democracy and individual freedom, has 
been given less emphasis than the idea of community principles.3 Political institutions 
have also been adjusted to fulfil the need for development, particularly to sustain a 
strong role of government. Political competition has been limited to a circle of elites 
2 Malaysia and Singapore's governments has sometimes banned foreign journalists for entering their 
country. They also brought cases against journalists in courts. See Roger Mitton, `Publish and Be... 
News Coverage Depend on Where You Live', Asìaweek, 12 December 1997. 
3 Interviews with Beng -Huat Chua and Daljit Singh, October 1996. 
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while the masses are mobilised to support government policies. The following is a 
discussion of the adaptation of the democratic institutions in the countries studied. 
1. Malaysia and Singapore 
These two countries have adapted Western political institutions to their political 
system. The leaders of the countries have been committed, to a certain degree, to 
continuing a liberal democratic system inherited from British colonialism with some 
modifications to allow for a strong role of executive power to manoeuvre in politics.4 
They have institutionalised a mechanism which can guarantee relatively free and fair 
elections, effective succession processes, and a certain level of control for the 
government. In Malaysia from the 1970's and in Singapore from 1965, the government 
set up the parameters of freedom for the political parties and the press which has been 
maintained until the current day. However, they also allow room for the political parties 
to oppose the government and to contest government candidates freely in general 
elections. In such a case, as DaIjit Singh, a researcher from ISEAS argues, the 
adaptation of a Western political system means that there is no fundamental differences 
between the two systems. The differences, if any, according to him, related to the degree 
of competitiveness of the Singaporean democratic system,5 in comparison with a 
Western democratic system. 
In the Malaysian case, the government has intervened in framing what type of 
democracy should be adopted by the nation. But this, in contrast with the situation in 
Indonesia, does not include a total rejection of the institutions of liberal democracy. 
Following the 1969 riot, Malaysia's government modified the Westminster system to 
suit the local context. Freedom of expression is limited to certain issues only and the 
media is controlled by the government. There exist certain similarities between the 
a Interview with Syed Hussein Alatas, October 1996. 
Interview with Daljit Singh, October 1996. 
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Malaysian system and the New Order in Indonesia. The centrality of power in the hands 
of the executive, for example, is strengthened. 
The adaptation of the Westminster system to the local context was also 
complicated by the place of Malays in the political system. The special position of 
Malays is encoded in the Constitution. Although in this special scheme elections are 
regularly held, real power resides in the hands of the UMNO leaders through which the 
positions of Prime Minister, deputy Prime Minister and other important ministerial posts 
are allocated. By following a kind of consociational system of democracy, other major 
ethnic leaders, both Chinese and Indian, have to recognise the special position of 
Bumiputera (sons of the soil) and this kind of agreement gives legitimacy to the 
dominant position of Malays in terms of political power. 
Government guidance on moral, political and intellectual issues is significant in 
nation building, particularly in relation to the unity of Malaysia's multicultural society. 
To a large degree, the unity and continuity of the Malaysian state has been maintained 
because of a consensus based on a kind of `ideological unity' among Malaysia's major 
ethnic leaders (Malay, Chinese and Indian) regarding possible multi -racial conflicts in 
the future.6 
The role of the government in directing the development and organisation of 
society can also be seen in Malaysia's Economic Plans. In the Second and Third Plans, 
it was clear that the government intended to lead the media and other institutions of 
social life in reducing poverty, supporting national development and restructuring 
Malaysian society by reducing the identification of race with economic function, and 
changing `national attitudes which are not conducive to national development'.? 
In Singapore, however, the adaptation of liberalism has taken a different form 
from the other two countries studied here. In Singapore, a free ideological battle under 
Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah, Fragmented Vision, Culture and Politics in 
Contemporary Malaysia (Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia in Association with Allen 
and Unwin, 1992), p. 9. 
John A. Lent, `Social Change and the Human Right of Freedom of Expression in Malaysia', 
Universal Human Rights, Vol. 1, No. 3, July- September, 1979, pp. 52 -53. 
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the framework of the liberal system inherited from colonialism took place only during 
1960s, particularly during its attachment with Malaysia from September 1963 to August 
1965 period. During this period a rather free ideological contest made it possible for 
liberals, communists, and socialists to compete against each other to gain a hegemonic 
position. In February 1963, the PAP government attempted to curb this ideological 
freedom by detaining 107 communists. However, even with these arrests, the PAP 
government was unable to establish its hegemonic position until after 1965. With heavy 
government intervention, the hegemony was designed to support the `survival' of the 
Singaporean state. 
Instead of pursuing a liberal individualist concept, Singaporean leaders 
engineered another transformation of political ideologies and values for Singapore. As 
in the case of Malaysia and Indonesia, the values searched for are those that can give 
some justification for the strong role of the state in society and a limited role for 
opposition. The theme of national salvation emerges in this context. This takes place, 
for example, in the idea of a `survival state' -through the adoption of a pragmatic and 
socialistic spirit. In economic and social policy, the government has inculcated the 
`ideology of survivalism' as a means of mobilising support from the people.8 
To advance these adaptations, as in Gramsci's theory, the Malaysian, 
Singaporean and also Indonesian governments have produced their own `organic 
intellectuals' whose task is to support the official position. There is a commitment 
among these intellectuals to support the government's efforts to make a `better life for 
the people' without criticising the kind of political system or mechanisms that the 
government has put in place. Daniel Regan points out that both English -speaking non - 
Malays and some Malay intellectuals believe strongly in the government's politics of 
harmony and disagree with the role of opposition parties in Malaysia,9 as understood in 
`Western' democratic terms. In Singapore, the so- called `Singapore school' is the main 
s Beng -Huat Chua, Communitarian, Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (London: Routledge, 
1995), p. 4. 
e Daniel Regan, The Politics of Malaysian Intellectuals', Journal of Asían and African Studies, Vol. 
13, No. 3 -4, July- October 1978, pp. 219 -220. 
242 
group of intellectuals providing justification for the current political system in 
Singapore. In Indonesia, the intellectuals incorporated a wide range of ideological 
positions. Under the New Order government some of these people, particularly the so- 
called technocrats, supported the government's prioritising of economic development 
without paying enough attention to political development. 
The fact that opposition parties are given an opportunity to contest government 
parties and to play a role as an opposition, however, has opened the possibility, however 
narrow, of controlling the governments in Malaysia and Singapore. In Malaysia, there 
have been some occasions where government candidates were defeated in general 
elections. People's demands were often fulfilled because the UMNO -led government 
was afraid of losing support from its voters.10 Similarly, in Singapore, although the PAP 
dominates the parliament, it has to work hard to defeat the parliamentary candidates 
from opposition parties. From the early 1980s until 1992, a growing percentage of votes 
and representatives in parliament was gained by the opposition. Given this fact, in 
contrast to Indonesia's case, it is clear that, in these two systems, there have been 
opportunities for people to check the government. 
2. Indonesia 
In contrast to the modification of Western liberal institutions accomplished by 
Malaysian and Singaporean governments, Indonesian's New Order government under 
President Soeharto attempted to suppress liberal democratic notions of government by 
introducing a version of Pancasila democracy. From the beginning it claimed that 
Pancasila was a unique system inherited from traditional values as well as Western 
democratic values. Soeharto's government claimed Pancasila as the fundamental basis 
and main source of democracy. Soeharto's government also interpreted the 1945 
Constitution in such a way as to promote a strong role for the government, particularly 
for the President to maintain the unity and economic development of the nation. 
to Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (St Leonards, NSW, Allen and Un win 
1996), p. 7. 
243 
Although it is not really strong in terms of its ability to fulfil its development promises, 
the idea of creating a centrality strong government remained significant within the 
technocrat elite circle in the government. 
During the Soeharto government's term, there was strong government 
intervention in many aspects of political life. Political parties were highly restricted and 
designed to legitimate the function of the government. The system did not have fair and 
free elections, nor a mechanism of control, nor a clear succession process. One 
consequence of this was that it faced a growing demand from within society for a more 
responsible, transparent and clean government. 
Instead of adopting a liberal style of democracy, Indonesia's so- called New 
Order regime was concerned with its own moral, political and intellectual development. 
The ideas of liberal democracy itself were rejected based on the failure of the direct 
implementation of the liberal parliamentary system during 1950 -1956. The New Order 
government believed that this system had damaged the political culture of the nation and 
brought about political and ideological clashes. Government rhetoric stressed the 
reorientation of people to the New Order's development vision, away from their 
ideological and political battles inherited from what was commonly called parliamentary 
democracy and the `Old Order' era which succeeded it. This process centred on 
endeavours to reform the political and economic structure of society as well as to ensure 
a `national morality' for people through education and other means. 
In contrast to Malaysia and Singapore, in Indonesia, as Beng -Huat Chua notes, 
the New Order government did not allow enough room for opposition parties to contest 
the semi - government Golkar party.tt Political parties were restructured by the New 
Order government. The leaders were chosen from among those who would cooperate 
with the government. In addition, the government had the power to select candidates of 
these political parties who would run in general elections. It could also order the leaders 
Interview with Beng -Huat Chua, October 1996. 
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of these parties to `recall' their representatives in parliament if they were considered too 
vocal or critical of the government. 
B. THE USES OF `ASIAN VALUES' AND `ASIAN DEMOCRACY' 
The tendency to have a controlled political system under a strong government 
requires justification, since such a system sometimes contradicts demands for freedom 
and equal participation in society. The demands for greater participation have increased 
recently partly because of the spread of the idea of freedom and democracy after the end 
of the Cold War and partly because of the growing numbers of middle class people who 
demand a greater say in their political systems. Except for the Indonesian case under 
Soeharto, the current styles of government in the countries studied have been 
maintained. In particular, the Ieaders of Singapore and Malaysia have used the claims of 
`Asian values' and `Asian democracy' to convince their people about the values, 
meanings and purposes of their adjusted political institutions. 
Despite some differences in the sources of and the ways to manipulate the claims 
of 'Asian values' and 'Asian democracy', the goals of the claims remain the same. They 
are used for three purposes: to justify the current political system and to convince people 
about their applicability and usefulness; to adapt their traditional culture to 
modernisation; and to strengthen national identity. Before examining further these three 
goals, I examine the sources of 'Asian values' and its application in the three countries. 
1. The Sources of `Asian Values' 
The differences in the sources and in the ways the countries use their claims of 
`Asian values' and 'Asian democracy' come from their different political and social 
backgrounds. The three regimes examined in this study came into power as regimes 
facing complex and different problems in their societies. Indonesia experienced political 
disorder after a coup attempt in 1965 and continued to be fragmented among different 
ideologies. Malaysia faced problems of internal economic disparity uncovered after 
ethnic riots in 1969 and problems of national integration. Singapore under Lee Kuan 
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Yew had to lay the basis for a Singaporean state after its separation from the Malaysia 
Federation in 1965 accompanied by problems of managing its Iimited natural resources. 
These conditions are the main sources to be considered when comparing these 
countries' claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy'. They are crucial in 
determining the degree of adaptation to the ideas of the modern state and democracy 
from the West. In the three countries studied, the claims of `Asian democracy' and the 
arguments behind the claims varied from one country to another. The use of ideology, 
culture and history by each government to strengthen its vision of democracy varies 
considerably. In particular, anti -Western elements, defining the nature of `Asian 
democracy', are strong in Malaysia and Singapore. Anti -Western elements and symbols, 
defining the nature of `Asian democracy', are used extensively in Malaysia and 
Singapore. This is because, among other things, the use of English in both countries is 
widespread thus leaving these societies susceptible to the influence of the West. In 
Indonesia, on the other hand, the use of English is basically limited to a Western 
educated elite. This is one reason why a discernible current of anti -Western rhetoric was 
rarely found in the New Order's Pancasila democracy discourse. There also exist 
different political conditions, institutions and social forces that have influenced the 
possibilities of public dialogue and debates about political issues in these three 
countries. 
The uses of some ideological aspects of `Asian values', evident in formal or 
informal ideologies such as Rukunegara and Wawasan 2020 in Malaysia, Shared Values 
and `Asian Values' in Singapore, and Pancasila in Indonesia, have different meanings 
for the elites in these three countries. 
(a) Singapore 
In Singapore a combination of attacks on the West and the introduction of the 
ideology of survivalism and pragmatism, resulted in `Asian values' becoming the main 
discourse used as justification for the current political system. Within the ideology of 
survivalism the dominant role of the State, its presence and intervention in every level of 
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social life, can be justified. The choice of capitalist industrial development as a solution 
for the country's future has been successful, for example, because of the government's 
ability to convince people, through the ideology of survivalism and pragmatism, that the 
government must be strong enough to introduce Iong and short term programmes, even 
if they are considered unpleasant for the people. 
The concepts of ` survivalism and pragmatism' seem to have allowed the 
government to engage whatever means necessary to complete their economic policies, 
including `overt state intervention, [and] even authoritarianism. »14 National issues 
focusing on political stability and the demands for economic growth often appear in 
national leaders' rhetoric as inseparable, justifying and supporting one another, in an 
effort to attract consensus and support from the people. This rhetoric has been 
effectively used by the State in the application of central planning and in the control of 
its main programmes.13 Also implicit in the ideology of pragmatism is the belief that 
society always needs firm direction in making decisions, therefore people have to be 
told what is good and important for them. This kind of paternalism, as John Clammer 
argues, occurs not only in government -people relations but also in all aspects of social 
life, such as the bureaucracy, the educational system, public enterprise and grass -roots 
community centers.14 
Together with a conscious ideology of pragmatism, which strengthens political 
order and harmony in society, the Singaporean government also uses ideological 
campaigns to support `Asian values', such as Confucianism, Communitarianism /shared 
values and moral education through religion.15 This is designed particularly to 
strengthen people's identification with and acceptance of the necessity for government - 
sponsored and controlled national programmes. To supporting `Asian values', 
Singaporean leaders often use rhetoric contrasting `Asian' and `Western' values, where 
the former are described as good, purifying, authentic, and genuine while the latter are 
12 Chua, Communitarian..., op, cit., p. 37. 
s John Clammer, Singapore, Ideology, Society, Culture (Singapore: Chopmen, 1985), p. 160. 
4 Ibid., p. 160. 
15 Ibid., pp. 9-40. 
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beset with arrogance, decadence, and are culturally polIuting.t6 Apart from creating a 
barrier against `Western influence', this strategy attempts to maintain people's 
affiliation and support for the hegemonic order created by the government. `Asian 
values' campaigns have been utilised in order to strengthen current mechanisms in the 
political systems. The government always argues that the current systems are adequate 
and guarantee economic growth and political stability. The success, according to PAP 
leaders, can be maintained if the people and the leaders adhere strictly to `Asian values'. 
Unlike the Indonesian case, where different ideologies are sometimes used by 
government for their short-term benefit in maintaining power, in Singapore the 
government tries to turn the ideological difference into a common platform of identity. 
Although it does not claim to support an ideological position, hegemonic terms that can 
represent the whole spectrum of society are always used and modified by the 
government according to their applicability. Promoting Confucianism and then 
transforming it into a form of 'Asian values' illustrates how seriously the government's 
seeking values that can support a Singaporean identity and how difficult that single 
identity is to construct. 
The programmes of Singapore's ruling party, the People's Action Party (PAP), 
show very clearly the drive to create a moral, political and intellectual leadership for the 
nation. Since Singapore's separation from the Malaysian Federation in 1965, under the 
leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, this party began experimenting with a societal model in 
which `economic growth, political stability, ethnic diversity and cultural creativity could 
be harmonised' 17. This would develop as a kind of cultural transformation and 
reorganisation of relations between government and the people through `an extensive 
system of grass -roots consultation'.18 It was pursued by Lee and other leaders, to prepare 
their society for industrial growth and modernisation. 
6 Ibid., p. 22. 
17 Clammer, op. cit., p. i. 
Dilys M. Hill, `Mobilization and Participation: Singapore in the 1980's', Public Administration 
and Development, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1987, p. 345. 
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PAP leaders transformed Singaporean society by disciplining and guiding people 
in the sole direction of `a sense of public spiritedness and self- sacrifice in the national 
interest'.19 This included the effort to build a Singaporean state that was imagined in 
terms of a `multi -racial, non -communist/and or anti -Communist orientation'.20 Efforts 
have also been made, as in the Indonesian case, to de- politicise and de- pluralise the 
society, aiming, in the words of Chua, to redirect `the attention of this (national) 
mobilised constituency from political struggle to economic development'.21 The 
government has directed most public institutions such as the bureaucracy, the 
educational system and the mechanisms of public enterprise in Singapore. 
(b) Malaysia 
Unlike the Indonesian government's mobilisation of traditional Pancasila 
values, the Malaysian government, particularly under PM Mahathir, refers to social and 
political problems in the West as a means of strengthening its power and legitimising 
the Malaysian political system. Mahathir consistently reminds people that Malaysia's 
current political system has a sound historical basis and warns of the dangers of 
following a Western path of liberal democracy. 
The attacks on the West, particularly led by the Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad, initially redirected the anger of the Malays accumulating in the early 1970s, 
from Chinese economic domination to the allegedly bigger threat posed by the West. 
The West is represented as imposing its values on Malaysians and other Third World 
countries. In countering what he characterises as a new Western imperialism, Mahathir 
represents the West as having many political and social problems which Malaysians 
should not emulate. Together with this, Mahathir asks Malaysians to respect `Asian 
values' which can be embraced by the main ethnic groups: Malays, Chinese and Indians. 
However, at the end of 1980s, the effectiveness of Malaysia's `Asian values' 
campaign was not attributable to the attacks on the West. A commitment to adopt some 
19 Chua, Communttarian..., op. cit., p. 18. 
20 Ibid., p. 18. 
21 Ibid., p. 16. 
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democratic principles among Malaysia's leaders, and more importantly, to renew their 
promise for a more democratic system, has been crucial to the legitimacy of the UMNO- 
led government under Mahathir. 
A concept such as `Wawasan 2020', which promises a more equal multi -racial 
system, is also an ideological measure signposting the direction in which Malaysia 
should head. This concept, which was first articulated in 1991, has been deployed as a 
means of expanding the government's hegemonic position. This hegemonic position has 
been contested by Chinese opposition groups for a long time because of the 
government's tendency to support the Malays. The affirmative action to help the Malays 
has particularly neglected a significant part of the non -Malay ethnic groups. Wawasan 
2020 attempts to include these long -time marginalised groups into the mainstream of 
Malaysian politics, while it also attempts to ensure that the Malays still can achieve the 
target of an appropriate share in the economy. 
The launch of Wawasan 2020 continues the formal ideological goal of 
Rukunegara. In 1970, the Malaysian government formally enunciated Rukunegara as a 
national ideology,22 which was intended to overarch and transcend the particularistic 
affiliations of race, religion, culture, class and political parties. It aimed to create a 
`Malaysian multicultural society' and an equitable share of the wealth of the nation.23 As 
in the Indonesia case with regard to Pancasila, Rukunegara is depicted as having a Iong 
'national' history and claims to include all the particular ideological aspects of the 
greater society, thereby purporting to unite the people of Malaysia.24 
Wawasan 2020 intends to overcome the excess of `national cultural policy' 
which was promoted in the mid- 1970s. The `national cultural policy', derived from a 
combination of the cultures of the indigenous people, a selection of other cultures, and 
The Rukunegara has five beliefs (united nation, democratic society, just society, liberal society, and 
progressive society) and five principles (belief in God, loyalty to king and country, upholding of 
constitution, rule of law, and good behavior and morality). See, Lent, op. cit., p. 53. 
23 Sabbaruddin Chik, National Ideology and Bureaucracy in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Pusat 
Pengajian Pembangunan Malaysia, occasional paper no. 5, June 1978), p. xi. 
24 Ibid., p. 32. 
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elements of Islamic values,5 aims to attract sympathy and support from the whole range 
of ethnic groups for many policies adopted by the government. It aimed at including all 
cultural aspects of the population. However this policy in practice, gave a specific place 
to Islam, which made it unpopular among non -Malays. 
Wawasan 2020 can also be viewed as a sound measure undertaken to overcome 
the grievances of non -Malays to the specific preferential treatment of Malays in 
`national cultural policy'. In particular, in the case of promoting the Malaysian 
Economic Plans, which include a New Economic Policy to overcome Malay economic 
inferiority, the government has set out to convince the various segments of society that 
the programme will benefit all people. This provided a vehicle for pursuing an 
affirmative action programme for Malays, as well as providing a basis for deflecting 
criticism of the government. During the 1980s, Mahathir gave a new emphasis to such a 
cultural policy by introducing the `Asian values' discourse which has been deployed not 
just as a justification for the role of a strong government, but more importantly as means 
of transforming the people's attitude toward modernity, progress and development. 
Although as in the Indonesian case, Rukunegara and Wawasan 2020 have been 
interpreted in different ways on a practical level, it gives meaning to being Malaysian in 
international society. In the case of Wawasan 2020, a further step was taken by Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad to strengthen the identity of Malaysia. His ` Wawasan 
2020' (2020 Vision) concept promises a progressive and 'modern' industrial Malaysia 
by the year 2020, as well as a `Malaysian' race and religious society concept.26 The 
`2020 Vision' is designed to gain genuine support from the whole society, including the 
Chinese, Indian and Malay sectors, for a `modern Malaysia'. The results of this `2020 
Vision' campaign, however, have been unclear because of the range of different 
interpretations. For non -Malays, it seems that the policy will transform Malaysia into a 
25 Kahn and Wah, op. cit., p. 13. 
26 Osman Bakar, `Southeast Asia in 2042 with Special Reference to Malaysia's 2020 Vision', 
International Social Science Review, Vol. 67, No. 4, Autumn I992, pp. 172 -173. 
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multicultural state, while some Malays may consider this policy and subsequent 
transformation, to be at the expense of their special position in Malaysian society. 
(c) Indonesia 
The campaign for `Asian values' during the New Order government had a 
traditional basis in Pancasila as a national ideology. Pancasila, which is derived from 
both traditional values such as Javanese cultures, Hinduism, Buddhism and foreign 
values such as Modern Islam and Western democratic ideas, was proposed as a platform 
for political and ideological policies for Indonesian's multi -cultural society and a clear 
alternative to the liberal democracy and the Islamic state. Until May 1998, in a political 
system which tended to be personalized in the hand of Soeharto, a version of Pancasila 
democracy, which manipulated traditional values like harmony and consensus, had been 
deployed especially to strengthen Soeharto's power and that of the executive. 
The New Order attempted to develop the Pancasila as a moral lesson for society 
and as the only basis for political behaviour. By promoting Pancasila, the New Order 
government wanted to build a new identity for Indonesia that was different from 
previous eras and from Western liberal society. Through education programs, down to 
the state level, this moral lesson, which had been derived and interpreted by the 
government from Pancasila, was regularly promoted. The emphasis of these teachings 
was particularly directed toward people behaving harmoniously in social and political 
life, respecting each other, and placing the national interest over personal interest. These 
moral lessons supported what the government interpreted as Pancasila democracy. To 
use Gramsci's concept of hegemony, these efforts were aimed at legitimising the New 
Order, `social power, wealth and prestige to the masses it [had] sought to dominate 
ideologically'.' 
27 Gramsci believes that a regime, in attempting to seek hegemony, will try to present `the conditions 
of its existence... as a universal principle, as a world -view, as religion...'. The battleground of ideas 
about political power marked out by Indonesian leaders included a wide field of discourse which 
include ideological, historical, philosophical and scientific discourses. Quoted in Hooey, op. cit., p. 
32. 
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Indonesia's national ideology of Pancasila was represented as a coherent and 
legitimate basis for the government to pursue its political and national integration policy 
for the whole country. Within a multicultural society such as Indonesia, the government 
often stated for political purposes, that Pancasila was an all- encompassing national 
ideology which had a uniting force. The Soeharto government proved keen to `socialise' 
the philosophical aspects of this national ideology, illuminating its long history and its 
relevance to the whole society. Other ideologies such as Islam, socialism and liberalism 
might have been elaborated on, and made coherent and sophisticated, but in the 
Indonesian context, in so far as they remained the product of individual commitment, 
they had been marginalised by the government. 
Although the efficacy of the Pancasila national ideology was limited to a very 
abstract and general level, its promotion showed, to a certain degree, how other forms of 
state including modern concepts of liberalism had been selected and modified by 
revitalising the local cultures. Pancasila's promotion in national discourse was part of a 
politics of identity that attempted to differentiate Pancasila from liberal democracy, the 
idea of the Islamic state, and `guided democracy'. The five principles of Pancasila 
adopted formally as the fundamental basis of Indonesia's state recognise the rights of the 
individual and community. However, the interpretation of Pancasila and the form of 
Pancasila democracy promoted by the New Order often disregarded the rights of the 
individuals to participate in politics. The New Order government maintained a 
monopoly of meaning designed to marginalise other forms of democracy or any 
demands for the reformation of its political system. 
Pancasila gave a general and sometimes philosophical answer to a direct 
problem faced by society. Not only did the government and elite fail to translate 
Pancasila into concrete policies, but they also failed to implement some of the ideals 
included in Pancasila. The New Order claimed that the ideal of Pancasila could answer 
all the problems of Indonesia's political and economic system but made only some 
efforts to translate it into concrete policies both in the economic and political sectors. 
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The gap between reality and ideal continued to widen. This, among other things, 
motivated demands for a more responsible and transparent government in the 1990s. 
2. The Goals of `Asian Values' 
The promotion of `Asian values' aims at creating an emotional attachment to 
political institutions adapted from their original form in Western countries. In other 
words, it aims at creating a sense of pride and belonging and a sense of identity which 
differentiates their system from other systems. This goal has been promoted in various 
ways including by ensuring the hegemony of the state over society. In other cases, the 
claims of `Asian values' have been promoted to redefine cultural identity toward aspects 
which are conducive for economic development. They are also crafted to gain 
recognition as a rightful member of international society, a position threatened because 
of growing concerns among Western members of the development of `undemocratic' 
systems in Third World countries. These three goals of promoting `Asian values' in 
these three countries studied will now be examined briefly. 
Firstly, among their immediate goals, governments attempt to counter the 
fragmentation of identity taking place within their societies by using 'Asian values'. As 
a result of the introduction of the ideas of freedom and massive global changes, 
particularly the demands toward democratisation, leaders are afraid of losing support 
and legitimacy. 
The above assumption dominates the older generation of leaders represented by 
Soeharto, Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew. They worry that a drastic change within their 
political system, for example the freeing up of political debates in public or in the press, 
may be counter -productive to the stability and the continuity of economic development. 
These leaders, in this context, tend to be conservative and use `Asian values' and other 
traditional cultures as a justification for the need to maintain the existence of their 
political system. In Indonesia under President Soeharto, it was believed that the opening 
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up of the political system would bring about a return to old -style aliran politics (politics 
based on religions and other ideological affiliations) which can create instability of 
government and disrupt the development process. In Singapore, in response to an 
increasing loss of votes, the PAP government declared that people had lost their 
traditional values such as Confucianism, therefore they needed to respect `Asian values'. 
In Malaysia, Mahathir constantly reminds people about the dangers of liberal democracy 
and its potential in his view of leading to anarchy and immorality. The governments of 
Malaysia and Singapore particularly attempt to assure people that the current system 
runs well and that no change is needed. 
In Malaysia and Singapore, however, despite being able to create an effective 
government capable of running the economy the current system, to a certain degree, is 
also a product of a mechanism of control by the government over opposition parties. 
Government elites in Malaysia and, to a lesser degree in Singapore, instill a fear in the 
minds of people regarding the problems of political instability if the opposition were to 
win a general election. 
Secondly, in a long -term process of strengthening identity, the claims of `Asian 
values' aim to integrate local sources, such as traditional cultures and historical 
experiences, with global demands of capitalism and the market. David Martin -Jones 
argues that since the 1970s new leaders of the countries studied have been aware of the 
need to adjust Western ideas of democracy and the market to their cultural and social 
systems. Their traditional cultures must also be transformed to serve new institutions 
and to encourage the growth of entrepreneurs in economic areas.28 
It is assumed that in a competitive economic environment, the countries studied 
need to find examples which can lead them toward successful economic and political 
development. As late industrialising countries, they have to learn from other states, 
firstly Western countries and secondly Japan and Newly Industrialising Countries 
(NICs). Both Japan and the NICs are particularly good examples of how to manage 
28 David Martin Jones, `Democratization, Civil society, and Illiberal Ivlíddle Class Culture in Pacific 
Asia', Comparative Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, January 1998, pp. 147 -169. 
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political stability with economic development. The notion of the `Look East policy' 
developed by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad is one example of this 
search for a model. 
Similarly, Singaporean leaders, after its separation from Malaysia, endeavoured 
to understand their situation and environment before deciding on their model for 
development. Once they found their `own' model, they applied it consistently and, more 
importantly, attempted to promote that model as a platform for other developing states. 
This can be seen in the confident delivery of a discourse on `East Asian modernity'. As 
C.J.W. Wee argues, this discourse may develop as an alternative to Western versions of 
modernity. To a large degree, it has replaced the anti- imperial and nationalist discourse 
which dominated Southeast Asian countries during the 1960s and 1970s.29 Other 
thinkers like Noordin Sopiee have strengthened this view by arguing that some `Asian 
values' such as thrift, saving, respect for authority, hard work, the ethic of the 
community, consensus and harmony, have contributed to the past economic progress of 
some Asian countries.3o 
By promoting such values, government elites, particularly in Malaysia and 
Singapore, seek to convince people that what is important is not democracy in the 
Western sense, but clean elections and an eradication of collusion, corruption and 
nepotism. As Anwar Ibrahim suggests, Malaysian leaders need to end the practices or 
the people themselves will demand that eradication.31 Former leader of the Youth wing 
in UMNO, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi similarly criticised the rhetoric of the Prime Minister 
Mahathir which blamed the West for a wide range of Malaysia's ills, in an effort to 
disguise the principal problems of the nation such as collusion, corruption and nepotism 
which are still very much a part of bureaucracy and government.32 
29 
30 
31 
32 
C.S.W.L. Wee, The 'Clash" of Civilizations? Or an Emerging "East Asian Modernity "?', Sojourn, 
Vol. 11, No. 2, 1996, pp. 211 -230. 
Noordin Sopiee, 'Asía and the West', Asiaweek, 12 December 1997. 
Jawa Pos, 17 July 1998. 
Ibid. 
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In Singapore, a clean and effective government has been a symbol and key 
characteristic of the PAP government. It has been advocated by Lee Kuan Yew and his 
supporters who argued that a good government is necessary for Singapore to survive and 
to be competitive with other states in the region. This, it is argued, creates a kind of self - 
control preventing any attempt at manipulation or corruption. 
In the early New Order government of Indonesia in 1966, there was an 
expectation that the corruption and nepotism practices inherited from the so- called Old 
Order would end. But the government failed to realise its promise to end such practices. 
The recent demands for changes in Indonesia are aimed at overcoming the acute 
problems of collusion, corruption and nepotism. Democracy is seen as a mechanism 
which can create social and other controls over the above practices which are considered 
detrimental to economic development. 
Thirdly, the desire has grown within these countries to maintain their equal 
status as sovereign nations with Western countries through the claim of `Asian values' 
and `Asian democracy'. One manifestation of this occurs through attacks on Western 
political interests and behaviour in the Third World. The accusation of a Western double 
standard with regard to the implementation of human rights and democracy is 
commonly heard both from leaders and academics in this region. Using these attacks, 
leaders of these countries attempt to deflect attacks on them or their government by 
showing that problems with human rights have also occurred in Western countries. For 
those leaders, it is inappropriate to accuse other countries of violating human rights 
while they also have problems with human rights. As the Indonesian Ambassador to 
Australia, S. Wiryono stated, `In Indonesia we believe that when we point a finger at 
people, three of our own fingers [are aimed] at ourselves. So in Indonesia we place more 
stress on humility, rather than arrogance'.33 By highlighting Western hypocrisy, these 
countries attempt to show that they do not need to be treated as a pariah in international 
society. 
33 Transcript, Radio National's Background Briefing, `Doing Human Rights in Asia', 24 August 
1997; <http: / /www.abc.net au /rn/talks/bbing/bb970824.htm>. 
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Given this goal, the next question is whether this target leads to an effort to 
claims a distinctive standard of democracy and human rights based on `Singaporean, 
Malaysian and Indonesian values'. It is noteworthy to see that serious attempts have 
been made by Malaysian and Singaporean academics to reject Western pressure 
concerning human rights and democracy and, in turn, to search for their own `Asian 
values' and `Asian democracy'. Chandra Muzaffar has set up 'Just World Order', a non- 
governmental organisation which gathers academics critical of the Western double 
standard on human rights and democracy around the World. He also argues for the 
relevance of Malay as well as Islamic values, such as respect for laws, to be maintained 
as integral parts of Asian societies.34 Indonesia since its independence has claimed 
Pancasila values as the political and moral basis for society. It has been developed 
philosophically as an alternative to Western values. Singaporean academics, particularly 
through the `Singapore school', have explored what `Asian values' are and their 
importance for the development of Asia. In spite of the fact that none of these attempts 
actually offers an alternative to Western concepts of democracy, they emerge as a part of 
a new discourse which can counter the universalisation of Western liberal democracy 
experiences. It also provides a basis of belief from which they can develop ideas based 
on their own philosophical values. 
C. TOWARD A SYNTHESIS OF 'WESTERN' AND `ASIAN VALUES' 
For critics of the claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy', the above 
adaptations of a Western democratic system end up strengthening authoritarian 
systems.35 The cases studied here, however, show that the role of the claims of `Asian 
values' is more complex than the above analysis suggests. The leaders of these countries 
need to use `Asian values' and other ideological terms, for example, to capture the idea 
of modern Western statehood and apply it to their countries. `Asian values', even for 
34 Interview with Chandra Muzaffar, September 1996. 
75 The critics come from various cultural backgrounds including Asia; see for example, Xiaorong Li, 
"'Asian Values" and the Universality of Human Rights', The Straits Times, 2I November 1992. 
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Mahathir, a staunch critics of the West, are values which have been advocated in the 
West but then discarded.36 This followed the assumption during the 1960s that Western 
ideas of modernity need to be adjusted to local circumstances in order to make the ideas 
work, to transform society, and to bring about economic development.37 
The inequitable distribution of wealth to the Malay community prior to the 1969 
crisis in Malaysia, and the failure to develop the national economy prior to the 1965 
coup attempt in Indonesia, convinced the governments of both countries of the need to 
create a stable political system which could support their economic development 
programmes. Despite examples of the failure of other newly independent governments 
in Asia and Africa, in the case of Singapore leaders believed in the need for the 
government to adjust its liberal system inherited from British colonialism and in the 
need to intervene in many aspects of political life, particularly for the sake of economic 
development. 
Apart from Mahathir's and Lee's espousal of `Asian values', and continuing 
attacks on `Western values', there have been various views on how the adjustment of 
Western values materialised. In contrast to Mahathir's discourse, moderation both in the 
claims of 'Asian values' and in the attacks on `Western values', has developed. These 
varying views on both `Asian values' and `Western values' proved that no one can claim 
a single or fixed definition of 'Asian values'. This means that the process of creating the 
so- called 'Asian values' is a continuing process open to many inputs. Various views 
circulating among leaders can evolve toward an adaptation of Western values to the 
local contexts. The circulation of these views can also result in a synthesis of the West 
and the East rather than the construction of distinctive and conflicting 'Asian' versus 
'Western values'. The adaptation of Western values to local contexts and the possibility 
of synthesis emerging from 'Western' and 'Asian' values can particularly be seen from 
three factors listed below. 
36 Mahathir Mohamad, "Nilai Asia' (Asian Values)', speech in Senate House, Cambridge University, 
London, 15 March 1995, see Dewan Budaya, April 1995, pp. 6 -8. 
37 Soedjatmoko, `Cultural Motivations to Progress: The "Exterior and the "Interior' Views', in Robert 
N. Bellah (ed.), Religion and Progress in Modern Asia (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 1 -3. 
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Firstly, in the debate about the ideal of `Asian values', some leaders within the 
countries studied have criticised the dominant claims of `Asian values' and `Asian 
democracy'. Among leaders such as Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia, Goh Chok Tong and 
Tommy Koh in Singapore, and Nurcholis Madjid in Indonesia, there has been 
discussion of adaptation and fusion of, rather than the differences between, `Asian' and 
`Western' values. Anwar Ibrahim was quite often quoted as saying that Asians should 
learn from the principles of liberal democracy which have been tested and proven as the 
best mechanism to pursue development and to overcome ethnic and communal 
tensions.38 One senior Singaporean leader, Tommy Koh, has suggested Asian leaders 
learn from the European Union to overcome their political and economic problems. He 
suggests that Asian leaders can learn from the Union about how to cooperate, to 
exchange views openly and to institutionalise their relations among region by discarding 
bitter experiences of the past.39 Similarly, a member of the `Singaporean school', 
Kishore Mahbubani, argues for `a fusion of Western and East Asian cultures in the Asia - 
Pacific region' which has pushed the dynamic of the Pacific region.40 He argues that this 
fusion has had an unprecedented impact on Asian renaissance. The Pacific region has 
taken `the best practices and values from many rich civilizations, Asian and Western'.41 
The transformation, adaptation, fusion and adjustment of Western values are commonly 
used to express this kind of synthesis. 
These views, which oppose the dominant Mahathir and Lee anti -Western 
rhetoric, win support from some intellectuals. Academics from the `Singapore school', 
such as Kausikan, argue that Western values need to be continually discussed and 
adapted to new needs and circumstances.42 He argues that the values questioned in Asia 
are actually problems debated at the first instance in the West, so that the debate about 
as See, for example, Charles Alexander (et. all), `What is Success without Freedom, Anwar on 
Currency Woes, Elders and Asian Values', Time, 6 October 1997. 
s9 Tommy Koh, `East Asia can learn from EU', The Straits Times, 10 July 1998. 
sa Kishore Ylahbubani, `The Pacific Way', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1, January/February 1995, 
pp. 102, 107. 
ai Ibid., p. 107. 
42 Bilahari Kausikan, `Governance That Works', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 25. 
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`Asian values' is actually `not a clash of civilisations'.43 He suggests, for example, that 
the issues of `the responsibilities of individuals to the society as a whole, the role of the 
family, the integrity of public institutions and the maintenance of law and order' are the 
most contested issues in political theory in the West.44 
In Malaysia, Sopiee suggests that the struggle for `Asian values' continues and 
involves the adoption of core Western values which have been forgotten in the West 
because of urbanisation, industrialisation and the weakening role of the family.45 This 
adaptation process of `Western values', however, need to be applied and implemented 
domestically. It has to be established as a consequence of the need to respect human 
dignity and not as the result of Western pressures.46 In Indonesia, Madjid, Miriam 
Budiardjo and those from the National Commission for Human Rights (Komisi 
Nasional Hak -hak Asasi Manusia) are the most prominent academics critical of `Asian 
values' as pursued by Lee and Mahathir. They criticise the tendency to use `Asian 
values' to justify the limitation of freedom and the abuse of human rights in some 
ASEAN countries.47 Madjid, in particular, supports the implementation of principles of 
modern nation -states, including its democratic system for Indonesia. He denies any 
possibility of building an Islamic state and, in contrast, he advocates the adaptation of 
Western democracy, particularly its ethical and moral principles as applied in the United 
States 48 
In general, this debate contributes to, in the words of Michele Schmiegelow, a 
'rediscovery of the classical approaches to knowledge and ethics in all major cultures 
43 Ibid., p. 31. 
aa Ibid., p. 31. 
as Sopiee, op. cit. 
46 Syed Husin Ali, `Democracy and Human Rights: ASEAN's way'; see <http://www.singapore- 
window.org/1112hrts.htm>) 
47 Nurcholis Madjid, `Peneguhan Kesadaran HAM dí Indonesia (The Strengthening of Human Rights 
Awareness in Indonesia)', Republika, 29 April 1997; Miriam Budiardjo, Perlukah Deklarasi HAM 
Direvisi? (Does Human Rights Declaration Need to be Revised ?)', Kompas, 30 August 1997, and 
`Indonesia dan Dialog HAM - Indonesia and Human Rights Dialogue', Kompas, 10 September 
1997. 
48 Nurcholish Madjid, `Reformasi di Indonesia dan Prospeknya (Reformation in Indonesia and its 
Prospects), speech delivered at the University of Sydney, 13 July 1998. 
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and their mobilisation against fundamentalist myths and the politics of resentment' .4° 
Such a rediscovery is under way in the region where there have been debates on `Asian 
values' and `Western values' in relation to democracy. Those participating in the debate 
try to find ethical bases of democracy in major cultures of the West and Asia. Various 
claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' indicate that the debate has not ended, 
and more importantly, their mobilisation, to a large degree, can reduce fundamentalist 
myths drawing their tenets from cultures and religions in the region. 
During the 1950s to 1960s, the idea of an Islamic state gained significant support 
in Indonesia. But nowadays such an idea tends to be seen as a fundamentalist myth, 
which do not gained significant support either in Malaysia or Indonesia. This is partly 
because the governments, both in Indonesia and Malaysia, have offered a more 
attractive; if not more substantial, and all- encompassing interpretation of democracy in 
their concepts such as `Asian values', Wawasan 2020, and Pancasila democracy.5° 
Secondly, the adoption of Western political institutional practices is manifested 
in the continuing debate on the role of democratic institutions. Academics and 
intellectuals especially play an important role in this debate. 
The debate is between those who support the government restructuring policy 
and those who are against it. The first group, including technocrats, justify the 
government's political restructuring. In Indonesia, the economists and technocrats who 
dominated Indonesian development policies during the New Order up to 1990, were 
clearly part of this first group. They paid little attention to the process of democratic 
government that could accommodate the demands from the people. In line with the 
49 Michele Schmiegelow, The Meaning of Democracy in Asia', in Michele Schmiegelow (ed.), 
Democracy in Asia (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1997), p. 52. 
50 In Malaysia, as shown in Chapter III, Mahathir's use of 'Asían values' can overcome both the 
anger of the Malays toward the Chinese and the fear of Chinese of the Malays' (and Moslems) 
militant claims of democracy. The open and modest UMNO interpretation of Islam has also won 
more support than a strict interpretation of Islam by the opposition PAS. In Indonesia, those 
gathering in Paramadina under the leadership of Nurcholish Madjid attempted to socialize their 
interpretation of Islam in a modern nation -state emerging from the West. Madjid, in particular, 
asserts that the best form of political system, and that which is the closest to the Islamic Ummah as 
set up by Muhammad 15 centuries ago is a modern Western democracy model, particularly as 
applied in the US. 
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views of some politicians and the military, these technocrats and economists required 
room for their policy choices to be accepted and implemented without disturbance from 
complicated democratic processes. The military- dominated government under Soeharto, 
in return, needed the support of these technocrats and economists to run the economy, 
which in turn strengthened the legitimacy of the government» 
It has also been argued by some supporters of the New Order that the process of 
establishing democracy in Southeast Asian countries does not matter because the end 
result is similar 52 According to this view, those who were in power in Singapore and 
Malaysia were for some time the same elites and parties. Applying this argument, one 
could see similar circumstances, operating in Indonesia where Golkar, the ruling party, 
held office for an extended period. 
In contrast to the above view, those who are against the strict control of the state, 
argue that the process of establishing democratic government does matter. According to 
this argument, in contrast to Indonesia, in Malaysia and Singapore the ruling party 
achieves its position through a more or less free and fair election where its party 
members compete against opposition members. Through the general elections, people 
can decide whether their representatives have been able to fulfil their promises. 
In a system free of mass political involvement, such as in Indonesia, it is difficult 
for politicians to understand clearly the interests of the people. An example emerges 
with the selection of where President Soeharto in March 1998 for the fifth time with an 
unanimous vote by parliament (MPR), and subsequent events which saw him toppled 
two months later. Members of parliament often lose touch, or in the words of RS Milne, 
they might lack the `political ability' to understand the interests of the majority of the 
masses.53 The system has rejected, as David Collier argues, the demands from grass- 
si A. Ramlan Surbakti, `Teknologi dan Process Politik (Technology and Political Process)', Prisma, 
Vol. XIII, No. 3, March 1984, pp. 27 -36. 
52 Such views were shared by intellectuals within the circle of the government such as Nazaruddin 
Sjamsuddin, a Professor of Political Science from Indonesian University (personal communication, 
October 1996). 
R.S. Milne, `Technocrats and Politics in the ASEAN Countries', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 3, 
Fall 1982, p. 403. 
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roots politics because many popular leaders were isolated from the national decision 
making processes.54 
In a competitive political system, a politician, even a technocrat, needs to 
consider the popular and political implications of a decision. As Milne argues, they need 
to adapt to grass roots needs.55 In a system where there have been contests among 
parliamentary candidates, there has been a level of accountability of politicians to the 
people, particularly in general elections. As mentioned by Harold Crouch, the politicians 
in Malaysia have to be responsive to ensure that they will not lose their office in general 
elections. Similarly, the PAP in Singapore continues to offer real policies Iike the 
improvement of housing and public facilities that could attract support in general 
elections. The tendency toward a decreasing percentage of votes and seats in parliament 
was taken very seriously. PAP members have addressed these problems, and 
subsequently recaptured support in the 1997 general election. 
In the Indonesian case, such a process did not take place. The support for the 
government party, Golkar, was based on the mobilisation of the masses and on the 
ability to interfere with the internal matters of the two other parties, PPP and PDI. In 
such a case, there has been little similarity, if any, between Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore in the process of gaining support during general elections. General elections 
in New Order Indonesia, as some critics have argued, were really a fiesta, as the 
government always called them, where people had a rally and listened to music, but 
there was no such thing as a real evaluation of the political and economic programmes 
the government had instituted during its time in office. The variant of a proportional 
representation electoral system, where the voters chose a party instead of the candidates, 
has also reduced the possibility of a candidate being evaluated before the voters that he 
or she represents. 
° David Collier (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1979), p. 401. 
55 Milne, op. cit., pp. 428 -429. 
264 
It is not surprising that, in contrast to the Malaysian and Singaporean cases, in 
overcoming the current economic crisis, the Indonesian New Order government was 
severely handicapped. The economic crisis became a legitimacy and political crisis. 
People saw a lack of control to the government as the main cause for the rampant 
corruption, cronyism and collusion eroding the fundamentals of the Indonesian 
economy. The source of the problem was seen as a lack of social and political controls 
thus depriving the government transparent in decision making. As Arief Budiman notes, 
the authoritarian style of the Indonesian government did not fully serve to develop the 
economy, but to profit the ruling family and those who had a close relation to Soeharto's 
family.56 This is, according to him, different from the style of clean government in 
Korea during the 1970s and 1980s, where despite the fact that the government applied 
an authoritarian style of government, it had a strong intention to develop a real 
entrepreneurial society.57 
Thirdly, the possibility of adopting Western values is also evident from the 
context of changes within the global and regional system which have ramifications in 
domestic society. The `Asian values' debate occurs in a situation where there have been 
growing demands for a more open political system. The global context has created 
circumstances that force the leaders of these countries to pay attention to Western 
concepts of democracy and democratisation. Western donor countries such as the USA 
and Western European states and organisations such as the World Bank, IMF and COI 
(Consultative Group on Indonesia) have also clearly linked their aid with problems of 
human rights and democracy. 
Current political and economic crises in Indonesia provide a clear sign of the 
influence of the international context. Donor countries in the IMF, such as the USA, are 
reluctant to assist Indonesia's economic recovery without commitments to 
improvements in human rights and democracy by the Indonesian government. Similarly, 
56 Arief Budiman, Negara dan Pernbangunan (State and Development) (Jakarta: Yayasan Padi dan 
Kapas, 1991), pp. 17 -18. 
57 Ibid., pp. 13 -18. 
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donor countries in the CGI, notably Japan, announced that they will assess the political 
and economic reforms accomplished by the Indonesian government as a pre- condition 
for continuing their economic aid to Indonesia.58 This condition gives weight to the 
demands for a more open and transparent political system that started after the fall of 
Soeharto's government. Nowadays, it is argued widely in Indonesia that the country 
needs a system of control for the government to keep politicians and officials honest. 
The political system also needs to be changed to give more room for the opposition to 
implement such controls and express alternative views and strategies. 
The demand for such controls has similar ramifications in Malaysia. Opposition 
parties and even members of IJMNO have been, for a long time, concerned with the 
problem of money and collusion in business and politics. With an eye on the 
experiences in Indonesia, such demands have been promoted loudly. UMNO youth 
leaders for example have expressed their concerns about the problems of collusion and 
corruption inside IJMNO. They even criticise Mahathir who always blames the `West' 
for having intruded in their economy and caused political problems. The problem, they 
say, is not in the West, hut within their own society. Former deputy PM Anwar Ibrahim 
concludes that if the government does not take any action to stop corruption and 
collusion, the people in Malaysia will do so. 
The Indonesia case shows that nothing is unique in regard to the need for a 
modern state. The country needs to overcome corruption and cannot depend on 
traditional cultures to maintain its legitimacy. Howard Dick argues that the traditional 
style of government under Soeharto failed and people demanded a modern nation state 
out of May's political turmoi1.59 However, Madjid argues that the ideas of the modern 
nation -state in Indonesia began as early as the Dutch colonial ethical policy in the early 
1900's. Since that time, the ideas of the modern nation -state were introduced and they 
continued to influence Indonesian national leaders until Indonesia's independence. This 
process of influence was interrupted by the introduction of traditional ideas of 
59 
59 Howard Dick, Seminar held by Indonesian Study Groups, Canberra, July 1998. 
Kompas, 30 July 1998. 
266 
government from the Javanese Kingdom during both Soekarno's and Soeharto's 
government.6o 
D. THE ADOPTION OF THE IDEAS OF STRONG GOVERNMENT 
I have focused on the adaptation of Western political institutions and various 
uses made of `Asian values' as ideologies to justify this adaptation, as well as the 
challenges toward the single definition of `Asian values' from within the countries 
studied. At this stage, it can be stated that the adaptation of Western political institutions 
was aimed particularly at supporting the creation of a strong and credible government 
able to maintain stability and economic development. Various views on the meaning of 
`Asian values' and `Asian democracy' themselves will strengthen and enrich the likely 
forms of good government which these countries hope to develop. 
Although some prominent leaders of these countries in their rhetoric and 
speeches formally denied the applicability of liberal democratic notions to their 
countries, they have, to a large degree, advocated ideas of Western modern statehood. 
The ideas have been continuously debated and adjusted. The idea of checking the power 
of the government, for example, still exists but its application has been moderated. 
Although the opposition wins some seats in parliament, they are unable to function as a 
significant check on the power of the government nor are opposition groups able to 
replace the government party in power as occurs in Western democracies. Good 
government, in such a case, is achieved more through trust of the leaders than through 
parliamentary controls. 
For the leaders of these countries there should be a transformation and adaptation 
process to Western conceptions of democracy before they can apply within society. 
However, such a transformation given the different problems and historical experiences 
they face, has taken place in different ways within the countries studied. These different 
explanations of what constitute democracy have often been used by some elites in those 
60 Ibid. 
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countries as an excuse to suppress internal demands for democratisation and as a 
counter to Western pressures on democracy, 
In spite of the goal of strengthening the political identity of the state in face of 
the growing criticisms from international society of the authoritarian practices of the 
government, the claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' have also been 
promoted by leaders of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia to redefine traditional 
cultures and mould them to new demands of modern economic development. In 
Singapore and Malaysia, in particular, the claims serves the purpose of reinventing 
traditional values so that they may advance economic and political development. In 
these countries the claims of `Asian values' has emphasised, among other things, 
discipline and order, both of which have been promoted to support the need for a good 
and clean government. 
In light of the international society perspective, what the governments in 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia attempt to fulfill is not limited to the adoption of 
minimal requirements of international society, such as sovereign recognition from other 
countries, but also to the implementation of modern principles of statehood, defined 
generally as an effective, clean and strong government. In the process of adopting these 
principles, the debates on 'Asian values', `Asian democracy', Confucianism, and 
Pancasila democracy play an important role, particularly in translating the ideas of 
modern statehood to local conditions. The debates provide opportunities for various 
groups in society to redefine their traditional cultures and attitudes towards authority and 
legitimacy after they intersect with modern Western cultures. 
In this context, Western notions of democracy and their political institutions 
have been selected and adjusted in these countries to create an effective and strong 
government. A strong government for these countries means that the government is able 
not only to control opposition but also to realise its economic and development 
programmes61 A government or an executive is seen here as a part of `a state as a 
61 Dauvergne, op. cit., p. 2. 
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multifaceted organization with a legitimate monopoly over the use of violence'. In this 
perspective, a government in its complex interaction with society plays the most 
important role in determining the strength and weaknesses of the state. The degree of the 
strength and weakness of the state depends, among other things, on the ability of the 
government `to maintain social control, ensure social compliance with official laws, act 
decisively, make effective policies, preserve stability and cohesion, encourage societal 
participation in state institutions, provide basic services, manage and control the 
national economy, and retain legitimacy',62 This assumption comes from the 
experiences of the governments in those countries in interacting with social forces. 
Various complex realities involving history, cultural traditions, political ideologies, 
ethnic and religious groups, and position in international society have influenced the 
formation of the above assumption of a strong government.63 
In light of the concept of the good government, the meaning of democracy, for 
leaders of these countries, seems to be different from that advocated in the West. This 
can be seen clearly from the views of prominent leaders like Mahathir, Lee and 
Soeharto. They have argued that the form of democracy has to be advocated for the 
specific developmental purposes of the countries. Mahathir said that there is no need for 
liberal democracy if it would bring about chaos. Similarly, Lee argues that what people 
demand is not liberal democracy but good government that can achieve economic 
development. Soeharto adopted a kind of Developmentalist ideology which used the 
Pancasila ideology to justify suppression and to limit freedom. Even former Malaysian 
deputy PM, Anwar Ibrahim, regarded by Western leaders and media as a supporter of 
democracy and political openness in Asia, argues that 
`Democracy should not be an end unto itself, but merely the means by which we 
can ensure humane governance: the restoring of the dignity of the human person 
and satisfying the hunger for justice'. There can be no dignity in poverty, sickness, 
deprivation, illiteracy and ignorance.64 
62 
63 
64 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Anwar Ibrahim, The Asian Renaissance (Singapore: Times Books International, 1996), p. 50. 
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Emphasis has been given to the meaning of democracy for development, 
particularly on the role of the state in bringing about development. This focus has made 
the leaders of these three countries strengthen the state and bureaucratic apparatus. In 
comparison with some African states which have not experienced a transformation of 
their state, such a focus has been successful. Leaders of these three countries attempt to 
forge efficient and strong states to develop their national economy. There have also 
operated phenomena common to Third World state mentioned by Robert Jackson, in the 
three Southeast Asian countries studied, such as corruption and incompetence in many 
agencies of government, self -enrichment of personal officials, `nepotism, patronage, 
bribery and extortion' of many `public' organizations, and `kleptocracy' in the systems 
of government.65 However, the extent of these problems, except for Indonesia's case 
under Soeharto government, is lower than comparable cases occurring in some African 
states. These Southeast Asian countries have, to a large degree, adopted principles of 
modern statehood so that they cannot be regarded as applying the `negative sovereignty' 
of which Jackson has accused some African states.66 
The intensity of the practices of collusion, corruption and nepotism needs further 
discussion. In Indonesia, the so- called `nepotism, collusion and corruption' practices are 
rampant, while in Singapore and Malaysia, there are more limited practices of 
corruption. The ability to create a transparent and open system, as Lee Kuan Yew 
argues, determines the degree of corruption.67 This kind of system, according to Lee, can 
detect, check and highlight aberrations.68 Countries such as Malaysia and Singapore 
have attempted to establish checks through the introduction of such a system. Being 
supported by a relatively strong `rule of law' these countries are able to manage 
corruption at a lower level than that evident in Indonesia. With growing political 
opposition in society to many of the governments' policies, such practices, also tend to 
es Robert H. Jackson, Quasi- states. sovereignty, international relations and the Third World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 527. 
ec Ibid., pp. 21 -25. 
67 Time's Interview with Lee Kuan Yew, Time, 16 March 1998. 
68 Ibid. 
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be unpopular and gradually eroded. In the Indonesian case, many people tend to believe 
that such practices can be eliminated by regulating government. Democracy, for the 
majority of Indonesians, is seen as providing a solution to the problems of collusion, 
nepotism and corruption. Recent developments have even shown the emergence of a 
' democracy -is -good- for -development' camp which relies much on democracy as the 
solution to economic crisis.69 
In the above context, the debate about democracy and development, therefore, 
closely relates to a utilitarian definition of democracy. Democracy is treated as a form of 
government and a tool for other goals. For society, it becomes a tool to control 
government corruption and collusion, and for the government, it is used to implement 
economic goals smoothly. Such an attitude evident in Indonesia's New Order 
government under President Soeharto. In the early New Order, Soeharto led a 
government promising economic growth and better government than that of the `Old 
Order'. Before Soeharto's resignation in May 1998, general elections and other 
institutions found in Western political institutions were applied in Indonesia only as an 
effort to Iegitimate Golkar to take power in the government. They were designed to 
make it easy for the government to formulate and implement its decisions and policies. 
In Singapore, this utilitarian view of democracy is strongly supported by the so- 
called `Singapore school'. Bilahari Kausikan, often included as a member of this group, 
argues that the best evaluation of democracy is whether or not it works. According to 
him, the test for any government is not its ability to adhere to a political ideal but its 
ability to `govern effectively, fairly, and in a way that increases the general welfare' .7(1 
The view that democracy is desirable in itself and brings about a good society,' 
which implies that democracy is very essential, has not gained much support among 
elites within these countries. In a state experiencing massive political struggles with the 
69 Amitav Acharya, `Viewpoint: Is Democracy Best? The Economic Crisis Tests Asia's Competing 
System' ,Askaweek, 23 October 1998. 
° Bilahari Kausikan, `Governance that Works', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1997, p. 29. 
71 This view is adopted, for example, by Margaret Ng, 'Why Asia Needs Democracy', in ibid., PP- 
10-23 and Acharya, op. cit. 
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potential to damage their countries, the leaders of these countries argue that the above 
non -utilitarian meaning of democracy is not important. What is attractive for these 
leaders is a developmental state. For the sake of economic development, the so- called 
soft -authoritarian regime has become the preference for countries in East and Southeast 
Asia. Leaders of these countries manipulate the mechanism of general elections to 
ensure majority support from society and limit freedom of opposition to reduce political 
competition. Through such a regime, these leaders believe that they need to develop 
their economy before democracy can flourish. Lee Kuan Yew, for example, when asked 
about the current turmoil in Indonesia, continues to express his belief that the main 
demand is for economic development not for democracy.72 
The utilitarian approach to democracy has invited debates among academic 
supporters of Developmentalism in the Third World. In a broader perspective, by 
comparing the experience of development in many Third World countries, Christopher 
Clapham argues that there is a complex relationship between democracy and economic 
development. In some cases, there is no direct relationship between democracy and 
development, but in other cases, according to Clapham, democratisation, defined as a 
process toward democracy, is needed to maintain long term economic development.73 
Emphasis has also been given to the need for a powerful developmental state to bring 
about successful economic development. Some features of developmental states, notably 
honest leaders and elites, the relative autonomy of the state from domestic special 
interests, a powerful and competent bureaucracy; the preference of the state over civil 
society, and state autonomy before national and foreign capital have gained significance 
in Third World countries.74 
72 The Straits Times, 16 June 1998. 
3 Clapham, op. cit., pp. 598 -600; For Southeast Asian case, see Jacques Bertrand, `Review Article - 
Growth and Democracy in Southeast Asia', Comparative Politics, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1996, pp. 355- 
375. 
4 See, Clapham, op. cit., p. 596; also Adrian Leftwich, `Governance, the State and the Politics of 
Development', Development and Change, Vol. 25, 1994, pp. 378 -379; Adrian Leftwich, Two 
Cheers for Democracy', The Political Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 4, Oct -Dec 1996, pp. 334 -339. 
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The Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean cases demonstrate that the demand 
for that kind of developmental state was latent in such a society. In Indonesia, students, 
political activists and academics demanded the end of collusion, corruption and 
nepotistic practices in Soeharto's government. This demand arose because people 
believed that the government was applying a model of governance that was effective 
only in suppressing freedom and other political rights in a crisis situation. According to 
Nurcholish Madjid, a prominent Moslem intellectual, the people demanded good 
government based on the principle of democracy and other ideas of the modern nation- 
state. 75 In Malaysia, a similar demand has been expressed to end practices of nepotism 
and collusion, particularly within UMNO. In Singapore, the government makes every 
attempt to build a clean and efficient bureaucracy and to ensure that a merit system 
applies in all sectors of the government. 
It is worth noting that a focus on developing the state has become one aspect of 
legitimacy for the above governments. Muthiah Alagappa argues that political 
legitimacy has been established by governing parties setting realistic development 
targets. He notes that the success of UMNO and PAP in building legitimacy lay, to a 
certain extent, in their ability to fulfill their rational target of development.76 However, it 
is noteworthy to see also that this rational target itself is not sufficient to support the 
legitimacy of the government. The New Order government under Soeharto had also 
planned economic developments and targets, but without implementing a broader and 
more inclusive political and social system, it failed to maintain its power. 
Another aspect of political legitimacy, as Chua argues, is integrated in the 
commitment to be responsive to people's aspirations. In the words of an Indonesian 
military thinker, the late General Soemitro, the main problem is how to make the 
government responsible to the people and to create transparency system of 
5 Nurcholish Madjid, ` Reformani di Indonesia dan Prospelmya (Reformation in Indonesia and its 
Prospects)', speech delivered in the University of Sydney, 13 July 1998. 
76 Muthiah Alagappa, `Seeking a More Durable Basis of Authority', in Alagappa (ed.), Political 
Legitimacy in Southeast Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 311 -326. 
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government." For this to happen, among other things, voices need to circulate and be 
understood, and general elections need to be run cleanly. According to Chua, the PAP 
and UMNO, naturally enough, are very concerned about their legitimacy and use the 
general election not as democratic mechanism but as a means of renewing their political 
legitimacy.i8 In contrast, Soeharto's government in Indonesia has rational targets of 
development, and thus did not concern itself much with fair general elections nor allow 
opposition voices to be heard. Indonesia under the New Order, according to Chua, 
manipulated general elections to such an extent that `no one in the world believes that 
Indonesia has a general election'.79 This may be one reason why the New Order regime 
lost its legitimacy and why demands escalated for Soeharto to step down. 
E. `ASIAN DEMOCRACY' AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
The above factors illustrate a tendency in these three Southeast Asian societies to 
adapt their cultures to the need for a modern nation -state. Robert Cox argues that such a 
tendency represents a process of 'internal debate and struggle over directions of change' 
which is hoped will bring about legitimate and genuine changes.80 This process also 
demonstrates the ability of these countries to internalise important values for managing 
their state by relying their own capacity and not succumbing to `unreasonable' pressures 
from the West. In these three countries, both the oppositions and the governments 
believe that the struggle for democratisation has to rely on people within their countries 
without unnecessary interference from Western countries. Even the prominent 
opposition leader Lim Kit Siang in Malaysia criticised US vice President Al Gore's 
interventionist attitude toward the reformation movement in Malaysia.81 So far the most 
" Interview with General Soemitro, November 1996; In the Indonesian case, such a responsibility to 
the people is very important because the country was born through revolution which involved a 
coalition of military forces and ordinary people to secure independence. 
8 Interview with Beng -Huat Chua, October 1996. 
99 lbid. 
80 Robert W. Cox, `Civilisations in World Political Economy', New Political Economy', Vol. 1, No. 
2, 1996, p. 147. 
81 Lim Kit Siang's media conference statement, Proposed Formation of an Asia- Pacific 
Parliamentary Union (APPU) for Parliamentarians to protect and promote human rights and 
democracy in the region', 25 November 1998); see < http:// www .malaysia.net/dap /sg1387.htm>. 
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intense debate tends to focus on a new awareness both within the government and 
within society about the importance of good government. 
In light of this tendency, I attempt to examine how significant the debate 
regarding `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' is in building universal and shared 
values of democracy from the perspective of international society. The tendency within 
the countries studied to accept the idea of an effective, clean and strong government, as 
this thesis has argued, is a useful starting point to discuss the implications of `Asian 
values' and `Asian democracy' for international society. In contrast to the critics of 
'Asian democracy' who worried that the claims would preserve on authoritarian style of 
government and initiate a similar pattern of government in other Asian countries, I argue 
that the claims, in practice, reveal a more complex phenomenon. The approach to the 
claims in international society, as a consequence, should consider the complex 
phenomena behind the claims. 
To discuss the approach, I examine the problems with common 
misunderstanding of 'Asian values' among critics who based their arguments on a 
selection of the elite's statements. Then, based on the case studies, particularly on the 
adoption of the principle of good government, I attempt to outline a better approach to 
democracy in this region, one that is based on a new understanding of `Asian values' 
and 'Asian democracy'. The approach locates the claims in relation to the attempt to 
search for a universal and more acceptable value of government and democracy in 
international society. 
1. Problems with the Common Approach 
The critics of 'Asian values' draw their arguments generally from the rhetoric of 
some prominent Southeast Asian leaders as reported by various Western magazines and 
newspapers. In this case, they focus on three kinds of justifications which are always 
referred to by the leaders of these countries to support the claims of 'Asian values' and 
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`Asian democracy' and to reject Western liberal democracy. The first justification used 
by the leaders such as Mahathir, Lee and Soeharto is to argue that the commitment to 
liberal democracy relies on distinctive cultures and unique historical developments 
which may not allow liberal democracy to survive in other circumstances. The second 
justification concerns the sovereignty principle in which democracy is regarded as an 
`internal matter' in which no other countries can interfere. The third justification posited 
by these leaders relates to a `double standard' policy in the West with regard to 
democracy. The United States (USA) in particular is criticised as supporting 
undemocratic and totalitarian regimes in some states, while at the same time promoting 
democracy in other states. 
Criticism of alternative approaches based on these justifications are, however, 
weak. The last two justifications used by the leaders of these countries are much easier 
to deal with than the first one, since they are clearly derived from the same sources of 
justification and inference namely non -intervention, the principle of sovereignty and 
power politics as put forward in International Society by the modern Western states. The 
sovereignty principle, for example, continues to be evaluated in many forums in 
international politics, with the result that the absolute meaning of sovereignty hardly 
applies in relations among states. Even within ASEAN itself which since its birth has 
adopted principles of absolute sovereignty and non -intervention as its main tenets, some 
members such as Thailand and the Philippines have questioned the relevance of the non- 
intervention principle in a globalised world.ß2 The justification of attacking the Western 
`double -standard policies' can also be questioned since there have been quite significant 
changes in some Western countries with regard to the promotion of human rights and 
democracy, such as in South Africa. The policies have actually been, for a long time, 
sz Thai Foreign Minister, Surin Pitsuwan has suggested ASEAN members in the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting in Manila on 24 -25 July 1998, replace the non -intervention principle with a `flexible 
engagement' concept. In this proposal, Surin suggests that it is time for ASEAN to take a more 
positive approach in addressing problems in its member countries which may have implications for 
the region. This proposal allows its members to comment on issues which have a negative impact 
on other countries. See, Republika, 27 July 1998; Lee Kim Chew, `Asian Unity Showing Signs of 
Fraying', The Straits Times, 23 July 1998. 
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based on the principle of power politics. But this dominant theme recently has also been 
complicated by the need for ethics and morality in international relations. 
This leaves only the first justification, which is more complex since its origin or 
its `sources of justification and inferences'83 are seemingly different from those existing 
in the West. With regard to democracy, this justification refers to specific cultures and 
values based on local traditions, notably Islamic and Confucian values. 
Contrary to the position of universalists and relativists who take seriously the 
culture, values and philosophical sources of 'Asian values' and `Asian democracy', I 
argue that the challenge of `Asian democracy', based on the first justification, has its 
origins in ideas of modern statehood in Western society. In particular, it cannot be seen 
as challenging `the cosmopolitan culture of modernity'84 in the `English School' of 
international society. There have been two reasons for this. Firstly, the claims are mainly 
aimed at enmeshing modern concepts of good government with existing structures in a 
society. As has been discussed, the countries studied have attempted to adopt a good, 
strong and clean government to overcome the weaknesses of their sovereign status and 
to gain recognition as equal partners with other modern states. 
Secondly, the leaders of the countries studied continue to use Western ideas of 
modern statehood to strengthen their legitimacy. There has been, of course, rhetoric in 
the claims of `Asian values' that might reinforce differences in the understanding of 
democracy. The ambitious attempt of the claims of `Asian democracy' promoted by 
leaders such as Mahathir, Lee and Soeharto, for example, is to bring about what Partha 
Chatterjee terms the `thematic'85 conception of democracy, claiming fundamental 
differences in sources of justification from those of `Western liberal democracy'. 
63 Milner, op. cit., 
84 About this cultural challenge, Andrew Linklater asserts that globalisation has fragmented cultures 
within societies as some groups embrace what Bull and Watson called `the cosmopolitan culture of 
modernity' while other groups reject Western symbols and images. See, Linklater, The 
Achievements of Critical Theory', in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), 
International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 
288. 
85 Partha Chatterjee uses the terms `thematic' and `problematic' to explain discourse of nationalism. 
Although nationalism is strongly opposed to colonialism, it shares, according to Chatterjee, the 
same theme as its designated enemy. The differences between them are only with respect to 
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This, however, can be disputed if we attempt to understand the claims through its 
social, historical and cultural contexts in the countries studied and through the critiques 
circulating among the elites themselves. In such a context, the discourse of democracy 
in these countries manifests and reflects a long process of the struggle for hegemony 
among various ideological discourses, ultimately resulting in a transformation of the 
`thematic' aspects of their ideologies into ideals of modern liberal democracy and 
particularly into the principle of good and clean government. 
Official discourses of 'Asian democracy' promoted by government leaders need 
to be seen as part of this long transformation process. Although they attempt to combine 
all other conflicting ideologies within their countries into a single ideology, they are 
often unsuccessful in achieving this. The discourses are sometimes dominated and 
informed by many ideologies including those from the West. The differences left 
between the assumptions of `Asian and Western democracy', therefore, may focus on 
`problematic' aspects of democracy such as programmes, priorities and meanings of 
democracy, as have been discussed in the previous sections. 
2. Theoretical Implications of the Debates 
By understanding the claims as part of a 'problematic' instead of a `thematic' 
aspect of ideology, we have a better position from which to locate the debate in a 
normative discussion of international order in the post -Cold War period. The idea of 
good government advocated by Mahathir Mohamad and Lee Kuan Yew, for example, is 
clearly derived from Western notions of modern statehood. As part of the dual claims of 
'Asian values' and 'Asian democracy', the good government concept is still in the 
framework of the expansion of modern -statehood in Western modernity. Its main tenet, 
the idea of the modern- state, has been the main value entering these countries alongside 
the expansion of international society. 
programs or `the problematic', while `the thematic', that is 'justificatory structures, epistemological 
principles, rules of inference and type of moral justification,' remains the same. Partha Chatterjee, 
Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World (New York: Zed Books, 1986), p. 38. 
278 
In the light of the problematic aspect of ideology, there have been three 
important theoretical implications of the `Asian values' debate. Firstly, the claims of 
`Asian values' shows the importance of culture in the discussion of democracy in the 
theory of international society. Secondly, `Asian values' and the concept of good 
governance need to be elaborated within the context of opposing norms, values and 
cultures around the world. Thirdly, there has been a need to see how the claims of 
`Asian values and `Asian democracy', particularly the idea of good government, wins 
support in the region, and in particular how it competes with other claims of norms and 
order in a regional context. In the following section, I discuss further these three points. 
(a) Cultural approach 
The cases studied show that cultures and values are important in understanding 
the complexity of internal processes behind the claims of `Asian democracy'. The 
claims of `Asian democracy' itself need to be seen as a cultural phenomenon since it 
emerges from certain cultural contexts where its proponents claim to have specific 
cultural justifications. Through culture, the proponents, particularly the Ieaders, 
attempted to show confidence within their own political and economic system before 
both international society and domestic society. Some of these leaders even claim that 
their system is superior to the Western system. 
Departing from the two main approaches to culture that focus on either the 
universalisation of Western values or the rejection of such values, I have followed a 
sociological perspective on culture. In this perspective, culture is one of the most 
contested concepts in social sciences. What the content and substance of culture is, how 
it might change, how it influences the behaviour of people and how it may be used and 
manipulated for other purposes are among the questions addressed in such a cultural 
approach. 
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The content of culture, according to Ann Swindler, consists of symbolic vehicles 
of meaning such as ideology, tradition and common sense.86 This symbolic meaning can 
be `a "tool kit" of symbols, stories, rituals, and world views, which people may use in 
varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems'.87 In the words of Clifford 
Geertz, culture `is not cults and customs, but the structures of meaning through which 
men give shape to their experience; and politics is... one of the principal arenas in which 
such structures publicly unfold' .88 
This conception of culture also considers the importance of values as an 
independent variable which may have a direct influence on the behaviour of an actor.39 
Culture is not seen merely as values which have been established and confirmed, but 
rather it is only `points of concern' to be discussed. People in the same cultural 
background have `shared values' but they use them only as `a widely shared grammar 
defining a problem' and so they may have different preferences and solutions to the 
same problem.90 They can also select what aspect of culture is of primary significance in 
dealing with a reality.91 
The claims of `Asian values' and `Asian style democracy' reflect the above 
complex meaning of culture. They have, on the one hand, been manipulated to fix a 
particular meaning of democracy. On the other hand, they have been used also to 
transform society, for example, from traditional culture to modem and entrepreneurial 
culture. It is also used to inculcate people with traditional value ethics such as 
Confucian ethics in Singapore achieved through education. In the words of Wang 
16 Ann Swidler, `Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies', American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, 
April 1986, pp. 273 -286. 
37 Ibid., p. 273. 
as Clifford Geertz, `Afterword: The Politics of Meaning', in Claire Holt (ed.), Culture and Politics in 
Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 320. 
89 Ibid., p. 273. 
90 David Laitin, `Political Culture and Political Preferences', American Political Science Review, Vol. 
82, No. 2, June 1988, pp. 589 -590. 
91 Ibid., p. 591. 
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Gungwu, the education was intended `as defence against detribalisation, an attempt at 
reculturation of young Singaporeans'.92 
In the first case, cultural changes have occurred and formed a common political 
discourse. There has been an artificial transformation of political thought engineered to 
support a preference for `Asian democracy' discourse promoted by some leaders in 
those countries. Changes and transformations are manipulated and engineered to serve 
the common platform of the state. Shared symbols became political resources to be 
exploited by political leaders and entrepreneurs. Leaders encourage their people to 
support government development programs by reducing political competition among 
them. 
In Malaysia and Singapore, such an effort, to a certain degree, has successfully 
given Iegitimacy to Malaysia and Singapore's current government, particularly in facing 
Western pressure on democracy. Leaders from these two countries, particularly in 
dealing with Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew, assume that there has been a Western 
hegemonic attempt and conspiracy to dominate the Third World and assert that this 
needs to be countered. These leaders have been ambitious with the `peculiarity' and 
distinctiveness of their own democratic development but such an obsession is 
questioned by the emerging criticism both from inside and outside the country. In 
Indonesia, the New Order government mainly used their interpretation of culture and 
Pancasila ideology to legitimate its power. Such an interpretation was used to limit 
political freedom and close off the aspirations of the people. The strategy has 
unintentionally brought about an explosion of participation that ended the 32 year old 
New Order system under Soeharto. 
In the second case, the phenomenon of `Asian democracy' reflect also another 
side of the above `Janus -face of culture, that is culture as a `point of concern'. The 
current discourse on 'Asian values' and `Asian democracy' has a long history, and is a 
92 Wang Gungwu, `Reflections on Asian Values', a speech delivered at the 6`" Sir Weary Dunlop 
Asialink Lecture in Melbourne, December 1998, see Amida, Vol. 5, No. 1, February/March 1999, 
p. 35. 
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result of a combination of the traditional ideas about government of the Javanese 
Kingdom, the Sultans and Confucianism. The introduction of modern democracy and 
statehood by the colonial government, which motivated the need to be part of 
international society, necessitated the transformation of those traditional thoughts, 
values and ideologies. In Malaysia and Singapore, the guidance of the government has 
had some intended results, particularly with regard to the emergence of enterpreneurship 
and the middle class. In Indonesia, the industry has been similar to that evident in 
Malaysia and Singapore particularly in addressing development issues, but the 
government is hampered by the lack of political institutions which are able to channel 
political aspirations. 
From this kind of transformation, it is clear that the purpose of the claims of 
'Asian values' supporting `Asian democracy' in these countries is part of the efforts to 
complete their political development programmes What is important in this process is 
that it shows the fact that democracy needs to take root and to be institutionalised to 
protect individual rights and to limit central power. The models of good government 
advocated by Mahathír and Lee, and some Indonesian leaders, are a result of the above 
dialogues where past experiences with liberal democracy have provided lessons for the 
elite about how to organise an effective government within their multi -racial political 
system. The model advocated in more recent times was intended as a mechanism for 
national modernisation. 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, attention to this model of the 
transformation process and its implications for the concept of order in the perspective of 
international society seems to be insufficient. The main debate of `Asian values' focuses 
mainly on the general debate about fundamental differences between `Asian and 
Western values'. On the one hand, the debates select the rhetoric, creating a political 
discourse of `Asian democracy' promoted by Ieaders in the three countries who believe 
that there is a strict line between `Asian and liberal democracy'. On the other hand, there 
have been claims that there is no such thing as `Asian values and democracy' apart from 
political schemes and interests of certain leaders. 
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This thesis does not support one or other of these views. Rather it sees directly 
the interaction process of the ideas of Western democracy with local traditions and 
cultures. Particularly from the above cultural perspective, it can be concluded that that 
both arguments pay Iittle attention to the complex ideas behind the claims of `Asian 
democracy'. 
(b) `Asian Values' and `Shared Values' in International Society 
The above understanding of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' necessitates a 
new approach to democracy in international relations. An appropriate angle, as this 
thesis proposes in the theoretical chapter, is the theory of international society -- 
although it can also be argued that many concepts of order have also started to recognise 
the importance of norms and ethical values to support order.93 Through the concept of 
international society, the claims of `Asian values' can be put in the context of a 
discussion of norms and cultures, particularly in relation to efforts to create `shared 
values and norms' of international society. 
Theories of international society have discussed the rise of cultural differences, 
contesting various ideological claims in international politics in many ways. Hedley Bull 
has discussed the break down of normative orders based on Western values and Western 
standards of civilisation, accompanying the emergence of Third Word and Islamic 
countries. These newly independent countries have introduced different concepts of 
many aspects of politics compared with those of the West. Bull calls these challenges 
`the revolt against the West'94, while Adda Bozeman characterises these differences as a 
failure, or an inability of Western values to spread fully around the world.95 
93 J.L. Richardson, Questions about A Post -Cold War International Order, (Canberra: Department of 
International Relations ANU, Working Paper 1992/2). The main reason to use theories from 
international society school is that the discussion of the role of cultures and values have for a long 
time been the main focus of discussion in this school. 
9a Hedley Bull, `The Revolt Against the West', in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The 
Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 217 -228. 
95 Adda Bozeman, `The International Order in a Multicultural World', in Hedley Bull and Adam 
Watson (eds.), op. cit, p. 404. 
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Using the above framework, claims such as `Asian values' and `Asian 
democracy' can be seen as different concepts of politics which challenge political 
concept in the West. From Bull's point of view, such a challenge can be seen as 
departing from the spirit of `cultural liberation'.96 With this challenge, he suggests that 
non -Western people attempt to replace the intellectual and cultural ascendancy of the 
West with their own identity. Unlike other challenges put forth by non -Western states in 
relation to sovereign equality, self -determination, equal treatment of races and economic 
justice in international society which are derived from Western values, Bull suggests 
that the cultural re- assertion of Asian and other non -Western people is more 
fundamental.97 He even wonders whether such intellectual challenges may have also 
included a revolt against Western values.98 
Some works about human rights and Western dominance written by Malaysian 
and Singaporean intellectuals, such as Chandra Muzaffar and his Just Organisation' and 
those from the `Singapore schooI', can also be seen as strengthening such a challenge or 
revolt against Western intellectual domination.99 Some aspects of the challenge are 
reactions to ideas and concepts of social sciences in the West. Syed Farid Alatas, for an 
example, argues for the 'indigenisation of the Western social sciences' and `Islamisation 
of knowledge' 
science. 
too 
as alternatives for Asian scholars to Western concepts of social 
96 Hedley Bull, 'The Revolt against the West', in Bull and Watson (eds.), op. cit., pp. 222 -223. 
97 Ibid. 
9s Ibid. 
99 See, for examples, Chandra Muzaffar, Human Rights and the New World Order (Penang: Just 
World Trust -Just, 1993); Chandra Muzaffar (ed.), Dominance of the West over the Rest (Penang: 
Just World Trust, 1995); Conferences on Western domination and its implication for Human Rights 
such as `Rethinking Human Rights' in Kuala Lumpur 6 -7 December 1994, were also held by Just. 
00 A need for an indigenization and Islamization of knowledge, for Syed Alatas, departs from an 
assumption that there have been some problems with Western theories and concepts in explaining 
social and political issues in the Third Word. Scholars in the Third World, and particularly in 
Southeast Asia, need to remold and reinterpret the theories based on the experiences of the 
countries studied. Syed Farid Alatas, `On the Indigenizatìon of Academic Discourse', Alternative, 
Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 307 -338; and Syed Farid AIatas, 'Agama dan Ilmu Kemasyarakatan: Masalah 
Teoritis 
- 
Religion and Social Science: A Theoretical Problem', Jurnal Antropologi dan Sosiologi, 
No. 20, 1993, pp. 129 -144. 
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In contrast to Bull's concern, none of the above efforts, this thesis argues, really 
provides an alternative to the Western concept of science. The efforts in general are still 
promoted in the framework of Western science. It is instead a problem of finding 
concepts that can examine social and political issues in the region based on local 
experiences of a given country. Such efforts attempt to question concepts which tend to 
become myths, reducing their applicability. The myth of lazy Malays and the dichotomy 
of nominal (abangan) and pious (santri) Moslem in Indonesia are two examples. These 
myths dominate the analysis of Islam and politics in Indonesia. They do not go so far as 
to support what Meera Nanda called 'indigenous science movements' which get their 
justification `in the name of cultural autonomy, tolerance and respect for non -Western 
ways of knowing the world'.101 Different from cases of religious and ethnic revivalism 
in a democratic country such as India, which use these theoretical approaches as the 
basis for their movements,102 the efforts to mould Western concepts do not provide 
theoretical grounds for any radical religious or ethnic movements in the Southeast Asia 
region. 
In light of the above experiences, the claims of 'Asian values' and 'Asían 
democracy', and the support from some intellectuals, may reflect a demand for what 
Bull has identified as rights more to cultural autonomy103 than to cultural alternatives. In 
the countries studied, leaders sometimes clearly emphasis the need for such a cultural 
right. Mahathir, for example, in response to Western criticism of his rhetoric regrets that 
such rights have been denied by some Western commentators.104 He argues that what he 
and other Southeast Asian leaders attempt to promote by using an `Asian values' 
rhetoric is equality and the right to re- define their own cultural values. According to 
01 Meera Nanda, `Against Social De(con)struction of Science: Cautionary Tales from the Third 
World', Monthly Review, Vol. 48, No. 10, March 1997, pp. 2 -3. 
oz Ibid., p. 3. 
03 Bull, `The Revolt...', op. cit., p. 223. 
04 Mahathir Mohamad, speech at the Just International Conference on `Rethinking Human Rights', 
Kuala Lumpur, 6 December 1994. 
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him, this is not aimed at supporting authoritarian or dictatorial government as is 
suggested by some Western commentators.105 
The main problem, then, is how such a challenge can be accommodated in a 
debate within the theory of international society. One way to accommodate the 
challenge can start from recent studies that remark on efforts to revitalise the concept of 
order in international society. By exploring its `progressive' aspect, which 
acknowledges states with different values and cultures, the international society 
approach can establish a framework for `mutual co- existence'.106 This endeavor 
welcomes different concepts of culture in various societies. 
Works from Shapcott, David Blaney, Naeem Inayatullah, for example, needs to 
be examined to show how new modes of `mutual co- existence', interactions among 
states and among societies in the world may maintain order in international society.107 
These authors propose a new approach, seeing the emergence of various cultures in 
international relations differently from Bull, Adam Watson and Bozeman. Bull was 
optimistic about the future of order, although in the light of fragmentations in the norms 
of international society, he suggested that the only way of attaining order was by 
spreading 'modernity' around the world.108 In an approach different from Bull's, 
Bozeman regretted the failure of the West and the tendency of relativism following ií.109 
Nonetheless she still hoped that the West would gain the confidence to strengthen the 
Western -dominated order in the world. 
New approaches offered by Shapcott, Blaney and Inayatullah differ from Bull 
and Bozeman's optimism in the sense that they did not subscribe to the idea of Bull and 
Bozeman that Western cultures should become global cultures as a precondition to 
105 Mahathir Mohamad, `Nilai Asia - Asian Values', speech in the Senate House, Cambridge 
University, London, 15 March 1995, see Dewan Budaya, April 1995, pp. 6 -8. 
106 Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations 
(London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 15 -20. 
107 Shapcott, op. cit.; N.J. Rengger, op. cit.; David Blaney and Naeem Innayatullah, Prelude to a 
Conversation of Cultures in International Society? Todorov and Nandy on the Possibility of 
Dialogue', Alternatives, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1994; and Mark Hoffman, `States, Cosmopolitanism and 
Normative International Theory', Paradigms, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 60 -75. 
108 Bull and Watson, `Conclusions', in Bull and Watson (eds.,), op.cit., pp. 425 -436. 
109 Bozeman, op. cit., p. 404. 
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maintain order. Their new approaches center around attempts to recognise cultural 
differences. These differences are seen as a contribution to a dialogue which may 
strengthen and enrich the ethics of international society."° 
In this context, although the `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' claims do not 
offer alternative ideas of democracy in terms of philosophical sources of democracy, it 
shows how culture has played an important role in transforming and adjusting Western 
ideas of democracy in the three countries studied. The claims also reflect a stage in the 
political development where ideas of democracy and its establishment need to be 
continually discussed in terms of both local and global demands for democratisation. 
In the process of adapting ideas of democracy, the countries studied have 
experienced tensions between demands to localize the meaning of democracy and 
demands to recognise the universality of democracy. Such tensions are useful because 
they can overcome the tendency toward relativism. Through such a process of dialogue, 
relativism in the understanding of democracy can be avoided by identifying similarities 
that may be present among cultures. To find the similarities among cultures, Rengger 
suggests identification of `traditions of thought within cultures' which have developed 
through interactions with other `traditions of thought'." Through the claims of `Asian 
democracy', and the adoption of liberal democratic institutions, the leaders of the three 
Southeast Asian countries studied have demonstrated that their countries have adapted 
ideas of democracy from the West and concluded that some of them are ready for 
application while others need further discussion and revision. By identifying these 
interaction processes, as Rengger argues, the differences between cultures may not be 
exaggerated and can be mínímísed.112 
By understanding that there has been a complex interaction process in the spread 
of ideas of democracy, one can place the countries studied as subjects which actively 
respond to their environment. As subjects in international society, the leaders of the 
110 Andrew Linldater, `The Achievements of Critical Theory, op. cit., pp. 284 -289. 
Rengger, op. cit., pp. 96 -99. 
112 Ibid. 
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countries claiming `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' attempt to ensure that ideas of 
democracy become part of political life in their countries. In the words of David Blaney 
and Naeem Innayatullah, the process of putting other cultures in an equal position is an 
`idealisation of conversation' between cultures in the world and the most appropriate 
way of dealing with other cultures. This has been done by putting the 'other' as `subject' 
in dialogue which, in turn, reduces the self -other distinction and puts the 'other' in an 
equal position.13 The countries claiming `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' need to 
be seen from a position equal with Western countries. Following their own paths, the 
countries claiming specific models of democracy need to be recognised as desiring the 
modernisation of their countries much as countries in the West did in the past. 
As a consequence of the fact that democracy is a complex process of adaptation 
and transformation, the approaches of some Western countries, -- particularly the US 
government which often dictates the application of democracy to non -liberal countries 
and promotes free elections in Third World -- seem to be inappropriate. Such approaches 
have actually strengthened the feeling of nationalism within the countries studied. It is 
not only government leaders such as Mahathir, Lee Kuan Yew and the Indonesian 
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas who have been against such an approach. In Malaysia, the 
main opposition leaders like Lim Kit Siang regret the so- called `Western interference' 
on internal Malaysia problems. He said that in the end Malaysians should take 
responsibility for the promotion and struggle for democracy, not a foreign power.114 
While in Singapore, one of the most respected opposition leaders, Chee Soon Juan, 
criticised Western hypocrisy in promoting democracy. In particular, during the Cold 
War, he maintained that democracy was `useful only for the leaders of the industrialised 
world to sling at their communist enemies at convenient times' »° Recently, he said the 
113 Blaney and tnayatullah, op. cit., pp. 24 -26. 
14 Lim Kit Siang's media conference statement, `Proposed Formation of an Asia - Pacific 
Parliamentary Union (APPU) for Parliamentarians to protect and promote human rights and 
democracy in the region', 25 November 1998; see < http:// www .malaysia.net/dap /sg1387.htm >. 
in Keynote Address by Dr. Chee Soon Juan on Commemoration of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 5O'' Anniversary in Melbourne, Australia on 10 December 1998. 
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support of Western leaders for authoritarian leaders such as Soeharto, Lee Kuan Yew 
and Augusto Pinochet (former Argentina's President) is often heard.116 
An approach to promote democracy needs to be sensitive to the complex 
problems of culture, economy, ethnicity and security faced by the countries studied. 
Without cultural and institutional readiness, countries that adopt a full liberal democracy 
system often turn to political chaos, murders, ethnic clashes, and even genocide.117 This 
has happened for example in Yugoslavia, Russia, Sudan, Algeria, Uganda, Pakistan and 
Sudan. It is better for the above Western countries, the US in particular, as Fareed 
Zakaria argues, to promote democracy in countries where democracy `has taken root and 
to encourage the gradual development of constitutional liberalism across the globe. 
Democracy without constitutional liberalism is not simply inadequate, but dangerous, 
bringing with it the erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic divisions, and even 
w,.,I18 
The above understanding, to a certain degree, can also contribute to a contention 
of order in a region. It, as Shapcott argues, introduces a kind of `fusion of horizons' 
among cultures and traditions in building order in international society.119 Such a fusion, 
according to Shapcott, can only be started by a process of understanding and interpreting 
other cultures. Human science, in contrast to natural science, which deals with fact and 
phenomena, according to Shapcott, always follows this kind of process of 
understanding, interpretative and linguistic endeavours.120 By a `fusion of horizons', 
Shapcott suggests that there is a possibility to create some shared, universalised meaning 
116 Ibid. 
117 Stephen S. Rosenfeld, `Democracy: the down side', Washington Post, December 5, 1997; see also 
<http: / /www. Singapore- window.org/1205wash.htm >. 
18 Fareed Zakaria, `The Rise of IIliberal Democracy', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6, 
November/December 1997, pp. 42 -43. By a development of constitutional liberalism, Zakaria 
means, a development of institutions of democracy such as 'the rule of law, a separation of powers, 
and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion and property'. Zakaria argues that 
the development of these institution is more important than the general election since many 
countries which hold a general election fall into chaos, ethnic conflicts and war because of the 
inapplicability of rule of laws enunciated in the above constitutional liberalism. 
19 Shapcott, op. cit., pp. 72 -76. 
120 Ibid., pp. 70 -71. 
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`that overcomes, not only particularity, but also that of the other'.121 This engages the 
transformation of the various cultures involved. 
The `fusion of horizons' in the context of the countries studied can be seen in the 
adoption of many forms of political associations and processes of democracy from 
modem Western civilisation. One connection that is very clear is the adoption of the 
idea of good government. Leaders of these countries have argued about what kind of 
government can work for the people. Such a government can be achieved, partly by 
using democratic practices involving general elections and opposition parties, but also 
partly by creating mechanisms that can create the emergence of a strong executive 
power able to maintain stability. 
How such an understanding of democracy is accepted in international society is 
an important question in creating `a set of common assumptions and values' in 
international society. In reality, the question is whether there is a place for the claims of 
`Asian values' and `Asian democracy' in the emerging consensus viewing liberal 
democracy as the standard of democracy in the post Cold War world. The principles of 
liberal democracy have been assumed to be universal and, therefore, countries which 
adopt it are seen as making progress in their history. Liberal democracy principles, 
norms and values have been, in many respect, in common sense and have become the 
standard by which one judges whether a state is democratic or not. 
On one level, this tendency can be a starting point for discussion of democracy. 
It offers a model that widely seen as the most viable model of democracy in 
international society. The principles of liberal democracy have been recognised as the 
most suited to the fulfilling of international obligations122 because they contain moral 
commitments for their citizens to follow those obligations. These principles also include 
a mechanism such as public opinion to monitor ethical content and the purpose of 
121 Ibid., p. 75. 
122 Andrew Linklater, `What is a Good International Citizen?', in Paul Keal (ed.), Ethics and Foreign 
Policy (Canberra: Allen and lJnwin, 1992), pp. 21 -43. 
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foreign policy.123 As in human rights discourses, we would view democracy, in 
Rengger's words, `as the language of the emergent cosmopolitan culture'.124 The state in 
this globalised world, according to Hoffman, cannot justify its legitimacy by its own 
standards. Rather it has to fulfill the demands and requirements both from people inside 
their countries and from outside.125 
On a deeper level, however, this universalisation has encountered some 
problems. Despite the criticisms of liberal democracy from civic republicanism, which 
exposes some problems with the tyranny of the majority and equality in the economic 
sphere inherent in liberal democratic principles, the conditions leading to the emergence 
of democracy need to be considered seriously.126 As has been shown, the principles and 
values of liberal democracy have been introduced to and, to a certain degree, practiced 
by the countries under study since their colonial period. Over this extended period, 
however, the debates about the adoption of both the principles and institutions of liberal 
democracy persist. In this light, it is the dialogue, understanding and `fusion of 
horizons', as proposed above, between Western and traditional concepts of democracy 
that the universalisation of democracy must address. In other words, attention must be 
paid to what democracy means for these countries, considering their `conditions of 
possibility of democracy, from power politics to national identity and normative 
commitment'.127 
(c) The Good Government in Regional Context 
The above commitment to search for shared values and to create a 'fusion of 
horizons', however, is not only a problem for Western countries which are often accused 
of dictating `Western values and democracy' to Asian countries. It is also a problem 
123 Nicholas f. Wheeler, `Guardian Angel or Global Gangster: a Review of the Ethical Claims of 
International Society', Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1, March 1996, p. I28. 
124 Rengger, op. cit., p. 91. 
125 Hoffman, op. cit., p. 68. 
126 Kimberly Hutchings, Modeling Democracy', Global Society, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1998, p. 174. 
27 Ibid., p. 174. 
291 
within the countries studied, particularly in terms of a regional, or ASEAN context. The 
question is whether ASEAN has maximised its function for the realisation of good 
governments among its members. 
Thus far ASEAN has provided a framework for the continuity of the claims of 
Indonesia's, Malaysia's and Singapore's perspectives on `good government' and 'Asían 
values'. For a long time ASEAN, for which the three countries studied were among the 
founding members, has relied much on the stability of member countries to maintain 
order. The governments in the three countries believe that the non -intervention principle 
supports their efforts to create good governments. This is the assumption that each 
members has various problems and only the government of individual countries knows 
how best to solve the problems. This has become a common starting point in managing 
relations among ASEAN members for a long time. This has also contributed to the 
development of a sense of community within ASEAN members. 
Within this regional organisation, it cannot be denied that the leaders of these 
countries have used the main principles of international society, such as sovereignty, to 
strengthen their grip on power. [t has to be noted that the rhetoric of ASEAN leaders has 
been detrimental to the attempt to look for `shared values'. Under the sovereignty 
principle, Mahathir, Lee and Soeharto for example, have used their regional 
environment to strengthen their ideological performance, especially by using ASEAN. It 
is common to see these leaders trying to define their ASEAN identity by referring to 
some aspects that they portray as different from `Western values'. This can be seen 
particularly in the way they manage their regional relations with Western countries. In 
this context, their main goal in creating ASEAN is to manage `a stable region' where the 
members can tackle their domestic problems without intervention from other states. 
Through ASEAN, they also open another opportunity for the pursuit of their 
authoritarian governance. 
In this case, the three regimes have some common interests in pursuing `a kind 
of regional hegemonic position', although they seem less successful compared with their 
achievement in creating hegemony in their domestic politics. ASEAN can be seen as a 
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forum where these regimes strengthen their norms and values about regional order. In 
this case, the linkage of efforts to establish hegemony in both the domestic and 
international contexts is quite clear. As Robert Jackson asserts, the emphasis on 
`negative sovereignty'128 as a norm in international relations provides firm terrain for 
Third World regimes to manoeuvre toward domestic stability.129 ASEAN is significant 
here because all ASEAN members tend to accept the organisation as a forum 
formulating and strengthening national and regional identity in facing Western pressure 
on democracy and human rights in the post -Cold War world. Much criticisms from the 
West of the violation of human rights, political repression and degradation of the 
environment have been handled by states in this region by strengthening their position 
through ASEAN.130 Such a position is only able to be pursued when core members such 
as Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia have succeeded in persuading other members to 
accept their norms and ways of seeing the world. 
Such an approach to order, however, has been debated following the end of the 
Cold War. In particular, with the breakdown of Soeharto's Pancasila system in 
Indonesia, such a dominant view may also change. Current changes in Indonesia's 
political system have some implications for the future role of ASEAN, consisting of 
various models of political systems. So far, ASEAN bases its unity on a sense of 
community, a non -intervention principle and an anti -Western stand. For a short time 
after the end of the Cold War, ASEAN regained its credibility by countering Western 
pressure for human rights and democracy. That kind of pressure has made ASEAN 
128 By `negative sovereignty', Jackson refers to the sovereignty of many Third World states which he 
calls `quasi states'. The equality of these `quasi- states' with other states, according to Jackson, is 
only achieved because there have been international laws and norms recognizing the principle of 
sovereignty and non -intervention. In practice, these states lack the capability to sustain their 
freedom and independence. Economically, they need foreign aid, and in military terms, they need 
protection from big powers. See Robert H. Jackson, Quasi- states: sovereignty, international 
relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 21 -25. 
129 The `negative sovereignty' in ASEAN has been shown in the demands such as `freedom from' any 
external threat and intervention. However, in reality, there is not much that ASEAN can do to apply 
that claims without depending on the international law and norms of non -intervention. These laws 
and norms give its members a space to maneuver and take actions for concentrating on political 
stability in their countries. About the `negative sovereignty' concept, see ibid., pp. 26 -30. 
13° Chen Jie, `Human Rights: ASEAN's New Importance to China', The Pacific Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, 
1993. 
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important to China"' which also rejects such pressure as interfering with their 
sovereignty. With changes in Indonesia's political system, other members of ASEAN 
countries which have not experienced changes in their political systems worry that 
Indonesia and other democratic ASEAN members may abandon them in the contest 
against what they view as `Western pressure' for democracy. 
Currently, criticism has also arisen from within ASEAN members themselves. 
Various counter -conferences, for example, have taken place to coincide with the formal 
ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meetìngs.t32 The current economic crisis in the region, and 
particularly in Indonesia, means that this country desperately needs Western economic 
intervention. These circumstances may further challenge the dominant assumption that 
ASEAN can reject any kind Western intervention in their country. 
With the massive change in the region, former Malaysian Deputy PM Anwar 
Ibrahim has suggested the ASEAN should `cast aside its long- cherished principle of 
non -interference and embrace "constructive intervention ".133 Thailand, with the support 
of the Philippines, has also advocated constructive intervention. However, given the 
strong rejection from other members of ASEAN, they softened the concept to `flexible 
engagement' and then to `enhanced interaction' to replace the non -intervention principle 
which has been the main principle of ASEAN since its formation.t34 Although this has 
not brought about any significant change in ASEAN's attitude toward the non- 
intervention principle, the attempt to modify the principle shows the concern of ASEAN 
members with evaluating their main principles of cooperation in the light of changing 
conditions. There have been also questions from among ASEAN members about 
harmony, consensus and hierarchy that have, until now, been the main tenets of the 
`ASEAN way'. Some members of ASEAN have also started to criticise the domestic 
political matters of their fellow members. The Philippines, for example, suggests that 
131 Ibid., p. 233. 
132 The latest protest held by NGOs and Human Rights activists occurred at the 31st ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting in Manila, the Philippines, 24 -25 July 1998. See, Kompas, 25 July 1998. 
133 Asiaweek, September 18, 1998 
134 ibid.; See also Kompas, 25, 26 July 1998. 
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Myanmar's military rulers pursue national reconciliation with the National League for 
Democracy under Aung San Syu Ki.135 
Unquestionably the common platform of non -intervention is hard to maintain in 
a complicated and globalised world. To achieve a good government those countries 
cannot rely mainly on their own resources. To overcome problems such as forest fire in 
Indonesia, degradation of the environment, the emergence of political dissidents, the 
emergence of illegal workers, refugees, drug trafficking, and crime, these countries need 
to work together. Anwar Ibrahim, when Malaysia's deputy PM, suggested ASEAN 
members should develop a mechanism to help each other in areas which can `firm up 
electoral processes, foster legal and administrative reforms, develop human capital, and 
strengthen civil society and the rule of law',136 Anwar refers to this direct involvement 
in other ASEAN members' affairs as `constructive intervention', an approach which 
will make the members more able to anticipate the `spill -overs of domestic economic, 
social and economic upheavals' from one member to another.137 
Together with the above domestic ASEAN problems, leaders advocating good 
government in ASEAN need to pay attention to growing demands for a more open 
political system in their society which have been supported by the same awareness about 
democracy at the international community. In addition to their own understanding of 
good government, the leaders of these countries need to learn from the aspirations for 
democratisation in international society. This learning process is a kind of pre -condition 
where `a set of common assumptions, values, ways of life, and modes of 
communication' can flourish.138 The upsurge in demand for democracy in international 
society may contribute to the creation of a sense of a moral community. In international 
society, one prerequisite of order is whether its members are able to create a sense of 
moral community or not. This necessitates the leaders of the countries continually 
135 Republika, 27 July 1998. 
136 Peter Eng, `Transforming ASEAN', The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1, Winter 1999, p. 
50. 
137 Anwar Ibrahim, `Crisis Prevention', Newsweek International, July 21, I997, p. 13. 
138 Blaney and [nayatullah, op. cit., p. 23. 
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revising their understanding and interpretation of democracy in the world, because part 
of the legitimacy gained by these countries lies also in their acceptance by a majority of 
members in international society. 
The experiences with `Asian democracy' in the countries studied have indicated 
a tendency to maintain their own concept of good government. The concept of good 
government itself is derived from common assumptions and values about managing the 
government in the West. Differences have emerged regarding interpretation of the role 
of executive which is dominant in these developing countries compared to those in the 
West. Based on experiences in those countries, good government concept has been 
achieved by allocating more power to the government through general elections and by 
limiting parliamentary and opposition power. 
hi the near future, lessons regarding good government from Western liberal 
democracy need to be taken into account. The demands for more freedom for opposition 
groups and the media need to be channelled in a way which can counter the government. 
Free general elections to renew the government's legitimacy, which has gained 
significant support and become `a political lexicon' among the people,139 are one way to 
realise the above goal. 
Formally, in the three countries studied, political participation was open but 
there have existed political and legal conditions which have prevented opposition 
groups from realising this freedom. Laws such as ISA in Malaysia and the subversive 
law in Indonesia has reduced the likelihood of an opposition groups winning majority in 
the general election. With the growing number of educated people, such laws which 
limit freedom of speech, have been increasingly questioned. It has limited the public 
space where people can debate political and economic issues. It is important for the 
governments of these countries to open space for the debate because this may also 
strengthen the sense of identity within the nations. The strengthening of identity cannot 
139 Takashi Inoguchi and Edward Newman, Introduction: `Asian Values' and Democracy in Asia, 
Proceeding of a Conference held on 28 March 1997 at Hamamatsu, Shizuoka, Japan, organised by 
the Shizuoka Prefectural Government and the Organizing Committee of the Asia -Pacific Forum; 
see < http:// www. unu. edu /hq /unupressfasían- values.html>. 
296 
rely only on the adoption of various cultural symbols within the countries but must be 
developed also by including the political interests of those who have for a long time 
been marginalised from the political process. 
To a certain degree, the need for more openness also means more checks and 
balances by opposition groups leading to the creation of good government. In Malaysia 
and Singapore, the operation of effective and clean government can be seen as the 
function of the legal system and, to a degree, from a monitoring by opposition groups. 
These two conditions, however, were weak in Indonesia during the Soeharto period. 
Student protests which ended Soeharto's rule demanded the government to allow the 
function of law and the participation of opposition parties. 
The most important condition making a government effective, clean and able to 
pursue its development programmes stems, to a Iarge degree, from the moral 
commitment of leaders to limit and address the issue of corruption. The so- called `Asian 
values' such as hard work, commitment to law and discipline have been promoted to 
support the need for transparency in government. But in the long term, where it is hard 
to find a strong leader such as Soeharto, Mahathir Mohamad or Lee Kuan Yew on 
whom the people depend greatly and were praised as the Fathers of the Nation or 
'Fathers of Development', these countries should rely more on selection of rational 
leaders chosen through a fair general election and guided by a mechanism of checks and 
balances between government and opposition in parliament. 
CONCLUSION 
The claims of `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' are part of a more complicated 
phenomena than many critics have argued. The critics argue that the claims are simply a 
justification used to legitimise the repressive style of government in Singapore, 
Malaysia and Indonesia. The promotion of a particular style of democracy such as 
`Asian democracy', for these critics, threatens the spread of universal values of 
democracy in international society. Such worries are quite reasonable considering that 
over the last three decades the three regimes studied have instituted specific political 
structures and complex cultural formations through which these structures of 
domination have been legitimised. As Richard Robison (et. al.) have noted, claims, 
based on such constructs as the `Asian style democracy', which stake their legitimacy on 
a notion of cultural relativism, can be used to deny demands for democratic principles 
advanced by reformist opposition in a particular country.1 
However, the above is only one dimension of the claims. Another dimension 
deals with concepts such as `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' as important ways of 
adjusting and transforming ideas of democracy from modern Western civilisation. Based 
on the countries' historical experiences, the ideas cannot be applied fully and directly. In 
`Asian democracy' and `Asian values' concepts, implemented in the forms of a soft - 
authoritarian government and Pancasila democracy, a framework to understand what 
democracy and good citizenship should be, has been promoted by the governments of 
the countries studied. In addition to this, the concepts are also promoted to transform 
some aspects of traditional cultures which are not compatible with demands of a modern 
capitalist economy. Leaders of the countries also attempt to convince their people that 
these processes of adjustment and transformation of Western ideas should take place 
Kevin Hewison, Garry Rodan, Richard Robison, `introduction: Changing forms of state power in 
Southeast Asia', in Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison and Garry Rodan (eds.), Southeast Asia in the 
1990s, Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism (St. Leonard, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1993), 
P. 5. 
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within their countries' parameters, limitations and contexts so that they do not lose their 
national identity or national characteristics. 
It is important to note that the above process is a continuing process. Drawing 
from the case studies, this thesis argues that there are four arguments suggesting that the 
above concerns may not necessarily be seen as a permanent reality of politics in those 
countries. The first argument relates to the content of `Asian values' and `Asian 
democracy', and the ideological goals behind them. As discussed earlier, any judgment 
of the degree of threat from the claims of `Asian values' and 'Asian democracy' toward 
order in international society, must involve analysis of the `thematic', the varying points 
of view, the goals and sources of references of the ideologies the regimes have 
developed. The reference source of 'Asían democracy' are the Western democratic 
system and the modern state concept both of which have transformed the political life of 
these countries since independence. However, historical experience and local conditions 
demonstrate that these Western ideas cannot be emulated completely and, therefore, 
require adjustment to the local context. The collective goals of `Asian values' and 
`Asian democracy' are clearly to overcome these local and particular internal problems, 
and are also part of the regime's hegemonic project to gain consent from society for its 
rule. 
As a consequence, the claims supported by ideologies developed in each of these 
three countries both formal such as Pancasila, Rukunegara, Shared Values and informal 
such as Pembangunan, Wawasan 2020, and Confucianism, remain fragmented, 
incoherent and oriented toward problem -solving, or in the word of Partha Chatterjee, 
focussed only on their `problematic' and not on their `thematic' aspects.2 The claims 
developed by these regimes do not offer as sophisticated or coherent a system as 
capitalist economy and liberal democracy in the Western states, nor have they been 
universalised. They are fragmented as a world view because they are taken from a 
disparate range of sources. The claims of 'Asían values' and `Asian democracy' remain 
Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World (New York: Zed Books, 1986). 
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reactive because they are designed to respond to a specific moment in domestic and 
global structures, but they are also pragmatic based on their ability to solve complex 
problems within specific societies. 
Although within these three regimes, the process to invent traditional values has 
been taking place for a long time and there have existed some `traditional intellectuals' 
whose function is to support government ideological campaigns, legitimate government 
policies and interpret national ideologies, these do not necessary result in a coherent 
concept of politics and democracy. The traditional intellectuals have not been able to 
interpret public values and cultures as coherent and capable of broad diffusion beyond 
their borders, or their region. What they have done is to strengthen and legitimise 
government policies by promulgating the view that the government policies are the best 
alternatives for improving the living conditions of people in their particular nation -state 
and that the systems in the West are not fully suitable to those purposes. 
Considering this phenomenon, we can infer that the efforts of these intellectuals 
are different from what is commonly known as pursuing the relativistic understanding of 
democracy in Western discourse. It is true that some intellectuals in the three states have 
taken seriously the claims and attachments of their governments to a particular kind of 
democracy and they have tried to develop philosophical foundations for that kind of 
democracy. This can be clearly seen, for example, in the formalisation of Pancasila as a 
way of life and philosophical basis for Indonesians, in Mahathir's anti -Western 
campaign in strengthening the Malaysian style of democracy and in the efforts of some 
intellectuals in Singapore to build a communitarian ideology. Their efforts and ideas 
have attracted response from some Western intellectuals. Their efforts on the whole, 
however, do not offer an alternative form of political life and are still trapped in a 
Western -style discourse of democracy. What they have done is no more than work to 
develop or construct a kind of variant of the dominant discourse of liberal democracy, 
particularly to develop what is labelled as good government. Democracy has been 
interpreted as a means to achieve other goals such as economic development. 
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The second argument is that the governments under discussion not rely mainly 
on an ideological justification to achieve their hegemonic status. Claims of `Asian 
values' and `Asian democracy', developed by these regimes, cannot be viewed as the 
only instrument legitimising their existence. What these regimes have done to gain 
hegemony depended upon specific formative moments in the history of each regime. It 
is interesting to note that the regimes in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore started 
consolidating their particular models of government after a period of crisis. Indonesia's 
`New Order' regime emerged after the fall of Soekarno in 1966. Malaysia' s regime 
consolidated its power after the 1969 communal riot. Singapore used its separation from 
the Malaysia Federation in 1965 as a starting point to construct Singaporean ways in 
politics and economic management. 
In Gramscian terms, during this specific moment, particularly during a crisis, 
some of the subordinate groups in society, such as students, intellectuals and other 
political powers uncritically and passively internalised the values, beliefs and ideas or 
world views of each state's dominant group. Problems under former regimes (e.g. 
authoritarianism, economic inequality and deterioration of the economy) led the masses 
to believe in and accept the new forms of government and the views of the elites 
controlling them. At that time, people hoped that the new governments would bring 
about new and improved conditions for the people. Belief in disorderly condition of the 
`old order' became a psychological pre -condition for them to accept a new government.3 
Following these specific moments, the three governments had to revitalise their 
dominant positions in society. 
However, the hegemonic positions they had achieved during the crisis periods 
could not sustain their long -term existence as legitimate governments. The experience 
shows that to achieve long term legitimacy, the countries need political space where the 
public can debate political issues. A competitive and free general election through which 
3 In Malaysia, for example, the traumatic events of 13 May 1969, are still in the minds of the people 
and this has become a precondition for supporting the government policies. See, Joel S. Kahn and 
Francis Loh Kok Wah, Fragmented Vision, Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia 
(Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia in Association with Allen and Unwin, 1992), p. 3. 
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popular support for government may be achieved is another important prerequisite to 
gain legitimacy. To a certain degree, although there have been many restrictions and 
limitations to opposition parties, relatively clean and competitive general elections 
have been taking place in Malaysia and Singapore, which then strengthens the 
legitimacy of the governments in these two countries. Whereas in Indonesia during the 
New Order government, general elections and other political institutions such as 
political parties were completely manipulated to support the power of the Soeharto 
regime. 
In some cases, physical and military force have played a significant role in 
maintaining regimes in power in these three countries. The arrest of certain opposition 
leaders has been a regular political phenomenon. This has been justified for stability and 
development reasons. The use of brute military force, however, means that the 
government has moved from producing hegemony to creating a system of domination. 
This happened particularly during the New Order government in Indonesia. The pre- 
condition of hegemony in the early New Order could not be managed to create a 
responsible government. A hegemonic condition achieved by consensus during the 
`New Order' period, in Gramsci's terms, did not occur.4 
After more than two decades, clearly the ideologies the regimes attempted to 
promote have had mixed results. On the one hand, they tended to be instruments of 
domination rather than instruments of liberation. However, on the other hand, they also 
helped to build national identity and a spirit of enterpreneurship. In Indonesia, Pancasila 
was initially potrayed as an open ideology, but the government soon claimed exclusive 
rights as the legitimate interpreter. It had also been legalised as the only basis (asas 
tunggal) for all aspects of political and social life of the society. In Malaysia, Mahathir's 
national visions of modernity, his anti -Western campaign, and Malaysia Boleh have 
given rise to a sense of being a Malaysian, and an improvement of Malay 
David Hooey, Capitalist Hegemony and the `New' World Order: A Gramscian Analysis of Global 
Restructuring, (Halifax, Nova Scotia: MA thesis, International Development Studies, Saint Mary's 
University, April 1992), pp. 32 -33. 
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entrepreneurial spirit. In Singapore, the government has been successful in creating a 
hegemonic order under which the interests of the people are adequately represented. 
However, tensions remain because of an emerging middle class which must combine 
traditional visions with modern- Western values, especially in the capitalist economic 
sphere. 
The third argument relates to the strong challenges to the dissemination of 
`Asian values' and `Asian democracy' both from within and without these countries 
discussed. In the context of these countries, the version of the concepts of `Asian values' 
and `Asian democracy' are not final; they have been questioned, rejected, and debated 
by people within the government itself and within society in general. Many ideological 
aspects are still contested within society. Although the government claimed to have the 
`right' interpretation of Pancasila in Indonesia, the ideology has been interpreted in 
different ways and so occupied different meanings for different people and groups. The 
dissemination of Rukunegara in Malaysia and Singaporean survivalism ideologies, 
similarly faces challenges from the elites themselves and from political oppositions. 
Significant obstacles include various interpretations of the ideologies underpinning 
`Asian democracy' claimed by the regimes, as well as various interpretations of the 
ideas of democracy themselves. These alternative interpretations of democracy have 
spread significantly among some individuals and opposition groups during recent years. 
Opposition groups have consequently countered the efforts of governments to create a 
hegemonic interpretation of democracy. 
In Indonesia, much criticism of the government's hegemonic ambition has arisen 
since the beginning of the New Order. The objective of the New Order of creating a 
politics based on programmes and free from aliran politics has failed in the face of 
continuing challenges from Islamic and Soekarnoist- marhaenism ideologies. Despite 
creating its own intellectuals, the New Order regime could not stop the emergence of 
critical groups within society questioning the uses of Pancasila for the sake of 
Soeharto's personal power. For these groups Pancasila becomes the source of liberation 
from a corrupt government under Soeharto. In Malaysia, with the growing criticisms 
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from opposition to Mahathir's rule, the `Asian values' and `Asian democracy' claims 
have not been realised completely. Among the Malays themselves which dominate the 
government, their vision of `Asian democracy' remains fragmented, exclusive and 
distinctive. The major ethnic groups, namely the Malays, Chinese and Indians, have 
maintained their fragmented visions based on particularistic and exclusive views of their 
cultures.5 Among government officials, especially between former deputy PM Anwar 
Ibrahim and Mahathir Mohamad, different views and interpretations have occasionally 
emerged. Singapore's claim of `Asian democracy' has also been contested by opposition 
figures. Although the opposition is represented by only one or two members of 
parliament, still it can offer alternative views on democracy. 
From outside the country, the regimes' specific definition of `Asian democracy' 
faces serious challenges from the international community. In particular, the 
dissemination of `Asian democracy' by the use of force has been criticised by Western 
governments, donor institutions, commentators and academics. The dominance of the 
government's interpretation upsets the balance of a free competition of ideas. In the 
context where modem communication has developed so widely, such strategies have 
been criticised for contradicting an `ethical hegemony' based on dialogue. According to 
Gramsci's theory of hegemony, `ethical hegemony' implies that government should 
consult their domestic audience, as well as integrate trends in the dominant global 
discourse of democratisation such as moral pressures from the international community 
on human rights. 
The fourth argument, that the claims are not a permanent phenomena, relate to 
conditions in international society within which the countries studied cannot fulfil their 
political and cultural aspirations as an independent and equal state in the same or similar 
manner as Western states. The claims of `Asian democracy', can be considered as a 
`politics of identity', a kind of reaction to Western policies of democracy which tend to 
dictate to Third World countries. In many ways, they also reflects a reaction towards the 
Khan and Wah, op. cit., pp. 5 -8. 
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confusing messages of some states, in particular the United States regarding their 
support for democracy movements. It can be seen that the strong reactions from 
academics in Malaysia, and from the Singaporean school against Western criticism of 
human rights and democracy is directed at the `double standard' approach taken by 
Western states, particularly the USA. This school often cites the problems `the West' 
has experienced in promoting human rights and democracy, referring to its own `bad 
records' .6 
In a broader context, the confusing messages of democracy originate from the 
sovereign state system. Within this system, there is a kind of `double -edge nature of 
international legitimacy' emphasising both democracy and development,' which the 
leaders in these Southeast Asian countries can manipulate. The sovereign state system 
allows them to criticise any efforts to `intervene' in their domestic problems, including 
problems of democracy and human rights, rejecting especially the idea of linking 
economic aid to politics. These states can get involved in the capitalist economic game 
and gain advantages from this economic mechanism, without any effective criticism of 
their domestic problems. 
Based on the above factors, this thesis suggests that it is important to consider a 
framework of cultural dialogue by placing these countries, as subjects, on an equal 
footing with Western countries in searching for `shared values' in international society. 
The claims should not be seen as an obstacle to democracy, but as part of an effort to 
foster `shared values of democracy', particularly in relation to the idea of good 
government, which has recently gained wide support in the countries studied. What is 
important, therefore, is how we define and approach `Asian values' and `Asian 
democracy'. Viewed only as a political phenomenon, one could conclude that the claims 
of `Asian democracy' were simply a means used by certain leaders to justify their 
6 See, for example, Bilahari Kausikan, `Asia's Different Standard', Foreign Policy, No. 92, 1993, 
pp. 24- 41. 
7 Mark R. Thompson, `The Limits of Democratization in ASEAN', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 14, 
No. 3, 1993, p. 481. 
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preferences in a political system. This certainly disregards many critical factors, 
principally the importance of culture in the lengthy process of finding an appropriate 
political framework for the multi- ethnic and multi -religious societies in these three 
countries. 
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